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RACHAEL VICTORIA MATTHEWS 
 
THE MYSTICAL UTTERANCE AND THE METAPHORICAL MODE  
IN THE WRITINGS OF MARGUERITE D’OINGT AND MARGUERITE 
PORETE 
 
 
The shared conceptual underpinnings of contemporary metaphor theory and 
Christian mystical expression form the basis of this study of the works of two very 
different fourteenth-century French mystics, Marguerite d’Oingt (c.1240-1310) and 
Marguerite Porete (d.1310). The former, a Carthusian prioress, wrote a series of vivid 
visionary narratives, the Pagina meditationum, the Speculum, and Li via de Seiti Biatrix, 
but, to date, has been the subject of little scholarly attention. The latter, meanwhile, is 
perhaps best known for her condemnation for relapsed heresy and her death at the 
stake in Paris, on account of her radical mystical text, the Mirouer des simples ames.  
 
These two women’s writings present very different examples of late medieval 
mystical expression. Nevertheless, the two are intimately connected in the sense that 
both oeuvres are driven by a desire to express their respective experiences of the 
mystical presence of God.  What precisely is meant by ‘mystical experience’ constitutes 
this mode of expression’s fundamental paradox: by its very definition, the perfection of 
divine encounter lies beyond the scope of human communication. Metaphor’s capacity 
for (partial) revelation in circumstances where other modes of communication fail, 
however, suggests that when applied as a hermeneutic device, theoretical perspectives 
of metaphor provide a fresh interpretative framework with which to explore the more 
enigmatic aspects of mystical thought.  
 
Drawing on a number of modern theoretical approaches, including those of 
Paul Ricoeur, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, and Gilles Fauconnier and Mark 
Turner, this investigation explores the extent to which metaphor’s conceptual and 
cognitive underpinnings engage with, and potentially unlock, the sensitivities of 
Marguerite d’Oingt’s and Marguerite Porete’s post-experiential accounts of mystical
phenomena. To this end, metaphor may be seen to represent mysticism’s cognitive 
analogue, a means of effecting linguistic and cognitive transformation impossible to 
express through literal language alone. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
‘Metaphor is one of our most important tools for trying to 
comprehend partially what cannot be apprehended totally: 
our feelings, aesthetic experiences, moral practices, and 
spiritual awareness.’1  
 
 
George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s seminal work Metaphors We Live By 
marked a paradigm shift in the study of metaphor. This ‘cognitive turn’ 
radically changed how scholars approached metaphor, traditionally understood 
as a literary device used to portray a comparison between two disparate entities, 
by arguing that metaphors are principally cognitive, and only secondarily 
linguistic.2 Metaphorical expressions, Lakoff and Johnson propose, underpin 
thought and action, and by extension, structure the mind’s perception of the 
world and how the world relates to the mind. Their observations and resultant 
theoretical framework bear a striking resemblance to the ways in which 
scholars have sought to comprehend mankind’s articulation of divine 
experience. In identifying metaphor’s capacity for (partial) revelation in 
circumstances where other modes of communication fail, Lakoff and Johnson’s 
‘cognitive metaphor theory’ bears a striking resemblance to the Pauline phrase, 
‘videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate.’3  Often found at the heart of 
contemplative Judeo-Christian expression, St Paul’s enigmatic phrase to the 
Corinthians encapsulates both the elusive nature of mystical experience and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (Chicago and London: The University 
of Chicago Press, 1980), p. 193.  
2 Gerard Steen writes of Lakoff and Johnson’s cognitive metaphor theory that it redefines 
metaphor as ‘a highly revealing instance of the human capacity for making sense’ and a crucial 
component in the construction of ‘conceptual world[s] with [their] own laws.’ See Understanding 
Metaphor in Literature: An Empirical Approach (London: Longman, 1994), p. 3. Also René Dirven 
and Wolf Paprotté, ‘Introduction,’ in The Ubiquity of Metaphor: Metaphor in Language and Thought, 
ed. by René Dirven and Wolf Paprotté (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1985), pp. vii-xix. Here at 
p. viii. 
3 1 Corinthians 13:12. ‘We see now through a glass in a dark manner.’ All Biblical quotations are 
taken from the Vulgate and/ or the Douay-Rheims translation. 
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resultant struggle to articulate its perfection using the imperfect tool of human 
language.4  
 
The shared conceptual underpinnings of contemporary metaphor theory 
and of Christian mystical expression form the platform of this study of the 
works of two very different fourteenth-century French mystics, Marguerite 
d’Oingt and Marguerite Porete. Little is known about the lives of these two 
writers, although their legacies mark tipping points in the long histories of 
religious and French literature. Writing in a combination of Latin, Old French, 
and her local Francoprovençal, Marguerite d’Oingt (c.1240-1310) is responsible 
for two short visionary works and a biography of Béatrix d’Ornacieu (c.1260-
1308/9), as well as a small collection of letters, apparently all composed within 
the confines of her Carthusian monastery at Poleteins, in the Rhône-Alps region. 
The only extant examples of medieval Carthusian women’s writing, Marguerite 
d’Oingt’s works are noteworthy for their vivid blend of Biblical imagery and 
conservative appropriation of Patristic exegesis, interwoven with strands of 
Cistercian thought.5 Although often mentioned in passing in anthologies of 
women’s mystical writing, she remains on the periphery of mainstream 
academic attention.6 
 
Marguerite Porete (d.1310) occupies a more notorious place in the canon 
of medieval mystical writing. What scant details are known about the author of 
the complex dialogic treatise, the Mirouer des simples ames, can be found in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Bernard McGinn, The Foundations of Mysticism: Origins to the Fifth Century, vol. 1 of The 
Presence of God: A History of Western Christian Mysticism (New York: Crossroad, 1991), p. xvi.  
5 Ulrike Wiethaus, ‘Marguerite d’Oingt,’ in Medieval France: An Encyclopedia, ed. by William W. 
Kibler, Grover A. Zinn, John Jr. Bell Henneman and Lawrence Earp, Garland Encyclopedias of 
the Middle Ages (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 110.  
6 Scholarly treatments of Marguerite d’Oingt’s writings are discussed in detail in Chapter Three.  
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documents relating to her trial by the inquisition in Paris for relapsed heresy.7 
Her sentencing on 31st May 1310, and death at the stake the following day, 
marked ‘the first known instance of an inquisitorial procedure ending with the 
burning of both a book and the accused author.’ 8  However the Mirouer 
continued to circulate anonymously. Its esoteric and occasionally controversial 
claims concerning the seven-stage mystical ascent of the Soul captured the 
attention of late medieval thinkers across Europe, finding a particularly 
receptive audience amongst the English Carthusians of fifteenth-century 
London.9 Reunited with the historical figure of its author little over half a 
century ago, the text has been subject to considerable scholarly scrutiny, as well 
as increasing interest outside the academy.10 
 
Marguerite Porete’s and Marguerite d’Oingt‘s articulations of 
encountering, or participating in, a ‘way of life’ with the divine do not, in terms 
of historical context, literary style, or mystical content, appear, at first glance, to 
have much in common.11 Nevertheless, the two are intimately connected by the 
sense that both their oeuvres are driven by a desire to express their respective 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 The trial documents are now held in the Archives Nationales, Paris, box J428. Paul Verdeyen 
S.J. edited the documents and published his findings in ‘Le procès d’inquisition contre 
Marguerite Porete et Guiard de Cressonessart (1309-1310),’ Revue d’histoire ecclésiastique, 81 
(1986): 47-94.  
8 Sean L. Field, The Beguine, the Angel, and the Inquisitor: The Trials of Marguerite Porete and Guiard 
of Cressonessart (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2012), p. 3.  
9 Romana Guarnieri first published her thesis connecting one of the condemned articles from 
Porete’s trial to the Mirouer in the Osservatore Romano (16th June 1946) under the title, ‘Lo 
specchio delle anime semplice e Margherita Porete.’ Extant manuscripts of translations of the 
Mirouer include those in Middle English, Italian and Latin. See below for details of the Mirouer’s 
manuscript tradition. 
10 Robert E. Lerner notes that in 2001, an ‘installation opera’ about Marguerite Porete based on a 
libretto by the poet Anne Carson was performed in New York City; in 2002 a ‘Requiem für 
Marguerite Porete’ with ‘dance and musical interpretation’ was performed in Karlsruhe. See 
‘New Light on The Mirror of Simple Souls,’ Speculum, 85 (2010): 91-116. Here at p. 91. More 
recently, the figure of Marguerite Porete was the subject of a television documentary based on 
the novelist Ken Follett’s World Without End (New York: Penguin, 2010). ‘Great Women,’ Ken 
Follett’s Journey Into the Dark Ages. Episode 2. Dir. by Jann Turner. Written by Tilman Remme. 
Tandem Communications. 21st August 2012.  
11 Bernard McGinn prefers to describe mysticism not as a singular experience, but as a ‘way of 
life.’ See The Foundations of Mysticism, p. xvi.  
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experiences of the mystical presence of God. This is a problematic notion, for, as 
Bernard McGinn notes, ‘[e]xperience as such is not part of the historical 
record.’12 The objective of establishing meaning in a mystical account, must, by 
definition of the experience it recounts, always lie beyond the reaches of the 
rational mind. Yet, as F. Samuel Brainard asks, ‘what does our interpretation 
address if not the experience signified?’13 This is an issue for all scholars of 
semiotics, and acutely felt within the remits of this discussion. To accept that a 
‘sign’ signifies its referential ‘reality’ is to suggest that the mystical text is a 
transparent revelation of the experience it recounts. Yet to do so is to refute the 
possibilities of mediation, and with them the associated functions of 
imagination and cognition. On the other hand, to contradict the referential 
qualities of a sign is to inhibit oneself from accepting any notion of experience 
or ‘reality’, with no capacity to judge what is real and what is not.  
 
Before turning to the question of establishing meaning in mystical 
testimony, it is worth pausing over what is meant here by the term ‘mysticism.’ 
Scholars of the subject have long debated the particular parameters of what 
might be thought of as a ‘category’ of Christian mystical experience, and their 
conclusions are rarely unanimous.14 Etymological indicators suggest that the 
terms ‘mystic’ and ‘mysticism’ derive from a Latin transliteration of the Greek 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 McGinn, The Foundations of Mysticism, p. xiv. 
13 F. Samuel Brainard, ‘Defining ‘Mystical Experience,” Journal of the American Academy of 
Religion, 64, 2 (Summer 1996): 359-393. Here at p. 385.  
14 Andrew Louth characterizes mysticism ‘as a search for and experience of immediacy with 
God,’ in The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition: From Plato to Denys (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1981), p. xv. McGinn similarly defines it as ‘part of [Christianity’s] belief and practices 
that concerns the preparation for, the consciousness of, and the reaction to what can be 
described as the immediate or direct presence with God.’ See Foundations of Mysticism, p. xvii. 
Nicholas Lash, on the other hand, challenges the assumption that ‘the mystical element’ is only 
part of Christianity’s belief. ‘The ‘mystical life’,’ he writes, ‘is really nothing other that the 
Christian life lived to the maximum intensity.’ The Beginning and the End of “Religion” 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 171. Other parameters for the definition of 
mysticism are set out later in the introduction. The definition of metaphor is similarly contested. 
David Punter concludes his study of the topic by writing that ‘there is no single, universal, 
ahistorical definition of ‘metaphor.’ Metaphor, The New Critical Idiom (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2007), p. 144. 
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root myein, ‘to close the eyes.’15 As such, the mystikos is someone who seals him- 
or herself off from the outside world, physically at least. Ocular sight is rejected 
in favour of spiritual vision, the latter drawing metaphorically on the former 
but signifying clarity of thought and judgement and a sharpening of the powers 
of the mind; the faculties of reason, imagination, and memory.16  
 
Regarding Marguerite Porete as a mystic in light of this rubric, however, 
presents an initial problem. There is no indication of sight or visionary activity 
of any kind in the Mirouer des simples ames; indeed in chapter 49 of the treatise, 
Porete’s Dame Amour explains that there can be no comparison between the 
annihilated soul and those who participate in other forms of divine ecstasy, 
suggesting that contemplation and ecstasy, often the pinnacle of a visionary 
narrative, ought to be surpassed in order for the soul to reach the final stage of 
union with God.17 In their interpretative essay to the latest English translation 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Robert Grosseteste in the 1230s provides an etymological definition of mysticism in his 
commentary on Pseudo-Dionysius’ treatise, The Mystical Theology. Grosseteste writes: ‘Mistica 
theologia est secretissima, et non iam per speculum et per ymagines creaturarum cum Deo 
locutio […]. Dicitur autem misticum a miω, verbo greco quod significant “disco occulta” et 
“doceo occulta” seu “secreta” et “obscure” et “constringo” et “claudo”, unde mistica theologia 
dicitur quasi clausa et constricta; ea enim que dicta est, clausa est et constricta ab oculis omnium 
actu videntium aliquid creatum.’ ‘Mystical theology is the most secret talking with God, no 
longer through a mirror and through the images of creatures […]. But the word “mystical” is 
taken from miω, a Greek verb which means “I learn hidden things” and “I teach hidden things” 
or “secrets”, and “I hide” and “I press together” and “I close.” Whence theology is called 
“mystical” in the sense of “closed” and “constricted.” For that theology which is referred to is 
closed and kept from the eyes of all who are actually seeing something created, and by that fact 
from the eyes of all common men actually living the present life.’ Mystical Theology: The Glosses 
by Thomas Gallus and the Commentary of Robert Grosseteste on De Mystica Theologia, ed., trans. and 
introduction by James McEvoy, Dallas Medieval Texts and Translations, 3 (Leuven: Peeters, 
2003), pp. 64-65. For more on the Greek etymology of the term, see Peter Schäfer, The Origins of 
Jewish Mysticism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), pp. 1-2. 
16 Sight and vision as metaphors for knowledge and the mental faculties are part of a long 
tradition that can be traced back to antiquity. For a discussion of the history of sight and vision 
as metaphors for knowledge and the mental faculties, see Suzanne Conklin Akbari, Seeing 
Through the Veil: Optical Theory and Medieval Allegory (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
2004), especially Chapter One, ‘Illumination and Language,’ pp. 3-20. 
17 ‘Voire encore, dit Amour, pouse que, pour ce bien vouloir, ilz peussent faire miracles et 
recevoir checun jour pour l’amour de Dieu martire; encore, dit Amour, n’y a point de 
comparasson, puisque voulenté demoure.’ Mirouer, ch. 49, pp. 146-148. All quotations from 
Marguerite Porete’s work are taken from Le Mirouer des simples ames, ed. by Romana Guarnieri/ 
Speculum simplicium animarum, ed. by Paul Verdeyen S.J., Corpus Christianorum Continuatio 
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of the Mirouer, Edmund College, J. C. Marler and Judith Grant go as far as to 
write that, in contrast to other religious and spiritual texts of the period, 
Porete’s ‘spirituality is purely intellectual, with no indications that she had 
received any of the private revelations of the secrets of the divine nature which 
are the distinguishing marks of genuine mysticism.’18 
 
 Other scholars, however, would propose that it is precisely this lack of 
visions that qualifies Marguerite Porete’s status as a mystic, and that of the two 
women, it is Marguerite d’Oingt whose writings fall beyond the remit of 
mystical literature. Marguerite d’Oingt’s emphasis on visionary experience 
brings her text into dialogue, for example, with the later English spiritual writer 
Julian of Norwich (c.1342-c.1416), who, Kevin J. Magill argues, belongs not to a 
category of ‘mystical’ but ‘visionary’ writing. 19  Similarly, Denys Turner 
suggests that there is a palpable difference between a mystic’s desire to 
overcome the confines of their selfhood and modern tendencies to foreground 
that same selfhood as the site for divine, ineffable experience.20 According to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Mediaevalis, 69 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1986), p. 188. Henceforth referred to as Mirouer. ‘Indeed 
truly, says Love, suppose that willing this good they could do miracles and receive martyrdom 
each day for the sake of their love of God, and still, says Love, there would be no comparison 
since their will remains.’ Mirror, p. 128. All translations are taken from The Mirror of Simple Souls, 
trans. by Ellen L. Babinsky, The Classics of Western Spirituality (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 
1993), p. 142. Henceforth referred to as Mirror. Babinsky’s chapters match those of Guarnieri’s 
edition. In chapter 118, the Soul explains that visions, actions of piety, and contemplation form 
part of the lower stages of the mystical trajectory towards the divine, but are absent from the 
fifth stage, once the Soul has relinquished her will back to God. See also Bernard McGinn, The 
Flowering of Mysticism: Men and Women in the New Mysticism, 1200-1350, vol. 3 of The Presence of 
God: A History of Western Christian Mysticism (New York: Crossroad, 1998), p. 247. 
18 Edmund Colledge, O.S.A., J.C. Marler, and Judith Grant, ‘Introductory Interpretative Essay,’ 
in The Mirror of Simple Souls by Margaret Porette [sic], trans. by Edmund Colledge, O.S.A., J.C. 
Marler, and Judith Grant, Notre Dame Texts in Medieval Culture, 6 (Notre Dame, IN: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1999), pp. xxxv-lxxxvii. Here at p. lxxi.  
19 Kevin J. Magill, Julian of Norwich: Mystic or Visionary?, Routledge Studies in Medieval 
Religion and Culture (London and New York: Routledge, 2006).  
20 Denys Turner, The Darkness of God: Negativity in Christian Mysticism (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995). W. T. Stace excludes them from his formulation of mystical experience 
on two counts: first, because they ‘have the character of sensuous imagery’; second, because 
they are sometimes rejected by mystics themselves. W.T. Stace, Mysticism and Philosophy 
(London: Macmillan, 1961), p. 49. William Wainwright, meanwhile, argues that visions and 
voices should be rejected since, unlike unitary states of mystical consciousness that are void of 
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these perspectives, Marguerite Porete’s Mirouer adheres to a definition of 
mystical experience and expression; Marguerite d’Oingt’s ‘visionary’ texts do 
not.  
 
That visions constitute a more contentious area of spiritual, otherworldly, 
or divine experience is not a novel idea. Questioning the relationship between 
seeing and knowing, and the extent to which how much a man can know equates 
with the correct meaning of God’s Word, St Augustine’s typology of visions, for 
example, found in his De Genesi ad litteram differentiates between three types of 
vision.21 The lowest of the three, ‘visio corporalis,’ involves seeing the material 
world with the physical eye and is limited by the viewer’s position in time, 
space, and physical orientation. The second category, ‘visio spiritualis,’ is 
characterised by a turn from outer to inner seeing, a more cerebral, spiritual 
form of vision. The inner eye of the soul sees images offered to the imagination 
(‘imaginatio’), the faculty of the soul that accumulates the information received 
via the sense organs and gathers it into a coherent conceptual representation. 
However Augustine suggests that this imaginative vision is still insufficient to 
comprehend divine ideas because it is facilitated by images (‘enigmata’ or 
‘phantasmata’), and is therefore as liable to corruption by the devil as they are 
to inspiration by the divine. The third and final stage of his trichotomy is ‘visio 
intellectualis,’ the highest form of vision by the rational soul performed by the 
eye of the mind. This intuitive insight is infallible, free from imagery, and, like 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
specific detail, visions point towards ‘empirical content.’ William J. Wainwright, Mysticism: A 
Study of its Nature, Cognitive Value and Moral Implications (Brighton: Harvester, 1981), p. 1.   
21 Augustine discusses his typology of visions, their causes, hierarchical relationship, and 
impediments to such visions at length in Book 12, especially in Chapters 7-25. See Augustinus 
Hipponensis, De Genesi ad litteram, ed. by J. Zycha, Corpus Christianorum Series Latina 28, 1 
(Vienna: Holder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1884). The Literal Meaning of Genesis, trans. John Hammond 
Taylor, Ancient Christian Writers: The Works of the Fathers in Translation, 42, vol. 2 of 2 (New 
York and Ramsey, N.J.: Newman Press, 1982).  
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Moses’ vision of God in Exodus 33:23, comprehended not corporeally or 
spiritually, but intellectually.22  
 
Augustine’s doubts as to the authenticity of his ambiguous middle 
category, ‘visio spiritualis,’ may form the basis for many scholars’, both 
medieval and modern, disregard for, or mistrust of, visionary experience.23 
Other authorities, meanwhile, patristic and medieval, stress the importance of 
visions. Gregory the Great (d.604), for example, holds up St Benedict of Nursia 
(ca.480-547) as a paradigmatic mystic, whose cosmic visions constitute 
exemplary indications of spiritual experience.24 By the high Middle Ages, the 
monastic emphasis on visionary experience within a life of prayer and 
meditation suggested that in the right context, visionary activity could catalyse 
a transcendence of the mind.25  
 
Opting to eliminate visionary experiences from the category of mystical 
consciousness points towards a larger methodological obstacle in the drive to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 ‘Tollamque manum meam, et videbis posteriora mea: faciem autem meam videre non 
poteris.’ ‘And I will take away my hand, and thou shalt see my back parts: but my face thou 
canst not see.’ Exodus 33:23.  
23 Other recent scholars, meanwhile, propose that accounts of visionary experience were a 
means by which to legitimate women’s writing in a period generally held to be resistant to 
women’s access to formal theological training and dubious of female intellectual capacity. See 
for example, Elizabeth Alvilda Petroff’s Medieval Women’s Visionary Literature (New York, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 6. ‘Visions led women to the acquisition of power in 
the world […]. Visions were a socially sanctioned activity that freed a woman from 
conventional female roles by identifying her as a genuine religious figure.’ See also Rosalynn 
Voaden, God’s Words, Women’s Voices: The Discernment of Spirits in the Writing of Late-Medieval 
Women Visionaries (Woodbridge: Boydell and Brewer, 1999).  
24 Pope Gregory I, The Life of St Benedict by Gregory the Great: Translation and Commentary, trans. 
by Terrence G. Kardong (Minnesota: Liturgical Press, 2009), especially Section 15, ‘The Vision of 
the World in the Light of God.’ 
25 In his Epistola ad Fratres de Monte Dei, for example, William of St Thierry (d.1148) writes that 
he lives in hope of one day seeing God ‘face to face,’ despite the warnings of Exodus 33:17-20. 
See Bernard McGinn, The Growth of Mysticism: From Gregory the Great to the Twelfth Century, vol. 
2 of The Presence of God: A History of Western Christian Mysticism (London: SCM Press, 1994), 
especially pp. 260-274, for a discussion of William’s mystical theology and the theme of the role 
of vision in the soul’s path towards the similitudo Dei and unitas spiritus in his writings. 
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define ‘mysticism.’ In attempting to ‘control’ and examine accounts of religious 
phenomena modern scholarship risks being too strict in its attempts at 
classification.26 As a result, ‘complex phenomena, such as the interplay between 
transcendence and immanence, or that between the communal and the 
individual,’ is reduced in an effort to make ‘evaluative judgements about what 
is central and what is peripheral to the mystical life, or, even more damningly, 
what constitutes “true” as opposed to “false” mysticism.’27   
 
The consequences of overly categorizing the concept of ‘mysticism’ are 
more critical than many scholars allow for. Christian mystical literature finds its 
thematic inspiration in the Bible, the narrative framework of which is 
punctuated by visions and revelations. In the Old Testament, God reveals his 
plan for mankind, and manoeuvres the crucial terrestrial agents of that plan 
into strategic positions, through a series of apparitions, dreams, and voices.28 
Similarly, in the New Testament, visions are used by God to establish his 
Church and to prepare the way for the incarnate Christ. Zacharias, Joseph, and 
Ananias, amongst others, are the recipients of God’s instruction and prophecy 
mediated through visions, dreams, and revelations. 29  Paul’s celebrated 
statements concerning speculation and its relationship to mankind’s knowledge 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Amy Hollywood, ‘Introduction,’ in The Cambridge Companion to Christian Mysticism, ed. by 
Amy Hollywood and Patricia Z. Beckmann (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 
1-33. Here at p. 4. See also Barbara Newman, ‘What Did It Mean To Say “I Saw”?: The Clash 
Between Theory and Practice in Medieval Visionary Culture,’ Speculum, 80, 1 (Jan. 2005):1-43. 
27 Hollywood, ‘Introduction,’ p. 4.  
28 God promises Abraham per visionem that he will be the father of many nations (Genesis 15:1); 
Jacob’s celebrated dream of the ladder extending from heaven confirms that Abraham’s 
covenant will be carried through him (Genesis 28:10-17); Joseph’s visions, and his 
interpretations of his and other’s visions, are central to his saving of the Egyptians and the 
Israelites (Genesis 37, 40, 41); Samuel (1 Samuel 3) and Solomon (1 Kings 3:5) are also recipients 
of pivotal visions in the Old Testament.  
29 Zacharias learns that he will be the father of John the Baptist in a vision (apparuit autem illi 
angelus Domini, Luke 1:11); Joseph learns that Mary has conceived miraculously in a dream 
(Matthew 1:20), and later is told in two dreams to escape Herod’s massacre and that he and his 
family are safe to return (Matthew 2:13, 2: 19); it is due to a vision from God that the Christian 
Ananias visits Paul in Damascus and converts him, restoring his sight (Acts 9:10-18). Peter (Acts 
10:1-6) and Paul (Acts 16:9-10, Acts 18:9-11, and 2 Corinthians 12:1-6) also receive visions whose 
messages constitute a vital role in the formation of Christian doctrine.   
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of God are grounded, likewise, in literal and metaphorical vision. 1 Corinthians 
13:12, and indeed its counterpart Romans 1:20, are, as mentioned above, often 
referenced as a touchstone in Christian mystical theology.30 To question the 
appropriateness or authenticity of a divine vision is to cast doubt on the 
cornerstone of the Christian faith and the bedrock of the mystical edifice itself. 
According to the Greek theologian Origen (c.184/185-c.253/254), it is in the 
interpretation of Scripture that the essence of mysticism can be found.31 If the 
visions of the prophets are to be excluded from ‘true’ religious experience in the 
same way that that the visions of later mystics are sometimes excluded or 
explained away in terms of psychiatric disorders or idiosyncrasies of the 
nervous system, then the parameters of mysticism have to be re-drawn, or else 
discarded entirely.32  
 
This study therefore adopts a broad definition as to what a ‘mystical’ 
person, experience, or text entails and uses the terms ‘mystic’ and ‘visionary’ 
interchangeably, depending on the context.33 In doing so, it allows, on the one 
hand, for the many manifestations of mystical awareness expressed during the 
Middle Ages, from the apophatic and cataphatic traditions of the early church, 
to the more sensory examples of the high and later medieval period, variously 
described as ‘love mysticism’, ‘bridal mysticism’, ‘Passion mysticism’, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 For a comparative study of Paul’s statements of 1 Corinthians 13:12 and Romans 1:20, see 
Jeffrey F. Hamburger, ‘Speculations on Speculation” Vision and Perception in the Theory and 
Practice of Mystical Devotion’, in Deutsche Mystik im abendländischen Zusammenhang: Neu 
erschlossene Texte, neue methodische Ansätze, neue theoretische Konzepte. Kolloquium Kloster 
Fischingen 1998, ed. by Walter Haug and Wolfram Schneider-Lastin (Walter de Gruyter: 
Tübingen, 2000), pp. 353-408. Here at p. 354.  
31 See Louth, The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition, pp. 52-74.  
32 The extent to which the Bible can be explored and explained through modern scientific 
research is the subject of Steve Jones’ recent publication, The Serpent’s Promise: The Bible Retold as 
Science (London: Little, Brown, 2013).   
33 Robert Ellwood’s definition of mysticism is particularly helpful here. He writes that for an 
experience to be considered ‘mystical’, it must take place: ‘[In a] religious or profane context, 
immediately or subsequently interpreted by the experiencer as encounter with a higher or 
ultimate divine reality in a direct, according to the subject, rational way, that engenders a deep 
sense of unity and of living during the experience on a level of being other than the ordinary.’ 
Robert S. Ellwood, Mysticism and Religion (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1980), p. 2.  
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‘ecstatic mysticism.’34 On the other hand, however, it is important to emphasize 
that a broad definition does not suggest that there is an ‘average’ mystic, or an 
‘average’ mystical experience. Rather, it presumes that mysticism is a sub-
category of religious experience and articulation, with religious experience 
defined as involving a physiological or psychological engagement with a divine 
agent, an appreciation of and engagement with the sacred nature of the liturgy, 
a belief in the afterlife, and profound reflection upon what Brainard terms 
‘ultimate life concerns’ and questions of ‘ultimate reality and truth.’35  
 
Mystical expression also recounts a shift in human consciousness, from 
what might be thought of as a state of everyday, waking awareness, to one of 
‘nonordinariness.’36 This may be a sense of miraculous phenomena, or of events 
and cognitive processes that appear to occur beyond the remit of the natural 
ordering of the world. Others have sought to define this quality of mysticism 
using terminology such as ‘ineffable’ and ‘anomalous,’ but neither of these 
terms are particularly helpful in defining the ‘mystical.’37 ‘Ineffable’ suggests an 
impossibility to describe the experience, and yet the existence of a text 
problematizes the notion that the experience lies beyond linguistic or pictorial 
depiction. Similarly, ‘anomalous’ implies a drastic rupture with the normal and 
the everyday. However, mysticism draws on a sense of the universal and the 
innate consciousness of being human, and therefore cannot be regarded as a 
state of consciousness wholly divorced from fundamental human concerns. In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Barbara Newman provides a useful overview of some of the more prevalent modes of 
twelfth- through fourteenth-century mystical expression in her essay ‘Gender,’ in The Wiley-
Blackwell Companion to Christian Mysticism, ed. by Julia A. Lamm (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 
2012), pp. 41-55.  
35 Brainard, ‘Defining ‘Mystical Experience,” p. 372 and p. 375. 
36 Brainard, ‘Defining ‘Mystical Experience,” especially pp. 372-375. See also Wayne Proudfoot, 
who writes that the mystic ‘must identify his experience under a certain description, and that 
description must preclude naturalistic explanation.’ Religious Experience (Berkley: University of 
California Press, 1985), p. 137.  
37 William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature: Being the Gifford 
Lectures on Natural Religion Delivered at Edinburgh, 1901-2 (London: Burns and Oates, 1952), 
passim; Proudfoot, Religious Experience, p. 148.  
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the words of William James, mysticism represents ‘that filmiest of screens’ that 
detaches our ‘normal waking consciousness, rational consciousness as we call it 
[…] [from] potential forms of consciousness entirely different.’38  
 
However, when a mystical experience is articulated, it is not only the 
mystic who provides coherence and meaning to mystical expression. In order 
for an utterance to be regarded as ‘mystical,’ it must engage with a community. 
It is this collective, contextual interest in the expressed experience that decides 
that as a category of experience, the label ‘mystical’ is an appropriate one to 
apply to the account. Some critics, especially those who view mystical literature 
as signifying a transparent ‘reality,’ assume that the authority for establishing 
an experience’s or a text’s mystical nature comes from the person having the 
experience, or the named author of the text.39 This is akin to regarding the 
mystical account as an empirical account of experience, rather like reading a 
metaphor as a literal statement, as opposed to an intricate web of signs and 
signifiers, designed to be decoded by a discourse community participating 
within the codifier’s hermeneutic framework. As Brainard argues: 
[T]he judgement of an experience’s veracity – of whether an 
experience is genuinely mystical or merely delusionary – is 
made by the one applying the label ‘mystical’. What we seek 
in a mystic’s testimony is evidence of what our community of 
discourse judges to be genuinely mystical. [original emphasis]40 
 
Mystical writing demands a delicate balancing act on the part of its reader to 
distinguish between experience and account. Direct access to mystical 
experience is impossible. In this sense, all mystical accounts are to be regarded 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 James, Varieties of Religious Experience, p. 305.  
39 Brainard, ‘Defining ‘Mystical Experience,” p. 365.  
40 Brainard, ‘Defining ‘Mystical Experience,” p. 379.  
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with an awareness of the constructedness of mystical prose and its relationship 
with the culture and context in which it is received.41  
 
Such an open-ended perspective on mystical phenomena does not 
necessarily sit comfortably with the twenty-first century critic, and the 
psychologists Jerome Kroll and Bernard Bachrach wonder whether the 
disregard for the significance of visions is perhaps more indicative of a modern 
discomfort with accounts of holy individuals, ‘seen to exist at the interface of 
humanity and divinity.’ 42  Similarly, Bruce Holsinger, in his analysis of 
Hildegard of Bingen’s musical compositions, writes of the ‘ideological 
problem[s]’ and ‘quandaries’ associated with ‘the historical challenge of 
analyzing works that are asserted by their authors to be divinely inspired.’43 
Kroll, Bachrach, and Holsinger’s remarks point towards a discomfort amongst 
scholars of premodern religions, caused by the dualistic nature of visionary 
literature as concerning issues of belief and spiritual faith on the one hand, and 
ideological value-systems and practices on the other, in conjunction with an 
interwoven textual overlay of poetic and rhetorical intertextual allusions and 
borrowings.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 See McGinn, The Flowering of Mysticism, pp. 27-30.  
42 Jerome Kroll and Bernard Bachrach, The Mystic Mind: The Psychology of Medieval Mystics and 
Ascetics (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 203-204. See also Mark A. McIntosh, Mystical Theology: 
The Integrity of Spirituality and Theology, Challenges in Contemporary Theology (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1998), p. 69. McIntosh writes: ‘mysticism in modernity also withdraws into […] the 
world of the inner self – a world whose claims to wisdom, authority and truth could easily be 
marginalized by religious and academic authorities, even as they have been suborned and co-
opted by modern individualistic consumerism. At this point, ‘the mystic’ has, in Western 
culture more generally, become something of a marginal eccentric at best, whose peculiar inner 
experience […] has come to seem a thing of pious curiosity, perhaps, but clearly of little 
relevance for the serious task of academic theology.’ 
43 Bruce W. Holsinger, Music, Body, and Desire in Medieval Culture: Hildegard of Bingen to Chaucer 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), p. 91.  
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Clare Barbetti expresses this tension particularly forcefully. Writing 
about the difficulties presented by ‘that amorphous subject, spirituality,’ 
Barbetti states: 
 
[I]t is decidedly difficult to analyze that which claims to be 
unmediated communication from God without side-stepping 
the ‘God-issue’ altogether and performing a purely 
anthropological analysis. […] This difficulty speaks to an 
interesting tension in the values of the contemporary Western 
academy, between a lukewarm wish not to discredit the 
beliefs of ‘divinely inspired’ authors and a snobbery 
concerning ‘illogical’ beliefs that underlies a drive to catalogue 
them as mere artifact.’44 
 
In its analysis of Marguerite d’Oingt and Marguerite Porete’s lives, 
works, and literary reception, this thesis seeks to be sensitive to Barbetti’s ‘God-
issue,’ careful to situate its literary and cognitive analysis in relation to the 
theological underpinnings of the two women’s literary aims and 
conceptualizations of belief. To regard mystical writing as ‘mere artifact’ is to 
sever it from the structures that make it coherent, and in turn to undermine the 
objectives of analysis.  
 
However, Barbetti’s observations also point towards two deeper and 
interrelated human concerns. What is problematic for scholars of visionary texts 
is not the divide between medieval and modern perspectives or the discomfort 
of a modern academy with the notion of a divine, invisible author. After all, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Clare Barbetti, Ekphrastic Medieval Visions: A New Discussion in Interarts Theory, The New 
Middle Ages (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p. 86.  
	   21	  
earlier discussion of Augustine’s tripartite and hierarchical classification of 
modes of seeing indicates that people of the ancient and medieval worlds were, 
at times, as uneasy with the role and underlying motivation of visionary 
experience as moderns. The fourteenth-century anonymous author of The Cloud 
of Unknowing similarly cautions novices against misunderstanding the spiritual 
senses and rails against the ‘hypocrites’ who: 
[T]urn their bodily senses inwards on themselves, physically, 
which is unnatural. They strain themselves, as though they 
could possibly see inwardly with their bodily eyes and hear 
inwardly with their ears; and so with all their senses of smell, 
of taste and of touch. And so they reverse the order of nature; 
they so overtax their imagination with this fantastic behavior 
and without the least discretion, that finally they turn their 
brains in their heads.45 
 
Mistrust of visions, and with it the broader unease about mysticism as an 
experience and as a textual category, acknowledges two perennial questions 
about the human condition: the difficulties of being bound by subjectivity and 
language.46 In part, perhaps the discomfort is a product of not having yet 
developed a sufficiently sophisticated vocabulary to compensate for the web of 
consciousness, experience, the melding of the self and the divine ‘Other,’ and 
the subsequent composition and articulation of these events that is mysticism. 
 
It is the claim of this thesis that metaphor and its theoretical 
underpinnings provide an underestimated conceptual model with which to 
address this problem. Put simply, a metaphor is a statement that, in some way, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Anonymous, The Cloud of Unknowing, ed. by James Walsh S. J., The Classics of Western 
Spirituality (Ramsey, N.J.: Paulist Press, 1981), chapters 52 and 53, pp. 220-224. The instructions 
to the novices can be found in chapter 52.  
46 Kroll and Bachrach, The Mystic Mind, p. 206.  
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presents a descriptive contrast and implies an epistemological truth different to 
those implied by its literal referent. The Eucharistic imagery used by St John in 
his Gospel account of Jesus Christ’s feeding of the five thousand provides a case 
in point. St John quotes Christ as saying: 
I am the living bread which came down from heaven. If any 
man eat of this bread, he shall live for ever; and the bread that 
I will give, is my flesh, for the life of the world.47 
 
Received as a literal statement, Christ’s words evoke the following 
response: ‘The Jews therefore strove among themselves, saying: How can this 
man give us his flesh to eat?’48 As a metaphorical statement, however, the 
passage from John’s Gospel encapsulates one of the fundamental truths of the 
Christian faith: that Christ is the daily source of the life and nourishment of the 
Church. In order for this inference to occur, a number of cognitive processes 
must take place. The audience are required to engage with the ‘infra-linguistic’ 
qualities, or signs and signifiers, of the statement; its accepted ‘truth-qualities.’ 
Similarly, they must verify that statement according to a combination of 
individually- and communally-held norms, categories and logic; factors 
controlled by common usage and context.  
 
As with its definition of mysticism, this study takes a broad view of what 
constitutes a ‘metaphor’ in linguistic terms. Figurative expressions such as 
analogy, allegory, simile, hyperbole, metonymy, parable, fable, and myth are 
drawn together here under the umbrella-term ‘metaphor.’ A metaphor can 
constitute a word, a phrase, a sentence, a recurrent motif, or extend across an 
entire work (or works, in the case of Marguerite d’Oingt). This broad approach 
is explicable on two counts. First, within many modes of creative expression, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 John 6:51-2.  
48 John 6:53.  
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narratives are constructed by ‘extended and sustained metaphors’, within 
which there may well be particular instances of metonymy, simile or analogy.49 
However whilst they differ from readings of ‘metaphor’ as poetic and rhetorical 
devices, these figurative tropes all share similar fundamental concerns about 
the cognitive nature of language, conceptual transference of meaning, and an 
epistemological need for meaningful expression. 50  Second, as Lakoff and 
Johnson propose, the term ‘metaphor’ in this instance not only signifies a figure 
of speech, but also a mode of thought.  
 
To return to the main tenets of Lakoff and Johnson’s cognitive metaphor 
theory, metaphor manifests itself on two levels; as a metaphorical linguistic 
expression underpinned by conceptual metaphor. 51  Metaphorical linguistic 
expressions are the words or phrases found in verbal expression, whose 
metaphorical meaning is determined by its user’s and audience’s ability to 
recognise and process its figurative, as opposed to literal, status. A recurrent 
metaphorical statement in both Marguerite d’Oingt and Marguerite Porete’s 
writings, for example, is that ‘human skin is parchment.’52 Cognitive metaphor 
theory proposes that linguistically, but more importantly, conceptually, the 
structure of the metaphorical phrase can be divided into two domains, one of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Colin Murray Turbayne, The Myth of Metaphor (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina 
Press, 1970), pp. 11-20.  
50 The separate and shared aspects of metaphor and metonymy are, for example, an area of 
ongoing debate. Recent publications on the subject include: Metaphor and Metonymy at the 
Crossroads: A Cognitive Persepective, ed. by Antonio Barcelona, Topics in English Linguistics, 30 
(Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 2000); Verena Haser, Metaphor, Metonymy, and Experientialist 
Philosophy, Topics in English Linguistics, 49 (Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 2005). Lakoff and 
Johnson discuss the question of metonymy in Chapter Eight of Metaphors We Live By, 
‘Metonymy.’  
51  See Zoltán Kövecses, Metaphor: A Practical Introduction, 2nd edition (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), especially Chapter One, ‘What Is Metaphor?,’ for a useful introduction 
to cognitive metaphor theory.  
52 ‘Skin is parchment’ is an extended metaphor across all three of Marguerite d’Oingt’s works; 
see Chapter Three for an extended discussion of this metaphor and its implications. Marguerite 
Porete uses the metaphor explicitly in chapter 66 of her Mirouer: ‘ceste leçon n’est mie mise en 
escript de main d’omne, mais c’est du Saint Esperit, qui escript ceste leçon merveilleusement, de 
l’Ame est parchemin precieusement,’ p. 188. ‘[T] his lesson is not placed in writing by human 
hand, but by the Holy Spirit, who writes this lesson in a marvellous way, and the Soul is the 
precious parchment.’ Mirror, p. 142.  
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which is partially projected, or ‘mapped’ onto the other.53 In this case, some of 
the qualities of ‘parchment’ are ‘mapped’ onto the notion of ‘human skin’ to 
indicate something about that skin which is not apparent or expressible through 
literal language alone. 
 
It is often suggested that this perspective finds its earliest articulation in 
Aristotle, particularly in the Poetics and the Rhetoric, the philosopher writing in 
the former that ‘a good metaphor implies an intuitive perception of similarity of 
dissimilars.’ 54 In contrast to literal language, which ‘convey[s] only what we 
know already’, or absurd phrases, which ‘simply puzzle us’, Aristotle suggests 
that ‘it is from metaphor that we can best get hold of something fresh.’55 
Metaphor conveys new ideas and new facts, he writes, and its effect is crucial to 
creating meaning.56 Perhaps more significantly for this discussion, Aristotle also 
suggests that metaphor causes the enigmatic or the abstract to become visible: 
‘the words, too, ought to set the scene before our eyes’.57 The Rhetoric makes it 
clear that metaphor is not simply a linguistic construction, but a cognitive 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 George Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal About the Mind 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1987), p. 276.  
54 Aristotle, Poetics, ed. by I. Bywater, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford 
Translation, ed. by Jonathan Barnes, vol. 2 of 2, Bollingen Series LXXI (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1984), 1459a 7-8.  Aristotle writes: ‘Metaphor consists in giving the thing a 
name that belongs to something else; the transference being either from genus to species, or 
from species to genus, or from species to species, or on grounds of analogy […] It is a great 
thing, indeed, to make a proper use of these poetical forms, as also of compounds and strange 
words. But the greatest thing by far is to be master of metaphor. It is the one thing that cannot 
be learnt from others; and it is also a sign of genius.’ Poetics, 1457b7-9, p. 2332; 1459a 5-7 and pp. 
2334-35. See Eva Feder Kittay, Metaphor: Its Cognitive Force and Linguistic Structure, Clarendon 
Library of Logic and Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 2-4, for a brief 
overview of Aristotle’s contribution to cognitive metaphor theory. J. E. Mahon provides a 
comparative survey of Aristotelian metaphor and modern metaphor theory in ‘Getting Your 
Sources Right: What Aristotle Didn’t Say,’ in Researching and Applying Metaphor, ed. by Lynne 
Cameron and Graham Low (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 69-80. 
55 Aristotle, Rhetoric, trans. by W. Rhys Roberts, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised 
Oxford Translation, ed. by Jonathan Barnes, vol. 2 of 2, Bollingen Series LXXI (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1984), 1410b 11-13, p. 2250.  
56 ‘It is also good to use metaphorical words; but the metaphors must not be far-fetched, or they 
will be difficult to grasp, nor obvious, or they will have no effect.’ Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1410b 32-33, 
p. 2251. See also 1411b 24-33, pp. 2252-53: ‘all such passages are distinguished by the effect of 
activity they convey.’ My emphasis.  
57 Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1410b 33-34, p. 2251. 
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process too. In ‘setting before the eyes’ a systematicity of the similarity of 
dissimilars, metaphor functions to produce images in the mind’s eye, where 
meaning is made. Aristotle’s evocation of another form of vision, which is 
intimately connected to knowledge, resonates with the argument made here; 
that metaphor and mysticism share something of a similar cognitive and 
conceptual framework.  
 
Aristotle’s observations have much in common with modern theories of 
metaphorical linguistic expression. To return to the example ‘human skin is 
parchment,’ cognitive metaphor theory suggests that one domain, in this case 
‘human skin,’ is ‘seen’ in terms of another domain, ‘parchment.’ The domain 
that is ‘mapped’ is known as the ‘source’ domain, and the domain onto which 
the features of the source are mapped is known as the ‘target’ domain.58 At a 
cognitive level, the metaphorical linguistic expression is underpinned by 
conceptual metaphor, made up of two supraordinate domains, which organise 
the linguistic expression. In the case of ‘human skin is parchment,’ the 
conceptual metaphor underpinning the statement would be THE BODY IS A 
SURFACE, or THE BODY IS A CONTAINER, depending on how the user of the 
metaphor conceives of the fundamental structure of ‘parchment’ and its 
function and purpose.59 The source domain, SURFACE or CONTAINER, and the 
target domain, BODY, form the two concepts that organise and provide 
systematicity for the components and their interactivity within the 
metaphorical linguistic expression. In order for the mapping to be successful, 
the conceptual properties of the source domain must not violate the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 These terms are discussed more fully in Chapter One. The particular terminology of ‘source’ 
and ‘target domains’ is taken from Lakoff and Johnson’s theory of metaphor, originally 
articulated by Lakoff in Fire, Women, and Dangerous Things, p. 276.  
59 Following Lakoff and Johnson, this thesis distinguishes metaphorical linguistic expressions 
from their conceptual underpinnings by putting the latter in uppercase letters. This indicates 
that the particular wording of the conceptual metaphor does not occur verbally, but rather 
underpins the metaphorical expression found in the text.  
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fundamental structure of the target domain. Providing both domains share a 
similar image-schematic structure, the projection is likely to be successful.60  
 
In mapping one domain onto another, a number of the superordinate 
conceptual metaphor’s source domain’s attributes, entities, and propositions are 
transferred into the realm of the target domain, so that the metaphor’s user or 
audience is able to make other inferences about the target domain and its 
related attributes, based on the properties of the superordinate source. These 
inferences are known in pragmatics as ‘entailments.’61 Metaphorical entailments 
are the perceptual facts or truths that arise from the metaphorical expression 
and which, in turn, characterise its systematicity. In the case of THE BODY IS A 
SURFACE, for example, the metaphor ‘it was written all over his face’ would give 
rise to the following entailments: the face is a surface, a surface is something 
you can write on, writing conveys information. Therefore, ‘is was written all 
over his face’ signifies that ‘his face’ is the vehicle for information. Taking this 
as a ‘true’ state of affairs, ‘his face’ becomes the focus for where we might seek 
information about ‘him,’ and, by extension, the unexplained ‘it’ of the phrase. In 
this way, metaphor provides a coherent conceptual structure for our 
understanding of the two abstract target domains in the utterance,  ‘him’ and 
the thing affecting ‘him.’  Metaphor is therefore a linguistic and a cognitive 
device, organising and revealing aspects of thought, meaning, and action 
obscured by other modes and registers of expression. 
 
A debate common to the fields of mysticism and metaphor concerns the 
role played in both by culture and context. As demonstrated above, in order for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Antonio Barcelona, ‘Clarifying and Applying the Notions of Metaphor and Metonymy 
Within Cognitive Linguistics: An Update,’ in Metaphor and Metonymy in Comparison and Contrast, 
ed. by René Dirven and Ralf Pörings (The Hague: Mouton de Gruyter, 2003), pp. 207-277. Here 
at p. 213.  
61 See Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, especially Chapter Sixteen, ‘Metaphorical 
Coherence.’  
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an utterance to be regarded as ‘mystical,’ it must engage with a community. It is 
this collective, contextual interest in the expressed experience that decides that, 
as a category of experience, the label ‘mystical’ is the appropriate one to apply 
to the account. In the case of Marguerite d’Oingt and Marguerite Porete, this 
cultural framework is constructed on two levels. First, by the eternal and 
macrocosmic notion of the Christian church and faith, potent as both a spiritual 
and a terrestrial phenomenon, and second by the microcosmic intellectual and 
political debates and the shifting spiritual landscape of the thirteenth century. 
Situating both women in relation to the historical backdrop of the late Middle 
Ages, in so far as the limited primary sources allow, permits a speculative 
survey of the influences on and possibilities for the two women’s capacities to 
creatively explore and exploit metaphorical linguistic expression. The evidence 
for ontological, topological, logical, memorial, and imaginative mappings at 
work in these women’s writings opens up new ways for a modern readership to 
engage with the patterns and entailments that underpin their expressions of 
mystical piety.  
 
This is due in part to the fact that metaphorical processing allows for a 
conceptual union between reason and imagination.62 As ontological, topological 
and logical attributes are mapped from the source to the target domain, the 
abstract concept adopts an internal coherence from the rational structural and 
orientational patterns and entailments deriving from the source domain. If this 
is successful, other cognitive faculties, such as memory and imagination, both at 
individual and communal levels, also elaborate the statement, shaping it to 
constitute expected, or novel meanings. This delicate cognitive intersection 
between reason and the imagination is termed ‘imaginative rationality.’63  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, pp. 192-193.  
63 Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, p. 193.  
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Christian mystical writing makes for an interesting case study in an 
exploration of ‘imaginative rationality.’ Liturgically and scripturally grounded, 
the textual space of Western Christian mystical literature, much like the 
liturgical space in which it is produced, constitutes a site for memorial activity 
anchored in visual sacred objects and images, which finds a rationale in the 
metanarrative of the life of Christ as mediated by Scripture. The experiences 
and visions of the mystic frequently borrow intertextual allusions from 
Scripture, as well as from other religious and classical texts, whilst 
simultaneously revealing, implicitly or explicitly, the mystic’s meditative and 
contemplative practices, and often exhorting the reader to follow in their 
devotional path. On one hand, these intertextual borrowings provide a 
rationale for the mystic’s articulation of their experience. On the other, the 
invitation for the pious reader to enter into meditative contemplation 
constitutes an offer for their imagination to work creatively with the text. 
Religious rumination on a text - be that performed internally within the text’s 
narrative by its protagonists, or externally by the reader or listener, engaged in 
the act of reception, functions as both a theoretical model and a practical 
demonstration of imaginative rationality.  
 
To contextualise these comments, it is worth a brief examination of 
Augustine’s celebrated account in Book IX of his Confessiones of an experience 
that puts these theoretical perspectives into practice, and grounds them in 
Christian experience.64 It is entirely possible that both Marguerite d’Oingt and 
Marguerite Porete would have been familiar with the narratives of the 
Confessiones, and Augustine’s recollections of his experience of the divine 
highlight four distinct aspects of his experience that resonate with their writings. 
These include: mystical transcendence realised and articulated through an 
embodied notion of the intellect, the transitory nature of mystical union with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 On the debate as to whether Augustine should be regarded as a mystic, see McGinn, The 
Foundations of Mysticism, pp. 229-231.  
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the divine, the capacity of language both to promote and limit this experience, 
and the need to communicate this experience in order for it to be recognised.  
 
Augustine writes that, shortly before his mother’s death, they were 
together in Ostia, waiting to travel back to their native North Africa. Talking 
alone, they wondered ‘qualis futura esset vita aeterna sanctorum, quam nec 
oculus vidit nec auris audivit nec in cor hominis ascendit.’65 As they speculated 
on the ‘joy of that life,’ Augustine recalls that he and his mother experienced a 
spiritual movement towards the divine, described in terms of a conceptual 
passage from the corporeal to the cognitive and beyond into their own souls: 
perambulavimus gradatim cuncta corporalia et ipsum caelum, 
unde sol et luna et stellae lucent super terram. et adhuc 
ascendebamus interius cogitando et loquendo et mirando 
opera tua. et venimus in mentes nostras et transcendimus eas, 
ut attingeremus regionem ubertatis indeficientis […].66 
 
As they spoke of the wonders of encountering divine wisdom, briefly coming 
across it ‘toto ictu cordis’, Augustine recalls that they ‘came back to the 
clattering of our mouths, where the spoken word has its beginning and its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Augustine, Confessions, vol. 1 of 2: ‘Introduction and Text,’ ed. by James J. O’Donnell (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1992), Book IX, Chapter 23, p. 113. ‘[W]hat the eternal life of the saints would 
be, which eye has not seen nor ear heard, nor hast it entered into the heart of man.’ Saint 
Augustine, Confessions, trans. by Vernon J. Bourke, The Fathers of the Church: A New 
Translation, 21 (Washington, D. C.; The Catholic University of America Press, orig. publ. 1953, 
repr. 1966, 2008), p. 251. In the accompanying notes to his translation, Bourke suggests that 
Augustine is borrowing from 1 Corinthians 2.9 here.  
66 Augustine, Confessions, p. 113; ‘we advanced step by step through all bodily things to the sky 
itself, from which the sun, moon, and stars shine out over the earth, and we ascended still 
farther into our interior cogitation, conversation, and admiration of Thy works and came to our 
own minds. Then, we transcended them, so that we might touch that realm of unfailing 
abundance.’ Saint Augustine, Confessions, pp. 251-252.  
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end.’67 Despite the fleetingness of their encounter, Augustine and his mother 
continue to imagine what eternal mystical union might entail. They envisage a 
state of silent imagelessness, in which the soul, having passed beyond itself, 
hears God’s Word spoken not ‘through’ the soul, ‘but through Himself’.68 This 
Neoplatonic description and conceptualisation of mystical union between the 
soul and the divine is strikingly similar to that described by Marguerite Porete. 
Augustine reinforces this sense of union by suggesting that the soul hears God 
‘non per linguam carnis neque per vocem angeli nec per sonitum nubis nec per 
aenigma similitudinis’; that is, not by means of a metaphor.69 Until such a state 
of total absorption in God can be attained, Augustine seems to imply, 
humanity’s conceptualisation of the mystical divine occurs through linguistic 
articulations of embodied cognition. How, and why, this is the case, will be the 
subject of this thesis.  
 
Chapter One investigates in detail the theoretical underpinnings of 
modern cognitive metaphor theory and demonstrates both its applicability to 
the paradox of medieval mystical language, as well as the methodological 
hurdles it presents. Over the course of the following five chapters, vocabulary 
and terminology move between literary, theoretical, religious, philosophical 
and at times, scientific registers of discourse, and it is important that this is not 
done carelessly, nor that it is implied that certain terms are to be used 
interchangeably. A theological referent to ‘the body’, for example, does not 
necessarily carry the same level of meaning as a philosophical or literary 
conceptualisation of that same ‘body’ or notion of ‘embodiment.’ Similarly, the 
terms ‘mysticism’, ‘cognition’ and ‘metaphor’ carry with them a rich tapestry of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Augustine, Confessions, p. 113; ‘an all-out thrust of our hearts,’ Saint Augustine, Confessions, p. 
252. Saint Augustine, Confessions, p. 252; ‘remeavimus ad strepitum oris nostri, ubi verbum et 
incipitur et finitur.’ Augusine, Confessions, p. 113. 
68  Saint Augustine, Confessions, pp. 252-253; ‘non per ea sed per se ipsum,’ Augustine, 
Confessions, p. 114.  
69 Augustine, Confessions, p. 114; ‘not through fleshly speech, or through the voice of an angel, 
or through the crash of thunder, or through the darkness of a similitude.’ Saint Augustine, 
Confessions, p. 253.  
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meaning and association; the opening chapter seeks to build on these 
introductory remarks concerning these terms and to highlight the 
methodological obstacles of a study involving parallel vocabularies. There are, 
however, considerable advantages to this approach. As Kroll and Bachrach 
comment, ‘part of the task in examining phenomena from one discipline 
utilizing the methodology of another is to develop a vocabulary of exchange.’70 
By observing that one area of human consciousness and cognitive processing 
has features in common with another field of awareness and articulation, it is 
possible to translate knowledge between the two. In this case, knowledge of 
cognitive metaphor theory can be transferred to a theoretical perspective on 
mysticism, and vice versa.  
 
 Chapter Two turns its attention to the contextual particularities of the 
textual corpus under review: two examples of mystical writing, composed at 
the close of the thirteenth century. Both Marguerite d’Oingt and Marguerite 
Porete lived and wrote sometime between c.1260 and 1310. However it must be 
borne in mind that both women wrote within respective intellectual and 
religious milieux that were highly conscious of a longer past. It is the nature of 
spiritual literature to draw ‘nourishment’ from ‘the sources of tradition,’ and 
both women’s works are no different.71 However this particular period is also 
recognised by modern scholarship as a particularly high point in the textual 
tradition of Christian mysticism, as well as a time of significant change in the 
manifestation of spiritual practices and lay literary reception.72 In the wake of 
the twelfth-century monastic reforms, the traditional Benedictine model of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Kroll and Bachrach, The Mystic Mind, p. 8.  
71  Richard Kieckhefer, Unquiet Souls: Fourteenth-Century Saints and Their Religious Milieu 
(Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1984), p. 17.  
72 McGinn, The Flowering of Mysticism, passim; Kieckhefer, Unquiet Souls, p. 150. The question of 
lay literary reception is covered in more detail in Chapter Two. Harvey J. Graff’s The Legacies of 
Literacy: Continuities and Contradictions in Western Culture and Society (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1987), especially Chapter Three, ‘New Lights of Literacy and Learning: From 
the Tenth-Eleventh to the Thirteenth Centuries,’ provides a broad summary of the changes to 
medieval modes of literacy, in terms of both theory and practice.  
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monasticism had been supplemented by a number of new orders for men and 
for women, including the Carthusians, whilst outside the cloister the contours 
of society were shifting too.73 Changes in agriculture and technology, and the 
subsequent urbanisation of Europe, had begun to catalyse new centres of 
wealth and power, challenging the traditional social alignments.74 Laypeople, 
meanwhile, began to explore other means of leading a Christian life without 
committing to formal vows, particularly in the urbanised regions of the Low 
Countries, the Rhineland, and northern Italy. Amongst these were the Beghards 
and their female counterparts, the Beguines, individuals and loosely formed 
communities, who, from around 1200, lived a combination of the active and 
contemplative life, devoted to prayer, teaching, care of the sick, and penance. 
Initially celebrated by the Church, by the thirteenth century their reputation for 
vernacular interpretation of Scripture, close relations with the friars, and public 
piety had turned certain scholars and clerics against them. Whether Marguerite 
Porete was associated with this religious collective, as her trial documents 
suggest, will be a matter for conjecture.    
 
  This environment ‘coincided,’ Barbara Newman suggests, ‘with the first 
stages of a far-reaching change in the relationship between Latin and Europe’s 
burgeoning vernaculars’, in turn posing new questions about ‘just what was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 For more introductory literature on the subject, see Giles Constable, The Reformation of the 
Twelfth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Henrietta Leyser, Hermits and 
the New Monasticism: A Study of Religious Communities in Western Europe, 1000-1150 (London: 
Macmillan, 1984); Derek Baker, “The Whole World a Hermitage”: Ascetic Renewal and the 
Crisis of Western Monasticism,’ in The Culture of Christendom: Essays in Medieval History in 
Commemoration of Denis L. T. Bethell, ed. by Marc Anthony Meyer (London: The Hambledon 
Press, 1993), pp. 207-223; Walter Simons, ‘New Forms of Religious Life in Medieval Western 
Europe,’ in The Cambridge Companion to Christian Mysticism, ed. by Amy Hollywood and Patricia 
Z. Beckman (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 80-113.  
74  Gérard Sivéry provides an overview of rural depopulation, the profound shifts in the 
structuring of late medieval rural society, and the effect of growing commercialisation in ‘Rural 
Society,’ in The New Cambridge Medieval History: Volume 5, c. 1198-1300, ed. by David Abulafia 
and Rosamond McKitterick (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 38-49. Wider 
reading on these changes in Western European society includes M. M. Postan’s classic study, 
The Medieval Economy and Society (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975); N. J. G. Pounds, An 
Economic History of Medieval Europe (London: Longman, 1974).  
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appropriate for a lay Christian to know,’ and from which sources.75 Chapter 
Two situates the figures of Marguerite d’Oingt and Marguerite Porete against 
this backdrop, and raises the questions of what it may have meant to be a 
female writer composing spiritual texts in her vernacular tongue. Once again, 
this poses more complex issues that some scholars recognise. The decision to 
write in the vernacular, Francoprovençal in the case of Marguerite d’Oingt, and 
most likely a Picard dialect in the case of Marguerite Porete, has been called a 
‘democratic’ choice, indicative of their respective desires to disseminate their 
theologies widely, amongst those ‘illiterati’ who could not read or understand 
Latin.76  
 
Yet neither Marguerite d’Oingt’s nor Marguerite Porete’s texts fit 
comfortably with this description. On one hand, the Carthusians’ reputation for 
seclusion and the survival of only one complete manuscript witness of 
Marguerite d’Oingt’s works suggest that her writing was not intended for 
circulation far beyond the charterhouse walls. On the other hand, Marguerite 
Porete’s Mirouer implies an author familiar with a wide range of sources, 
secular and religious, ancient and contemporary, some of which would 
certainly have been translated into the vernacular by the mid-late thirteenth 
century.77 Despite the text’s double condemnation for heresy, and Marguerite 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 Barbara Newman, ‘Latin and the Vernaculars,’ in The Cambridge Companion to Christian 
Mysticism, ed. by Amy Hollywood and Patricia Z. Beckman (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012), pp. 225-239. Here at p. 225.  
76 Newman, ‘Latin and the Vernaculars,’ p. 228. The Picard original of the Mirouer is the subject 
of Lerner’s article, ‘New Light,’ and is the subject of further discussion in Chapters Two and 
Four.  
77 College, Marler, and Grant identify traces of Boethius’ De Consolatione Philosophiae in Porete’s 
Mirouer, perhaps mediated through Jean de Meun’s Roman de la Rose, which Newman 
demonstrates shares much in common with Porete’s later work. Newman also illustrates 
possible borrowings from Gérard of Liège’s mid-thirteenth century treatise on fine amour, his 
Quinque incitamenta ad deum amandum ardenter, with its citations from Augustine, pseudo-
Augustine, Bernard of Clairvaux, and Richard of St Victor, developed further by the 
anonymous Règle des fins amans, a beguine rule composed around the same time as the Mirouer. 
Jean Orcibal, meanwhile, highlights Marguerite’s use of the Nicene Creed, the echoes of 
pseudo-Dionysian thought in the Mirouer, and its resemblance to passages concerning spiritual 
love and liberty by William of St Thierry in his Epistola ad Fratres de Monte Dei. William’s Epistola 
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Porete’s resultant death at the stake, the Mirouer continued to circulate and was 
translated into a number of European vernaculars, as well as into Latin.78 
Porete’s theology, meanwhile, suggests a more esoteric, specialised readership 
than the broad category of ‘the laity’ implies. In this respect, it is hardly 
surprising that it later found a home amongst the Carthusian collections of 
mystical writing at the Sheen Charterhouse in the late fifteenth or early 
sixteenth century and annotated by the Carthusian annotator and critic, James 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and Bernard’s Sermones in Cantica canticorum, Robert Taylor observes, were available in French 
versions by c. 1200. Chapter Two treats Porete’s intertextual borrowing in more detail. See 
Colledge, Marler, and Grant, ‘Introductory Interpretative Essay,’ pp. lxix-lxx; Barbara Newman, 
‘The Mirror and the Rose: Marguerite Porete’s Encounter With the Dieu d’Amours,’ in The 
Vernacular Spirit: Essays on Medieval Religious Literature, ed. by Renate Blumenfeld-Kosinski, 
Duncan Robertson, and Nancy Bradley Warren (New York and Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), pp. 
105-123; Jean Orcibal, ‘Le Miroir des simples âmes et la “secte” du Libre Esprit,’ Revue de l’histoire 
des religions, 176 (1969): 35-60; Robert Taylor, ‘The Old French “Cistercian” Translations,’ in 
Medieval Translators and Their Craft, ed. by Jeanette Beer (Kalamazoo, MI: Medieval Institute 
Publications, 1989), pp. 67-80.  
78 The Mirouer was first condemned sometime between 1296 and January 1301 by Gui II de 
Colmieu, bishop of Cambrai and publicly burnt in Valenciennes. However it appears that 
Marguerite continued to circulate her text, and was consequently brought before Philip of 
Marigny, the new bishop of Cambrai and sent to Paris by the autumn of 1308 to face the 
accusation of relapsed heresy under the jurisdiction of the Dominican William Humbert. 
Humbert ordered the destruction of all copies of the Mirouer, but to date, one Middle English 
version of the Mirouer survives in three manuscripts, London, British Library Ms. Additional 
37790, Oxford, Bodleian Library Ms. Bodley 505, and Cambridge, St John’s College Ms. 71. The 
Middle English was translated into Latin by Richard Methley at Mount Grace Priory, Yorkshire, 
in 1491, and survives in a single manuscript, Cambridge, Pembroke College Ms. 221. One 
continental Latin version of the text survives in six manuscripts, primarily of Italian provenance, 
five of which are held at the Vatican, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Mss. Chigiano B IV 41, Vat. 
Latin 4355, Rossiano 4, Latin 4953, and Chigiano C IV 85. A sixth Latin fragment survives in 
Bodleian Library Ms. Laud Latin 46. One Italian translation survives in two versions, Florence, 
Biblioteca Riccardiana Ms. 1468, and Naples, Biblioteca Nazionale Ms. XII F 5, the latter a 
revision of the former. Descriptions of these manuscripts can be found in: Romana Guarnieri, ‘Il 
movimiento del Libero Spirito,’ Archivio italiano per la storia della pieta, 4 (1965): 351-708; Paul 
Verdeyen, ‘La première tradition latine du Miroir de Marguerite Porete,’ Ons Geestelijk Erf, 58 
(1984): 388-89; Marilyn Doiron, ‘The Mirrour of Simple Souls: An Edition and Commentary,’ by 
Marguerite Porete, PhD dissertation (Fordham University, 1964); John P. H. Clark, ed. and intro., 
Speculum animarum simplicium, A Glossed Latin Version of The Mirror of Simple Souls, trans. by 
Richard Methley, Analecta Cartusiana, 266, 2 vols (Salzburg: Institut fur Anglistik und 
Amerikanistik, Universität Salzburg, 2010); Michael G. Sargent,  ‘Medieval and Modern 
Readership of Marguerite Porete’s Mirouer des simples ames anienties: The French and English 
Traditions’, in Middle English Religious Writing in Practice: Texts, Readers, and Transformations, ed. 
by Nichole R. Rice (Turnhout: Brepols, 2013), pp. 47-89; Sargent, ‘Medieval and modern 
readership of Marguerite Porete’s Mirouer des simples ames anienties: the manuscripts of the 
continental Latin and Italian tradition,’ In principio fut interpres: The Medieval 
Translator/Traduir au Moyen Age 15, ed. by Alessandra Petrina (Turnhout: Brepols, 2013), pp. 
85-96. 
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Grenehalgh.79 This brief discussion of the role of the vernacular in late medieval 
French mystical writing demonstrates that its development, use, circulation, 
and reception were a far more delicate and complex matter than Newman’s 
notion of ‘democratisation’ suggests. As Kathryn Kerby-Fulton notes, the 
notion of a ‘vernacular canon’ in this period is something of a modern 
construction. ‘Vernacularity’, she writes, ‘was […] a boundary for very few of 
the writers and thinkers’ of the later Middle Ages.80 As a result, this thesis does 
not explore the notion of vernacular reception in isolation from its Latin 
counterparts, but rather regards it more holistically within its broader cultural 
context.  
 
That said, the particularities of the vernacular variants used by 
Marguerite d’Oingt and Marguerite Porete continue to intrigue, and form an 
important part of their reception history. The Carthusian composed her Pagina 
meditationum in Latin, her Miroir and hagiography of Béatrix d’Ornacieux in 
Francoprovençal, and her letters in a form of Middle French, interwoven with 
words and phrases borrowed from Francoprovençal. 81  These works were 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 See Michael G. Sargent, ‘The Transmission by the English Carthusians of Some Late Medieval 
Spiritual Writings,’ Journal of Ecclesiastical History, 27, 3 (July 1976): 225-240; Sargent, James 
Grenehalgh as Textual Critic, 2 volumes, Analecta Cartusiana, 85 (Salzburg: Institut für Anglistisk 
und Amerikanistik, 1984); Nicolas Watson, ‘Melting Into God the English Way: Deification in 
the Middle English Version of Marguerite Porete’s Mirouer des simples ames anienties,’ in Prophets 
Abroad: The Reception of Continental Holy Women in Late-Medieval England, ed. by Rosalynn 
Voaden (Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 1996), pp. 19-49; Marlene Cré, ‘Women In the Charterhouse? 
Julian of Norwich’s Revelations of Divine Love and Marguerite Porete’s Mirror of Simple Souls in 
British Library, MS Additional 37790,’ in Writing Religious Women: Female Spiritual and Textual 
Practices in Late Medieval England, ed. by Denis Renevey and Christiania Whitehead (Llandybic: 
Dinefwr Press, 2000), pp. 43-62; Kathryn Kerby-Fulton, Books Under Suspicion: Censorship and 
Tolerance of Revelatory Writing in Late Medieval England (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 2006), especially pp. 272-296.  
80 Kathryn Kerby-Fulton, Books Under Suspicion, p. 16. Kerby-Fulton remarks: ‘Studies of 
vernacularity itself are valid and important in their own right and have been revealing in their 
own way, but they have come to monopolise what we do and artificially fence-off bodies of 
literature in a way that would have puzzled literate Richardians.’  
81 Les Œuvres de Marguerite d’Oingt, ed. and intro. by Antonin Duraffour, Pierre Gardette, and 
Pauline Durdilly, Publications de l’institute de linguistique romane de Lyon, 21 (Paris: Société 
d’édition ‘Les belles lettres’, 1965), pp. 63-64. Marguerite d’Oingt’s editors suggest that she was 
most comfortable composing in Francoprovençal, but sufficiently literate in Middle French to 
correspond with those who did not use her dialect. 
	   36	  
collected sometime after her death in 1310, along with three posthumous 
miracle accounts attributed to her; the collection survives in a fourteenth-
century manuscript, Grenoble Municipal Library, Ms. 5785R. 82  Two 
seventeenth-century copies, Grenoble Ms. 5786R, with parallel French 
translations, and an uncatalogued variant, housed in the archives of the Grande 
Chartreuse, whose spine reads ‘66b, 7 ORNA 5’ and whose contents echo those 
of Ms. 5786R but are contained in a different order, remain unedited.83 A fourth 
Provençal witness, dated to the fourteenth century and partially published in 
1953, is judged by d’Oingt’s modern editors, Antonin Durraffour, Pierre 
Gardette, and Pauline Durdilly, to be ‘infidèle’ and ‘bavard.’ They rather 
scathingly write: ‘le scribe provençal […] lui ajoute des explications de son cru, 
souvent inutiles, parfois obscures. Cette version ne peut guère servir à 
améliorer le texte de A [Ms. 5785R].’84  
 
Tracing the textual history of Marguerite Porete’s Mirouer des simples 
ames is a more complex task, and is considered in more detail in Chapters Two 
and Four.  Of interest here is the Middle French version of the Mirouer, extant in 
one surviving manuscript, Ms. Chantilly, Musée Condé F xiv 26, dating to 
c.1500. This is the witness presented by Romana Guarnieri in 1965 linking the 
historical figure of the heretic Marguerite Porete to the Mirouer, and forms the 
basis for Guarnieri’s 1986 transcription of the text.85 Although Robert Lerner 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 Durraffour, Gardette, and Durdilly provide a paleographic study of, and historical notes on, 
Grenoble Ms. 5785R in Les Œuvres, pp. 15-20. All quotations given here are from the edition of 
this manuscript by Durrafour et al. English translations are taken from Renate Blumenfeld-
Kosinski’s translation of Durrafour’s edition, unless otherwise stated. See The Writings of 
Margaret of Oingt, Medieval Prioress and Mystic, Translated From the Latin and Francoprovençal 
With an Introduction, Notes, and Interpretative Essay, by Renate Blumenfeld-Kosinski, Focus 
Library of Medieval Women (Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 1990). The numbered paragraphs in 
both the edition and the translation are the same, and therefore only provided for the French 
quotations. 
83 Les Œuvres, pp. 20-22. 
84 Les Œuvres, p. 23.  
85 Romana Guarnieri first published her thesis connecting one of the condemned articles from 
Porete’s trial to the Mirouer in the Osservatore Romano (16th June 1946) under the title, ‘Lo 
specchio delle anime semplice e Margherita Porete.’ Guarnieri later published her transcription 
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has recently and convincingly posited that the Middle English translation may 
point towards a more faithful version of the now lost original version of the 
Mirouer, his hypothesis requires further testing before the Middle English 
tradition can supersede the Middle French as the scholarly model of choice for 
analyses of the text.86  
 
One final remark about Porete’s Mirouer ought to be clarified before 
turning to a synopsis of Chapters Three, Four, and Five. Porete’s text is not 
named in her trial documents, and a glance at the bibliography will reveal that 
modern scholars of Porete’s text have long been divided and confused as to her 
work’s correct title. Of the two in use, this thesis follows Blanca Garí in 
accepting the shorter of the two, Le Mirouer des simples ames, as the correct one.87 
The longer title, Le Mirouer des simples ames anienties et qui seulement demourent en 
vouloir et desir d’amour, is the result of scribal error. Derived from the Chantilly 
manuscript’s table of contents and first used as a title by Guarnieri in her 
edition of the text, the longer title is a reproduction of an unpunctuated passage 
in chapter 13. Here, Dame Amour responds to Raison’s plea that the work’s  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
of the Chantilly manuscript as ‘Le mirouer des simples ames anienties et qui seulement 
demourent en vouloir et desir d’amour,’ in Romana Guarnieri, ‘Il movimiento del Libero 
Spirito’. The edition is at pp. 513-635.  
86 Lerner suggests that the Middle English translation is a closer descendant of the now lost Old 
French archetype of the Mirouer on several counts. He notes that the rivers mentioned in 
chapter 82 are ‘Oise or Muese’, the names of two rivers in the Hainault region. In the Middle 
French Chantilly manuscript, these are rendered ‘Aise ou Sene.’ The shift, Lerner suggests, 
demonstrates that the Middle French copy may have been made for a Paris-centric readership, 
rather than one located in the Low Countries as Porete’s readership would have been. The 
Middle English translations also contain the ‘best witness for the wording of’ the three 
favourable referees of the text, ‘frère Ion of Querayn,’ ‘daun Frank, chantour of Þe abbey of 
Viliers,’ and Godfrey of Fontaines. The Chantilly manuscript omits them completely, and the 
Latin translation gives considerably less detail. Lerner’s final pieces of evidence for his 
preference of the Middle English over the Middle French are based on his theory that certain 
phrases are doctrinally ‘more daring’ and ‘more consistent with Marguerite’s overall thought,’ 
but require further investigation, including comparisons with the other Latin translations, as 
well as the Italian tradition, of the Mirouer in order to be consolidated. See ‘New Light,’ pp. 97-
103. See also Nicholas Watson, ‘Melting Into God the English Way.’ 
87 Garí writes of Guarnieri’s longer title, ‘es posible que se trate de un error,’ in Blanca Garí and 
Alicia Padrós-Wolff, trans., El Espejo de las almas simples, El Árbol del paraíso, 45 (Barcelona: 
Icaria, 1995), p. 59, n. 1. See also Luisa Muraro, ‘Le Mirouer des simples ames de Marguerite 
Porete: Les avatars d’un titre,’ Ons Geestelijk Erf, 70, 1 (1996): 3-9.  
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‘doubles mots’ are explained once again for the benefit of the ‘communes 
gens.’88 Dame Amour replies: 
ou sont ces doubles motz, que vous me priez que je distincte et 
declaire pour le prouffit de ceulx pour lesquieulx vous faites a 
nous si humble requeste, et aussi pour les auditeurs de ce livre, 
lequel nous nommerons le “Mirouer des Simples Ames, qui en 
vouloir et en desir demourent”? [my emphasis]. 89 
 
Left to stand, the long title ironically pronounces the function of the book 
as being antithetical to the ultimate spiritual state of the ame adnientie, who is 
without both will and desire. Luisa Muraro comments that if the term ‘mirouer’ 
is given (one of) its medieval synonyms, ‘manual for’, it appears odd that 
Porete would write a ‘manual for simple souls who are annihilated and remain 
only in the will and desire of love.’ Annihilated souls ‘n’ont besoin de rien […] 
et encore moins d’un manuel où se mirer.’90  Following the insertion of modern 
punctuation into the passage, however, as Suzanne Kocher suggests, the 
passage reads as follows: ‘the hearers of this book, which we will title, The 
Mirror of Simple Souls, who remain in will and desire.’91 The shorter title reduces 
the disagreement as to the text’s intended and inscribed audiences. Rather than 
merely addressing the elite, the esoteric, and the ‘noble’, as Joanna Magure 
Robinson proposes, Porete’s Mirouer is a text that anticipates and confronts the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 Mirouer, ch. 13, p. 54; ‘double words’, ‘common folk,’ Mirror, p. 94.  
89 Mirouer, ch. 13, p. 54; ‘where are these double words, which you pray me to distinguish and 
clarify for the profit of those whose sake you make to us such a humble request, and also for the 
hearers of this book, which we will name the  “Mirror of Simple Souls Who Remain in Will and 
Desire.”?’ Mirror, p. 94.  
90 Muraro, ‘Les avatars d’un titre,’ p. 6.  
91 Kocher, Allegories of Love, p. 12.  
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very essence of humanity’s emotional and cognitive faculties, will and desire, 
and the complexities of their relationship with a divine Other.92 
 
Chapters Three and Four examine Marguerite d’Oingt’s and Marguerite 
Porete’s respective mystical works in close detail. Despite a peak in nineteenth-
century scholarly interest in the Carthusian prioress’s writings due to their 
philological importance as an early example of written Francoprovençal, 
comparatively little attention has been paid to her compositions in contrast to 
the volumes dedicated to other mystical writers of the thirteenth and fourteenth 
centuries. 93  Where Marguerite d’Oingt’s writings have caught the eye of 
modern scholars, her work has tended to be viewed in one of two lights; either 
as a foil to other, more poetic works of medieval women’s mysticism, or as 
textual evidence of purportedly ‘objective truths’ about the state of the Church 
in the later Middle Ages or what it meant ‘to write as a woman in the Middle 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 Joanne Maguire Robinson, Nobility and Annihilation in Marguerite Porete’s ‘Mirror of Simple 
Souls’, SUNY Series in Western Esoteric Traditions (Albany, NY: State University of New York 
Press, 2001), especially at pp. 32-34.  
93 In his analysis of the Latin Pagina meditationum, Victor Le Clerc writes that Marguerite’s prose 
is sprinkled with ‘mots étrangers à la langue latine’ but that it displays nothing of the ‘barbarie 
sauvage qui infestait alors trop souvent les oeuvres monacales.’ To which oeuvres Le Clerc refers 
is not clear. Marguerite’s Francoprovençal Meditations are, Le Clerc argues, written with ‘moins 
d’originalité [...] moins de mysticisme et d’obscurité que dans d’autres Méditations chrétiennes 
écrites par des femmes, comme Gertrude et Mechtilde,’ but nevertheless, he concludes, it is a 
piece written with all the ‘élans de la foi et de l’amour [...] dont se composent, dans les écrivains 
ascétiques, les elevations à Dieu.’ In ‘Marguerite de Duyn, prieur de la chartreuse de Poletin,’ in 
Histoire littéraire de la France, vol. 20 of 43 (Paris: L’Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres, 
1842). Reprinted in 1971 (Lichtenstein: Kraus Reprint). Here at p. 307 and pp. 310-311.  Modern 
treatments of Marguerite d’Oingt’s works include: Catherine Müller, ‘How To Do Things With 
Mystical Language: Marguerite d’Oingt’s Performative Writing,’ in Performance and 
Transformation: New Approaches to Late Medieval Spirituality, ed. by Mary A. Suydam and Joanna 
E. Ziegler (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999), pp. 27-45; Catherine M. Müller, Marguerite 
Porete et Marguerite d’Oingt de l’autre côté du miroir (New York: P. Lang, 1999); Jessica Barr, 
Willing to Know God: Dreamers and Visionaries in the Later Middle Ages (Columbus, OH: The Ohio 
State University Press, 2010), especially Chapter Two, ‘Active Reading and the Language of 
God’; Sean L. Field, ‘Agnes of Harcourt, Felipa of Porcelet, and Marguerite of Oingt: Women 
Writing About Women at the End of the Thirteenth Century,’ Church History, 76, 2 (June 2007): 
298-329; Stephanie Paulsell, ‘Scriptio divina: Writing and the Experience of God in the Works of 
Marguerite d’Oingt,’ PhD dissertation (University of Chicago, 1993).  
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Ages.’94 Chapter Three suggests that neither of these perspectives account fully 
for the complexities of d’Oingt’s prose, nor do they shed light on her 
conceptualisation of divine experience. Instead, it proposes a reading of her 
Pagina meditationum, Meditationes, and Li Via Seiti Biatrix Virgina de Ornaciu, 
which draws attention to her use of metaphor, analysed using cognitive 
metaphor theory, and in particular, to the function of a key structural concept in 
all of her writing: THE BODY IS A CONTAINER, discussed earlier. Tracing this 
conceptual metaphor across her corpus of writing reveals a highly experiential 
sense of mystical awareness, in which language is intimately connected to 
mystical knowledge. Textuality, corporality, and specularity are all shown to 
share similar conceptual structures that frame her narrative and provide an 
internal coherence and shape to the three works. Animating a pastorally-driven 
collection of works, Marguerite’s metaphors are, Chapter Three proposes, 
designed to be lived by.  
 
Chapter Four turns its attention to the Mirouer des simples ames, the dense 
and ambitious work by the condemned heretic Marguerite Porete. The work 
was initially banned by the Bishop of Cambrai, Guy de Colmieu sometime 
before the period 1296-1306, but Porete appears to have continued to circulate 
her writings, and by late 1308 was imprisoned in Paris under the watch of the 
Dominican William of Paris. Between March and May 1310, a collective of 
theologians and canon lawyers from the University of Paris scrutinised fifteen 
articles extracted from Marguerite’s controversial text, and, on 1st June 1310, she 
was burnt at the stake in an event often referred to in Henry Charles Lea’s 
phrase as ‘the first formal auto-de-fé of which we have cognizance at Paris.’95 In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Renate Blumenfeld-Kosinski, ‘The Idea of Writing as Authority and Conflict in the Works of 
Margaret of Oingt,’ in The Writings of Margaret of Oingt: Medieval Prioress and Mystic, Translated 
From the Latin and Francoprovençal With an Introduction, Notes, and Interpretative Essay, 
trans. Renate Blumenfeld-Kosinski, Focus Library of Medieval Women (Cambridge: D. S. 
Brewer, 1990), pp. 71-83. Here at p. 71.  
95 Henry Charles Lea, A History of the Inquisition of the Middle Ages, vol. 1 of 3 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010, orig. publ. 1888), pp. 122-123.  
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contrast to Marguerite d’Oingt’s oeuvre, Porete’s writings have been subject to 
far more intense scholarly scrutiny. Since Guarnieri’s reunion of the then 
presumed anonymous text with the historical figure of its author in 1965, the 
Mirouer has been translated twice into English, twice into modern French, twice 
into Spanish, and once into German and Italian.96  The text’s complicated 
manuscript tradition, the controversies of Marguerite Porete’s trial and her 
connections with the higher echelons of the ecclesial and scholarly worlds, and 
the actual extent of her heresy, are the subject of continuing debate and outlined 
in more detail in the chapter. The ways in which Porete articulates new patterns 
of conceptualising and loving God, figuratively and creatively, demonstrate 
that Porete’s use of metaphor functions as a conceptual device to keeps its 
protagonist, l’Ame, wavering on the brink of a state of unitas indistinctionis with 
the divine. As with the analysis of Marguerite d’Oingt’s writings, this 
discussion is anchored in the tropes of the codex, the body, and the mirror and 
their relationship to a specular and mystical epistemology. Porete’s 
epistemology lies not in the specifics of literal language, but in its use as a 
means to unlock new cognitive registers of meaning. As Nicholas Watson 
suggests, Marguerite Porete’s use of metaphor ‘is not merely a rhetorical trope 
but almost a metaphysical principle’ in her effort to verbalise the ineffability of 
mystical awareness.97  
 
In their alignment of mysticism and ‘conceptual embodiment,’ both 
Chapters Three and Four engage, to a certain extent, with feminist and post-
feminist critical interests in the medieval representation of the female body, a 
particularly vocal scholarly tradition in the field of visionary and spiritual 
discourse. In her evocatively titled Speculum de l’autre femme, for example, Luce 
Irigaray writes that the mode of communication she terms ‘la mystérique,’ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 Romana Guarnieri, ed. ‘Le mirouer des simples ames anienties et qui seulement demourent 
en vouloir et desir d’amour,’ in Romana Guarnieri, ‘Il movimiento del Libero Spirito,’ pp. 513-
635. See the Bibliography for details of modern translations of the full text of the Mirouer.  
97 Nicholas Watson, ‘Translating the Untranslatable: Marguerite Porete and the Mirouer des 
Simples Ames,’ New Comparison, 12 (1991): 124-137. Here at p. 131.  
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constitutes ‘le seul [lieu] où dans l’histoire de l’Occident la femme parle, agit, 
aussi publiquement.’98 The hysteria, mystery, and femaleness of ‘la mystérique,’ 
and particularly that of the late medieval period, Irigaray suggests, causes the 
female, ‘les plus ignorants’ to be ‘les plus éloquents.’ 99 Women writing as 
women, critics such as Irigaray and Hélène Cixous have argued, demand and 
portray a consciously female, and feminised, identity in their works.100  
 
 The application of feminist theory to medieval writing has generated a 
significant corpus of secondary literature concerning the depiction, and 
sometimes conflation, of medieval women’s voices, identities, and bodies, 
particularly in relation to poetic and spiritual expression.101 Yet while some 
recent studies of Passion piety, imitatio Christi, the Resurrection, saints’ vitae and 
their relics, sexuality and chastity, performativity, and ascetic traditions of 
abstinence and self-mortification have shed new light on the role of the body in 
Christian discourse, this thesis’ approach to ‘the body’ and ‘bodily experience’ 
in mystical writing differs from much of the contemporary discourse 
concerning the gendered, sexualized and politicized body in Christian 
spirituality.102 Rather than following the recent critical tendency to view the 
body as a locus for sexuality and desire, or as symbolic of the marginalised, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 Luce Irigaray, Speculum de l’autre femme (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1974), p. 238. ‘[T]he only 
place in the history of the West in which the woman speaks and acts so publicly.’Speculum of the 
Other Woman, trans. by Gillian C. Gill (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985). p. 191.  
99 Irigaray, Speculum de l’autre femme, p. 239; ‘the most ignorant’ to be ‘the most eloquent.’ 
Speculum of the Other Woman, p. 192.  
100 See Hélène Cixous’ classic essay, ‘Le rire de la méduse,’ in Le rire de la méduse et autres ironies 
(Paris: Galilée, 2010), pp. 35-68, for her argument that women’s writing constitutes a call to 
women to free themselves from the repression of men and reclaim their place in history. 
Originally published in L’Arc (1975), 61: 39-54.  
101 Examples of this approach include Joan M. Ferrante, Woman as Image in Medieval Literature: 
From the Twelfth Century to Dante (New York and London: Colombia University Press, 1975); the 
collection of essays entitled Seeking the Woman in Late Medieval and Renaissance Writings: Essays in 
Feminist Contextual Criticism, ed. by Sheila Fisher and Janet E. Halley (Knoxville: University of 
Tennessee Press, 1989); E. Jane Burns, Bodytalk: When Women Speak in Old French Literature 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993); Gail Ashton, The Generation of Identity in 
Late Medieval Hagiography: Speaking the Saint (London and New York: Routledge, 2000).  
102 This claim is dealt with more fully in Chapters Three and Four, which include bibliographic 
details of the main advances in the field.  
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grotesque, and the abject, this discussion assesses the role of the body in terms 
of its capacity to act as an organising agent of, and vehicle for, mystical 
expression, drawing on the notion that metaphor and embodiment are 
intimately related, mentioned above.103 It regards the structural image schema 
of the body, governed by a contrast between the ‘inner’ and the ‘outer,’ as 
constituting one of the mind’s most basic means by which to conceive of itself, 
and suggests that by using this schema as a thematic foundation for the 
articulation of their experience, mystics are able to coherently explore and 
explain the suprasensory experience underpinning mystical literature.104 As a 
result, the perspective taken here towards ‘the body’ is relatively free of gender-
orientated discussion and does not make a distinction between male and female 
articulations of mystical experience. 
 
This draws on recent findings in the field of embodied cognition and the 
notion that it is as ‘physical beings, bounded and set off from the rest of the 
world by the surface of our skins, [that] we experience the rest of the world as 
outside us.’105 As Lakoff and Johnson summarise, ‘Each of us is a container, 
with a bounding surface and an in-out orientation.’106 The structural metaphor 
of ‘containment’ helps to organise, and coherently articulate to a discourse 
community who share a similar schematic comprehension, the mind’s 
experience of its immediate environment, its spatial orientation, its composition, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 Caroline Walker Bynum presents a perceptive critique of medieval religious ‘body criticism’ 
in ‘Why All the Fuss About the Body? A Medievalist’s Perspective,’ Critical Enquiry, 22 (1995): 1-
33.  
104 Commenting on how Augustine distinguishes between the ‘inner’ and the ‘outer’ man in De 
Trinitate, 12.1, Denys Turner writes, ‘human self-awareness appears to be structured by these 
facts so that our ways of perceiving ourselves are governed in some contrast between “inner” 
and “outer” […]. Thus do the spatial relations of the body to the “world” become a metaphor 
for consciousness in relation to its objects. […] [T]he language of interiority is, at this level of 
generality, neutral as between any particular epistemology whatever – it is as near to being a 
“pre-cultural” and “natural” fact of human cognitivity as any is.’ The Darkness of God, p. 91. 
105 Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, p. 29. For an overview of the recent theoretical 
advances in the field of embodied cognition, see Lawrence Shapiro, Embodied Cognition, New 
Problems of Philosophy (London and New York: Routledge, 2011). 
106 Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, p. 29.  
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and its interaction with others. Applied in this context, the BODY AS CONTAINER 
metaphor allows for a sensitive reading of Marguerite d’Oingt’s and Marguerite 
Porete’s writings that focuses closely on how the mystical protagonist presents 
and authenticates her experience linguistically, and in turn, conceptually, 
without recourse to modern boundaries of sex and gender.  
 
This perspective takes its influence from the reception history of the 
manuscript British Library Additional 37990, one of the Carthusian Middle 
English translations of the by then anonymised Mirouer.107 Contained alongside 
copies of Julian of Norwich’s Revelations of Divine Love, Henry Suso’s Horologium 
Sapientiae, and Thomas de Froidmont’s Golden Epistle, this codex appears not to 
ascribe the same role to sex and gender in mystical writings that many modern 
scholars appear anxious to do. As Marleen Cré observes, ‘[t]he present-day 
critical and interpretative angle that interprets all spiritual texts by women as 
expressing a typically female spirituality seems not to have been shared by the 
readers of Amherst.’108 In this context, the Mirouer’s author is assumed by the 
scribe, ‘M.N.’ to have been a man. This may, of course, suggest that most 
medieval authors were (and indeed are) assumed to be male, yet it also points 
towards the fact that the spirituality presented by the Mirouer did not strike M. 
N. as being manifestly ‘female’ in its composition. As the explorations of 
Chapter Three demonstrate, Marguerite d’Oingt’s writings draw heavily on 
male-authored sources; as a result, there is little in either set of works to suggest 
that a specifically gender-orientated reading is either consistent with the 
contexts the texts were produced in, or illuminative of their author’s thought. 
These chapters argue that Marguerite d’Oingt and Marguerite Porete’s 
respective conceptualisations of corporeity and ‘the body’ form are quite similar 
and form a coherent platform for ordering and expressing their divine 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 The other two Middle English manuscripts are BL Add. 37990, Cambridge, St. John’s 
College, ms. 71, and Oxford, Bodleian Library, ms. Bodley 505, both dated to the mid-1400s.  
108 ‘Amherst’ is the former name of British Library Ms. Additional 37990. Cré, ‘Women in the 
Charterhouse?,’ p. 43. 
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experience, albeit in very different ways and with differing pastoral, intellectual 
and theological emphases.  
 
The final chapter brings the seemingly very different writings of the two 
women into closer focus, and returns to the challenge of exploring to what 
extent Marguerite d’Oingt’s and Marguerite Porete’s literary signs or symbols 
signify something of how the mystic ‘sees’ the divine. This prompts a return to 
the modern tendency to categorise mysticism in some way, the salient features 
of how the mystic ‘sees’ the divine defining the type of experience she has 
undergone. Chapter Five demonstrates how problematic a venture this is, and 
proposes that an assessment of the metaphorical language in both women’s 
writings points, not towards a need for division in mystical writing, but rather 
towards a continuity in their modes of expression. Where previous critics have 
emphasised polarity, this discussion will instead propose that both writers’ 
works can be placed on a scale of mystical cognition, whose conceptual 
framework might be seen to be structured by two recently proposed ideas in 
the fields of cognitive metaphor theory and mystical criticism respectively: 
‘imaginative rationality’ and ‘imaginative theology’.109 Marguerite d’Oingt’s 
and Marguerite Porete’s writings may be read as representations of mystical, 
metaphorical worlds, in which metaphor functions as the organising principle 
of their modes of expression. As such, both women’s works participate in a 
‘reality’ within the paradigm of those worlds; a ‘reality’ made possible by 
metaphor’s ability to unite two modes of thought, reason and the 
imagination.110 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 ‘Imaginative theology’ is a phrase created by Barbara Newman in God and the Goddesses: 
Vision, Poetry, and Belief in the Middle Ages (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003), 
in particular at pp. 292-301. The ramifications of the term are explored in Chapter Five.  
110 Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, p. 192.  
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It is to cognitive metaphor theory that this discussion now turns. In 
examining metaphorical language, and the conceptual structures that underpin 
it, the critic or scholar is exposed to a series of revelations, from the negation of 
the literal, to the realisation that the telos of the metaphor may transcend the 
linguistic structures that ground it, and may even point towards something 
human language cannot capture. As such, thinking about metaphor opens up a 
vocabulary and theoretical framework which may provide another means of 
understanding and articulating the enigmatic and paradoxical phenomenon 
that is mystical thought and its representation within the logos-centric Christian 
tradition, whilst navigating the cultural contours of pious expression in the later 
Middle Ages. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
The Metaphorical Utterance and the Mystical Mode: Caught Between 
Experience and Expression 
 
Metaphor is both the linguistic and the conceptual analogue to mystical 
experience. This is not to suggest that one mode of expression may be 
substituted for the other: not all that is metaphorical need necessarily belong to 
the realm of the mystical, and cognitive metaphor processing is not a re-
creation of mystical union. Rather, metaphor, much like mystical writing, asks 
its user or recipient to adjust their perceptual abilities; to move away from a 
world-view structured by fixed referents, by subjects and objects, and to be 
drawn into a negotiation of meaning that re-formulates their understanding of 
reality and truth.  
 
Mystical expression demands much of its reader; its often enigmatic web 
of paradoxical statements, its reversing of natural phenomena, or, in the case of 
Marguerite Porete, its apparent rejections of reason, require a reappraisal of 
what is possible within the world of the text and ask that the audience engages 
with the protagonist according to a new matrix, in an otherwise unimaginable 
relationship with the divine other. This is one of the main tenets of hermeneutic 
theory. Reader-response criticism has long suggested that the meaning of a text 
lies in the interaction between author and audience, or speaker and listener.1 It 
is in participating in the perpetual dialectic of concealment and revelation, and 
of the implicit illuminating the explicit, two prevalent features of mystical 
writing, that a reader engages with a text, and in doing so, establishes new 
meaning, or a new world.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 A classic work in the field is Wolfgang Iser’s ‘Interaction Between Text and Reader,’ in The 
Reader in the Text: Essays on Audience and Interpretation, ed. by Susan R. Suleiman and Inge 
Crosman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), pp. 106-119.  
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The following account of modern cognitive theories of metaphor 
demonstrates that metaphor functions conceptually and hermeneutically in 
much the same way. As a linguistic entity and as a conceptual structure, 
metaphor’s meaning lies in the ‘gap’ between the source and the target domains, 
within which the mapping process takes place. Starting with the dominant 
features of the linguist George Lakoff’s conceptual theory of metaphor, 
developed in conjunction with the philosopher Mark Johnson, and articulated 
in their seminal study Metaphors We Live By, the purpose of this chapter is to 
test elements of their theory of ‘cognitive metaphor’ against the interpretative 
possibilities and obstacles presented by a corpus of medieval mystical writing.2  
 
Given the complexity of the subject matter, however, it soon becomes 
apparent that no theoretical framework can ever wholly capture the conceptual 
workings of either the metaphorical or the mystical utterance.3 Instead, in 
proposing an interpretative methodology with which to explore the writings of 
the two very different thirteenth-century French mystics, Marguerite d’Oingt 
and Marguerite Porete, this study draws on the work of a number of scholars 
working across the two fields and with both medieval and modern material, 
principally Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner, Paul Ricoeur, Bernard McGinn, 
Steven Katz, and Robert Forman. The sensitivities of the chronological gap 
between medieval mysticism and modern metaphor theory cannot be 
underestimated, and flagging the resultant methodological issues here has 
important consequences for the unfolding of the subsequent four chapters. 
Starting with a broader perspective on the conceptual underpinnings of both 
metaphor and mystical expression will reveal that the process of finding 
meaning in mystical writing is strikingly similar to the cognitive frameworks 
involved in finding meaning in metaphor. Ultimately, a mystical text is both the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, passim.  
3 Ellen Winner remarks, ‘The lesson to be learned is that there is no “pure” measure of 
metaphor comprehension.’ See The Point of Words: Children’s Understanding of Metaphor and Irony 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988), p. 47. See also Steen, Understanding Metaphor 
in Literature, especially pp. 9-10. 
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locus and the product of its own metaphorical content, and to view the two as 
participating in a symbiotic relationship is to be alive to the questions, if not 
always the answers, they pose concerning the interpretative, imaginative, and 
transformative potency of language, thought, and belief.  
 
A brief overview of Lakoff and Johnson’s modelling of cognitive 
metaphor theory and main terminology was provided in the introduction; 
namely that linguistic metaphorical expression is composed of two ‘domains,’ 
the ‘target domain,’ the more abstract entity being described, and the ‘source 
domain,’ the realm in terms of which the target domain is being illustrated. In 
mapping one domain onto another, the target becomes clearer because elements 
from the source domain, deemed to bear a resemblance to aspects of the target, 
highlight certain qualities of the target domain whilst simultaneously 
disguising others.4 Different source domains can be mapped onto a single target 
domain, which allow the metaphor’s focus to be adjusted in accordance with 
the various qualities of the target deemed essential by the user or audience.5 
This ability of the source domain to highlight or eclipse selective elements of the 
target domain reinforces the observations made above concerning textual 
hermeneutics, and finds a particular analogue in mystical writing and its 
anxieties concerning the referential qualities of language.  
 
At the heart of Christian mystical expression lies a paradoxical need to 
communicate an experience of God that is rendered impossible by the 
inadequacy, or fallen nature, of human language. An abundance of descriptive 
imagery is countered by the recognition that its referential object is impossible 
to objectify, strikingly articulated by the sixth-century Greek-Syriac writer later 
known as Pseudo-Dionysius in his treatise The Mystical Theology, in which he 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, pp. 10-13 and p. 61.  
5 Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, p. 28.  
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considers the various ways of naming God.6  Developing a referential spectrum 
ranging from the ‘symbolic’ to the ‘conceptual’ properties of God, Pseudo-
Dionysius moves between the tangible (the ‘images […], forms, figures, and 
instruments’) and the abstract (the ‘good, existent, life, wisdom, power’) in his 
desire to describe the divine which, even as it describes, requires a corrective, 
an ‘un-saying.’7 This tension becomes the motor behind the discourse: it is the 
power of language to both illuminate and eclipse that makes his mystical 
thought meaningful. The opening prayer to The Mystical Theology provides a 
classic example: 
Trinity!! Higher than any being, 
 any divinity, any goodness! 
[…] 
Amid the deepest shadow 
 they pour overwhelming light 
 on what is most manifest. 
Amid the whole unsensed and unseen 
  they completely fill our sightless minds 
  with treasures beyond all beauty.8 
 
 
This affirmative, or kataphatic, outpouring serves only to illustrate its 
inadequacy by failing to capture a complete rendering of God and turns to 
negative, or apophatic, theology; mystical discourse caught between the creative 
and the reductive, with the ever-elusive point of reference and the text’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Pseudo-Dionysius, ‘The Mystical Theology,’ in Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works, trans. by 
Colin Luibhéid and Paul Rorem, Classics of Western Spirituality (New York: Paulist Press, 
1987), pp. 133-142.  
7 Pseudo-Dionysius, ‘The Mystical Theology,’ p. 139. On ‘un-saying’ or ‘speaking away’ in 
Pseudo-Dionysius, see Michael A. Sells, Mystical Languages of Unsaying (Chicago: The University 
of Chicago Press, 1994), especially pp. 2-3 and pp. 36-40.  
8 Pseudo-Dionysius, ‘The Mystical Theology,’ p. 135.  
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hermeneutic key located somewhere in the gap between the two.9 A similar 
dialectic can be found in Marguerite d’Oingt’s and Marguerite Porete’s prose.10 
Both women use vivid imagery to depict their respective mystical experiences, 
and yet, at the height of their descriptions, acknowledge that language fails 
them. Porete’s Ame, for example, speaks of ‘ung desir boullant de l’amour,’ and 
of ‘deffroissant et debrisant soy mesmes,’ followed by falling into nothingness. 
The Soul plunges into the abyss in which paradoxically ‘non veoir luy fait veoir 
parfaicetement elles mesmes.’11 This striking juxtaposition between intense 
feeling, nothingness, and apparent revelation (‘veoir parfaicetement’) is more 
than mere rhetorical flourish. As in the Pseudo-Dionysius, Porete’s mystical 
meaning is located neither in the affirmative domain of love nor in the 
nothingness of the abyss, but rather in the space between, the ‘non veoir fait 
veoir.’ Language ceases to behave referentially and transforms into a mediating 
mode: it may not point towards God, but rather it mediates the soul’s passage 
beyond its world-view, carrying it into a higher domain. 
 
In this context, language delineates the systematic withdrawal from 
earthly signs and signifiers, not only revealing the extent of the mystical 
experience, but also structuring and motivating it too. This is the crux of Lakoff 
and Johnson’s conceptual metaphor theory. Linguistic expressions reveal not 
only how a given culture’s language is constructed, but also how that culture’s 
conceptual system functions.12 Underpinning a metaphorical utterance is the 
framework of the speaker’s thought processes, conditioned by a series of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 ‘[T]he more it climbs,’ Pseudo-Dionysius writes, ‘the more language falters, and when it has 
passed up and beyond the ascent, it will turn silent completely, since it will finally be at one 
with him that is indescribable.’ ‘The Mystical Theology,’ p. 139. 
10  The influence of Neoplatonic Dionysian thought on Marguerite Porete is widely 
acknowledged. See, for example, Paul Rorem, Pseudo-Dionysius: A Commentary on the Texts and 
an Introduction to Their Influence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 224.  
11 Mirouer, ch. 118, pp. 320-328. ‘[A] boiling desire of love’; ‘breaking and bruising the self’; ‘not-
seeing makes her see herself perfectly.’ Mirror, pp. 190-192.   
12  George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, ‘Conceptual Metaphor in Everyday Language,’ in 
Philosophical Perspectives on Metaphor, ed. by Mark Johnson (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1981), pp. 286-329.  
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supraordinate key conceptual metaphors which Lakoff and Johnson identify as 
including such concepts as UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING and LOVE IS A PHYSICAL 
FORCE, two particular examples that resonate with dominant themes found in 
mystical expression.13  
 
Broader conceptual metaphors are linked together to form coherent 
‘systems’ through ‘entailment relationships’.14  Entailments, the inferences that 
can be made from a conceptual metaphor, combine to make the internal logic of 
the metaphor, and in turn contribute to its ‘truth-claim,’ what it purports to be 
revealing about a given target domain. For example, in a linguistic expression 
underpinned by the conceptual metaphor IDEAS ARE FOOD, such as Marguerite 
d’Oingt’s exclamation, ‘Domine dulcis!,’ certain assumptions can be made 
about the target domain, ‘Domine,’ which result from the implications of the 
properties of the source.15 ‘God’ is conceptualised as spiritually nurturing, 
gentle, and good, a conceptualisation that links logically, according to the 
pattern of metaphors in the ‘world’ of the Pagina meditationum, to her later 
description of Christ as the ‘sweet electuary.’16 Grouping the entailments of a 
metaphor allows for the creation of a map of the speaker’s linguistic and 
underpinning conceptual metaphors, and by extension, the charting of the 
speaker’s understanding of their experience, thought, and action. This is not a 
solitary exercise. Metaphor, like mystical expression, operates within a 
discourse community, and an analysis of metaphor must take into account how 
that culture contributes to the speaker or reader’s ability to conceptualise the 
world proposed by a metaphorical statement or a mystical text.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 For linguistic examples of the conceptual metaphor UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING, see Metaphors 
We Live By, p. 48; LOVE AS A PHYSICAL FORCE can be found on p. 49. Other classic examples of 
conceptual metaphors, according to Lakoff and Johnson, include THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS; IDEAS 
ARE OBJECTS, and ARGUMENT IS WAR.   
14 Lakoff and Johnson, ‘Conceptual Metaphor,’ p. 291.  
15 Pagina meditationum, p. 88, §109. A Page of Meditations, p. 41.  
16 Pagina meditationum, p. 76, §23. A Page of Meditations, p. 29, see also n.3.  
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This raises an aspect of Lakoff and Johnson’s theoretical model that 
problematizes their particular articulation of metaphor’s reception and 
processing and this study of medieval mystical literature. Metaphors We Live By 
makes little mention of by whom, or in what context, Lakoff and Johnson 
envisage their conceptual metaphors to be understood. Their linguistic data is 
drawn from metaphors that occur in the ‘everyday’ speech of modern, Western 
speakers, Lakoff writing that his methodology focuses on the ‘speech of an 
idealized native speaker.’17  
 
Whilst there is clearly a disjunction between the language, thought, and 
actions of the modern Western speaker and that of the thirteenth-century 
mystic, it is not possible to dismiss Lakoff’s ‘idealized speaker’ out of hand. All 
hermeneutic activity, to varying degrees, supposes the existence of an idealised 
author, reader, speaker, or listener, upon whose interpretative activity the 
theoretical model can be pinned. This is felt acutely in the study of medieval 
texts, given the often fragmentary nature of the extant evidence relating to their 
composition, dissemination, and reception.  On the other hand, there is no 
‘average mystic’ or ‘average mystical experience,’ and the distortions that result 
from even a tacit assumption that there is an ‘average’ or ‘common’ writer of 
the Middle Ages go without saying.18 This is not to suggest that it is ever 
possible to re-construct a portrait of the particular historical writer or speaker. 
Later medieval mystical writing, with its intertextual borrowings from Biblical 
imagery, exegetical commentaries, and, in the case of Marguerite Porete, 
allusions to secular material such as the poetic traditions of the Puys, and often 
with an explicit desire to dissolve the identity of the self in contact with the 
divine, often makes it extremely difficult to extract a biographical narrative 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Their data is drawn from ‘conventional expressions […], which deal with the conventional 
part of the language [and…] the ideas they express […] in the conventional conceptual system 
on which that language is based.’ George Lakoff, ‘Metametaphorical Issues: A Figure of 
Thought,’ Metaphor and Symbolic Activity, 1, 3 (1986): 215-225. Here at p. 223.  
18 See the Introduction for more on the fallacy of the ‘average mystic.’ 
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onto which a text and its reception can be safely pinned.19 Adopting any 
theoretical approach to a literary artefact forces the creation of an ‘idealised 
speaker,’ even as the argument persists that first, no such thing can be re-
created, and, second, that in doing so, we distort the literary material in 
question. 
 
Lakoff and Johnson distinguish between three types of cognitive 
metaphor, structural, orientational, and ontological, which are inherent within 
human conceptual systems. However, this raises further questions regarding 
how these systems are ‘grounded.’20 On one hand, concepts are understood 
because humans are physical entities, and meaning is made out of a physical 
interaction with the world, no matter how abstract. Marguerite Porete’s Ame, 
for example, frequently refers to being ‘in’ time, particularly when she is 
referring to time spent in contact with the divine: ‘en ung moment,’ ‘en ung 
moment de heure.’21 According to Lakoff and Johnson’s schema, the conceptual 
metaphor underpinning this statement is a structural one. The Soul is 
conceptualised as a physical entity, structurally, in relation to time, which also 
takes on a physical, relational structure. Similarly, the frequently occurring 
metaphor, BODY IS A WRITING SURFACE, to be found in both Marguerite d’Oingt’s 
and Marguerite Porete’s texts, combines both orientational and ontological 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Puys were poetic societies, originating in the thirteenth century and emerging from the 
traditions of the Trouvères and the Jongleurs, whose compositions were heavily influenced by 
the lyrics of the Troubadours. The earliest mentioned puy is that of Valenciennes, Marguerite 
Porete’s probable hometown, in 1229. For more on the puy tradition, see Alan E. Knight, Aspects 
of Genre in Late Medieval French Drama (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1983), 
especially at p. 129; Jean Devaux, ‘From the Court of Hainault to the Court of England: The 
Example of Jean Froissart,’ in War, Government and Power in Late Medieval France, ed. by 
Christopher T. Allmand (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2000), pp. 1-20, especially pp. 6-
7 and ns. 20 and 21 for additional bibliography. The relationship between Porete’s Mirouer and 
the puys is investigated by Barbara Newman in Medieval Crossover: Reading the Secular Against 
the Sacred, Conway Lectures in Medieval Studies (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 2013), pp. 111-166.  
20 Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By. On structural, orientational, and ontological 
conceptual metaphors, see pp. 7-32. On how conceptual systems are grounded, see pp. 56-87.  
21 Mirouer, ch. 77, p. 214; Mirror, ‘in one moment,’ p. 151. Mirouer, ch. 9, p. 34; ‘in a moment of 
an hour,’ p. 87.  
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concepts. Spatially, the human body is conceptualised as taking on the structure 
of the book, in Marguerite d’Oingt’s writings, or the wax tablet in Porete’s, 
whilst ontologically, its boundaries can be mapped onto those of the human 
form. In identifying experiences as entities or substances, it becomes possible to 
refer to them, systematise them, group them, and quantify them – and make 
meaning about them.22 Conceptual metaphor is physically grounded and an 
innate part of the processes of human experience and the construction of what 
constitutes interpretation, belief, and an accepted truth. 
 
On the other hand, metaphorical linguistic expressions and their 
conceptual systems depend upon what is known, and which aspects of the 
source and target domains in question are valorised by both the cognitive 
processes of the individual and the culture in which they operate.23 Returning 
to the idea of the selective nature of metaphor, this is partly what makes 
metaphor so pervasive within cultural groups: metaphors appear naturally 
within a culture because they illuminate that which corresponds to that 
culture’s collective experience and disguise what corresponds with very little.24  
 
This is where Lakoff and Johnson’s theoretical model proves less helpful. 
Beyond insights such as that metaphor ‘reveals’ and ‘structures’ thought 
relative to both an individual’s and a culture’s world-view, their methodology 
fails to provide a framework for distinguishing how the mappings between 
source and target domains take place, nor does it allow for detailed discussion 
of how the given culture contributes to the act of making meaning from 
metaphor. The two-domain model provides an important structural platform 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, p. 25.  
23 ‘What we call “direct physical experience” is never merely a matter of having a body of a 
certain sort; rather every experience takes place within a vast background of cultural 
presuppositions.’ Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, p. 57.  
24 Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, p. 68.  
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from which to begin analysing metaphor, but arguably is too static and 
inflexible to account for metaphor’s many interpretative modes and the 
transformative role it can have on both user and recipient.  
 
 Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner propose an evolved model of Lakoff 
and Johnson’s theoretical framework in the form of Blending Theory.25 Rather 
than viewing metaphor as functioning in terms of a source- and target- domain 
relationship, with a strict directional trajectory in the mappings between the 
two domains, blending theory extends this relationship, regarding metaphor 
processing as a mental operation that involves the interaction of various ‘mental 
spaces’ or ‘packets of meaning,’ which combine within the metaphor to create 
another ‘packet’ or space with a new, emergent notion of understanding.26 
These ‘mental packets’ are short-term mental constructs, catalysed by the 
metaphor, and include not only the information and structure of the two 
domains but also additional contextual and cultural information. The source 
domain (or ‘input space’, as it is known in Blending Theory) constitutes one 
mental space; the target domain (also known as an ‘input space’) constitutes 
another, whilst a third, the ‘generic space’, contains the information deemed 
common to the two input spaces within the rules of the culture in which the 
metaphor operates. The interaction between these three spaces produces a 
fourth space, known as the ‘blended space.’ This composite structure of spaces 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 ‘Blending Theory’ is also variously known as ‘Conceptual Integration,’ ‘Mental Blending,’ or 
‘Conceptual Blending’ theory. Fauconnier and Turner provide a summary of Blending Theory 
in ‘Conceptual Integration Networks,’ Cognitive Science, 22, 2 (1998): 133-187. An extended 
investigation and articulation of their theory can be found in The Way We Think: Conceptual 
Blending and the Mind’s Hidden Complexities (New York: Basic Books, 2002). See also Mark Turner, 
The Literary Mind: The Origins of Thought and Language (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); 
Seana Coulson and Todd Oakley, ‘Blending Basics,’ Cognitive Linguistics, 11, 3/4 (2000): 175-196; 
Seana Coulson, Semantic Leaps: Frame-Shifting and Conceptual Blending in Meaning Construction 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
26 Mark Turner, ‘The Cognitive Study of Art, Language, and Literature,’ Poetics Today, 23:1 
(2002): 9-20. Here at p. 10. The notion of ‘mental spaces’ is derived from Gilles Fauconnier’s 
earlier work on cognition. See Gilles Fauconnier, Mental Spaces: Aspects of Meaning Construction 
in Natural Language (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Gilles Fauconnier, 
Mappings In Thought and Language (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
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is called a Conceptual Integration Network. 27  Within the network, the 
conceptual projections can move between the spaces in multiple directions and 
with arguably infinite resultant cognitive results or entailments.  
 
Unlike Lakoff and Johnson, who posit that conceptual mapping moves in 
a single direction, from the source to the target, each of these mental packets or 
spaces engages in ‘multiple projections.’ 28 The resultant ‘blend’ never reflects 
the whole combination of the other input spaces, but rather is a space in which 
meaning makes sense because its composite parts are seen in relation to the 
meanings constructed by the other input spaces.29 This network of mental 
spaces involves at least three cognitive activities.30 First, the content is projected 
from each of the inputs into the blended space in a process known as 
‘composition’. Second, the pattern of the blended space is filled out with 
matching information from long-term memory and inferences, so as to 
‘complete’ or make sense of the event or situation. Third is ‘elaboration’, during 
which the blended space is stimulated by these projections and during which 
both pre-existing as well as novel conceptualisations can be formed indefinitely. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27  Fauconnier and Turner, ‘Conceptual Integration Networks,’ pp. 142-144. A diagram 
illustrating the mental spaces and their relationship to one another can be found in The Way We 
Think, p. 46. See also Joseph O’Grady, Todd Oakley, and Seana Coulson, ‘Blending and 
Metaphor,’ in Metaphor in Cognitive Linguistics, ed. by Raymond W. Gibbs and Gerard J. Steen, 
Selected Papers From the 5th International Cognitive Linguistics Conference, Amsterdam, 1997, 
Issues in Linguistic Theory, 175 (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1999), pp. 101-124. Here at p. 105.  
28 This movement is termed ‘unidirectionality.’ George Lakoff, ‘The Contemporary Theory of 
Metaphor,’ in Metaphor and Thought, ed. by Andrew Ortony, 2nd edition (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993), pp. 202-251. Here at p. 245. Olav Jäkel questions Lakoff and Johnson’s 
hypothesis of unidirectionality in ‘Is Metaphor Really a One-Way Street? One of the Basic 
Tenets of the Cognitive Theory of Metaphor Put To the Test,’ in Issues in Cognitive Linguistics: 
1993 Proceedings of the International Cognitive Linguistics Conference, ed. by Leon de Stadler and 
Christoph Eyrich (The Hague: Mouton de Gruyter, 1999), pp. 367-388. Eve Sweetser, 
‘Compositionality and Blending: Semantic Composition in a Cognitively Realistic Framework,’ 
in Cognitive Linguistics: Foundations, Scope, and Methodology, ed. by Theo Janssen and Gisela 
Redeker, Cognitive Linguistics Research, 15 (Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 1999), 
pp. 129-162. Here at p. 135. 
29 Lakoff and Johnson come close to making this point in their suggestion that understanding is 
achieved through a combination of conceptual projections onto an event or object and the 
certain interactional ‘dimensions,’ which define how a perceived entity is dealt with and 
understood. Metaphors We Live By, pp. 176-79.  
30 O’ Grady, Oakley, and Coulson, ‘Blending and Metaphor,’ p. 107.  
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Seen from this perspective, metaphor and its theoretical implications 
bear a strong structural resemblance to the hermeneutics of mystical writing 
mentioned earlier. The network of mental spaces is analogous to the mystical 
text itself, containing ‘inputs’ by the author, their cultural and spiritual 
background, and intertextual allusion, amongst others. The ‘blended space,’ 
meanwhile, with its possibilities of new meaning, is reminiscent of the ‘gaps’ 
found in mystical texts between the implicit and the explicit, and the dialectic of 
concealment and revelation. It is only in these blended spaces, or ‘gaps,’ that the 
metaphor or the mystical text share a logical rationale with the experiences or 
events they describe. 
 
This is evident in one of the foundational symbols of the Christian faith 
and a recurring image in the mystical corpus, the Eucharist, in which the 
faithful join in union with Christ by consuming his body and blood. In this case, 
the source domains involve the bread and the wine, mapped onto the 
corresponding target domains (body and blood). The subsequent entailments 
shape a matrix in which the believer ‘consumes’ Christ. If the additional 
elements highlighted by blending theory are added to this interpretation, the 
way in which the metaphor produces meaning becomes even clearer. The two 
input spaces are formed by the bread and the wine, on one hand, and the body 
and blood of Christ, on the other. Conceptual blending causes the components 
in the first input space to map onto their counterpart in the second input space 
in the process of ‘composition’: the bread onto the body, the wine onto the 
blood. Where these spaces share common features, the abstract ‘solidness’ of 
the bread and the body, or the ‘red’ of the wine and the blood, a third, generic 
mental space takes shape. Another mental space containing long-term 
memories associated with the components of the two input spaces or the 
generic space may also materialise here, adding additional imagery to the blend 
in the process of ‘completion.’ Finally, the structuring of the generic space 
allows the cross-space mappings of the input spaces to blend in the fourth 
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mental space. It is only in this blended space that the bread becomes the body of 
Christ, and the consumption of the wine becomes unification with the divine. As 
long as the blend functions in accordance with these principles and structures, 
the metaphor can be inspired mentally and cognitively re-enacted and 
elaborated in ways that are, at least in principle, infinite.31 Despite the literal 
events and imagery that make up the mental spaces perhaps being implausible 
or impossible within the natural or physical order, within the blended space 
metaphor possesses its own reality and its own rationale. Participating in the 
Eucharist possesses a theological reality and reinforces Christian truth.  
 
As such, metaphor and mystical texts share even more in common than 
has previously been recognised.32 Both phenomena can be thought of as loci, or 
sites, in which a dynamic and transformative process takes place, which 
involves both author and audience in a symbiotic relationship. Paradoxically, 
whilst it is the speaker’s experience that is narrated, that experience is 
impossible to re-discover. Rather, it is in the audience’s interpretative 
experience that the meaning is made. This idea is particularly acute in the 
reception of medieval mystical literature. The irony of mystical writing is that 
its interpretation always occurs post hoc; there is, by definition of the mystical 
event, no access to the experience of the text’s author, and, even if there were, 
by articulating it, the illocutionary act propels the expression of that experience 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Hugo Lundhaug offers a reading of Eucharistic imagery using Fauconnier and Turner’s 
‘Blending Theory,’ in Images of Rebirth: Cognitive Poetics and Transformation Soteriology in the 
Gospel of Philip and the Exegesis on the Soul, Nag Hammadi and Manichean Studies, 73 (Leiden: 
Brill, 2010), pp. 32-34. 
32 The role played by metaphor has recently become an area of interest for scholars of religious 
language, although not, it appears, specifically of mystical discourse. See, for example, Kurt 
Feyaerts’ edited collection of essays, The Bible Through Metaphor and Translation: A Cognitive 
Semantic Perspective (Berlin and New York: Peter Lang, 2003); Petri Luomanen, Ilkka Pyysiäinen, 
and Ristro Uro, eds., Explaining Christian Origins and Early Judaism: Contributions From Cognitive 
and Social Science, Biblical Interpretation Series, 89 (Leiden: Brill, 2007); Erik Konsmo, The Pauline 
Metaphors of the Holy Spirit: The Intangible Spirit’s Tangible Presence in the Life of the Christian, 
Studies in Biblical Literature, 130 (New York: Peter Lang, 2010); Beth M. Stovell, Mapping 
Metaphorical Discourse in the Fourth Gospel: John’s Eternal King (Leiden: Brill, 2012), especially 
Chapter Two, ‘Waterskiing Across Metaphor’s Surface: A Linguistic and Literary Metaphor 
Theory.’ 
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into a public realm, no longer constrained by the privacy of the author’s 
original experience. Paul Ricoeur expresses the tension of mystical writing 
particularly well in his discussion of the dialectic between event and meaning: 
My experience cannot directly become your experience […]. 
Yet, nevertheless, something passes from me to you […]. 
Something passes from one sphere of life to another. This 
something is not the experience as experienced, but its 
meaning. Here is the miracle. The experience as experienced, 
as lived, remains private, but its sense, its meaning, becomes 
public. Communication in this way is the overcoming of the 
radical non-communicability of the lived experience as lived.33 
 
Ricoeur’s words capture the dynamism of mystical texts and could be 
regarded as equally applicable to metaphor too in their mention of the transfer 
‘from one sphere of life to another.’ Indeed what contributes to drawing 
metaphor and mystical writing into dialogue in this particular context is the 
idea that both rely on use in order to be understood.34 In the act of interpretation, 
or use, shown by Fauconnier and Turner to involve a complex process of 
mental activity, the metaphor effects a secondary ‘experience’ in the recipient.35 
The same can be said of mystical writing. Ricoeur’s observations suggest that a 
mystical text is also a locus of perpetual secondary experiences, in which, like 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Paul Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning (Fort Worth, TX: Texas 
Christian University Press, 1976), pp. 9-10.    
34 As Donald Davidson has claimed, ‘metaphors mean what the words, in their most literal 
interpretation mean, and nothing more.’ Metaphor, Donaldson contends, ‘says only what shows 
on its face – usually a patent falsehood or an absurd truth (original emphasis).’ ‘What 
Metaphors Mean,’ in Philosophical Perspectives on Metaphor, ed. by Mark Johnson (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1981), pp. 200-220. Here at p. 201 and p. 214. A critical analysis 
of Davidson’s theory of metaphor, situated within its intellectual context, can be found in Janet 
Martin Soskice, Metaphor and Religious Language (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 
especially at pp. 27-31.  
35 These are the findings of Raymond W. Gibbs Jr. in ‘Researching Metaphor,’ in Researching and 
Applying Metaphor, ed. by Lynne Cameron and Graham Low (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), pp. 29-47.  
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metaphor, the possibilities for new meaning are endless, at least within the 
cognitive remit and ideological expectations of the recipient and their 
environment. 
 
Quite what these secondary experiences consist of, beyond the 
theoretical notion of ‘mental spaces’ and a ‘blended space’ in which meaning is 
made, remains an issue for conjecture. However, another of Ricoeur’s works, in 
which he discusses the roles of cognition, imagination and feeling in relation to 
metaphor, provides some clarifying insights. 36  Adopting the Aristotelian 
position that a good metaphor ‘sets before the eyes’ the sense it wishes to 
convey, Ricoeur suggests that within the metaphorical utterance is a pictorial 
dimension, which he labels the ‘picturing function’ of metaphorical meaning.37 
For Ricoeur, the essence of metaphoric meaning resides in the realm of the 
mind’s eye, foreshadowing Lakoff and Johnson’s proposal that metaphor is not 
linguistic but cognitive in function.38 Ricoeur terms his theoretical framework 
for the processing of metaphor a ‘psychology of imagination,’ which he adjusts 
in accordance with the semantic properties of metaphor.39 Unlike the views of 
other theorists discussed here, his is a three-stage pattern of metaphoric 
processing, the implications of which provide a further reading of metaphor 
that deepens its conceptual relationship with mystical expression. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36  Paul Ricoeur, ‘The Metaphorical Process as Cognition, Imagination, and Feeling,’ in 
Philosophical Perspectives on Metaphor, ed. by Mark Johnson (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1981), pp. 228-247. 
37 Ricoeur, ‘The Metaphorical Process,’ p. 229. See Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1410b 33-34, p. 2251.  
38 That metaphor engages with cognitive processes is a relatively common idea amongst 
twentieth-century scholars of the subject. I. A. Richards, for example, anticipated much of what 
were to become the dominant principles of cognitive metaphor theory and blending theory in 
The Philosophy of Rhetoric (New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1936), in which he 
wrote: ‘fundamentally, it [metaphor] is a borrowing between and intercourse of thoughts, a 
transaction between contexts. Thought is metaphoric, and proceeds by comparison, and the 
metaphors of language derive therefrom.’ Here at p. 94. A brief historical overview of scholarly 
positions on the role of metaphor as a cognitive device can be found in Mark Johnson, 
‘Introduction: Metaphor in the Philosophical Tradition,’ in Philosophical Perspectives on Metaphor, 
ed. by Mark Johnson (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981), pp. 3-47.  
39 Ricoeur, ‘The Metaphorical Process,’ p. 233. 
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On contact with metaphor, the imagination is catalysed into being the 
space where a deciphering process takes place, involving the cognitive 
activities of thinking and seeing: ‘thinking’ because the imagination must 
restructure the semantic fields in question; ‘seeing’ because, in calling these 
semantic fields into being, the imagination envisages them. The imagination is 
engaged in a productive activity: there is an instantaneous conjuring of all of 
the various ‘combinatory possibilities’ between what Ricoeur calls the ‘two 
ratios’ of the metaphor.40 These ‘ratios’ correspond to Lakoff and Johnson’s 
‘domains’ and Fauconnier and Turner’s ‘mental spaces.’ What Ricoeur adds to 
these two schools of thought, however, is that this imaginative assimilation is 
not merely a question of constructing linear patterns of resemblance between 
the ‘ratios’. Rather, this productivity is based on new combinatory possibilities 
being seen ‘through’ (original emphasis) the older, incompatible meanings of 
the metaphoric word or phrase.41 The imagination’s primary ability is to 
produce new meanings by assimilation, but to produce them not ‘above’ the 
difference between primary and subsidiary subjects, but ‘in spite of and 
through’ them.42 In this, Ricoeur appears to derive some of his inspiration 
from Max Black’s interaction theory, in which Black famously suggested that 
metaphor functions like a ‘filter’, or ‘screen’, allowing what he calls the 
‘principal subject’ (which corresponds to Lakoff and Johnson’s target domain) 
to be ‘seen through’ the metaphorical expression. 43  Once again, Ricoeur 
foreshadows an important aspect of Fauconnier and Turner’s blending theory. 
Metaphor functions by detaching its recipient from one matrix of knowing 
represented by the metaphorical expression in its most literal, objectifying 
sense, and in a kind of poesis, ‘lifting’ the recipient into a more participatory 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Ricoeur, ‘The Metaphorical Process,’ p. 233.  
41 Ricoeur, ‘The Metaphorical Process,’ p. 234.  
42 Ricoeur, ‘The Metaphorical Process,’ p. 234. Ricoeur’s thesis here is reminiscent of an 
argument made by Donald Davidson in the same year. Davidson suggested that in metaphor 
processing, a metaphor possesses ‘two different meanings at once, a literal and a figurative 
meaning. Imagine the literal meaning as latent, something that we are aware of, that can work 
on us without working in the context, while the figurative meaning carries the direct load.’ 
Davidson, ‘What Metaphors Mean,’ p. 205.  
43  Max Black, ‘Metaphor,’ in Philosophical Perspectives of Metaphor, ed. by Mark Johnson 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press), pp. 63-82. Here at p. 73 and p. 75.  
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kind of knowing, in which the ‘ruins of the intraworldly objects of everyday 
existence’ are shed in favour of a new method of making meaning.44  The 
metaphor as a linguistic device is simply a shell. Regarding metaphor as a 
locus for making meaning, however, is to view it as participating in a process 
that is strikingly similar to the mental experiences described in a mystical 
journey.  
 
The idea that metaphor represents a locus for making meaning has 
considerable ramifications for the study of religious language.  Religious 
language is, in and of itself, no different to secular language: at a lexical level, 
the words used to express mystical experience are no different to those used to 
convey other, everyday experiences that involve emotion, feeling, and 
cognition. Christian language, for example, and its cognitive possibilities are 
simultaneously controlled by a series of semiotic codes, which, within the 
Christian culture, are, and indeed must be, highly conventional.45 If they are 
not, as the case of Marguerite Porete demonstrates, the alternative is to 
consider them heretical. As Robert Neville demonstrates in his work on 
religious symbolism, the semiotic codes that govern any religious tradition are 
binding, and ‘contain the possibilities for all the formal interpretations or 
propositions involving their symbols.’46 Where Ricoeur’s argument is helpful 
is in his suggestion that new, metaphoric meaning is seen ‘through’ the old, 
and predicated upon its own logic of reasoning and assimilation. In this sense, 
religious language is no different: its meaning is constructed ‘through’ and ‘in 
spite of’ ordinary language and projected into a different domain by the 
‘combinatory possibilities’ offered according to the cultural logic of the given 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Paul Ricoeur, ‘Towards a Hermeneutic of the Idea of Revelation,’ in Essays in Biblical 
Interpretation, ed. by Lewis S. Mudge (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1980), pp. 73-118. Here at p. 
100 and p. 104.   
45 See Robert Cummings Neville, ‘A Pragmatic Semiotic Theory of Religious Symbolism,’ in 
Metaphor and God-talk, ed. by Lieven Boeve and Kurt Feyaerts (Berlin: Peter Lang, 1999), pp. 15-
32.     
46 Neville, ‘A Pragmatic Semiotic Theory,’ p. 19.   
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religion. As such, within the Christian mystical tradition, source and target 
domain construction, and the subsequent formulation of metaphorical 
entailments, must be delineated semantically and syntactically in accordance 
with the conventional expectations of the discourse community in which they 
operate. 
 
The ‘pictorial’ dimension or ‘figurative’ character of metaphor (original 
emphasis), meanwhile, is not so much a ‘mental picture’ per se, but rather, 
Ricoeur suggests, an exposure to a ‘flow of images,’ initiated by discourse. 47  
‘To imagine,’ Ricoeur observes, ‘is not to have a mental picture of something 
but to display relations in a depicting mode.’48  A mental processing of 
metaphor involves a matrix of perception and interpretation that involves a 
relational ‘seeing as’, as opposed to merely ‘seeing.’ Ricoeur’s theory of 
relational seeing opens new possibilities concerning the scope of metaphor’s 
function. ‘Seeing as’ suggests a reciprocal unity between metaphor user and 
receiver, which converges at the site of the metaphorical utterance. The user is 
presented with the opportunity to project the subject of their ‘inner vision’ into 
the metaphoric statement, encapsulating metaphorically what may have been 
impossible to capture in literal terms. The recipient of the metaphor, 
meanwhile, is presented with a variety of potential assimilations, which range 
from the literal ‘seeing,’ to ‘seeing as’ the user might have intended the 
metaphor to be interpreted, to ‘seeing as’ if a wholly new range of meanings 
had presented themselves. A symbiosis between user and recipient develops, 
in which both are drawn into a desire to make the other ‘see.’ The metaphoric 
utterance induces the recipient to imagine him or herself in the place of the 
user – to actively re-cast him- or herself into a different cognitive sphere in 
order to capture the absent subject of the metaphoric reference.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Ricoeur, ‘The Metaphorical Process,’ p. 235. 
48 Ricoeur, ‘The Metaphorical Process,’ p. 236.  
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Applying this hypothesis to mystical texts and the metaphors they 
contain proves particularly illuminating. If metaphor permits a ‘seeing as’ for 
both user and recipient, then arguably it allows the devout reader/ listener to 
enter, albeit partially, into something of the mystical experience themselves. 
More specifically, on coming into contact with a metaphor that depicts an 
element of mystical experience, the audience, via its imagination, is given the 
possibility to ‘see as’ the mystic might see; to experience a small part of the 
mystical experience within their own imaginative sphere.49  
 
Ricoeur’s final step in his three-stage theory takes into account what he 
calls the ‘suspension,’ or ‘moment of negativity brought by the image in the 
metaphorical process.’ 50 The referential qualities of metaphor imply that, 
when meaning is created out of metaphor, the imagination must hold two sets 
of antithetical ideas together simultaneously. The imagination begins with the 
sense of the metaphor, in which metaphoric sense emerges from a new 
semantic relevance that has arisen from the remains of the literal sense, 
destroyed by semantic incongruity. However, alongside the ‘new’ meanings is 
a need for ‘suspension’ – the negative conditions that result from metaphor’s 
ability to create more radical perspectives that have resulted from the collapse 
of ordinary descriptive language. When seen as being held in tandem by the 
imagination alongside the pictorial, creative element of metaphor, Ricoeur’s 
‘suspension’ (‘epoché’) of ordinary descriptive reference seems to express a set 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Michael Sells reaches a similar conclusion but does so through his approach to apophatic 
language. Rather than viewing mystical texts as reflective of mystical experience, he argues that 
their function is to foster an experience within the reader. Language and meaning become fused 
in what he terms ‘meaning events,’ in which descriptive language and the meaning behind the 
language perform the same function. Mystical Languages of Unsaying, p. 9 and pp. 215-216.  
50 Ricoeur, ‘The Metaphorical Process,’ p. 238. Monroe C. Beardsley memorably termed this the 
‘metaphorical twist’; the moment at which the listener or reader realises the metaphorical status 
of the utterance in recognising the features of the subsidiary or source domain that are not 
related to the primary or target domain but which constitute the ‘difference, i.e. the sortal, 
semantic and/or pragmatic contradiction’ or ‘logical opposition’ when related to the primary 
subject. See Monroe C. Beardsley, ‘The Metaphorical Twist,’ in Philosophical Perspectives on 
Metaphor, ed. by Mark Johnson (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981), pp. 105-122. 
Here at p. 112. 
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of linguistic and cognitive processes and challenges not unlike those found in 
the tensions of Pseudo-Dionysius’ apophatic and kataphatic struggle. Within the 
three stages of Ricoeur’s theory of imagination and metaphor are a series of 
profound ontological questions concerning what ‘is’ and what ‘is not.’  
 
Recent discussions of metaphor also seek to define metaphor’s role in 
clarifying existential degrees of knowledge and perceptual truth.51 Ricoeur 
addresses this by accounting for the place and role of  ‘feeling’ in metaphoric 
processing, and again exposes an issue that is as pertinent to the study of 
mysticism as it is to metaphor. He argues that feeling and imagination are 
necessary for a semantic approach to metaphor and prefaces this with the 
caveat that ‘genuine feelings are not emotions.’52 He contends: 
By saying that it is felt, we underscore the fact that we are 
included in the process as knowing subjects. If the process 
can be called, as I called it, predicative assimilation, it is true 
that we are assimilated, that is, made similar, to what is seen 
as similar. This self-assimilation is a part of the commitment 
proper to the ‘illocutionary’ force of the metaphor as speech 
act. We feel like what we see like (original emphasis).53 
 
That feeling catalyses a ‘self-assimilation’ at the site of the metaphoric 
utterance is reminiscent of the suggestion that mystical texts contribute to 
inducing a similar mystical experience in the reader, as well as encapsulating 
something of the ‘felt’ experience of the mystic themselves. Ricoeur 
summarises this as follows: ‘to feel, in the emotional sense of the word, is to 
make ours what has been put at a distance by thought in its objectifying 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Lakoff and Johnson, for example, devote an entire chapter to their understanding of truth in 
Metaphors We Live By. See Chapter 24, ‘Truth.’  
52 Ricoeur, ‘The Metaphorical Process,’ p. 243.  
53 Ricoeur, ‘The Metaphorical Process,’ p. 243.  
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phase.’54 Feeling, therefore, places the user (either utterer or receiver) of the 
metaphoric utterance at its heart: it makes the cognitive processes belong to the 
user in a way that cognitive metaphor theory and blending theory do not. 
Perhaps more importantly, however, there is a reverse side to this notion of 
self-assimilation. Feeling also involves a kind of suspension – akin to that of 
the imagination – whereby emotions can be experienced without recourse to 
the literal, first-hand emotions themselves. Feeling, in a Ricoeurian sense, 
functions as literal emotion transcended – it is the essence of an experience or 
event without the actual experience or event; a ‘being’ there without ‘being 
there.’  
 
This quality of religious language has not gone unnoticed. Stephen H. 
Phillips explores this aspect of religious language from a different 
perspective.55 Exploring the reception of mystical discourse by non-mystics, 
Phillips contends that non-mystics can understand mystical testimony despite 
their lack of individual mystical experience due to the role played by 
figurative language. He suggests that the primary function of figurative 
language in this context is its ability to create analogies, both implicit and 
explicit, on which the non-mystic draws to shape knowledge and meaning out 
of the mystical statement. Metaphor constitutes a crucial part of this ‘implicit 
analogizing,’ which Phillips terms the ‘peculiarly mystical.’56 In recognising 
the importance of metaphor in mystical language and highlighting its 
‘peculiarity,’ his observations can be seen to relate to those of Ricoeur outlined 
above, as well as more broadly with the conceptual theory of Fauconnier and 
Turner. What for Phillips constitutes the ‘peculiarly mystical’ is, for Ricoeur, 
the ‘seeing as.’ Theorists of conceptual blending, meanwhile, know this as the 
‘blended space.’ Phillips acknowledges this quality in mystical language and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Ricoeur, ‘The Metaphorical Process,’ p. 243.  
55 Stephen H. Phillips, ‘Mystic Analogizing and the “Peculiarly Mystical”,’ in Mysticism and 
Language, ed. by Steven T. Katz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 123-142. 
56 Phillips, ‘Mystic Analogizing,’ p. 128.  
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its reception, but does not explore the potential of his observations in any 
depth.  
 
A second, striking similarity to Fauconnier and Turner’s articulation of 
metaphor processing as essentially a ‘limitless’ cognitive activity can be seen 
in Phillips’ proposal that mystical texts are ‘essentially open-ended.’ Phillips 
suggests that: 
the essential open-endedness of mystic analogizing suggests a 
radical open texture for […] traditional religious concepts [and 
that] there is no reason to suppose that a nonmystic cannot at 
all understand mystic testimony, including, to some degree, 
what the special experiences are like (original emphasis).57  
 
Phillips’ claim echoes one of this chapter’s key propositions: that through 
metaphor’s own ‘open-ended’ qualities, non-mystics can, in different ways, find 
cognitive access to the deeper meanings of mystical testimony. However this 
sense of ‘open-endedness,’ be it of metaphor or of mystical writing, requires 
some moderation. To return to Lakoff and Johnson’s ‘selectivity’ of metaphor, 
they write that ‘the very systematicity that allows us to comprehend one aspect 
of a concept in terms of another […] will necessarily hide other aspects of the 
concept.’ 58  This systematicity, according to cognitive metaphor theory, 
structures metaphor processing so that it cannot be wholly ‘open-ended.’ What 
is ‘hidden’ by the metaphor creates certain limits as to what can be perceived by 
those processing it. Indeed, any discussion of metaphoric processing soon 
becomes redundant if the person processing the metaphor does not believe 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Phillips, ‘Mystic Analogizing,’ p. 135.   
58 Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, p. 10.  
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properties of both the target and source domains to be true. 59   In both 
metaphorical and mystical utterances, language, epistemology, cognition, 
imagination, and feeling are all underpinned by the belief systems of the 
individual and the community, which, in linguistic terms at least, are controlled 
by the semantic function of language. These are the conclusions reached 
variously by Robert Neville in his work on Christian language and by Paul 
Ricoeur in his analysis of metaphor and the imagination, both mentioned above. 
It is not incorrect to refer to both metaphor and mystical writing as being ‘open-
ended.’ Rather, both share a similar structural quality that tempers this ‘open-
endedness.’ The limitless number of interpretative possibilities catalysed by 
each phenomenon is not related to what they relate, but how they do so.  
 
The cognitive processing of metaphor or of mystical prose involves the 
simultaneous correlation, or ‘flow,’ to use Ricoeur’s terminology, of numerous 
mental images, and it is this aspect of metaphor and mystical reception that also 
makes them both such potent modes of expression.  Fauconnier and Turner’s 
framework is useful in explaining this relationship. In analysing a metaphor, it 
is possible to work out the interaction of the blended space to the input spaces, 
and the ways in which those inferences within the blend translate back towards 
the input spaces. However, all of the mental spaces involved in the blend are 
combined simultaneously in the cognitive processing of metaphor, and it is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Paul Henle’s adoption of Charles Sanders Peirce’s semiotic theory provides a helpful 
platform for a discussion of the truth-value system of metaphor. Henle remarks that, whilst the 
function of metaphor is to extend language, this does not imply that metaphor always affords 
complete understanding: ‘Often, […] metaphor is only partly understood. One develops a 
feeling for the kind of parallel required without quite seeing what it is.’ Henle develops his 
thesis by proposing whenever something new is created – be it an object, image, or idea - a 
metaphor may be used to fill the lexical gap. In such cases, he concludes that, often, metaphor 
has the ability to conjure meaning for the person hearing the metaphor without them having 
ever experienced its literal components or referents. Henle uses the example of the ‘breastplate’ 
of a turtle, biologically termed a ‘plastron’. He suggests that a person would not necessarily 
know what a ‘plastron’ was, nor perhaps have ever seen a turtle, but in knowing that the 
metaphor ‘breastplate’ is a borrowing from the semantic field of armoury could map 
whereabouts on the body and what the function of the ‘plastron’ or ‘breastplate’ might be. 
‘Metaphor,’ in Philosophical Perspectives on Metaphor, ed. Mark Johnson (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1981), pp. 83-104. Here at pp. 95-96. See also Beardsley, ‘The Metaphorical 
Twist,’ p.107-109. 
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only at the site of the blend that the structural efficiency of the integrated 
network unavailable in the other spaces becomes apparent.  
 
The example of the Eucharist discussed above is emblematic of this 
dualism of ‘open-endedness’ and semantic control. In a metaphorical analysis 
of the Eucharist, the features of the two source domains (the bread and the 
wine) that that are mapped onto the target domains of Christ’s body and 
blood include the ‘redness’ of the wine and the blood, the ‘solidness’ and 
‘nutritional value’ of the bread and the body, to which ‘whiteness’ might be 
added, and the Christian context of communion. That Christ’s body is 
symbolised by bread, and not by some other substance, is controlled by the 
biblical account of the Last Supper. There is no possibility of ‘open-endedness’ 
or deviation from this model, which is controlled by the semiotic code of the 
Christian faith. However these shared elements of the two domains can also 
give rise to new entailments. In a blended model, this would be described as 
the generic space of one conceptual model becoming the input space for 
another conceptual network. For example, the ‘redness’ may trigger 
associative connections with the blood of the martyrs or the ‘whiteness’ of the 
paschal lamb. As a result, the generic space of the metaphor of the Eucharist 
becomes the input space triggering a conceptual network for the metaphor of 
sacrifice and so on. In this respect, the Eucharistic metaphor is, in Phillips’ 
terms, ‘open-ended’ and the interpretative possibilities ‘limitless.’ 
 
 An exploration of conceptual metaphor and Christian mysticism 
demonstrates that the two phenomena share a striking number of interpretative 
features in common. When juxtaposed, an interdisciplinary dialogue emerges 
between the two modes of discourse and thought, in which each serves to 
illuminate and help articulate the shadowy reaches of the other. Both metaphor 
and mysticism have, at various times in their long histories as areas of study, 
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suffered from levels of distrust in the fields of philosophy, linguistics, and 
theology.60 However, neither metaphor nor mysticism deserves to be labelled as 
deviant modes of expressions of thought or language. Rather than representing 
a break with other forms of representation and interpretation, both entities 
require a hermeneutic framework that regards them as transforming the literal, 
the objective, or the everyday world, whilst retaining sufficient structural 
similarities with the ‘old’ world so as never to risk becoming representations of 
the fantastic, the grotesque, or the absurd. Both phenomena participate in open-
ended, imaginative interpretation, tempered and structured by semantic codes, 
which in turn are codified by perceptual truth and belief. Metaphor and 
mystical writing can both be conceptualised as dynamic loci, or sites of 
meaning, which require their own logic and structure, and which, in return, 
offer a participatory and revelatory interpretative experience.  
 
 A fundamental question remains, however. Having established these 
theoretical similarities, it is necessary to turn to their implications and what 
they can be seen to achieve. Amongst the respective theories of metaphor and 
of mystical experience and expression, two sets of binary philosophical 
positions have emerged. All four perspectives offer a means of interpreting 
events, experiences, states of consciousness, or indeed their articulations. 
Amongst scholars of mysticism, the positions held by ‘contextualists’ and 
‘perennial psychologists’ or ‘decontextualists’ continue to question what 
constitutes a referent for mystical experience. In Metaphors We Live By, 
meanwhile, Lakoff and Johnson, open up a debate as to how representations of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Johnson sketches out the troubled history of metaphor amongst scholars, from the Ancient 
Greeks to the early twentieth century, in ‘Introduction: Metaphor in the Philosophical Tradition.’ 
Similarly, it is possible to trace a distrust of mysticism as an overly subjective mode of thought, 
expression, and literary genre from the medieval period to the modern day. In 1401, for 
example, the French prelate Jean Gerson presented his mistrust of some mystical reports in his 
De distinctione verarum visionum a falsis. More recently, McIntosh observes that the academic 
theology of the modern period has displayed a suspicion of spirituality based on its highly 
subjective nature. Quoting the work of Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834), McIntosh writes 
that mysticism’s poetic language of devotion is often seen as needing to be ‘exchanged for a 
literal one, or transformed into such by being explained.’ See Mystical Theology, p. 26.  
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truth might be approached, focussing on the arguments put forward by the 
perspectives of objectivism and subjectivism.  
 
 The contours of these two separate debates reveal that they have far 
more in common with each other than has previously been recognised. 
Exploring both in tandem, and with regard to the particular features of the 
mystical literature under consideration here, highlights the usefulness, as well 
as the limitations, of all four perspectives. An interpretative angle is established 
that both preserves and discards elements of the two debates in the creation of 
an alternative schema, and in doing so, presents an outline of what might be 
achieved by the proposal that conceptual metaphor and mystical writing share 
a thematic unity. Reaching an accurate definition of mystical experience 
constitutes a key theme in the continuing debate between two groups of 
theorists, the ‘constructivists’ and the ‘perennial psychologists,’ also known as 
the ‘decontextualists.’ Focussing on questions of mystical experience and 
expression, these groups dispute the extent to which mystical consciousness 
and its mediation are either catalysed or structured by their context, or whether 
mysticism reflects an innate human capability to harness the mystical mode.  
 
William James was the first scholar of the twentieth century to suggest 
that other modes of consciousness might co-exist alongside normal daily 
existence, modes he refers to as ‘mystical.’61 Placing a premium on the personal 
experience of religion, as opposed to its systematic presentation or its 
relationship to ecclesial organisation, James posits a more profound and 
intuitive human faculty than that of the senses, the highest expression of which 
he calls ‘mystical states of consciousness.’62 Of such states, he contends that four 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 James, Varieties of Religious Experience, pp. 371-420. For a brief overview of James’ theory, see 
Louise Nelstropp, Kevin Magill, and Bradley B. Onishi, Christian Mysticism: An Introduction to 
Contemporary Theoretical Approaches (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), pp. 3-6.  
62 James, Varieties of Religious Experience, p. 379.  
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characteristics must be present. The first two, ‘ineffability’ and ‘noesis,’ must 
occur in order for the experience to be termed ‘mystical.’ A less frequent and 
second pair, transience and passivity, are also noted. 63  This emphasis on 
experience causes James to argue that any doctrinal structures expressed in the 
context of mystical consciousness merely constitute a post-experiential 
interpretation of the event by means of pre-existing belief structures. Instead, he 
prefers to focus on the contours of the mystical experience itself; one that he 
postulates contains a common, universal core. James’ theory catalysed the 
‘perennialist’ school of thought amongst philosophers of mysticism, whose 
basic tenet holds that a common core of mystical experience cuts across the 
historical, cultural, and political differences of particular religious groups.64 At 
the core of the mystical experience, they argue, lies a deep and intensely 
personal encounter foundational to human consciousness, and the study of any 
textual account of these experiences serves only to move the reader closer to 
this universal state of being.65  
 
 ‘Contextualism’ is a direct challenge to this position. Steven T. Katz 
argues that no state of pure, universal mystical consciousness exists, since all 
experience is rooted in its cultural context.66 This applies not only to subsequent 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 An extended discussion of James’ psychological theory can be found in G. T. Alexander, 
‘Psychological Foundations of William James’ Theory of Religious Experience,’ Journal of 
Religion, 56 (1976): 421-434.  
64 Critics of the Jamesian approach include Rudolf Otto, who disapproved of James’ disregard 
for doctrine, and W. T. Stace and R. C. Zaehner, both of whom, despite their differences, 
challenged James’ assertion that mystical states can be easily differentiated from other states of 
consciousness. See Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy: An Inquiry Into the Non-Rational Factor in the 
Idea of the Divine and Its Relation to the Rational, trans. by John W. Harvey (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1928); W. T. Stace, Mysticism and Philosophy; R. C. Zaehner, Mysticism: Sacred 
and Profane: An Inquiry Into Some Varieties of Praeternaturnal Experiences (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1957). Evelyn Underhill, meanwhile, disagreed with James’ comparison of 
mystical states to drug-induced states of consciousness in Mysticism: A Study in the Nature and 
Development of Man’s Spiritual Consciousness (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1911).  
65 Two classic statements of the perennialist position can be found in Aldous Huxley, The 
Perennial Philosophy (New York: Harper, 1944) and Frithjof Schuon, L’Unité transcendante des 
religions (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1948).   
66 Katz writes: ‘There are NO pure (i.e. unmediated) experiences. Neither mystical experience nor 
more ordinary forms of experience give any indication, or any grounds for believing, that they 
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interpretations of the experience, but also to the shape of mystical 
consciousness itself as experienced at the time of an encounter with the divine. 
The cultural and conceptual background that the mystic brings to his or her 
own experience places pre-experiential limits on what they may or may not 
experience within their respective tradition. Contextualism proposes that the 
study of mystical phenomena must take into consideration its historical context 
and ideological premises. If it does not, deficiencies will ensue ‘which skew the 
entire discussion in ways which distort any and all conclusions or suggestions 
made.’67  
 
  The methodological approach to both metaphor and to mysticism 
outlined above may appear more closely aligned with the contextual rather 
than the perennial perspective. In the combination of theories proposed by 
Ricoeur, Lakoff and Johnson, and Fauconnier and Turner, language use, 
referential imagery, cognition, imagination, and feeling are all widely accepted 
as products of, and reactions to, our historical, literary, cultural, social and 
political contexts. Yet realising a ‘truly’ contextualist reading of medieval texts 
is often impossible. The frequently incomplete nature of their physical record 
and transmission, coupled with modern editorial issues, lacunae in the broader 
historical framework, and disparities in the ideologies between medieval 
accounts and modern scholarly approaches, render it almost impossible to 
study a medieval text with the singularly anthropological lens of the 
contextualist. The lives and works of Marguerite d’Oingt and Marguerite Porete 
are a case in point. Comparatively little material evidence relating to the lives, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
are unmediated. That is to say, all experience is processed through and organised by, and 
makes itself available to us in extremely complex epistemological ways’ (original emphasis). 
Steven T. Katz, ‘Language, Epistemology and Mysticism,’ in Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis, 
ed. by Steven T. Katz (London: Sheldon Press, 1978), pp. 22-74. Here at p. 26. His other articles 
on the subject include: ‘The “Conservative” Character of Mystical Experience,’ in Mysticism and 
Religious Traditions, ed. by Steven T. Katz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), pp. 1-45; 
‘Mystical Speech and Mystical Meaning,’ in Mysticism and Language, ed. Steven T. Katz (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 3-35; ‘Mysticism and the Interpretation of Sacred Scripture,’ 
in Mysticism and Sacred Scripture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 7-67.  
67 Katz, ‘Language, Epistemology, and Mysticism,’ p. 32.  
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contexts, and works of the two survives, and what does has led to a multitude 
of scholarly suggestions about the nature of their mystical experiences.  
 
The perennial philosophers’ account, on the other hand, offers an 
appealing alternative model. In suggesting that a universal common core exists 
between various expressions of mystical consciousness, irrespective of doctrinal, 
epistemological, and ontological differences, perennialism removes the 
methodological concerns of temporal, cultural, or religious dislocation. This 
enables accounts of mystical experience from various chronological periods and 
religious traditions to be compared and contrasted with critical ease. According 
to this perspective, the mystical theologies of Plotinus, Gregory of Nyssa and 
Meister Eckhart, for example, can be drawn together without concern for their 
respective contextual backgrounds.68  
 
 In this context, perennialism appears to remove most major 
methodological hurdles. According to this approach, metaphors derived from 
any mystical text could, theoretically, be compared and contrasted, regardless 
of tradition or chronology. Pseudo-Dionysius’ use of metaphor, for example, 
could be analysed alongside that of Evelyn Underhill without concern for their 
respective cultural contexts. Indeed, Marguerite Porete and Marguerite d’Oingt 
would need minimal introduction or historical examination. According to the 
perennial philosophical tradition, their shared common essence of mysticism 
alone constitutes the hermeneutic key that reveals their meaning. 
 
Yet perennialism contains one flaw. In decontextualising the mystical 
utterance, the perennialist philosophers ignore one of its most important 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 See, for example, Anthony N. Perovich Jr., ‘Innate Capacities and the Nature of the Self,’ in 
The Innate Capacity: Mysticism, Psychology, and Philosophy, ed. by Robert K. C. Forman (New York 
and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 213-245.  
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features: language itself. Without language, there is no mystical utterance, no 
projection of the mystical experience into any other sphere than into that of the 
mystic’s own private consciousness. To echo the words of Ricoeur, without this 
‘communication’ there is no way of overcoming ‘the radical non-
communicability of the lived experience as lived.’69 As such, perennialism 
seems to undercut its own thesis by means of its methodology, making it 
impossible to harness in a working approach towards mysticism and 
metaphor.70  
 
 Recent revisions to the perennialist position have engendered new 
perspectives on the mystical mode. In The Problem of Pure Consciousness, Robert 
K. C. Forman concludes that there is at least one form of mystical experience 
that is both innate and free from all contextual influences, the Pure 
Consciousness Event (PCE). 71  In contrast to the contextualists, Forman 
concentrates his analysis on the operations of mystical consciousness. He 
argues:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, p. 10. As Steven Katz observes, perennialists such as W. T. Stace 
paradoxically rely on language as a means of comparing mystical experience even as they 
negate it. In Mysticism and Philosophy, Stace suggests that due to the similarity of language used 
in, amongst others, Meister Eckhart’s Christian discourse, the Jewish Kabbalist’s notion of 
devekuth, and the Buddhist creed of sunyata or the Void, and their comparable descriptions of 
the ineffable, the sublime, and the paradoxical, these accounts all point towards a ‘common 
core,’ a shared mystical essence. Katz, on the other hand disagrees, pointing out that such a 
reading implies that Stace bases his argument on the ‘surface grammar of the mystical reports,’ 
despite simultaneously contending that such linguistic material is irrelevant. Steven T. Katz, 
‘Language, Epistemology, and Mysticism,’ pp. 46-47.  
70 As Steven Katz notes, perennialists such as W. T. Stace paradoxically rely on language as 
means of comparing mystical experience even as they negate it. In Mysticism and Philosophy, 
Stace suggests that due to the similarity of language used in, amongst others, Meister Eckhart’s 
Christian discourse, the Jewish Kabbalist’s notion of devekuth, and the Buddhist creed of sunyata 
or the Void, and their comparable descriptions of the ineffable, the sublime, and the paradoxical, 
these accounts all point towards a ‘common core,’ a shared mystical essence. Katz, on the other 
hand disagrees, pointing out that such a reading implies that Stace bases his argument on the 
‘surface grammar of the mystical reports,’ despite simultaneously contending that such media 
is irrelevant. Steven T. Katz, ‘Language, Epistemology, and Mysticism,’ pp. 46-47.  
71 Robert K. C. Forman, ‘Mysticism, Constructivism and Forgetting,’ in The Problem of Pure 
Consciousness: Mysticism and Philosophy, ed. by Robert K. C. Forman (New York and Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 3-52.  
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[T]he key process in mysticism is not like a construction process 
but more like one of unconstructing. Meditative procedures 
encourage one to gradually lay aside and temporarily cease 
employing language and concepts. If one truly forgets all 
concepts and beliefs for some period, then those concepts and 
beliefs cannot play a formative role in creating the mystical 
experience(s). This forgetting model shows how at least some 
forms of mysticism – that is, the pure consciousness event 
(PCE), a wakeful but objectless consciousness – should be 
viewed as decontextualized (original emphasis).72 
 
  Forman does not suggest that during a PCE the mystic’s consciousness is 
blank. Rather, it is characterised by a paradoxical ‘knowing something,’ such as 
being awake, or being in the presence of ‘something,’ whilst simultaneously 
‘knowing nothing,’ having no ‘mental or sensory objects.’73 Thus the mystic 
comes into contact with his or her own consciousness, into a state that is not 
linguistically formulated and is naturally intuitive. Forman defines 
consciousness not as an ‘awareness of anything at all’ but rather as an 
‘awareness per se, which can become aware of anything at all.’74 This forms the 
platform from to which he constructs his theory of ‘perennial psychology.’ As 
an essentially human psychophysiological construct, consciousness has an 
ability to ‘tie itself together through time.’ ‘In consciousness,’ Forman concludes, 
‘we may have something that transcends cultures and eras.’75  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Robert K. C. Forman, ‘Introduction: Mystical Consciousness,’ in The Innate Capacity: Mysticism, 
Psychology, and Philosophy, ed. by Robert K. C. Forman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 
pp. 3-41. Here at p. 7.  
73 Forman, ‘Introduction: Mystical Consciousness,’ p. 7. 
74 Forman, ‘Introduction: Mystical Consciousness,’ p. 16.  
75 Forman, ‘Introduction: Mystical Consciousness,’ p. 27.  
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This refinement of the perennial philosophers’ approach makes 
perennial psychology more accessible from a medievalist’s perspective. In 
locating a common shared and innate quality of consciousness at the heart of 
the mystical tradition, it is possible to compare the resultant transformative 
processes at work during mystical experience across cultures and ages, despite 
fissures in time and space, perspectives and worldviews. Implicit within 
Forman’s conclusion is an argument for a single conceptual spectrum of 
mystical experience, in which the innate and the contextual constitute two poles 
of epistemological discourse, but where neither pole can be wholly discounted 
in favour of the other. 
 
There are, however, two problems in the methodology underpinning 
Forman’s perennial psychology. The first concerns the mystical reports chosen 
to illustrate the theory. All, be they from the Hindu Upanishadic, the Buddist 
Mahayanic, or the Christian mystical traditions, are carefully selected because 
they point towards a contentless state of consciousness. They relate a 
transformatory process that releases an innate quality of spiritual purity, rather 
than the production of a new spiritual quality. Perennial psychologists rule out 
all other forms of expression that do not point towards their definition of a PCE. 
The methodological obstacle here is clear: by pre-selecting the texts according to 
pre-defined criteria, there can be no argument. Forman’s theory is not able to 
cope with any other forms of expression other than those that form a neat ‘fit’ 
with his formulae. It is not clear whether the texts drive his theory, or whether 
his theory defines his choice of texts.  
 
The second problem is that the perennial psychologists’ thesis does not 
recognise that all mystical accounts are composed retrospectively and, once 
composed, exist and circulate within a contextual domain. In this sense, all 
mystical experience is mediated: if it remains unmediated, how and by whom 
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are such writers deemed to belong to a mystical tradition? The only reason that 
Meister Eckhart’s sermons or the Buddhist Lotus Sūtra can be discussed at all by 
Forman is because they have been composed, mediated, and disseminated in 
textual form. They are, quite literally, contextualised.  
 
These tensions and methodological hurdles are, to a large extent, driven 
by questions of language, referentiality, and, most elliptical of all, definitions of 
truth. Contextualism suggests that there is a neat ‘fit’ between context, 
experience, expression, reality, and truth. According to this perspective, to 
separate expression from context or experience only serves to ‘sever all grounds 
of their intelligibility.’76 As a result, this stance shares some philosophical 
similarities with another interpretative model, which Lakoff and Johnson call 
the ‘myth of objectivism.’77 The objectivist paradigm asserts that it is possible to 
arrive at a position of absolute and unconditional truth and that all reality is 
objective and rational. Meaning is measured in terms of its unconditional ‘fit’ 
with an external world constructed solely out of objects which possess inherent 
properties and a reality independently of any thoughts, experiences or 
interactions projected onto them. Human experience is structured through 
contact with these objects, and the words that describe these objects correlate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Katz, ‘Language, Epistemology and Mysticism,’ p. 47.  
77 Lakoff and Johnson write that they do not use the term ‘myth’ in ‘any derogatory way,’ but 
rather, ‘like metaphors, myths are necessary for making sense of what goes on around us. All 
cultures have myths, and people cannot function without myth any more than they can 
function without metaphor. And just as we often take the metaphors of our own cultures as 
truths, so we often take the myths of our own cultures as truths. The myth of objectivism is 
particularly insidious in this way. [original emphasis]’ Metaphors We Live By, pp. 185-186. The 
objectivist paradigm is found at the heart of logical positivism as posited by the Fregean and 
Husserlian traditions, as well as in the neorationalist orientations inspired by Noam Chomsky’s 
work on linguistics and language acquisition. For an introduction to these philosophical 
traditions, see Alvin I. Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 
1986), especially Chapters Three, ‘Truth and Realism,’ and Eleven, ‘Constraints on 
Representation.’ See also Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, p. 195.  
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exactly with their inherent properties. As such, language is endowed with a 
fixed meaning and its objective should be to clarify meaning and convey truth.78 
 
In modern, Western culture, objectivism’s antithesis is traditionally 
understood to be subjectivism. 79  Lakoff and Johnson propose that the 
subjectivist tradition derives from the Romantic privileging of imagination, 
intuition, and aesthetic experience over rationality, categorisation, and a natural 
structuring of the objectified world. Lakoff and Johnson situate modern 
subjectivism in the ‘domain of art and perhaps in religion’ as a perceived 
‘retreat for the emotions and the imagination.’80 The subjectivist tradition offers 
an account of truth based on private significance to the individual, whose 
structure is structured solely by that individual’s ‘feelings, experiences, 
intuitions, and values.’81  
 
At first glance, subjectivism’s perspective on truth appears to correlate 
easily with the description of mystical states and their descriptions given in the 
introduction. Subjectivism’s emphasis on interiority, feeling, experience, and 
the aesthetic engages with the attributes commonly associated with mystical 
literature: the shift in human consciousness, the emphasis on ‘nonordinariness,’ 
the creativity of visionary experience, and its apparently ineffable or 
inexpressible qualities. This concentration on intimate experience, as opposed 
to the systematic or ‘lawlike’ meaning of context and human reality, resonates 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Lakoff and Johnson provide a summary of objectivism and their critique of its truth-value in 
Metaphors We Live By, pp. 186-188; pp. 195-222. Lakoff also challenges the objectivist paradigm 
in his preface to Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things, pp. xi-xvii. See also George Lakoff and Mark 
Turner, More Than Cool Reason: A Field Guide to Poetic Metaphor (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1989).  
79 Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, p. 223.  
80 Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, p. 192.  
81 Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, p. 224.  
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with Forman’s articulation of mystical experience as an ‘awareness per se, that 
can become anything at all.’82 
 
Yet, like perennial psychology, subjectivism provides little help as a 
hermeneutic framework. Its premise that experience and context are essentially 
unstructured, and that meaning cannot be adequately represented, undermines 
the very essence of the written word. If truth were entirely subjective, there 
would be no point in trying to communicate it. As the earlier discussion 
concerning the semantic framework of mystical expression has demonstrated, 
mystical writing is structured, and the experiences it recounts must be told in 
terms of an absolute truth grounded in Christian doctrine.83   
 
This is also a criticism levelled at perennial psychologists by 
theologians.84 If ‘true’ mystical experience involves, as Forman suggests it does, 
a process of ‘decontextualisation,’ of ‘gradually lay[ing] aside and temporarily 
ceas[ing…] language and concepts,’ it is difficult to see why mystical texts 
would be composed or transmitted at all. If the act of composition is to 
compromise the purity of the ‘consciousness event,’ by shrouding it in language 
and concepts, it seems strange that any mystic would wilfully jeopardise the 
essential nature of that experience. Conversely, and particularly if this 
perspective is applied to the late medieval period, it seems incongruous that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82  Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, p. 223; Forman, ‘Introduction: Mystical 
Consciousness,’ p. 16.  
83 Peter Moore writes: ‘The lack of doctrinal presuppositions might prevent the mystic not only 
from understanding and describing his mystical states but even from experiencing the fullness 
of these states in the first place. ‘Mystical Experience, Mystical Doctrine, Mystical Technique,’ in 
Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis, ed. by Steven T. Katz (London: Sheldon Press, 1978), pp. 
101-131. Here at p. 112.  
84 McIntosh, Mystical Theology, pp. 136-140.  
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such effort would be made to collect, copy, translate and disseminate mystical 
material to the considerable extent that it appears to have been.85  
 
This is not to suggest that perennial psychology, its linguistic corollary, 
subjectivism, or contextualism and its corollary, objectivism, should be 
discarded out of hand. Rather, a preservation of the fundamental tenets of all 
four perspectives leads to a blended, more flexible framework might be termed 
‘post-experiential recontextualism.’ In the same way that the analysis of 
theoretical approaches to metaphor has illustrated, so too a singular approach 
to complex material such as that of the mystical tradition will never prove 
sufficiently comprehensive to cope with its many manifestations.  
 
A blended approach, however, begins with the premise that the capacity 
(not, necessarily the ability) to experience a state of mystical consciousness is, in 
itself, an innate quality of human existence. Entry into this mode of being may 
well involve a passing beyond the constructions of ordinary discursive thought, 
and an entry into an unbounded mode of being characterised by profundity 
and nonordinariness; this is certainly the case argued for the cognitive 
possibilities of metaphor. Recognising this ‘common denominator’ of mystical 
consciousness captures the underlying unity of mysticism and permits 
comparisons such as those between the writings of Pseudo-Dionysius and 
Meister Eckhart, or, as in this case, between the diverse figures of Marguerite 
Porete and Marguerite d’Oingt. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Bernard McGinn provides insight into just how popular the mystical mode of expression had 
become by the later Middle Ages in The Flowering of Mysticism: Men and Women in the New 
Mysticism, 1200-1350, vol. 3 of The Presence of God: A History of Western Christian Mysticism (New 
York: Crossroad, 1998). 
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Once again, the framework and vocabulary provided by cognitive 
metaphor theory helps to articulate this approach. From the perspective of the 
mystic, his or her experience is projected into a contextualised world. ‘Post-
experiential recontextualism’ is based on the observation that once mystical 
consciousness is communicated, it is contextualised. 86  It is context that 
characterises the diversity of mystical expression, but that also restricts it 
historically and culturally, categorising and modifying it to suit religious, 
political, and cultural boundaries, and thereby rendering it meaningful.  
 
 From the perspective of the mystic’s audience, meanwhile, the 
experience of the mystic is ‘seen through’ the veil of the contextual world. On 
the other hand, subsequent audiences are always subject to the influences of 
contemporary ideologies. Katz’s theory of contextualism is not, as he argues, a 
singular process of identifying the ‘interpretative structures’ that shaped the 
mystic’s experience and the subsequent mediation of this experience.87 Rather, 
contextualisation takes place from a number of perspectives; paradoxically 
beginning with the notion that mystical consciousness itself is free from context. 
Hence the coining of the term ‘recontextualism.’ Any analysis of the mystical 
constitutes a rebuilding, be it by the mystic themselves, as he or she recalls and 
shapes their experience into a contextualised form, or by their audience, 
scholarly or otherwise, who engage with and enter into the reported experience.  
 
As such, mysticism shares a philosophical core with Lakoff and 
Johnson’s proposed alternative to objectivism and subjectivism, which they call 
‘experientialism.’ This perspective combines the objectivist need to draw on 
objects and structures with the subjectivist focus on internal aspects of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 As Moore observes, ‘the immediate data of the philosophical analysis of mysticism are not 
the mystical experiences themselves, but the mystic’s accounts of these experiences.’ ‘Mystical 
Experience, Mystical Doctrine, Mystical Technique,’ p. 101.  
87 Katz, ‘Mystical Speech and Mystical Meaning,’ p. 4.  
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understanding, and suggests that the interaction between the two perspectives 
permits a fuller understanding of cognition within a given physical 
environment.88 Their notion of ‘experientialism’ is fundamental to this thesis’ 
exploration of Marguerite d’Oingt’s and Marguerite Porete’s writings, and is 
applicable to the broader conceptualisation of the mystical tradition. 
Experientialism is a synthetic framework in which the cognitive processes of 
reason-based categorisation and inference combine with the imaginative ability 
of the mind to discern similarities between the projected properties of objects 
and events. These are the cognitive processes underpinning conceptual 
metaphor; that which Lakoff and Johnson term ‘imaginative rationality.’89 
 
As with objectivism, the scholarship of mysticism requires a ‘rising 
above’ of individual or collective bias.90 This is occasionally an issue for modern 
scholars, who approach medieval mystical writing with too fixed an ideological 
perspective and reveal an anachronistic over-privileging of current phenomena 
over chronologically more sensitive hermeneutic methodologies.91 However the 
objectivist paradigm asserts the importance of externally validated truth and 
knowledge ‘based on the importance of such knowledge for successful 
functioning’ in a given environment.92 The mystical paradigm, on the other 
hand, like metaphorical reality, is composed of relative truth, consistent with 
both an individual’s and a community’s conceptual system and set of cultural 
norms. Yet mystical writing also preserves something of the subjectivist myth. 
Meaning and relative truth do not rely on rational knowledge alone, but also on 
memory, feeling, past experience, and intuition. After all, ‘meaning is not cut 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, pp. 229-231.  
89 Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, p. 193.  
90 Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, p. 227.  
91 This issue is discussed in more detail in Chapters Three, Four and Five. Examples of this 
over-privileging include some of the feminist readings of medieval women writers, or indeed 
the ‘medicalising’ of Margery Kempe’s spiritual narrative. Denys Turner, meanwhile, cautions 
against the ‘psychologizing’ of mystical speech in The Darkness of God, pp. 245-253.   
92 Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, p. 226.  
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and dried,’ as Lakoff and Johnson observe, but is ‘a matter of imagination and a 
matter of constructing coherence.’93 
 
‘Post-experientialist recontextualism’ must, therefore, tread a careful path 
in its examination of mystical discourse. It assumes a symbiotic relationship 
between language and belief, whereby language represents the vehicle of 
expression and belief the locomotive force that directs this vehicle in accordance 
with contextual and individual influence.94 As in Ricoeur’s thesis that ‘feeling’ 
is a crucial component within metaphoric processing, so too at the heart of both 
the composition and reception of mystical writing lies the notion that 
‘attitudinal purification is necessary for right perception.’95 As Frederick J. 
Streng argues, ‘what one knows is closely related to how one knows,’ and 
therefore ‘to see beyond the apparent, or superficial, world means a change in 
the mechanisms of apprehension.’96  
 
To return to an idea expressed earlier, mystical language, like 
metaphorical language, does not function solely as a description of mystical 
experience, but is capable of conveying the experience of post-experiential 
reception. That it is able to do so is well documented.97  Yet crucially, Streng, 
himself a contextualist, differs in his approach to mysticism to those expressed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, p. 227.  
94 Bimal Krishna Matilal observes that the meaning of mystical language is entirely bound up 
with expectation, emotion and context. In writing about poetry, Matilal writes: ‘where the 
emotion is transmitted […] expression dons a new cloak of meaning […] The language of the 
mystics has to be contextualized in the same way.’ ‘Mysticism and Ineffability: Some Issues of 
Logic and Language,’ in Mysticism and Language, ed. by Steven T. Katz (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1992), pp. 143-157. Here at p. 151. 
95 Frederick J. Streng, ‘Language and Mystical Awareness,’ in Mysticism and Philosophical 
Analysis, ed. by Steven T. Katz (London: Sheldon Press, 1978), pp. 141-169. Here at p. 142. See 
also pp. 166-167.  
96 Streng, ‘Language and Mystical Awareness,’ p. 142.  
97 See Bernard McGinn, ‘The Language of Love in Christian and Jewish Mysticism,’ in 
Mysticism and Language, ed. by Steven T. Katz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 202-
235; Katz, ‘Mystical Speech and Mystical Meaning,’ particularly at p. 5. 
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by his contextualist contemporaries. He argues not only for the 
transformational qualities of mystical language, but also for the ‘catharsis in 
thinking’ that this language is able to catalyse.98 His emphasis on the role 
language plays in cognition recalls the earlier discussion in this chapter 
concerning the dynamic capacity of metaphor to catalyse and inform thought 
processes and evoke new image schemas, or conceptual integrated networks, in 
the mind.  
 
Once again, the theoretical functions and capabilities of both mystical 
discourse and the metaphoric utterance intersect. Both require user and 
audience to discard literal or absolute perceptions of an event or image 
formulation, and instead use language as a vehicle with which to reformulate a 
world-view in accordance with belief. The particular structures and methods 
employed by mystical writers undoubtedly differ across time and space, and 
even within certain cultural and religious traditions. How they are manifested 
in the works of Marguerite Porete and Marguerite d’Oingt will constitute the 
beginnings of an interpretative methodology illustrating how figurative 
language is deployed as both a descriptive and transformational medium in 
thirteenth-century French Christian mystical discourse.  
 
All access to the mystical experience is, ultimately, retrospective. 
However, like metaphor, it reveals its meaning partially, imaginatively, and, 
importantly, according to a structured rationale. Indeed, mystical expression is 
metaphorical, and it is therefore appropriate to use metaphor theory to talk 
about mysticism. The mystical experience itself resides in an indefinable time 
and place; however, its subsequent linguistic expression is wholly contextual, 
and, as such, the context that buttresses the recording of the ineffable requires 
careful examination. This will be the subject of the following chapter. Without 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 Streng, ‘Language and Mystical Awareness,’ p. 143. 
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an understanding of the respective contexts in which Marguerite d’Oingt and 
Marguerite Porete composed their works, and the environments in which they 
may have been received, it is impossible to recontextualise their writings and 
therefore to understand the world-views that aided them in shaping their 
mystical expression in the first place. Context allows for the structural 
mappings to be revealed, and the generic mental spaces of their complex 
figurative imagery to be more sensitively interpreted.   
 
No one theory is sufficient to illuminate the polysemous nature of 
mystical expression or the metaphorical utterance. However a re-contextualist 
approach, which takes in a range of methodological perspectives, allows 
theoretical boundaries to be broken down, and opens up a multivalent reading 
of Marguerite d’Oingt’s and Marguerite Porete’s enigmatic accounts of spiritual 
speculation.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
Texts and Contexts: The Carthusian Prioress and the pseudo mulier  
 
Scholarly attempts to establish the contextual details of the lives, 
experiences, and writings of Marguerite d’Oingt and Marguerite Porete have 
been slow to emerge. Surveying the field of Porete scholarship over the last six 
decades, Nicholas Watson remarks that ‘any hope that Guarnieri’s scholarly 
coup would lead to a balanced appraisal of the Mirouer’s place in history has 
been slow to come to fruition.’1 In very different ways, attempts to reconcile the 
portraits, no matter how incomplete, of Marguerite d’Oingt and Marguerite 
Porete as authorial figures with their literary works have been problematized 
by issues of mistaken identity, a fragmentary manuscript corpus, and in 
Marguerite Porete’s case, a legacy tainted with the stain of heresy. Although the 
historical evidence relating to both women is limited, even details that have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  Nicholas Watson lists the Mirouer’s complex and anonymous manuscript tradition, its 
implication in inquisitorial procedures, its bastardised incorporation into the papal bull Ad 
nostrum, rumours of an additional manuscript copy held in a ‘secret’ location, and the false 
discovery of a German translation as just some of the obstacles faced by scholars of Porete’s text. 
See ‘Melting Into God the English Way,’ p. 21. Nineteenth-century investigations surrounding 
the figure of Marguerite d’Oingt, though subject to less scholarly scrutiny, were also troubled 
by errors in the manuscript tradition (see Introduction for details of the surviving manuscripts 
containing Marguerite d’Oingt’s works). Ms. 5786R and Ms. 66b, 7 ORNA 5 incorrectly cite her 
name as ‘Marguerite d’Oin,’ ‘Marguerite de Duin’ and ‘Marguerite Douin,’ an error that was 
carried forward in subsequent studies and the earliest editions of her work, and which led to 
Samuel Guichenon’s belief that Marguerite was, in fact, from the small village of Duyn in the 
Savoy and a descendant of the noble family of Duygnt-la-Val-d’Isère. See Histoire de Bresse et de 
Bugey (Lyon: J. A. Huguetan & M. A. Ravaud, 1650), p. 90. Pierre Gardette lists other 
orthographic variations of Marguerite’s name in his introductory notes to Les Œuvres de 
Marguerite d’Oingt, p. 11. The errors in her nomenclature were resolved by Antoine Péricaud, 
and latterly by M. Valentin-Smith, who established that the prioress ‘Marguerite d’Oin’ of Ms. 
5785R was a descendant of the d’Oyngt family, whose estates were not far from Lyon and 
Poleteins. Valentin-Smith confirmed this with a will dated 25th July 1297, in the name of 
Guichard d’Oyngt. Alongside Guichard’s two main inheritors, his sons Guichard and Louis, the 
will mentions specific bequests to his daughters, Catherine, Isabelle, Agnès, and Marguerite. 
This document re-connected the figure of Marguerite with one of the oldest and most 
influential families in the Lyonnais, whose genealogy extends back to the early eleventh century. 
See Antoine Péricaud, Variétés historiques, biographiques, & littéraires (Lyon: L. Boitel, 1836), p.110; 
Valentin-Smith’s findings are detailed in the introductary notes to Les Œuvres de Marguerite 
d’Oingt, p. 11, also ns. 7 and 8. 
	   89	  
become widely accepted in most secondary literature are difficult to corroborate 
when subjected to scrutiny.  
 
The writer who calls herself ‘ego Margareta, ancilla Christi’ was the 
fourth prioress of Poleteins, a Carthusian chapterhouse located in the parish of 
Mionnay in the Rhône-Alps founded sometime between 1225 and 1226. 2 
Documentary evidence suggests that Marguerite was a member of the powerful 
d’Oyngt family, landed nobility with a history dating to the early eleventh 
century.3 What little else has been deduced about Marguerite d’Oingt is drawn 
from the details she leaves behind in her writings, and the marginal notation 
found in the only complete and surviving manuscript of her works, Ms. 5785R, 
Grenoble. In the opening lines of the Pagina meditationum, Marguerite states: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2  Pagina meditationum, § 1, p. 71. A Page of Meditations, p. 25. Marie-Claude Guigue’s 
introductory notes to Edouard Philipon’s 1877 edition of Marguerite’s writings suggest that the 
Poleteins charterhouse was probably founded between 1225 and 1226, based on a surviving 
document decorated with the seals of Marguerite de Bâgé and her husband, Humbert de 
Beaujeu. Marguerite and Humbert were members of the local nobility whose marriage had 
united the fiefdoms of Miribel and Beaujeu in the area surrounding Lyon. Marguerite de Bâgé 
financed the opening of the chapterhouse at Poleteins as an appeal to God for the protection of 
Humbert on his summons by King Louis IX to fight against the Count of Toulouse. Guigue’s 
description of this document notes that Marguerite promised to ensure that the chapterhouse 
was well resourced, with sufficient buildings, accommodation, land, and a pond. She promised 
to fund all necessary building work, provide grazing for the rearing of cattle and sheep, a 
vineyard, meadows, woods, a windmill, and to waive all charges and taxes pertaining to the 
land and to goods bought and sold there. See Oeuvres de Marguerite d’Oyngt, Prieure de Poleteins, 
publiées d’après le manuscrit unique de la Bibliothèque de Grenoble, ed. by E. Philipon with 
introductory notes by M.-C. Guigue (Whitefish, MT: Kessinger Legacy Reprints, 2010), pp. x-xii, 
and p. xxxiii, n. 3. First published in Lyon, 1877. 
3 For a detailed account of the d’Oingt family from 1093-1383, see Antoine Vachez, Chatillon 
d’Azergues: son château, sa chapelle et ses seigneurs (Lyon: Imp. d'Aimé Vingtrinier, 1869), pp. 46-52. 
Vachez traces the line back to Umfred d’Oingt, whose lordship is mentioned in maps belonging 
to the abbey of Savigny, and notes that the family had connections with many of the other 
powerful families of the region. He states that two of Marguerite’s sisters, Isabelle and Agnès, 
became nuns at Alix in the Beaujolais region, although his revised edition of the same work, Le 
Château de Châtillon d’Azergues, sa chapelle et ses seigneurs (Lyon: Brun, 1883) goes a step further, 
claiming that Agnès became the sixth prioress of Poleteins in 1314, see pp. 57-58. To date, this 
has been neither proven nor discounted. 
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Anno Domini millesimo. ducentesimo. octogesimo. sexto. 
dominica in septuagesima, ego Margareta, ancilla Christi, eram 
in ecclesia in missa [...].4 
 
Micheline de Fontette’s work on the formation and daily life of medieval 
Carthusian nuns suggests that Marguerite must have been at least twenty-eight 
at the time of revealing her visions to Hugo, Prior of Vallis Bone (Vallebonne), 
as the incipit to the Speculum recounts, and almost certainly older still. She 
would have been already subject to a rigorous period of study, prayer, and 
meditation prior to her being committed as a cloistered member of the 
Carthusian community.5 On consecration as Prioress, Marguerite would have 
participated in a rite absent from other monastic orders of the period, which de 
Fontette calls ‘le seul point vraiment original du statut des moniales 
chartreuses.’6 Presented with a veil and a ring from the Bishop as symbols of 
virginal consecration, and a stole and maniple as an emblem of her benediction 
as a deaconess, Marguerite would have been permitted to read the epistle at 
mass and from the gospels at the evening office. She had probably already been 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Pagina meditationum, p. 71, § 1. ‘In the year of our Lord 1286, on the Sunday of Septuagesima, I 
Margaret, the maidservant of Christ, was in church at mass […].’ A Page of Meditations, p. 25. At 
no other point does Marguerite mention her name, although a later scribe, possibly the compiler 
of Ms. 5785R, includes her name in the various incipits and explicits.  
5 Those who wished to become a cloistered nun were required to approach the Carthusian 
convent before the age of twenty-eight, and were expected to spend a year reflecting on their 
vocation before God in a period known as ‘Postulancy.’ This was followed by the ‘Novititate,’ 
during which the nun received the Carthusian habit and spent long periods studying and in 
prayer and meditation. Only after two years might the nun offer herself to the Order and to 
God by making the ‘Temporary Profession,’ a vow made for three years, and renewable for a 
further two. Her final commitment, or ‘Solemn Profession,’ formalised her status as a cloister 
nun. See Micheline de Fontette, Les Religieuses à l’âge classique du droit canon (Paris: Vrin, 1967), 
especially at p. 87; see also James Hogg, ‘Everyday Life in the Charterhouse in the Fourteenth 
and Fifteenth Centuries,’ in Klösterliche Sachkultur des Spätmittelalters, ed. by M. Heinrich Appelt 
(Vienna: Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1980), pp. 113-146.    
6 Micheline de Fontette, ‘Recherches sur les origines des moniales chartreuses,’ in Etudes 
d’histoire du droit canonique, dédiées à Gabriel Le Bras, vol. 2 of 2 (Paris: Sirey, 1965), pp. 1143-1151. 
Here at p. 1150.  
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installed as prioress before beginning to compose and circulate her visionary 
experiences.7 
 
Although the Carthusian Order had a reputation for monastic 
contemplation devoted to poverty, silence and prayer, it is apparent from the 
few external documentary sources, as well as details found within Marguerite’s 
own writing, that she both came from, and in Poleteins had entered into, an 
elite community founded by and made up of noble and aristocratic women 
from the Rhône-Alps. 8  Her correspondence with other monks and nuns 
suggests that, despite the rule of enclosure, as prioress she was familiar with the 
concerns of daily, non-religious life, as she conveys in one letter to an unnamed 
monk: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Two pieces of evidence point towards this. Firstly, a note in Ms. 5785R writes in the Speculum’s 
incipit: ‘Anno domini millesimo ducentesimo nonagesimo quarto, Hugo, prior Vallis Bone 
attulit ad capitulam generale, donno Bosoni priori Cartusie hanc visionem sibi missam ab 
ancilla Dei domina Margareta, priorissa condam de Pelotens.’ Speculum, p. 89. ‘In the year of 
our Lord 1294, Hugo, prior of Vallebonne brought to the Chapter General, by the gift of Boso, 
prior of the Grande Chartreuse, this vision, sent to him by the servant of God Marguerite, 
sometime prioress of Poleteins.’ My translation. Even if Marguerite was not prioress at the time 
of her experiencing the visions of the Speculum, it was clearly important to the compiler of Ms. 
5785R that she be remembered in the role, perhaps to give her writing an added sense of 
authority. However, it is highly likely that Marguerite would, indeed could, only have met 
Hugo as a prioress. The strict rules of enclosure upheld by Carthusian nunneries meant that the 
prioress was responsible for overseeing all communication entering and emanating from the 
charterhouse and, in accordance with the Antiqua Consuetudines (sometimes known as the 
Antiqua Statuta), statutes issued by the Grande Chartreuse c.1259 (although not promulgated 
until 1271), which ruled that all Carthusian nunneries were to be led by a male prior. It is quite 
possible that Hugo was the supervisory prior of Poleteins to whom Marguerite reported as 
prioress.  
8 The austere, rigorous, yet bookish life of the Carthusian order is depicted in Guibert of 
Nogent’s early description of the first charterhouse in his De vita sua, ed. by E. R. Labande 
(Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1981). Similarly, a century later, in 1214, the Carthusian Raimond 
d’Aurouse was forced to take shelter at Bertaud, a Carthusian nunnery. Recounting his 
experience at the chapterhouse, he exclaimed: ‘Contraints par le mauvais temps de séjourner là, 
nous avons appris par la sévérité du lieu, les roches tourmentées et les montagnes croulantes, 
dans quelle pauvreté corporelle ces moniales se trouvent nécessairement, et quelle rigueur d’un 
froid terrible elles ont à souffrir.’ See Dom Maurice Laporte, Aux sources de la vie cartusienne: 
traits fondamentaux de la Chartreuse, vol. 2 of 7 (La Grande Chartreuse: In Domo Cartusiae, 1960). 
Here at pp. 536-537. Poleteins benefited considerably from its links to the French nobility. In 
1245, Pope Innocent IV placed Poleteins under the special protection of the Holy See, and, some 
time later, Louis X (1289-1316) further reinforced the privileges that had been bestowed on the 
convent. Other royal benefactors included Philippe de Valois, Jean II, Charles V, Charles VI, 
Charles VII, Louis XI, Charles VIII, and François I, as well as various donations given by the 
Dukes of Bourbon and Savoie.  
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je vos di que je sui tant occupee es besoygnes de nostra 
mayson, que n’ay poir de pensar a choses qui bones soent, 
quar je ay tant a fayre que ne say de qual part je me torne. Nos 
n’avons pas culit de ble. a VII. moys de l’ant et nos vignes sont 
tempestees. D’autre part nostre yglyese est en si mal point que 
il la nos covient refayre en partia, et cetera.9 
 
The historical figure of a medieval woman such as Marguerite d’Oingt 
contradicts what has become a popular binary stereotype amongst modern 
scholars of the medieval woman. Frequently characterised as either subservient, 
largely illiterate and incapable of leadership, or as responsible for disseminating 
a counter-discourse to that of the misogynistic and patriarchal Church, 
generalisations about medieval women are rife in modern scholarship and not 
always of much help.10 The Carthusian prioress administered a large estate, 
presided over her religious community, read aloud from the Scriptures, and 
engaged in written communication with monks and nuns. As the next chapter 
will demonstrate, Marguerite d’Oingt’s own mystical compositions suggest a 
woman with a keen sense of creative intelligence, despite her protestations to 
the contrary.11 This outlining of Marguerite’s historical background suggests 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Item ex alia epistola, p. 142, §139. ‘I tell you that I am so occupied with the business of our house 
that I cannot think of those things that are good, for I have so much to do that I do not know 
where to turn to first. We did not harvest the wheat in the seventh month of the year, and our 
vineyards are devastated by a storm. In addition, our church is in such bad repair that we have 
to rebuild it in part, etc.’ From Another Letter, p. 65. Another letter to a certain Agatha, abbess at 
Saint-Pierre de Lyon, tells of the financial strains being put on the charterhouse’s income by 
certain tithes, and suggests that Poleteins was perhaps more involved with the world of money 
and revenue than the Carthusian founders might have envisaged for their successors. On this 
letter to Agatha, see Guigue, Oeuvres de Marguerite d’Oyngt, p. xxv and p. xxxviii, n. 44. 
10 For a detailed survey of these stereotypes, see the ‘Introduction’ to Alcuin Blamires’ The Case 
for Women in Medieval Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 1-18. 
11 Barbara Newman deals with the question of ‘creative intelligence’ amongst communities of 
medieval female religious, and the apparently paradoxical claim of ‘she didn’t write it’ by 
women mystics and their hagiographers in ‘More Thoughts on Medieval Women’s Intelligence: 
Denied, Projected, Embodied,’ in Voices In Dialogue: Reading Women in the Middle Ages, ed. by 
Linda Olson and Kathryn Kerby-Fulton (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 
2005), pp. 231-243. For Marguerite d’Oingt’s claims of ignorance and illiteracy, see the Pagina 
meditationum, p. 72, § 4. A Page of Meditations, p. 26.  
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that she does not easily fit the stereotypes created for medieval women. 
Furthermore, as a historical figure, Marguerite d’Oingt presents the modern 
scholar with a series of questions concerning what it meant to be literate, to give 
religious instruction, to communicate in the vernacular, and to disseminate 
textual accounts of mystical consciousness. Participating in these activities as a 
woman in the Middle Ages alters the parameters of these questions, but not, 
perhaps, in the way that the majority of today’s feminist scholarship has sought 
to do. Tracing the finer nuances of these queries, if not offering definitive 
answers, is the rationale for the second half of this chapter. As will become clear, 
a very similar set of queries arises when sketching out the contextual details of 
Marguerite d’Oingt’s contemporary, the woman known only as ‘Margareta, 
dicta Porete,’ the pseudomulier.12 
 
What can be discerned about the woman burnt as a relapsed heretic in 
Paris on 1st June 1310 amounts to very little, particularly in comparison to the 
amount of secondary material consequently generated. The text for which she 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 The reference to ‘Margareta, dicta Porete’ is found repeatedly in the trial documents, now 
housed in the Archives Nationales, box J428. The epithet pseudomulier[e] was given to her by the 
anonymous continuator of the Chronicon of Guillaume de Nangis, written at Saint-Denis shortly 
after Marguerite’s death. Paul Verdeyen S.J. edited the trial documents and some contemporary 
commentaries on the trial, such as the Chronicon, as well as others including the Grandes 
chroniques de France and that of Géraud de Frachet, who also refers to Marguerite as a 
‘pseudomulier[e]’. See ‘Le procès d’inquisition.’ References to the pseudomulier[e] are at pp. 87-
90. References to ‘Margareta, dicta Porete’ are at pp. 56, 62, 78, 82, and 88. Verdeyen’s 
contribution to the calendaring and editing of the inquisition’s records of Marguerite Porete’s 
trial and his compilation of the Latin critical edition of the Mirouer are valuable sources of 
information and scholarship for the study of Porete’s life and text. However, as both Colledge 
and Lerner observe, Verdeyen’s work has also been responsible for several misconceptions. 
Colledge notes that Verdeyen’s assumption that Porete was a ‘Beguine from Valenciennes,’ 
based on his literal reading of the trial documents, may, in fact, be ‘no more than casual 
denigration’ on the part of her inquisitors. Lerner, meanwhile, remarks that Verdeyen’s dating 
of the trial documents to 11th April 1309, rather than the correct date of 11th April 1310, ‘set 
scholarship back’ considerably, particularly in continental European publications. Ellen 
Babinsky corrects the error in the introductory notes to her English translation, whilst Field 
discusses the broader impact of the errors in chronology relating to Porete’s trial on modern 
scholarship in The Beguine, the Angel, and the Inquisitor, pp. 4-6. See also Edmund Colledge, ‘The 
Latin Mirror of Simple Souls: Margaret Porette’s “ultimate accolade”?,’ in Langland, the Mystics 
and the Medieval Tradition: Essays in Honour of S. S. Hussey, ed. by Helen Phillips (Cambridge: D. 
S. Brewer, 1990), pp. 177-183, here at p. 179; Lerner, ‘New Light,’ p. 92, n. 9; Babinsky, 
‘Introduction,’ in The Mirror of Simple Souls, p. 20, pp. 23-24, and p. 55, n. 72.  
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was condemned, the Mirouer des simples ames, mentions her name only once, 
and even here remains characteristically enigmatic. Addressing l’Ame, Dame 
Amour says: 
O tres bien nee, dit Amour a ceste precieuse marguerite, bien 
soiez vous entree ou seul franc manoir.13 
 
Her cognomen, ‘Porete,’ meanwhile, is only referenced in the trial documents, 
and despite its adoption as Marguerite’s surname by modern scholars, it is 
probably, Robert Lerner argues, only a nickname, since ‘no such name has yet 
been found in thirteenth-century documents from the region.’14 
 
Throughout the trial records, Marguerite is referenced as being ‘de 
Hannonia,’ suggesting that she was a native of the region of Hainaut, now part 
of modern Belgium, although the widely accepted notion that she was born in 
Valenciennes has been questioned by both Colledge and Lerner.15 The only 
documentary evidence connecting Marguerite Porete to Valenciennes exists in 
the Parisian trial records, in which it is noted that the Bishop of Cambrai had 
first tried her in that town, thus making it possible, but not certain, that she 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Mirouer, ch. 52, p. 152. ‘O very high-born one, says Love to this precious pearl, it is well that 
you have entered the only noble manor.’ Mirror, p. 129. Babinsky suggests that the Old French 
reference to the ‘marguerite’ is both a reference to the name of the author, as well as to the 
parable of the pearl in Matthew 13: 45-46. Mirror, p. 225, n. 35. The practice of conflating the 
assumed identity of the author with that of the perceived inscribed narrator is a common 
methodological obstacle in the critical analysis of mystical writing (and indeed any form of 
historical literature). This is discussed in relation to both Marguerite d’Oingt and Marguerite 
Porete in subsequent chapters.  
14 Lerner suggests that scholarship cease the use of ‘Porete’ and refer to her simply as 
‘Marguerite,’ so as to put her on a par with other female authors known only by their first 
names, such as ‘Hadewijch’ and ‘Mechthild’. ‘New Light,’ p. 92. However this study continues 
to call her by her full, if inaccurate, name of Marguerite Porete so as to avoid the possibility of 
confusion with her Carthusian counterpart.  
15 See Colledge, ‘The Latin Mirror,’ p. 179; Lerner, ‘New Light,’ p. 93.  
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hailed from Valenciennes. 16  Almost a century later, in 1401, Jean Gerson 
challenged the work of a certain ‘Marie de Valenciennes,’ who, he argued, had 
written that divine love freed the individual from all law and doctrine.17 It is 
highly likely that this ‘Marie’ was in fact Marguerite Porete and the work 
Gerson was referring to was the Mirouer; further evidence in favour of the 
suggestion that Marguerite was indeed from Valenciennes, and also an 
indication that the inquisition had not been successful in destroying every copy 
of the work and that Gerson may even have set eyes on a copy himself. In sum, 
however, Lerner concludes that all that may be safely assumed about 
Marguerite Porete is that she came from the ‘Valenciennes vicinity.’18 
 
The mysteries of Marguerite Porete’s identity do not end here. A more 
problematic issue for the study of Porete and her text is the continuing 
uncertainty as to whether she was a beguine or not, and if so, whether she lived 
and wrote as part of a beguinage or as an itinerant beguina with no fixed 
community.19 The impact and consequences of this aspect of her identity have 
largely shaped the various critical stances adopted by modern scholars towards 
the Mirouer. These scholarly positions are examined in more detail in Chapter 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Lerner, ‘New Light,’ p. 93. The trial records reveal that Marguerite’s book had previously 
been tried by Gui de Colmieu (d.1305), Bishop of Cambrai, sometime between 1296 and 1305, 
and publicly burnt in Valenciennes with the order that she must never disseminate its contents 
again. Continued use of the text was forbidden on pain of excommunication – an order 
Marguerite appears to have ignored - and she was once again brought before the Bishop of 
Cambrai, Colmieu’s successor, Philip of Marigny, sometime between 1306 and 1308. See 
Verdeyen, ‘Le process d’inquisition,’ pp. 78-79; Robert Lerner, The Heresy of the Free Spirit in the 
Later Middle Ages (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, corrected and reprinted 
1991, reprinted 2007, orig. publ. 1972), p. 71; also Lerner, ‘New Light,’ p. 93. An analysis of the 
trial records relating to this first condemnation can be found in Colledge, Marler and Grant, 
‘Introductory Interpretative Essay,’ pp. xxxix-xl.  
17 Jean Gerson, De distinctione verarum revelationum a falsis, in Gerson, Œuvres complètes, ed. by 
Palémon Glorieux, vol. 3 of 10 (Paris: Desclee et Cie, 1962), pp. 51-52.  
18 Lerner, ‘New Light,’ p. 93.  
19 Ernst W. McDonnell’s The Beguines and Beghards in Medieval Culture: With Special Emphasis on 
the Belgian Scene (New York: Octagon Books, 1969) remains one of the key texts in the study of 
beguine and beghard communities, their history, and their writings. McDonnell deals 
specifically with Marguerite Porete on pp. 400-492. Another helpful overview of the beguine 
movement can be found in Malcolm Lambert, Medieval Heresy: Popular Movements from the 
Gregorian Reform to the Reformation (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), especially at pp. 199-207.  
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Four. What follows sets out the evidence relating to Marguerite’s religious and 
social status, taking into consideration the documentary and contextual 
evidence and its recent interpretations.  
 
Thirteenth-century northern Europe was a melting pot of both 
established and newly founded religious movements, within which the 
beguines, and their male counterparts, the beghards, formed a vocal 
community. Beguines could choose to live alone, as recluses, mendicants, 
itinerant teachers, or preachers, or to live together in loosely organised 
communes, beguinages, or in groups aligned to a monastery. 20  These 
movements fitted easily into urban life, and answered a calling from those 
women who could not afford the dowry required to enter a convent, or found 
that their personal circumstances excluded them from entering into established 
orders. As Richard Southern summarises, ‘in many ways, it [is] an idyllic 
picture – women escaping from the sordid frustrations of the world into the 
liberty of an unpretentious spiritual life: enjoying vivid experiences of a loving 
God, and occupied in useful services ranging from the care of the sick to the 
embroidery of ecclesiastical vestments.’21  
 
Contemporary reactions to these new movements were divided. Some 
churchmen wrote favourably about the beguines, including Jacques de Vitry 
(c.1160 - 1240) and, later, the scholar and bishop Robert Grosseteste (c.1175-
1253), who, around 1240, taught that the beguines represented the highest and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20  These feminine religious movements most frequently aligned themselves with the 
Premonstratensians, who had, prior to the end of the twelfth century, included women in their 
establishments. Even after their exclusion of women, they continued to support them in the 
realisation of their commitment to poverty, contemplation, and continence. Similarly, groups of 
religious laywomen sought out the guidance of Cistercian monks, who like their 
Premonstratensian brothers, offered a level of religious and pastoral guidance to the women. 
See Babinsky, ‘Introduction,’ pp. 6-7.  
21 R. W. Southern, Western Society and the Church in the Middle Ages (London: Penguin, 1970), p. 
32. 
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most perfect religious group ‘because they live from the proceeds of their own 
work and do not burden the world by exacting what they need.’22  Other 
theologians, whose interpretation of canon thirteen of the Fourth Lateran 
Council (1215), which expressly forbade the founding of new religious orders, 
was more exacting, were highly suspicious of the new movement. 23  The 
beguines’ lack of officially sanctioned status left them vulnerable to accusations 
of heresy, and the range of lifestyles open to them, either as nomads or as 
residents of a beguinage, led to confusion and contempt amongst the clergy.24 
By the close of the thirteenth century, beguines had become the target of 
satirical poetry and their reputation for interpreting and disseminating 
Scripture in the vernacular, as well as their propensity for mystical experience 
and expression, frightened the Church into taking repressive measures against 
them.25 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Quoted in Paul Mommaers, Hadewijch: Writer, Beguine, Love Mystic (Leuven: Peeters, 2004), p. 
36.  
23 See Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, ed. and trans. by Norman P. Tanner, vol. 1 of 2 
(Washington D. C.: Georgetown University Press, 1990).  
Available online:	  http://www.papalencyclicals.net/Councils/ecum12-2.htm. Accessed 
22/01/2014. 
24 See H. Grundmann, Religiöse Bewegungen im Mittelalter: Untersuchungen über die geschichtlichen 
Zusammennhänge zwischen der Ketzerei, den Bettelorden und der religiösen Frauenbewegung im 12. 
und 13. Jahrhundert und die geschichtlichen Grundlagen der deutschen Mystik (Hildesheim: Georg 
Olms, 1961), p. 344. 
25 Renate Blumenfeld-Kosinski lists the poets Gautier de Coincy (d.1236), Rutebeuf (c.1245-1285), 
and Jean de Meun (c.1240-c.1305) as amongst those intent on satirizing the ‘institutional novelty,’ 
‘too friendly relations with the friars’ and ‘lack of rigour in the beguines’ way of life.’ See 
‘Satirical Views of the Beguines in Northern French Literature,’ in New Trends in Feminine 
Spirituality: The Holy Women of Liège and Their Impact, ed. by Juliette Dor, Lesley Johnson, and 
Jocelyn Wogan-Browne, Medieval Women: Texts and Contexts, 2 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1999), pp. 
237-249. Here at pp. 240-241. Newman also deals with Jean de Meun’s satirical treatment of 
beguines in God and the Goddesses, pp. 107-108. Lerner lists further sources ridiculing the 
beguines in The Heresy of the Free Spirit, pp. 39-44. A thirteenth-century sermon by the 
Franciscan Gilbert of Tournai is often cited as evidence of the Church’s critical view of the 
beguines ‘audacious use of vernacular scripture.’ Writing for the Second Council of Lyon in 
1274, Gilbert castigated the beguines for their manipulation of Scripture in public articulations 
of vernacular spirituality. ‘Sunt apud nos mulieres, que Beghine vocantur, et quedam earum 
subtilitatibus vigent et novitatibus gaudent. Habent interpretata scripturarum mysteria et in 
communi idiomate gallicata, quae tamen in sacra Scriptura exercitatis vix sunt pervia.’ 
Quotation from Sean L. Field, ‘Annihilation and Perfection in Two Sermons by Gilbert of 
Tournai for the Translation of St. Francis,’ Franciscana, 1 (1999): 237-274. Here at pp. 255-256, n. 
49. A century earlier, in 1175, the parish priest of Liège, Lambert li Bègues, commonly referred 
to as an early advocator of the Beguine movement, was charged with heresy for translating the 
Acts of the Apostles and the Vita Sancti Agnetis into French verse for his parishioners. See 
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The type of beguinal life led by Marguerite Porete, if indeed she was 
associated with the movement at all, continues to be a matter for debate. On the 
one hand, Victoria Cirlot and Blanca Garí, drawing on the work of Marie Bertho, 
suggest that Marguerite may have been an itinerant beguine due to the fact that 
she must have been in possession of considerable independent resources in 
order to finance the production of multiple copies of her text.26 Not only that, 
but the length of the Mirouer alone suggests that copying it would have taken at 
least one hundred folios and therefore reproducing it would have cost a 
substantial sum of money.27 Cirlot and Garí speculate that Marguerite may 
herself have been a trained scribe or copyist, learning her craft at a beguinage or 
monastic school, perhaps under the supervision of Franc of Villiers, the third of 
the figures to append his approbation to the Mirouer.  The Cistercian monastery 
at Villiers was, they note, a francophone community in the region of Hainaut 
known for the mulieres religiosae who worked in its library. They suggest that 
Marguerite may have been educated or possibly have worked in the library 
there, giving her access to the works of Church Fathers, including Augustine, 
Dionysius, and Gregory of Nyssa, as well as those of William of St Thierry, 
Bernard of Clairvaux, and the writings of the school of St Victor, traces of 
whose thought can all be identified in the Mirouer. No evidence exists to 
discount Cirlot and Garí’s suggestion, and indeed, were it to be proven that 
Marguerite was more closely connected to Villiers than has been demonstrated 
to date, this would constitute a considerable advance in the contextualisation of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Walter Simons, “Staining the Speech of Things Divine’: The Uses of Literacy in Medieval 
Beguine Communities,’ in The Voice of Silence: Women’s Literacy in a Men’s Church, ed. by Thérèse 
de Hemptinne and María Eugenia Góngora (Turnhout: Brepols, 2004), pp. 85-110. Kathryn 
Kerby-Fulton also observes that beguine superiors, known as ‘Marthas’ both preached and 
‘wielded a surprising degree of pastoral power,’ hearing ‘a kind of pre-confession,’ which, 
presumably was conducted in the vernacular. See Books Under Suspicion, p. 242.   
26 Victoria Cirlot and Blanca Garí, La mirada interior: Escritorias místicas y visionarias en la Edad 
Media (Madrid: Ediciones Siruela, 2008), pp. 213-214. See also Marie Bertho, Le Miroir des Âmes 
Simples et aniénties de Marguerite Porete. Une vie blessée d’amour (Découvrir: Paris, 1993). 
McDonnell also concludes that Marguerite must have been an ‘unattached beguine […] refusing 
to submit to authority.’ The Beguines and Beghards, p. 367.  
27 Suzanne Kocher, Allegories of Love in Marguerite Porete’s Mirror of Simple Souls, Medieval 
Women: Texts and Contexts, 17 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2008), p. 163. See also Lerner, ‘New Light,’ 
for his estimates as to the probable length of the Mirouer, based on the missing seventeenth-
century Bourges copy and Ms. Chantilly, Musée Condé, XIV F 26, p. 108. 
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her text. Until these suggestions can be verified, however, they remain little 
more than another speculative piece in Porete’s puzzle.  
 
Robert Lerner, meanwhile, dismisses the suggestion that Marguerite 
Porete was an itinerant beguine on two counts; the first being that ‘this form of 
beguinal life was unknown to the Franco-Flemish area,’ and the second that 
‘nothing in the documentary evidence can be taken to show that Marguerite 
ever left the vicinity of Valenciennes before her trial in Paris.’28 Yet, as with so 
many investigations into the details of Marguerite Porete’s life and work, 
Lerner’s and Cirlot and Garí’s conclusions are based on a lack of, as opposed to 
the production of, any substantive evidence. 
 
What problematizes an outright dismissal of Marguerite’s identity as a 
beguine are the references to her as a beguina by contemporary documentation. 
The two Parisian trial records and a Sentences commentary by the Carmelite 
theologian John Baconthorpe (c.1290-1345) label Marguerite a ‘beguina,’ whilst 
the later Grandes chroniques de France mention her as a ‘beguine clergesse’; 
sufficient evidence for modern scholars including Barbara Newman, Bernard 
McGinn, and Amy Hollywood to depict Marguerite as a member of a beguinal 
‘textual community,’ engaging in a discursive network of vernacular theology 
which spans the dawn of the thirteenth century to at least midway into the 
fourteenth. 29  Taking the contemporary documentation at face value, it is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Lerner, ‘New Light,’ p. 93.  
29 For the references in the Parisian trial documents, see Verdeyen, ‘Le procès d’inquisition,’ p. 
60 and p. 78. John Baconthorpe’s comments relating to Porete were first noticed by Auguste 
Jundt, Histoire du panthéisme au moyen âge et au seizième siècle (Paris: Sandoz et Fischbacher, 1875), 
p. 109, n.3. Verdeyen overlooked this detail in his collection of Porete references, but Lerner 
suggests that Baconthorpe’s comments make it appear as if Marguerite was a beguine that lived 
in a beguinage. See The Heresy of the Free Spirit, p. 206; ‘New Light,’ p. 93. The citation from the 
Grandes chroniques can be found in Tanya Suella Stabler, Now She Is Martha, Now She is Mary: 
Beguine Communities in Medieval Paris (1250-1470), PhD diss. (University of California, 2007), p. 
206, n. 3. Stabler takes the quotation from Les grandes chroniques de France, ed. Jules Viard, vol. 8 
of 10 (Paris: Champion, 1934), p. 273. For discussions of Marguerite as a participant in beguinal 
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tempting to reconstruct a set of circumstances that would place Marguerite at 
the heart of the Franco-Flemish beguine community.30 Newman, McGinn, and 
Hollywood establish textual parallels between the Mirouer and the writings of 
known beguines such as Mechthild of Magdeburg and Beatriz of Nazareth, and, 
as Chapter Four examines, elements of all of these texts can be seen to echo and 
resonate with each other. The shared metaphorical imagery, literary, and 
theological expression of these women writers are striking, and appear to typify 
a certain type of radical mystical consciousness or union prevalent in 
vernacular theology of the period, that which McGinn calls ‘a goal of “union 
without difference” […] the insistence that in the ground of reality there is 
absolute identity between God and the soul.’31 Whether or not Marguerite’s 
writing may be seen wholly to reflect this ideology will be a matter for debate.  
 
A second factor used to equate Marguerite Porete with the beguine 
movement concerns the erudite nature of her writing, with its apparent 
exposure to, and use of, a range of both monastic and popular writings, and 
‘grasp, at least of the basics, of scholastic thought.’32 In attempting to account 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
‘textual communities’ (drawing on Brian Stock’s celebrated notion of textual communities first 
expounded in The Implications of Literacy: Written Language and Models of Interpretation in the 
Eleventh and Twelfth Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983).), see Barbara 
Newman, From Virile Woman to WomanChrist: Studies in Medieval Religion and Literature 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1995), passim; Bernard McGinn’s edited 
volume, Meister Eckhart and the Beguine Mystics: Hadewijch of Brabant, Mechthild of Magdeburg, and 
Marguerite Porete (New York: Continuum, 1994), passim; Amy Hollywood, The Soul As Virgin 
Wife: Mechthild of Magdeburg, Marguerite Porete, and Meister Eckhart (Notre Dame, IN: University 
of Notre Dame Press, 1995), passim. 
30 The beguine communities of Flanders and Hainaut were heavily patronised by the daughters 
of Baldwin IX, emperor of Constantinople, Jeanne (b. 1199/1200) and Marguerite (b. 1202). The 
community of ‘fratres beghini et sorores beghinae’ was strengthened in Valenciennes under the 
auspices of Jeanne, and later developed and consolidated by Marguerite. See McDonnell, The 
Beguines and Beghards, p. 208. Short biographies of both Jeanne and Marguerite by Karen S. 
Nicholas can be found in ‘Countesses as Rulers in Flanders,’ in Aristocratic Women in Medieval 
France, ed. by Theodore Evergates (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999), pp. 
129-135.  
31  Bernard McGinn, ‘Introduction: Meister Eckhart and the Beguines in the Context of 
Vernacular Theology,’ in Meister Eckhart and the Beguine Mystics: Hadewijch of Brabant, Mechthild 
of Magdeburg, and Marguerite Porete, ed. by Bernard McGinn (New York: Continuum, 1994), pp. 
1-14. Here at p. 12. 
32 Kerby-Fulton, Books Under Suspicion, p. 274.  
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for this, modern scholars frequently find it convenient to associate Marguerite 
with the beguines’ reputation for assimilating and disseminating Scripture in 
the vernacular and their particular interest in speculative theology. Ernest W. 
McDonnell encapsulates this concern in his writing about two Flemish beguines’ 
mystical prose, Hadewijch’s Visions and lyrics, and the Seven Maniren van 
Heiligher Minnen by Beatriz of Nazareth: 
It is difficult to conceive how such works […] could spring 
up almost simultaneously without some preparation for 
their language and intellectual climate through a 
vernacular moral-didactic literature.33 
 
McDonnell speculates as to whether beguine communities may have possessed 
libraries or produced writings for ‘their own edification and to satisfy the 
spiritual yearnings of the lay public,’ but this remains unproven.34 Male clergy, 
in particular the Dominican friars, were also known to have preached in 
beguine houses, which offers another potential avenue through which beguines, 
and perhaps Marguerite Porete, may have come into contact with the ideas on 
the Trinity found in their devotional literature.35  
 
More recent work has, however, placed Marguerite more firmly into the 
intellectual and textual milieu of the late thirteenth and early fourteenth 
centuries. Sean Field discusses the possible scenarios that may have led to an 
interaction between Marguerite, her Mirouer, and the celebrated secular master 
of theology at Paris, Godfrey of Fontaines, the third of the ‘clerkis Þat haue 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 McDonnell, The Beguines and Beghards, p. 365.  
34 McDonnell, The Beguines and Beghards, p. 365.  
35 Kerby-Fulton, Books Under Suspicion, p. 252. McDonnell also highlights the interaction 
between the Dominican friars and the beguines in The Beguines and Beghards, p. 225. 
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redde Þis boke.’36 Field presents a strong case. Basing his thoughts on the 
Middle English text’s description of what Godfrey ‘seide’ and ‘counsailide,’ and 
on circumstantial evidence relating to the active relationships between beguines 
and university theologians, Field proposes that Godfrey and Marguerite may 
have actually met in person, sometime between 1300-03, when Godfrey was 
making one of his frequent journeys between Liège, where he held a canonry, 
and Paris.37 The strength of Field’s argument is derived from his comparative 
analyses of the Mirouer and Godfrey’s own intellectual history and his 
reinsertion of both of these into their contemporary scholastic and religious 
milieux. His conclusion that ‘in Godfrey, Marguerite had located an authority 
who was on record as saying that it was legitimate to ask one bishop to 
overturn his predecessor’s condemnation’ is difficult to fault, and indeed sheds 
light on elements of the text’s circulation, intended readership and reception 
that will be returned to in due course.38 
 
In his detailed analysis of the Mirouer’s circulation post-1310, Lerner also 
presents a compelling hypothesis: that Marguerite may well have been a 
resident not of the beguinage of Valenciennes, but of that of Masny, situated 
some thirty kilometres from Valenciennes and patronised by Jeanne of Flanders’ 
younger sister, Marguerite. 39  Yet one detail in both Field’s and Lerner’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Sean L. Field, ‘The Master and Marguerite: Godfrey of Fontaines’ Praise of The Mirror of 
Simple Souls,’ Journal of Medieval History, 35, 2 (2009): 136-149. The three approbations do not 
appear in Ms. Chantilly, Musée Condé, XIV F 26. They are, however, extant in the three Middle 
English versions found in British Library Ms. Additional 37790, Oxford, Bodleian Library Ms. 
Bodley 505, and Cambridge, St. John’s College Ms. 71, used by Marylin Doiron in her English 
edition, ‘The Mirror of Simple Souls: A Middle English Translation,’ Archivio italiano per la storia 
della pietà, 5 (1968): 241–355. Guarnieri appends Doiron’s Middle English to the end of her 
Middle French edition of the Mirouer. It is from this Corpus Christianorum Continuatio 
Mediaevalis edition that all Middle English quotations are taken. Mirouer, p. 404.  
37 Mirouer, p. 406. Field, ‘The Master and Marguerite,’ pp. 140-141. Field cites Stabler’s PhD 
thesis, ‘Now She is Martha, Now She Is Mary,’ in demonstrating that university masters 
frequently preached to beguines, particularly in Paris, on p. 141, n. 23. Godfrey’s travels to the 
Low Countries are also set out in detail at p. 141, n. 24.   
38 Field, ‘The Master and Marguerite,’ p. 148.  
39 Lerner bases his thesis on the possibility of a now-lost early copy of the Mirouer, produced in 
the vicinity of Valenciennes, making its way to England in the hands of Walter de Manny, a 
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hypotheses remains untested: the veracity of Marguerite’s beguinal status. In 
assuming that she lived, thought and wrote as part of a beguine community, 
both scholars project a narrative that seeks to make sense of her writing through 
the lens of inquisitorial records and the Clementine bulls, Cum de quibusdam 
mulieribus, and Ad nostrum, discussed at the ecumenical Council of Vienne, 
1311-12 and whose prose bears striking similarities to phrases and ideas found 
in the Mirouer. 40 The first of these decrees forbade the practices of women 
‘commonly known as beguines,’ some of whom spoke ‘as if insane’ on the 
Trinity and the divine essence; the second condemned beguines and beghards 
for upholding a radically mystical and antinominian heresy. Both Guarnieri and 
Lerner suggest that ‘the only source for Ad nostrum that can be established is the 
list of tenets extracted from The Mirror of Simple Souls used by the inquisition to 
try Marguerite Porete.41  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
member of Philippa of Hainaut’s entourage who accompanied her to England in 1327 for her 
marriage to Edward III. De Manny was a close associate of Michael Northbrook, bishop of 
London and co-founder, with de Manny, of the London Charterhouse and a possible candidate 
for the Carthusian scribe ‘M.N.’ who translated the Mirouer into Middle English sometime 
during the fifteenth century. ‘Manny’, Lerner notes, is an Anglicanisation of ‘Masny,’ and 
Walter travelled frequently back to his hometown on military engagements, diplomatic 
missions, and family business. Lerner proposes that Marguerite Porete may have lived as a 
beguine at Masny and have been patronised by the Countess of Flanders or the local aristocracy, 
thus allowing for an extant copy of her recently condemned text to have remained there after 
her death in 1310 and to have subsequently travelled across the Channel seventeen years later. 
See Lerner, ‘New Light,’ pp. 103-110.  
40 Ad nostrum enumerates what the council understood to be eight fundamental errors in the 
beguines’ beliefs: ‘(1) humans can attain a sinless state, (2) in which sensuality is so 
subordinated to the soul that the body may be freely granted whatever it likes, (3) in this ‘spirit 
of liberty’ individuals are not subject to human obedience, (4) and can attain the same 
perfection of beatitude on earth as in heaven; (5) every intelligent nature is blessed in itself, (6) 
and the acts of virtue are necessary only for those who are imperfect, for the perfect soul no 
longer needs to practice them; (7) the carnal act is not a sin; (8) the perfect should not rise 
during the elevation of the Host, for to think of the sacrament of the Eucharist or the Passion of 
Christ would be a sign of imperfection, a descent from the heights of perfection.’ Quoted in 
Gwendolyn Bryant, ‘The French Heretic Beguine: Marguerite Porete,’ in Medieval Women Writers, 
ed. by Katharina M. Wilson (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1984), pp. 204-226. Here 
at p. 207. For the text of the Bull Ad nostrum, see Corpus iuris canonici, ed. by Aemilius Ludwig 
Richter and Emil Friedberg, vol. 2 of 2 (Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt, 1959), cols. 
1183-1184. Lambert writes that when the Ad nostrum is compared to Marguerite Porete’s text 
and the articles extracted from it used at her trial, the Mirouer was ‘a quarry for certain suspect 
statements’ condemned in the bull. See Medieval Heresy, p. 205. 
41 Lerner, The Heresy of the Free Spirit, p. 82; Guarnieri, ‘Il movimiento del Libero Spirito,’ p. 416.  
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Despite Guarnieri’s, Lerner’s and Field’s research, to date no document 
positively connecting Marguerite Porete with an established beguine 
community in Hainaut has been identified, and nor does the Mirouer fit neatly 
into what might be broadly thought of as a genre or canon of beguine 
literature.42 Rather, an alternative biography for Porete might be posited, the 
reasons for which stem both from textual evidence contained within the Mirouer 
itself, and from the circumstances in which medieval lay women were able to 
disseminate expressions of their faith. To continue to regard Marguerite Porete 
as a beguine, to the exclusion of other potential contextual influences on her 
writing, is to reconstruct both the historical figure and her text within a falsely 
restrictive paradigm, with a range of occasionally pejorative associative 
connotations, but without sufficient corroborating evidence. Marguerite may 
well have been a beguine, or have had access to beguinal literature. But placing 
too much emphasis on the Mirouer’s identity as a beguinal text is to compel it to 
engage in an anachronistic dialogue with other texts emanating from beguine 
communities, or to seek correlations between the content and sub-text of her 
writing and heretical doctrine, neither of which allow for the text to stand alone 
and speak for itself.  
 
An indication that Marguerite Porete may not have been aligned with 
the beguine movement can be found in the Ame’s song in chapter 122. The Soul 
sings: 
Amis, que diront beguines, 
 et gens de religion, 
Quant ilz orront l’excellence 
 de vostre divine chançon? 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 McDonnell, The Beghards and Beguines, p. 367; Lerner, The Heresy of the Free Spirit, pp. 229-230. 
Walter Simons advises against the conceptualisation of a coherent beguinal genre of writing. 
Contemporary sources are, he argues, too overtly hostile and too little can be gleaned from 
works written by beguines to form an impression of their literacy. See Cities of Ladies: Beguine 
Communities in the Medieval Low Countries, 1200-1565 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2001), pp. 80-85.  
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Beguines dient que je erre, 
 prestres, clers, et prescheurs, 
Augustins, et carmes, 
 et les freres mineurs, 
Pource que j’escri de l’estre 
 de l’affinee Amour.43 
 
 
Within the framework of her spiritual hierarchy and seven-stage journey 
towards the divine, the Soul appears to associate the beguines with those 
trapped in the lower stages of mystical ascent. These ‘gens de religion’ are 
members of Porete’s Saincte Eglise la Petite, overly fixated on the material 
symbolism of the Scriptures and the sacrament:  
Telz gens, dit ceste Ame, que je appelle asnes, quierent Dieu 
es creatures, es monstiers par aourer, en paradis creez, en 
paroles d’omnes, et es escriptures.44 
 
In criticising the beguines, juxtaposing them with the ‘prestres, clers, et 
prescheurs, Augustins, et carmes, et les freres mineurs,’ Porete may be alluding 
to a trend prevalent in late thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century vernacular 
literature and already mentioned briefly above: that of satirical poetry targeting 
the beguine movement. Barbara Newman, amongst others, has demonstrated 
the striking similarities between Porete’s Mirouer and its ‘unlikely intertext,’ 
Jean de Meun’s completed version of Guillaume de Lorris’ Roman de la rose, to 
be discussed further in Chapter Four. The Roman includes a biting attack on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Mirouer, ch. 122, p. 344. ‘O my Lover, what will beguines say/ and religious types,/ When 
they hear the excellence/ of your divine song?/ Beguines say I err,/ priests, clerics, and 
Preachers,/ Augustinians, Carmelites,/ and the Friars Minor,/ Because I wrote about the 
being/ of the one purified by Love.’ Mirror, p. 200.  
44 Mirouer, ch. 69, pp. 194-196. ‘Such folk, says this Soul, whom I call donkeys, seek God in 
creatures, in monasteries for prayer, in a created paradise, in words of men and in the 
Scriptures.’ Mirror, p. 144.  
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beguine movement and its relationship to the mendicant friars in the figures of 
Atenance Contrainte and Faux Semblant.45 The former, a beguine, is portrayed as 
having too close an association with Faux Semblant, dressed as a friar, and the 
two characters are satirized as emblematic of false piety, a lack of regulation, 
and sexual liberty.46 Porete, like Jean de Meun and his contemporaries, groups 
the beguines with other mendicant preaching orders such as the Augustinian 
Friars and the Carmelites, perhaps implicitly engaging with a concern that had 
long troubled the ecclesiastical authorities. As Gilbert of Tournai had 
complained a century earlier, many in the Church viewed these ‘falsi prophetae’ 
with distrust, who openly interpreted the mysteries of Scripture and spread 
their subtleties and novelties ‘without respect, with daring, in their 
communities, their workshops, and on the streets.’47  
 
It seems unlikely that Marguerite Porete would have belonged to one of 
the very communities whose practices were commonly ridiculed as being 
antithetical to those she advocates in the Mirouer. Rather, it is quite possible that 
Marguerite lived and wrote as a laywoman, unattached to a particular religious 
association or group. Support for this hypothesis can be found in the content 
and structure of the Mirouer itself. Unlike Marguerite d’Oingt’s mystical 
composition, with its frequent and often almost verbatim quotations from 
religious writings, ranging from the Scriptures to biblical exegesis, Porete’s text, 
whilst doctrinally more daring, is also more fluid and less reliant on the citation 
of authoritative sources for the exposition of her ideas. Whereas d’Oingt’s 
writing is reflective of a life spent in structured prayer, immersed in Scriptural 
exposition and exegesis, with ready access to library materials, and perhaps 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Newman, ‘The Mirror and the Rose,’ p. 105. See also Blumenfeld-Kosinksi, ‘Satirical Views of 
the Beguines,’ p. 242; Newman, God and the Goddesses, pp. pp. 107-108.  
46 Blumenfeld-Kosinski demonstrates that the two dominant criticisms levelled at the beguines 
and the friars in thirteenth-century satirical poetry, excessive and predatory lust and 
unmediated access to Scripture and unauthorized public preaching, were exploited by a 
number of poets including Matheolus, the anonymous author of the Songe du paradis, and 
Rutebeuf. See ‘Satirical Views of the Beguines,’ particularly pp. 242-244.   
47 Gilbert of Tournai, Collectio de scandalis ecclesie. The Latin quotation can be found in Field, 
‘Annihilation and Perfection,’ pp. 255-256, n. 49. My translation.  
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reflective of the Carthusian impulse to collect and copy religious works, 
Porete’s Mirouer adopts and reworks biblical and monastic imagery in a manner 
more suggestive of an author who has been exposed orally to religious material, 
hearing or reading selected extracts from sermons or a book of hours, and who 
may have even heard scholars, beguines or preachers speaking or debating 
publicly, such as those of whom Gilbert of Tournai had complained so 
bitterly.48  
 
It is possible that Marguerite Porete’s intellectual development and talent 
for mystical expression were shaped by extended and intense, but generally 
unstructured and unregulated, contact with a range of clerics and scholars in 
the Franco-Flemish region. Assuming that Lerner’s thesis that Porete came from 
the ‘Valenciennes vicinity’ is correct, the city and its environs would have 
formed an ideal environment in which Marguerite could absorb, discuss, and 
shape her particular vision of mystical devotion, with its striking blend of 
courtly and religious imagery. As Juliet Vale’s study of late thirteenth- and 
early fourteenth-century culture and society in northern France shows, the city 
of Valenciennes was situated on a north-south axis running from Paris to an 
area between Bruges and Ghent, and was one of the most densely urbanized in 
Europe.49 An important commercial centre and home to Franciscan, Carmelite, 
and Dominican orders from the mid-thirteenth century, Valenciennes was also 
regarded as a symbolic ‘political’ capital due to the frequent presence of the 
king or other nobility and their respective courts and administrations.50 As a 
result, it was a site of increasing contact not only between the various lay and 
religious communities resident and travelling through the region, but also 
between the noble rural classes and the urban élite. Porete may easily have been 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 For more on the Carthusians’ bibliophilic tendencies, see Sargent, ‘The Transmission by the 
English Carthusians’; see also Chapter Three.  
49 Juliet Vale, Edward III and Chivalry: Chivalric Society and Its Context, 1270-1350 (Woodbridge: 
Boydell and Brewer, 1982). See, in particular, pp. 25-32 and p. 42.  50	  Vale,	  Edward	  III	  and	  Chivalry,	  p.	  26.	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from either grouping, although the latter appears a more obvious choice, due to 
the sustained contact with theologians, friars, and secular minds she would 
have needed in order to pool the resources necessary for the composition of a 
text such as the Mirouer.  
 
Operating within this cosmopolitan environment, and with access to 
funds and the requisite materials, an educated woman belonging to the city’s 
urban élite would have witnessed a range of religious practices, which were 
often brought to the fore in the civic festes, celebrations lasting one or two days 
and involving jousting, feasting, dancing and religious activities. Vale notes 
that Valenciennes was famed for these celebrations, which fused the secular 
chivalric culture of the noble rural classes with those of the urban bourgeois in 
an period of increasingly public religious fervour, a combination of which, 
Newman argues, can be seen in the Mirouer’s particular manifestation of ‘la 
mystique courtoise.’51 As a writer, Porete slips seamlessly between the world of 
chivalric practices and its secular discourse of love and that of the divine Other, 
the quest for unbounded desire and the ‘endless deferral of consummation’ 
transposed into a narrative of self-denial and annihilation.52  
 
Set against this backdrop, it is possible to offer another perspective on 
the historical figure of Marguerite Porete. Although it is important not to 
overemphasize the role of autobiography in Porete’s writing, these aspects of 
the cultural and religious customs of Valenciennes’ late medieval culture 
suggests that she may have composed the Mirouer not as a beguine, but as a 
pious and well-read individual, immersed in and reflecting on the cultural 
practices of late-thirteenth century northern France. Regarding her as such 
provides the modern reader of the Mirouer with a more flexible and less 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Newman, From Virile Woman to WomanChrist, especially Chapter Five, ‘La mystique courtoise: 
Thirteenth Century Beguines and the Art of Love’.  
52 Newman, From Virile Woman to WomanChrist, p. 13.  
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restrictive platform from which to begin to analyze Porete’s writing and, in this 
case, her use of metaphor.  
 
Drawing attention to the substantial lacunae in the contemporary 
records of Porete’s life and writing, as well as to the paucity of evidence relating 
to the life and works of Marguerite d’Oingt, serves to highlight the obstacles 
encountered and sensitivity required in any modern treatment and comparison 
of their works. However, the following discussion suggests an alternative 
approach to contextualising these two writers by drawing attention to a more 
fundamental series of questions. These include the processes of literary 
composition, definitions of (female) authorship in the vernacular, and the 
implications of audience reception and textual dissemination within the 
intellectual and ecclesiastical milieu of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries; 
questions which demonstrate both the shared conceptual bonds linking the two 
mystics and areas in which the two women’s forms of expression can be seen to 
diverge. A focus on these questions will, in turn, lay a stronger methodological 
platform from which to engage with a series of interrelated issues concerning 
how metaphor might function within this particular framework of medieval 
mystical literature. 
 
The following outline situates both women more decisively within their 
respective contemporary environments and draws attention to some of the 
more problematic and interrelated features of the period. These include the 
growth of an increasingly textual society, the remit of intellectual freedom, the 
rights of and roles played by women in these debates, the concept of heresy and 
the validity of an institutionalised inquisition, and the part played by the 
vernacular in these developments. Many of these questions feed into a broader 
challenge faced within this study: finding adequate definitions for notions such 
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as literacy and literature, particularly in the domain of mystical expression 
where they intersect with questions of experience and ephemerality.  
 
Positing a sufficiently stable narrative in order to address a body of 
literature which defies objective analysis leaves more issues unanswered than it 
does resolved. Mystical writing as a mode of expression, is, as Franz Baüml 
memorably wrote, ‘the creation of a fiction that a fiction is not a fiction.’53 
However, it is also the case that, as the fifteenth-century manuscript 
transmission of Porete’s Mirouer demonstrates, not even the mystical texts 
themselves can be seen to constitute an accurate representation of their author’s 
composition. In some ways, the texts are as elusive as the experience they 
purport to describe, subject as they often have been to editing, re-ordering, 
abridging, and, in the case of Marguerite Porete, de-authorization by her text’s 
Carthusian collectors and copyists. Through their modern republication and 
analysis, these texts undergo a secondary wave of ‘glossing and interpretation’ 
as they are analysed and authenticated. It is with this process, and with both 
writers’ theological, cultural, and literary contextualisation, that the following 
discussion will concern itself.  
 
What can be said with certainty is that Marguerite d’Oingt and 
Marguerite Porete lived and wrote against the rapidly shifting religious and 
political backdrop of Western Christendom. One aspect in particular, namely 
the opening up of new manifestations of religious lifestyles, may appear 
antithetical to another paradigm shift that occurred during the period. As 
Richard Kieckhefer puts it, one of the deep-seated concerns amongst the schools 
and the monasteries was to ‘define more narrowly the boundaries of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Franz H. Baüml, ‘Varieties and Consequences of Medieval Literacy and Illiteracy,’ Speculum, 
55, 2 (April 1980): 237-265. Here at p. 262.  
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permissible belief and conduct.’54 Given the complexity of the period, it is 
perhaps too easy for modern scholars to slip into the convenience of binary 
opposition. Assuming a culturally defined male-female dichotomy means that 
the religious and intellectual environment at the turn of the thirteenth to the 
fourteenth century can swiftly become one characterised by pioneering women 
and repressive men, or alternatively, heretical and subversive females 
juxtaposed against pious and God-fearing churchmen. Both extremes are 
frequently accompanied by questions of intellectual capacity and the 
development of vernacular expression.55 Marguerite Porete, for example, is 
repeatedly typecast in the roles of both pioneer and heretic, a hazard that 
Chapter Four will be careful to navigate.56  
 
Barbara Newman provides a useful contribution to this discussion 
concerning the over-valorisation of certain characteristics of empowerment or 
embargo by a modern academy dealing with medieval theology and literary art. 
Writing about the problems of medieval heresy, censorship and modern 
reception, she argues that modern literary critics are too quick to imagine ‘texts, 
ideas, or even metaphors designated “heretical” because they impress a modern 
reader as subversive or in violation of some preconceived theological norm, a 
norm that might actually be patristic or modern rather than medieval.’57 Heresy 
is, after all, Newman observes, a juridical concept, and one that exists only 
when and if an authoritative churchman pronounces on it. It is therefore 
unhelpful to regard the Mirouer solely as a heretical piece of writing to the 
exclusion of other features, and to imagine the text as one written in defiance of, 
or subjected to, rigorous examination by an institutionalised Inquisition.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Richard Kieckhefer, ‘The Office of Inquisition and Medieval Heresy: The Transition from 
Personal to Institutional Jurisdiction,’ Journal of Ecclesiastical History, 46, 1 (January 1995): 36-61. 
Here at p. 40.  
55 Blumenfeld-Kosinski, Robertson, and Warren discuss this in some detail in their introductory 
essay to their edited volume, The Vernacular Spirit.  
56 College’s extensive work on the Mirouer, for example, repeatedly emphasises the heretical 
nature of Porete’s work. See Watson, ‘Melting Into God the English Way,’ p. 24, also n. 16.  
57 Newman, God and the Goddesses, p. 305.  
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Indeed, as Kieckhefer demonstrates, it is too easy to overstate the sophistication 
and efficacy of the thirteenth and early fourteenth century’s repression of 
heresy and imagine that Porete somehow fell victim to a uniform and terrible 
agency, ‘perfected by the instructions of Inquisitors-General Torquemada and 
Valdés.’58  
 
Questions concerning the heretical nature either of Porete’s possible 
lifestyle or spiritual practice, or of the appearance of articles and themes from 
the Mirouer in contemporary or later condemnatory materials such as Ad 
nostrum and Cum de quibusdam, have been amply treated elsewhere.59 As Field’s 
recent study shows, work still remains to be done on the nature of Porete’s trial 
and its political circumstances.60 The obstacles created by restricting the lens 
through which the Mirouer is viewed to one tinted by the connotations (modern 
or medieval) of heresy are of a similar order to those encountered when the text 
is regarded primarily as a beguinal composition. To examine the Mirouer as an 
example of fourteenth-century heresy risks overlooking much of Porete’s 
artistic skill in favour of what can only ever amount to a partial recovery of 
events and textual reception. Given the need for context, or recontext, as the 
previous chapter suggested, to purposefully limit the context of the Mirouer’s 
reception without sufficient corroborating evidence is a counterproductive 
exercise, particularly when examining her use of metaphor.   
 
Whilst the period from the mid-thirteenth to the mid-fourteenth century 
is frequently considered to be one of increasing ecclesiastical censure and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Jean-Pierre de Dieu, ‘The Inquisition and Popular Culture in New Castile,’ in Inquisition and 
Society in Early Modern Europe, ed. by Stephen Haliczer (London: Croom-Helm, 1987), pp. 129-
146. Here at p. 132.  
59 These include, but are not limited to: Lambert, Medieval Heresy, passim; Lerner, The Heresy of 
the Free Spirit, passim; Guarnieri, ‘Il movimiento del Libero Spirito’; Field, The Beguine, the Angel, 
and the Inquisitor, passim.  
60 Field, The Beguine, the Angel, and the Inquisitor, passim.  
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persecution, it was also one in which new debates concerning intellectual 
freedom were coming to the fore. Godfrey of Fontaines’ quodlibetal debates 
between 1286 and 1296/7 at the University of Paris, for example, present him 
arguing variously against the rights of prelates or bishops alone to condemn 
particular opinions as heretical or erroneous, and in favour of masters of 
theology standing on the side of divine truth in matters relating to salvation. On 
several occasions, Godfrey’s intellectual record suggests that, in matters of 
theology, he ‘could not avoid teaching the truth just because it would run into 
opposition.’61  
 
On those occasions where disagreement resulted from theological 
confusion or scandal amongst students, Godfrey argued that free debate was 
permissible and indeed necessary in establishing the truth.62 Field suggests that, 
in the figure of Godfrey of Fontaines, Marguerite Porete had purposefully 
located an ‘authority who was on record as saying that it was legitimate to ask 
one bishop to overturn his predecessor’s condemnation.’63 In his discussion of 
Porete’s trial by a panel of twenty-one theologians and canon lawyers, Field 
demonstrates that Godfrey’s argument was, to a certain degree, upheld. 
Marguerite was not sent to the stake solely on the word of the Bishop of 
Cambrai, Philip de Marigny, nor that of a single inquisitor, William Humbert.64 
Although the outcome of Porete’s trial can hardly be upheld as a victory for 
intellectual freedom, it was, at least, subject to something of a discussion. It is 
worth speculating perhaps that if Marguerite had chosen to participate in that 
discussion by replying to her inquisitor, the result of the trial might have been 
different. The dialogue between the characters of Raison, Dame Amour, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Ian P. Wei, ‘The Self-Image of the Masters of Theology at the University of Paris in the Late 
Thirteenth and Early Fourteenth Centuries,’ Journal of Ecclesiastical History 46, 3 (1995): 398-431. 
For a discussion of Godfrey of Fontaines’ quodlibeta relating to masters refusing to engage with 
or opposing the Church’s views, see Wei, pp. 421-428. Here at p. 424.  
62 See Field, ‘The Master and Marguerite,’ p. 146, also n. 48.  
63 Field, ‘The Master and Marguerite,’ p. 148.  
64 Field, ‘The Master and Marguerite,’ p. 149.  
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l’Ame, however, is entirely concerned with the question of true intellectual 
freedom. In this sense, the Mirouer shares a common thread with Godfrey of 
Fontaines’ stance on philosophical and academic liberties: for the Ame to be 
united with the divine, she must discard the overly-literal practices of Raison 
and adhere to the divinely-inspired truth represented by Dame Amour. Porete’s 
writings might therefore be seen as echoing Godfrey’s criticism of the excessive 
restrictions of the episcopacy, and Raison as a critical allegory of what Godfrey 
saw as the intellectual limitations of some bishops in comparison with the freer 
thinking of the masters.  
 
Just as Godfrey argued for a broader sense of intellectual autonomy in 
the schools, his contemporaries were debating the parameters of another form 
of intellectual engagement: the topic of teaching doctrine and the right to 
preach on the role of prophecy, particularly by women.  Whilst some church 
officials and a number of figures within leading monastic orders, including the 
Cistercians, the Franciscans, and the Carthusians, gave their support to 
women’s intellectual development and leadership, other clerics and scholars 
were strongly opposed to the idea that women might provide religious 
instruction outside the home or to anyone other than their children.65 The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Contemporary thirteenth- and fourteenth-century society was well furnished with textual 
examples of women playing a formative role in their children’s religious education and 
exercising the gift of prophecy. Biblical examples include the suggestion in Proverbs 4: 3-4 that 
Solomon was taught wisdom by his mother, whilst Mary, the sister of Aaron (Exodus 15:20), 
Deborah (Judges, 4:4), and Huldah (4 Kings 22:14) are all named as prophetesses who play a 
public role in extolling the word of God. Thomas Aquinas used these examples, amongst others, 
in his debate on whether women had the right to teach outside the home. See Kathryn Kerby-
Fulton, ‘When Women Preached: An Introduction to Female Homiletic, Sacramental, and 
Liturgical Roles in the Later Middle Ages,’ in Voices in Dialogue: Reading Women in the Middle 
Ages, ed. by Linda Olson and Kathryn Kerby-Fulton (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 2005), pp. 31-55, particularly pp. 34-35. Other examples include the role played by 
Monica in Augustine’s early education, the Carolingian queen Dhuoda’s ninth-century Liber 
manualis, written for her son c. 841-845, and Anselm of Canterbury’s account to his biographer 
Eadmer of how he learnt from his mother that God was in heaven. See Nicole Bériou, ‘The 
Right of Women to Give Religious Instruction in the Thirteenth Century,’ in Women Preachers 
and Prophets Through Two Millennia of Christianity, ed. by Beverly Mayne Kienzle and Pamela J. 
Walker (Berkeley and London: University of California Press, 1998), pp. 134-145. The most 
popular counterclaim to women’s right to preach was derived from Paul’s Epistle to the 
Corinthians, in which he wrote, ‘Mulieres in ecclesiis taceant, non enim permittitur eis loqui, 
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question of women speaking in the Church was touched upon earlier: 
Marguerite d’Oingt, as a Carthusian prioress, was authorised to read from the 
epistle at mass and from the gospel at the evening office. In a related vein, the 
condemnatory remarks of Gilbert of Tournai concerning beguine women 
preaching and reading publicly from scripture have frequently been considered 
by modern scholars as pointing towards Marguerite Porete’s religious practices 
and the content of her text.66  
 
As Nicole Bériou demonstrates, however, the thirteenth-century debate 
surrounding women’s right to teach and preach on matters of scripture and 
doctrine was more widespread, profound, and complicated than these 
examples might suggest, crystallising around two distinct types of speaking: 
preaching and prophesying.67 In 1245, the secular master Gauthier de Château-
Thierry (d.1249) argued on the questio ‘Does anybody, either a woman or a man, 
have the right to preach?’ Gauthier concluded that only clerics had the 
authority to read aloud from scripture, expounding it in the literal sense, and to 
interpret it according to the other three senses of scriptural interpretation, the 
allegorical, the anagogical, and the moral. For Gauthier, preaching amounted to 
the office of teaching Christian doctrine through the explanation of scripture, an 
exercise that, as chapters three and four of this thesis will demonstrate, both the 
Carthusian’s and the laywoman’s texts appear to undertake.   
 
Bériou cites a second figure, Eustace of Arras (c.1225–91), as countering 
Gauthier’s position.68 Reflecting on holy women such as Saint Catherine and 
Mary Magdalene, the Franciscan stated that providing the Holy Spirit had 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
sed subditas esse’; ‘Let women keep silence in the churches: for it is not permitted them to 
speak, but to be subject.’ 1 Corinthians 14:34. 
66 Simons, Cities of Ladies, p. 85.  
67 Bériou, ‘The Right of Women,’ p. 137.  
68 Eustace debated this question sometime between 1263-66. Bériou, ‘The Right of Women,’ p. 
139.  
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inspired women to preach (Eustache specifies ‘virgins’), the right to speak 
about scripture and doctrine might be afforded to those women upon whom 
the ability of prophesy had been bestowed. Bériou suggests that Eustace 
‘probably had in mind the crucial spread of mysticism among women during 
his time.’69  Whilst it is unlikely that the positions voiced by secular and 
religious authorities such as Gauthier and Eustace had any direct influence on 
either Marguerite d’Oingt’s or Marguerite Porete’s spiritual or textual practices, 
it is not inconceivable that traces of these arguments had spread from the 
schools and the monastic orders into the wider religious and lay communities 
by the later thirteenth century, thereby shaping both writers’ intellectual 
parameters and environment. For the purposes of this discussion, it is also 
worth noting the interrelated nature of these debates concerning mysticism, 
scriptural interpretation – both literal and metaphorical – religious instruction, 
and public dissemination. All of these facets of the changing nature of women’s 
religious experience are brought to bear in the subsequent discussions of Porete 
and d’Oingt’s writings and have important implications for the study of 
mysticism and its use of the metaphorical utterance. All, that is, apart from one.  
 
The extent to which the notion of gender played a part in shaping 
medieval intellectual and religious discourse relating to intellectual freedom, 
religious education, and public preaching and prophecy is, on the one hand, a 
question central to the debate, and much ink has been spilt on the subject. On 
the other hand, gender was not the only criterion used to discern who had 
access to scriptural and doctrinal material. Over-emphasising the role 
masculinity and femininity played in shaping these debates risks distorting the 
evidence at hand or yielding an anachronistic interpretation, particularly if an 
attempt is made to overlay the fragments of historical evidence with the 
mystical writings themselves. Despite Caroline Walker Bynum’s oft-cited 
observations that identifiable within male- and female-authored mystical 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Bériou, ‘The Right of Women,’ p. 139.  
	   117	  
writing are two distinct, gendered voices, what is striking about Marguerite 
d’Oingt and Marguerite Porete’s mystical expression is that gender, if it is 
referenced at all, is considered in terms of spiritual equality.70 Marguerite 
d’Oingt’s conceptualisation of saints and sinners, for example, is characterised 
by its inclusivity. The Creator’s saints, she writes, are: 
tot assy com li peysson qui sont dedenz la mar qui 
beyvont toz jors a plein seins enoer et seins l’ayguy 
amermer. […] Quar tot assi com li fluyvo sallont de la 
mar tuit et tuit y retornont, tot assi li beuta Nostron 
Segnour et li doucors, cum bein que illi se expandet a 
tot, illi retornet toz jors a luy. E per co ne pot illi ja 
mays descreytre.71 
 
 Sinners, meanwhile, are doubly castigated for their materialistic and 
lazy approach to religion. Several paragraphs in the latter half of Marguerite 
d’Oingt’s Pagina meditationum are devoted to the criticism of the ‘religiosi, quia 
portant se sic inordinate in verbis suis et continentiis sicut seculares.’72 Some 
people (‘aliqui’), d’Oingt cautions, ‘seem’ to exhibit the signs of a devout and 
pious faith but do not have the virtue of patience. Those, she writes, ‘sunt boni, 
sed non sunt perfecti.’73 Others, for whom she reserves her harshest criticism, 
drink good wine, eat well, and fall asleep during vigils; ‘Sed ipsi non sunt pigri 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Caroline Walker Bynum, Fragmentation and Redemption: Essays on Gender and the Human Body 
in Medieval Religion (New York: Zone Books, 1991), especially at p. 156.  
71 Speculum, §19, p. 96. ‘The saints will be within their Creator as the fish within the sea: they 
will drink as much as they want, without getting tired and without diminishing the amount of 
water. […] For just as the rivers all come out of the sea and go back to it, so it is for the beauty 
and sweetness of Our Lord: although they flow everywhere, they always return to Him. And 
for that reason they can never grow smaller.’ Mirror, p. 44.  
72 Pagina meditationum, §64, p. 81; ‘the religious behave and speak so irregularly that they are 
almost like secular people.’ A Page of Meditations, p. 34.  
73 Pagina meditationum, §65, p. 82; ‘are good, but not perfect.’ A Page of Meditations, p. 35.  
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neque sompnolenti ad malum faciendum.’74 These impostors of the faith are 
characterised by their inability to comprehend and use language properly: they 
talk ill of each other, scold and tell lies, and are ‘impotentes ad ferendum unum 
parvulum verbum si dicatur eis; immo respondent per signa, per verba et 
reddunt malum pro malo.’75 
 
Marguerite d’Oingt’s description of humanity’s fidelity to the Christian 
faith, and her criteria in determining a hierarchy ranging from saint to sinner, is 
strikingly similar to that found in Marguerite Porete’s writing. The Mirouer also 
employs the metaphor of the rivers flowing into the sea as a means of 
illustrating the annihilated souls’ relationship to God (discussed in detail in 
Chapter Four) and Porete describes those she regards as incapable of attaining 
spiritual perfection as constrained by the limits of logic and reason. These 
‘bestes’ and ‘asnes’ struggle to understand the polysemy of divinely inspired 
language, Raison herself complaining to l’Ame: ‘car plusieurs doubles mots y a, 
qui sont fors a entendre a leur entendement.’76  
 
Both Marguerite d’Oingt and Marguerite Porete conceptualise humanity 
in inclusive terms: where divisions in humanity are adumbrated, these are not 
on gendered grounds. Both women admonish those who lack religious integrity 
and couch their disapproval in terms of the ability to communicate and 
interpret with intellectual and spiritual depth. Gender is not absent from their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Pagina meditationum, §70, p. 82; ‘but when it comes to bad things, they are neither lazy nor 
sleepy.’ A Page of Meditations, p. 35.  
75 Pagina meditationum, §64, p. 81; ‘incapable of remembering the smallest word told to them; on 
the contrary, by signs and words they return bad for bad.’ A Page of Meditations, p. 34.  
76 Mirouer, ch. 68, p. 192; ‘beasts and donkeys,’ Mirror, p. 143. Mirouer, ch. 13, p. 54; ‘for there are 
several double words which are hard to grasp with their intellect.’ Mirror, p. 94.  
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works, but it does not constitute the social and cultural marker that their 
historical context might, at first glance, suggest.77  
 
 The earlier overview of thirteenth-century debates concerning women’s 
rights to interpret scripture, and to religious instruction and its public 
dissemination in a mystical or prophetic mode of discourse, highlights a second 
element shared by Marguerite d’Oingt and Marguerite Porete’s writing, the 
roots of which may be established in the historical context laid out above. For 
those involved in debating women’s access to scriptural and doctrinal teaching, 
the most contentious scholarly and theological issue appears to have had less to 
do with their access to religious or doctrinal material per se, than with the idea 
of where and how their exegesis and prophecy were communicated.  
 
Tuition in private, preferably in the home or chapel, seems to have been 
acceptable for a woman in the role of a student learning from a priest or as a 
teacher to her own children. Public teaching or purportedly prophetic utterance 
was regarded as considerably more subversive. To return to the angry words of 
Gilbert of Tournai’s Collectio de scandalis ecclesiae, the dangers of oral 
transmission were two-fold. In the wrong hands, access to divine truths by 
uneducated laypeople without intermediary or supervisory monitoring by the 
clergy, particularly using a vernacular tongue, was believed by a sizable 
majority within the ecclesiastical establishment to open the floodgates to heresy. 
Gilbert specifically refers to the beguines in his sermon, but his sentiments were 
echoed by church authorities with reference to other laywomen, semi-religious 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Kathleen E. Garay discusses this subject with reference to the mystical writings of Marguerite 
Porete, Marguerite d’Oingt, Richard Rolle, Walter Hilton, Julian of Norwich, Margery Kempe, 
and the anonymous author of The Cloud of Unknowing in “A Naked Intent Unto God’: 
Ungendered Discourse in Some Late Medieval Mystical Texts,’ Mystics Quarterly, 23, 2 (June 
1997): 36-51.  
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and even those whose monastic orders had once supported the foundation of 
women’s houses and their education.78 
 
 Marguerite d’Oingt and Marguerite Porete’s writings are, in very 
different ways, inextricably linked to ideas of oral transmission. The Pagina 
meditationum is catalysed when Marguerite d’Oingt’s narrator hears the words 
of Psalm 17:5 being read aloud at mass; the dialogic form and internal linguistic 
structure of Marguerite Porete’s Mirouer has, meanwhile, been viewed by some 
as evidence that Porete’s text was intended for oral delivery.79 The Mirouer’s 
characters frequently implore each other to listen carefully, whilst reaching out 
beyond the fourth wall of the text to an imaginary inscribed audience. It is also 
worth noting the difference between the two locutionary spaces contrasted here, 
which may provide additional clues as to what lies at the heart of the 
subsequent histories of the texts and their authors.  
 
One locutionary space is constituted by a liturgically-grounded utterance 
made in the cloistered confines of a Carthusian monastery. As for the other, it is 
very difficult to posit where and by whom Porete’s Mirouer may have been 
intended to be read, whether silently or aloud in a private room or chamber, 
perhaps performed publicly in the street, at one of the festes, or perhaps at 
court.80 Protected by the authority invested in the citation of scripture, as well 
as by the cloister and limited contact with the outside world, d’Oingt’s writing 
did not circulate far beyond her chapterhouse at Poleteins, but nor did it appear 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 See D. H. Green, Women Readers in the Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007), p. 37.  
79 Robinson suggests that the Mirouer may have been designed for public delivery in Nobility 
and Annihilation, p. 130. Kocher, meanwhile, argues that there are no stage directions in any of 
the surviving copies of the Mirouer and that the performative action, such as it is, is contained 
‘within what the characters say.’ See Allegories of Love, p. 10. The internal linguistic structure of 
the Mirouer is examined in detail by Juan Marin in ‘Annihilation and Deification in Beguine 
Theology and Marguerite Porete’s Mirror of Simple Souls,’ Harvard Theological Review, 103, 1 
(2010): 89-109. 
80 Vale, Edward III and Chivalry, pp. 25-26.  
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to elicit anything other than praise from her monastic contemporaries.81 The 
public fate of Marguerite Porete and her Mirouer is, meanwhile, all too familiar, 
although the subsequent transmission and translation of her work was, despite 
the inquisition’s attempts to suppress it, more widespread than modern 
scholars initially realised.82  
 
The surviving manuscripts of the two women’s writings leave little 
indication as to how they were originally intended to be read or listened to, or 
by whom. Although the introductory remarks provided some indications as to 
possible audiences in view of the use of the vernacular by both authors, it is 
also possible to posit some further suggestions as to potential audiences and 
modes of reception in the light of more recent scholarship. In the case of 
Marguerite d’Oingt’s short visions and reflections, it is likely that she had an 
audience of her fellow Carthusian nuns in mind, and perhaps too the monks of 
other chapterhouses or those resident at the Grande Chartreuse. Although the 
early Carthusians regarded themselves more as hermits or recluses than as 
monks, evidence exists to suggest that they adopted elements from the 
Benedictine Rule, one of which may have been the prescription for individual 
monks to read for themselves (‘sibi legere’), and which, as D. H. Green observes, 
was also extended to nuns, providing they were sufficiently educated. 83 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Ms. 5785R’s inclusion of the posthumous apparition of Marguerite as a dove to Dom Durand 
implies that she was held in high regard by her Carthusian community.  
82 The book was burned as a result of the initial trial in Valenciennes, and William Humbert 
ordered all copies to be surrendered to Church authorities following Porete’s condemnation. 
Sargent concludes that ‘the pattern of transmission and survival of the Mirouer was […] quite 
broad, but relatively thin.’ See Michael G. Sargent, ‘The Annihilation of Marguerite Porete,’ 
Viator, 28 (1997): 253-279. Here at p. 262. For an estimate of how many copies of the Mirouer 
may have been circulating in late medieval Western Europe, with a particular focus on the 
English Carthusian translations (into Middle English and Latin), in the Low Countries and in 
Italy, see Lerner, ‘New Light,’ especially pp. 109-116.  
83 For more on the controversy regarding the Carthusians’ indebtedness to, and implementation 
of, the Benedictine Rule, see James Hogg, ‘The Carthusians and the ‘Rule of St Benedict’,’ in 
Itinera Domini: Gesammelte Aufsätze aus Liturgie und Mönchtum: Emmanuel v. Severus OSB zur 
Vollendung des 80. Lebensjahres am 24. August 1988 dargeboten, Beiträge zur Geschichte des alten 
Mönchtums und des Benediktinertums, ed. by A. Rosenthal, Supplementband, 5 (Münster: 
Aschendorff, 1988), pp. 281-318. Giles Constable provides further details of secondary literature 
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Providing that Marguerite d’Oingt’s contemporaries and peers possessed the 
ability to read her Latin Pagina meditationum or her Francoprovençal vernacular 
compositions, her writing may therefore have been intended to function as a 
devotional work, to be read privately in the cell as a theoretical handbook and 
pastoral guide to visionary experience and spiritual growth.84  
 
Speculating on the intended audience for Marguerite Porete’s Mirouer des 
simples ames is more difficult. Given the text’s colourful use of allegory, 
particularly with reference to tropes of courtly love, economic transaction, and 
social rank, as well as the less frequent direct quotations from biblical and 
patristic sources noted earlier, it seems likely that Porete was directing her text 
towards a well educated, urban audience.85 Geneviève Hasenohr’s discovery of 
four fifteenth-century examples of extracts or treatises combining thematic 
echoes of the Mirouer’s ideology suggests that there was a particular appetite 
for the work in and around the Loire valley, amongst private collectors and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
concerning this debate in The Reformation of the Twelfth Century, p. 59, n. 55. See also Green, 
Women Readers, p. 7.  
84 Writing about Latin literacy, David Bell divides the ability to read and write into four ‘levels,’ 
ranging from the capacity to ‘read a text without understanding it’ to being able to ‘compose 
and write a text of one’s own.’ Whilst Bell’s formulation is explicitly about Latinate reading 
communities, it is a helpful framework with which to also examine vernacular textual 
communities. Whilst Marguerite d’Oingt clearly belongs to this final category, her intended 
audience may not necessarily have possessed an equivalent level of literacy, and, in Bell’s terms, 
have been able to ‘read and understand non-liturgical texts,’ i.e. mystical and visionary writing. 
See David N. Bell, What Nuns Read: Books and Libraries in Medieval English Nunneries (Kalamazoo, 
MI: Cistercian Publications, 1995), p. 60. Jessica Barr also concludes that Marguerite d’Oingt’s 
work is intended to function as a ‘path towards visionary knowledge that is theoretically 
applicable for the reader or auditor of her work.’ Willing To Know God, p. 68.  
85 The allegorical nature of Porete’s work, especially with reference to the allegories of love, 
social rank, economic exchange, and gender relations, is the subject of Kocher’s monograph, 
Allegories of Love. Maria Lichtmann suggests that in view of the text’s all-female cast (with the 
exception of LoinPrès), ‘Marguerite’s mysticism is overtly female’ and therefore must have been 
addressed to a female audience. See ‘Marguerite Porete and Meister Eckhart: The Mirror of 
Simple Souls Mirrored,’ in Meister Eckhart and the Beguine Mystics, ed. by Bernard McGinn (New 
York: Continuum, 1994), pp. 65-86. Here at p. 69. This, however, does not constitute conclusive 
evidence for a solely female audience, although a significant body of recent scholarship has 
signalled the wider readership of mystical writing amongst female audiences. See, for example, 
Newman’s argument in ‘Latin and the Vernaculars’; D. H. Green, Women Readers, p. 45.  
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monastic audiences alike.86 However, as Edmund College, Michael Sargent, 
Nicholas Watson, and Marlene Cré have shown, Porete’s work perhaps found 
some of its most appreciative readers amongst the Carthusian order. 87 
Translated into Middle English from the French by a figure known only by his 
initials, ‘M. N.,’ and extant in a further two manuscripts, all three Middle 
English versions of the now anonymous Mirouer were produced, or at least 
commissioned, by the Carthusian community.88 Although M. N. voiced his 
concern as to the orthodoxy of some of the content of the Mirouer, and 
proceeded to gloss what he saw to be its more contentious passages, Cré 
suggests that the Mirouer, along with its fellow travellers, was probably a well-
circulated text, at least within the confines of the Charterhouse: 
The preoccupation of all the texts in the anthology with the 
solitary contemplative life makes it eminently suitable for a 
Carthusian audience. All the texts in the manuscript require that 
the true contemplative should withdraw from the world in a 
most radical way.89 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Geneviève Hasenohr reports the discovery of a book entitled Myrouer des simple ames aneanties 
that was offered for sale by a bookseller in Tours and a treatise written by an anonymous 
Celestinian near Orléans dedicated to a nun that was intended to resolve some difficult and 
dangerous theories from a book entitled Le livre de la simple ame aneantie in her essay, ‘La 
littérature religieuse,’ in La littérature française aux XIVe et XVe siècles, ed. by Daniel Poirion, 1, 
Grundriss der romanischen Literaturen des Mittelalters 8 (Heidelberg: Winter, 1988), pp. 266-
303. A second study by Hasenohr reveals a further two discoveries: an early fifteenth-century 
guide to spiritual life written for an aristocratic woman in the Loire valley that spoke of the soul 
bidding goodbye to the virtues and moving to a higher spiritual degree and estate, and a late 
fifteenth-century manuscript in the Valenciennes archive containing an anthology of spiritual 
texts in which Hasenohr identified two chapters taken from the Mirouer, alongside works by 
Jean Gerson, Hugh of St Victor, and Bonaventure. See ‘La tradition du Miroir des simples âmes au 
XVe siècle: de Marguerite Porete (†1310) à Marguerite de Navarre,’ Comptes rendus des séances de 
l’Académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres: L’année 1999, janvier-mars, vol. 4 (Paris: Académie des 
Inscriptions et Belles Lettres, 1999), pp. 1374-1366.  
87 See Colledge, ‘The Latin Mirror of Simple Souls’; Sargent, ‘The Transmission by the English 
Carthusians’; Watson, ‘Melting Into God’; Cré, ‘Women in the Charterhouse?’  
88 None of the surviving copies of the Mirouer bear Marguerite Porete’s name, or give any 
indication as to her identity or fate. M.N.’s initials are found in British Library Ms. Additional 
37790. For a detailed overview of the scholarly debate as to the identity of M. N., see Lerner, 
‘New Light,’ pp. 103-107. The same translation occurs in Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 
505, and Cambridge, St John’s College, MS 71.  
89 Cré, ‘Women in the Charterhouse?,’ pp. 47-48.  
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Indeed, in the Mirouer, the ame adnientie is described as deriving her 
name from her status: nothingness equates to the soul’s solitude in God.90 M. 
N.’s glosses, however, indicate more precisely how at least one subsequent 
audience treated the text. Writing in the preface to his translation, M. N. 
explains that he had made an earlier attempt at translating the work but that 
readers had struggled to interpret the text correctly. British Library Ms. 
Additional 37790 is therefore a witness to M.N.’s attempt to interpret, or ‘re-
read,’ the Mirouer and to ensure a more accurate reception for the work 
amongst his contemporaries. His glosses imply a need for, and a directive 
towards, a hermeneutic approach to Porete’s mystical expression. Her work 
may have been censored by the ecclesiastical authorities on account of its 
heretical nature and public dissemination, but, stripped of its cultural, political, 
and geographical connotations and without the autograph of a condemned 
heretic, the Mirouer was recognised amongst the English Carthusians as a text 
that required the meditative and introspective reading practices advocated by 
the monastic life. In this sense, Marguerite Porete’s text is perhaps closer to that 
of Marguerite d’Oingt’s than has previously been recognised. Inherent within 
both women’s writings is the notion that words, in their conceptualisation, 
composition, reception, and interpretation, possess an ability to re-capture or 
re-enact something of the cognitive associations that accompany the soul’s 
ascent to mystical ecstasy. 
 
 M.N.’s glosses are also an indication that, whether composed orally or 
received aurally, or written directly onto parchments and read privately and 
individually, no surviving linguistic element of either woman’s writings can be 
regarded as a stable entity.91 It is tempting to regard their expression as a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 See Mirouer, ch. 81, p. 230-232. Mirror, pp. 156-157.  
91	  Two theoretical positions are helpful here: Paul Zumthor’s notion of mouvance, and Bernard 
Cerquiglini’s concept of variance. Zumthor proposes that no medieval text can be regarded as a 
finished article, or ‘un achèvement,’ leading him to suggest that medieval literary production 
always constitutes ‘un texte en train de se faire.’ Writing on the Chanson de Roland, Zumthor 
characterizes mouvance as ‘une quasi-abstraction,’ which manifests itself in the interaction of 
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replica of experience, to view the ‘accepted report’ of the event as being of 
‘greater importance than the event itself.’ As William Ivins Jr. remarks, ‘what 
we think about and act upon is the symbolic report and not the concrete event 
itself.’92  
 
Both Marguerite d’Oingt’s and Marguerite Porete’s works sit at the 
intersection of symbolic report and concrete event, and between the fixed and 
the ephemeral. How these enigmas are to be interpreted, in a medieval, or a 
modern setting, depends on how the texts are regarded as literary artifacts, and 
the resultant interpretative mode ascribed to them. In turning now to detailed 
examinations of Marguerite d’Oingt and Marguerite Porete’s writings, the 
following two chapters will focus on their respective uses of metaphorical 
language, and, like M. N., seek to access some of the more concealed aspects of 
their mystical expression.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
variant readings of different manuscript witnesses of a particular work: ‘les textes concrets qui 
la réalisent présentant, par le jeu des variantes et remaniements, comme une incessante 
vibration et une instabilité fondamentale.’ Essai de poétique médiéval (Paris: Seuil, 1972), p. 73, p. 
507. See also pp. 43-47 and 65-75. Whereas Zumthor’s theory is predicated principally on texts 
deriving from oral transmission, in which textual variation reflects the potential for 
performative variation, Cerquiglini’s model of variance, meanwhile, focuses solely on written 
medieval texts and their circulation. Cerquiglini argues that: ‘l’écriture médiévale ne produit 
pas de variantes, elle est variance.’ Eloge de la variante: Histoire critique de la philologie (Paris: Seuil, 
1989), p. 111.	  	  
92 William M. Ivins Jr., Prints and Visual Communication (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1953), p. 180.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
The Writings of Marguerite d’Oingt: Metaphors of Codices and Corporeity 
 
Marguerite d’Oingt’s troubled relationship with verbal expression is 
perhaps the most frequently discussed aspect of her writings.1 Within the 
limited corpus of secondary scholarship generated by Marguerite’s 
compositions, however, critical interest has tended to prefer one of two 
dominant methodological approaches. On one hand, much of the anthology-
based criticism has tended to dismiss or only pay scant attention to the 
intellectual, theological, and cognitive feats achieved by Marguerite d’Oingt’s 
linguistic post-experiential expression of mystical consciousness.2 On the other 
hand, meanwhile, more recent examples of sustained literary criticism have 
offered conclusions that cast the prioress as overly aware of both self and 
textual creation, particularly given the period and literary mode in which she 
was writing.3 A closer reading of Marguerite d’Oingt’s metaphorical language 
reveals, however, an intricately woven thematic schema based on conceptual 
metaphors of containment and embodiment, which not only articulates the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See, for example, Blumenfeld-Kosinksi, ‘The Idea of Writing’; Müller, ‘How To Do Things 
With Mystical Language’; Barr, Willing To Know God, particularly Chapter Two, ‘Marguerite 
d’Oingt: Active Reading and the Language of God.’ 
2 Examples of such approaches to Marguerite’s writings include: Petroff, Medieval Women’s 
Visionary Literature; Caroline Walker Bynum, Holy Feast and Holy Fast: The Religious Significance 
of Food to Medieval Women (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1987); 
Roberta L. Krueger, ‘Female Voices in Convents, Courts, and Households,’ in A History of 
Women’s Writing in France, ed. by Sonya Stephens (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000), pp. 10-40.   
3 Examples of such approaches to Marguerite’s corpus include: Blumenfeld-Kosinski, ‘The Idea 
of Writing’; Müller, Marguerite Porete et Marguerite d’Oingt; Barr, Willing to Know God. Müller’s 
monograph places an emphasis on Marguerite d’Oingt’s auto-referentiality and her sense of 
femininity. Müller writes that she was a figure able to ‘s’écarte[r] audiacieusement de la 
tradition médiévale’ and that she represented ‘un défi au discours exégétique traditionnel’ and 
erroneously suggests that Marguerite does not ‘see’ the water flowing down the mountain in 
the vision recounted in the second of her letters, but rather ‘se laisse inonder […] pour devenir 
elle-même ce fleuve,’ p. 126. A similar emphasis on individuality can be seen in Barr’s analysis 
of Marguerite d’Oingt’s writings. Barr focuses on the power of, and role played by, individual 
reading in d’Oingt’s corpus, although she too has a tendency to portray the authorial figure of 
Marguerite as possessing an overly individual sense of self, and suggests that the Speculum in 
particular demonstrates a ‘process of self-reflection […] trigger[ed] in her soul.’ Willing to Know 
God, p. 55. 
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vividness of her mystical experiences, but also draws them together into a 
coherent triumvirate. Her writings demonstrate a Carthusian mind familiar 
with theological ideas drawn primarily from Biblical and exegetical material, 
and confident to use them imaginatively within the parameters of her late-
thirteenth-century discourse community. Marguerite d’Oingt’s three mystical 
texts, the Pagina meditationum, the Speculum, and Li Via Seiti Biatrix Virgina de 
Ornaciu, encapsulate this thesis’ theoretical argument that both metaphor and 
mystical experience share a common core, grounded in experience, cognition, 
and the imagination. 
 
Isolating the key target domain within Marguerite’s mystical writing is 
not difficult: the purpose of all three of her mystical texts is to articulate her 
relationship with the divine. How she shapes the articulation of this 
relationship, however, reveals much about how she may have conceptualised 
these experiences. Marguerite’s particularly vivid use of metaphor might 
almost be seen to function in the Aristotelian sense, ‘setting before the eyes’ the 
sense of God which she wished to convey, and thus offering her audience a 
descriptive, almost pictorial narrative with which to imagine these experiences 
for themselves.4 Whilst her prose is less self-consciously esoteric than that of 
Porete, and her vivid descriptions provide her reader with a clearer sense of 
causality and narrative direction, Marguerite d’Oingt warns that her 
experiences are not intended to be easily understood. They are, she warns: 
si secretes et de si obscur entendiment que segont nostrum petit 
entendiment oy non nos est viayres que oy seyt neguna persona 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 See Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1410b 33-34, p. 2251. This aspect of her writing resonates with the 
discussion in Chapter One of Paul Ricoeur’s theory of metaphor. Metaphor, Ricoeur, possesses 
a ‘picturing function,’ which conjures the image created cognitively by the metaphor in the 
imagination. ‘The Metaphorical Process,’ p. 229.  
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qui per sent ne per clergi o puit entendre se li sanz espiriz non li 
ureyt los euz del cors.5 
 
Of primary interest here are the source domains that Marguerite 
draws on in order to narrate a metaphorical Divinity. In isolating these 
domains, and mapping them onto her ineffable target, an initial objective will 
be to shed some light on the possible literary resources that Marguerite may 
have been drawing on, and to relate them to what Gerard Steen would call 
her ‘other context variables.’6 Building on the previous chapters’ discussion 
of the importance of context in the analysis of metaphor, and the religious, 
political, and intellectual trends of the thirteenth century that may have 
shaped and influenced Marguerite d’Oingt’s work, this analysis now turns to 
a closer reading of her prose. In doing so, it will bring historical context into 
dialogue with the metaphorical imagery of her text, and in turn illuminate 
the possible conceptual integration networks that underpin her mystical 
expression. Lakoff and Johnson’s ‘imaginative rationality’ finds an 
articulation within an image -schema shaped by a dialectic of enclosure and 
permeability, which provides not only an internal coherence to Marguerite’s 
three mystical compositions, but also a structural logic with which to engage 
with the speculative spheres of mystical experience.   
 
The exploration of the mind’s creative capacity to make sense of mystical 
experience through the cognitive tools at Marguerite’s disposal relates to this 
chapter’s second objective. The idea of ‘recontextualisation’ explored in the 
opening chapter proposed that both mystical expression and metaphor act as a 
dynamic space in which an audience actively participates in the process of 
reception and interpretation. To this end, this investigation of Marguerite 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Li Via Seiti Biatrix, p. 126, §101; ‘such secret and such hard to understand things that, as far as 
we know, no one can understand them, neither through intelligence nor through learning, 
unless the Holy Spirit opens a person’s eyes of the heart.’ The Life of Saint Beatrice, p. 58.  
6 Steen,, Understanding Metaphor in Literature, p. 29.  
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d’Oingt’s corpus will question the extent to which she constructs a coherent 
conceptual world for her audience, allowing them to ‘see,’ in some capacity at 
least, as she may have ‘seen.’ By exploring the sources of her metaphorical 
imagery and positing their underlying cognitive framework, it is possible to 
locate d’Oingt’s expression within the wider tradition of Christian mystical 
discourse, and to demonstrate that her writing deserves a more central place in 
the canon of fourteenth-century mystical literature than it has perhaps been 
afforded to date.  
 
Chapter One outlined a number of theoretical approaches to the way 
in which the mind both facilitates and restricts the structures of Christian 
language, thought and belief. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, for example, 
suggest that the selective mappings between the domain structures control 
the ways in which concepts are understood, whilst Paul Ricoeur and Robert 
Neville propose, albeit in different fields, that the mind is primarily 
influenced by semiotic structures. Within the remit of these discussions, 
Mark Johnson proposes another approach to the way in which the mind 
structures, organises and articulates conceptual metaphors which resonates 
with some the dominant figures of expression found in women’s medieval 
mystical writing. Like Ricoeur and Neville, Johnson argues that the way in 
which the mind conceives of the world is not arbitrary or open-ended, but 
instead is ‘highly constrained by […] aspects of our bodily functioning [… 
involving] everything that makes us human.’7 The ways in which events are 
experienced, structured, and conceptualised are, Johnson argues in 
collaboration with George Lakoff in their more recent study, Philosophy in the 
Flesh, rooted in the ‘peculiar nature of our bodies.’8 Lakoff and Johnson’s 
theory of embodiment suggests that, as physical and reproductive bodies, 
constructed as fleshly containers, and bounded by an elastic and penetrable 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Mark Johnson, The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination, and Reason 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1987), p. xvi.  
8 George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and its Challenge to 
Western Thought (New York: Basic Books, 1999), p. 19. 
	  	   130	  
skin membrane, humanity both experiences, and projects onto that 
experience, a parallel set of conceptual structures grounded in containment 
and embodiment.9 Conceptualising the world in terms of objects, substances, 
and boundaries, which are subject to those patterns of spatiality, orientation, 
force, and composition experienced by our physical selves, equips humanity 
with a coherent framework and vocabulary, without which life’s events 
would be impossible to process and translate. This forms the basis of Lakoff 
and Johnson’s understanding of how our conceptual system is ‘grounded.’ 
‘We typically conceptualize the nonphysical in terms of the physical – that is, 
we conceptualize the less clearly delineated in terms of the more clearly 
delineated.’10  
 
In the context of Marguerite d’Oingt’s mystical expression, certain 
aspects of Lakoff and Johnson’s theory of embodiment require some 
adjustment. They argue, for example, that categorising and objectifying is an 
integral part of being human.‘ We cannot, as some meditative traditions 
suggest,’ they write, ‘“get beyond” our categories and have a purely 
uncategorized and unconceptualized experience. Neural beings cannot do 
that.’11 This statement bears a striking resemblance to the constructivist 
position articulated by Steven Katz and his dislike of the perennial 
psychologists’ theory of Pure Consciousness Events. However, given that, in 
the case of mystical experience, no record exists of what actually happens 
during a mystic’s ecstatic state, and that all categorisation occurs post-
experientially, what is of interest here is the role embodiment plays in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, pp. 25-30; Philosophy in the Flesh, pp. 34-38.  
10 Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, p. 59. Theories of embodiment and embodied 
cognition now constitute a wide and flourishing area of multi-disciplinary research. Lakoff and 
Johnson’s approaches are just one of many contributions to this field and have not always been 
universally accepted. However, for the purposes of this thesis, their methodological framework 
provides a stimulating platform from which to discuss the issue in relation to medieval 
Christian mysticism. For a comprehensive overview of the history of and recent developments 
in, and reception of, the field of embodied cognition, see Shapiro, Embodied Cognition, passim. 
11 Lakoff and Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh, p. 19.  
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mediating process in order to render the account both recognisable and 
coherent in narrative form.  
 
That the world and our experiences in it are conceptualised in terms of 
humanity’s own physiological structures resonates with an early sentiment 
expressed in the Pagina meditationum. Drawing on the imagery of Book One 
of Genesis, Marguerite addresses God with the words: ‘tu […] me fecisti ad 
ymaginem et similitudinem tuam.’12  Within a cosmic schema, her own 
creation is emblematic of God’s creation of all things; man as embodied 
microcosm of the macrocosm. Indeed, that embodiment forms a conceptual 
platform both for the verbal expression of Christian mystical experience, and 
for a broader understanding of humanity’s role within and relationship to 
the created cosmos, is to echo one of the fundamental tenets of the Christian 
faith, ‘et verbum caro factum est.’13  
 
 Before turning to an analysis of metaphor and embodiment in 
Marguerite’s works, it is worth outlining some of the attitudes expressed in 
recent scholarship towards the body in mystical writing. The prevalence of 
the human body in Christian literary and iconographic traditions is an area 
of long-standing academic commentary, and more recent scholarship on the 
topic has both drawn attention to, and called for, a reassessment of a number 
of interrelated themes, including Passion piety, Eucharistic devotion, the 
doctrine of the Resurrection, ascetic practices of fasting and self-mortification, 
and sexuality and chastity.14 Indeed, even when the human body appears 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Pagina meditationum, p. 77, §7; ‘you made me in your image and likeness.’ A Page of 
Meditations, p. 27. Genesis 1:27: ‘And God created man to his own image: to the image of God he 
created him’; also 1 Corinthians 11:7: ‘man indeed ought not to cover his head, because he is the 
image and glory of God.’ 
13 John 1:14. ‘[A]nd the Word was made flesh.’  
14 Introductory reading to this field includes Peter Brown, The Body and Society: Men, Women and 
Sexual Renunciation in Early Christianity (New York: Columbia University Press, reprinted 2008, 
orig. publ. 1988); Caroline Walker Bynum, ed., The Resurrection of the Body in Western Christianity, 
1200-1336, Lectures on the History of Religions, New Series, 15 (New York: Columbia 
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absent from mystical expression, as in the works of the fourteenth-century 
Flemish mystic, John Ruysbroeck (c.1293-1381), for example, its very absence 
is cause for modern comment.15  
 
Within the field of female mystical writing, a focus on the human 
body as a locus for ascetic self-punishment, sickness and suffering, and for 
imitation of, and union with, Christ, perhaps constitutes the most evident 
common denominator in a corpus otherwise notoriously difficult to 
stabilise.16 Feminist critics frequently focus on the female mystic’s body as a 
vehicle for visionary expression, arguing that corporally based imagery 
equipped female mystics with a meaningful discourse through which to 
counteract the ‘patriarchal and forthrightly misogynistic society’ in which 
they found themselves.17 ‘Where men fought heresy with theology and the 
stake, the tangible power of the institution they controlled,’ argues Jo Ann 
McNamara, ‘women fought with their own bodies.’ 18  Laurie Finke, 
meanwhile, seeks to reinforce the connection between female mystical 
experience and its expression. Echoing Elizabeth Petroff’s theory that ‘visions 
led women to the acquisition of power in the world while affirming their 
knowledge of themselves as women,’ Finke suggests that the discourse 
through which these visions were expressed ‘was constructed out of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
University Press, 2013); J. G. Gager, ‘Body-Symbols and Social Reality: Resurrection, Incarnation 
and Asceticism in Early Christianity’, Religion, 12 (1982): 345-363; Jennifer A. Glancy, Corporal 
Knowledge: Early Christian Bodies (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); 
William T. Cavanaugh, Torture and Eucharist: Theology, Politics, and the Body of Christ (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1998).  
15 See Bynum, Holy Feast and Holy Fast, pp. 109-110.  
16 The question of establishing what is meant by the term mysticism, and who, what and why a 
holy person qualifies them to be called a mystic (as opposed to, for example, ‘visionary’ or 
‘prophet’) continues to be debated and redefined by modern scholarship; see the Introduction 
for how this thesis defines the term ‘mystic.’ Works concerning the role of the body in female 
mystical writing include: Wiethaus’ edited collection, Maps of Flesh and Light, Karma Lochrie, 
Margery Kempe and Translations of the Flesh (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1999); Liz Herbert McAvoy, Authority and the Female Body In the Writings of Julian of Norwich and 
Margery Kempe (Woodbridge: D. S. Brewer, 2004); Bynum, Holy Feast and Holy Fast, passim.  
17 Jo Ann McNamara, ‘The Rhetoric of Orthodoxy: Clerical Authority and Female Innovation in 
the Struggle With Heresy,’ in Maps of Flesh and Light: The Religious Experience of Women Mystics, 
ed. by Ulrike Wiethaus (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1993), pp. 9-27. Here at p. 13. 
18 McNamara, ‘The Rhetoric of Orthodoxy,’ p. 13.  
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disciplines designed to regulate the female body, and it is, paradoxically, 
through these disciplines that the mystic consolidated her power.’19  
 
Modern perceptions of embodiment are, however, problematic when 
applied to medieval literature. Where modern feminist scholarship focuses 
predominantly on the female body as a means for the metaphorical figuring 
of the divine, it has a tendency to project new ideas onto mystical expression 
that are frequently not apparent at the level of the texts themselves, such as 
social constructions of gender and the notion that gender is conceived of in 
terms of hierarchical power structures.20 The danger of these approaches is 
that in treating gender – itself a product of culture and society - as a tool for 
historical organisation and categorization, the resultant pictures of the 
historical past become increasingly difficult to tease out from the cultural 
models of the present.21 When coupled with an attempt to decipher how 
certain communities perceived their lives and experiences – religious or 
otherwise – the methodological tensions only intensify.  
 
 Of fundamental importance to this analysis is the premise that the 
concept ‘body’ need not always signify ‘human body,’ nor need it imply a 
‘body’ with a determined sex or gender.22 Instead, this reading of Marguerite 
d’Oingt’s works focuses on the idea of corporeity, both literal and metaphorical, 
in terms of its physiological structure and orientation and suggests that this 
provides a more sensitive, contextually sensitive basis from which to explore 
her conceptual metaphors of embodiment. By mapping the bodily metaphors in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Petroff, Medieval Women’s Visionary Literature, p. 6; Laurie A. Finke, ‘Mystical Bodies and the 
Dialogics of Vision,’ in Maps of Flesh and Light: The Religious Experience of Women Mystics, ed. by 
Ulrike Wiethaus (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1993), pp. 28-44. Here at p. 29.  
20 See, for example, Finke, ‘Mystical Bodies,’ pp. 36-37.  
21 For a critque of the problems of gender as a tool for categorization with particular focus on 
Bynum’s Holy Feast and Holy Fast, see Kathleen Biddick, ‘Genders, Bodies, Borders: 
Technologies of the Visible,’ Speculum, 68, 2 (1993): 389-418.  
22 It is perhaps noteworthy that Johnson makes no reference to gender in either The Body in the 
Mind, or in his collaborative studies with George Lakoff. 
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her writings, a coherence opens up which suggests not only how Marguerite 
may have projected patterns drawn from source domains located within her 
daily existence, but also how the target domains of another, mystical, 
experience might be rendered intelligible. Metaphor in this sense, functions as 
Lakoff and Johnson suggest, not only a linguistic mode of expression, but also a 
means of structuring the abstract target domains of her mystical experience, 
and in turn projects the means by which to imagine a world-view predicated on 
structures of spiritual theology.   
 
A striking example can be found in Marguerite’s Li Via Seiti Biatrix 
Virgina de Ornaciu, which merits quoting in full. Describing Beatrix’s vision 
of the Elevation of the Host, Marguerite focuses on a complicated pattern of 
light held between the priest’s hands:  
Icilli clarta li eret vyaires que fut tota rionda, et dedenz la 
clarta apparisseyt una granz vermelia si tras resplandenz et si 
bela que, de sa grant beuta, illi enluminavet tota la clarta 
blanchi. Et cilli clarta gitavet si grant resplandour que illi 
fayseit resplandir tota la vermelia si que li una beuta 
enluminavet si l’autra et si ytiant li una en l’autra que eles 
rendiant si meravillousa beuta et si grant resplandour que un 
veet tota la beuta de la blanchi clarta dedenz la vermeli et la 
beuta de la vermeli veet hon dedenz la beuta [de la] clarta 
blanci.  
Et dedenz la clarta blanchi apparisseyt huns petit enfes […]. 
Desus cel enfant et de totes pars apparisseyt una granz clarta 
semblanz a or qui rendeit si grant illumination que illi trahit 
totes les autres a si et tota s’en entravet dedenz lour. Et les 
autres traiant tota cela a lour, et totes s’en entravont dedenz 
liey. Ycetes quatro divisions se appareyssant en una mema 
semblanci et beuta et replandour. Et li eret viaires que cilli 
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comunauz beuta et resplandors apparissit tota dedenz cel 
enfant. Et li enfes apparisseyt toz dedenz cela resplandour.23 
 
In her accompanying notes to this passage, Renate Blumenfeld-Kosinki 
suggests that the tri-partite configuration of light with a child at the centre 
symbolises the Trinity as both three and one.24 Indeed, such Eucharistic 
visions are not uncommon in mystical literature, and the particularities of 
Marguerite’s description can be seen to mirror an earlier depiction of the 
Trinity by the Rhenish mystic, Hildegard of Bingen (1098-1179). In Book Two 
of her Scivias, Hildegard describes seeing a bright light, at the centre of which 
is the figure of a man, surrounded by fire: 
Et illa serena lux perfudit totum illum rutilantem ignem, et ille 
rutilans ignis totam illam serenam lucem, ac eadem serena lux 
et idem rutilans ignis totam speciem eiusdem hominis, ita 
lumen unum in una ui possibilitatis exisistentis.25 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Li Via Seiti Biatrix Virgina de Ornaciu, pp. 118-120, §84-85. Blumenfeld-Kosinski’s translation 
of this passage is very economical, and omits the second half of §84, perhaps to avoid repetition. 
However, in omitting this detail, Blumenfeld-Kosinski loses some of the lexical mirroring of the 
Francoprovençal; the mirroring and repetition of the language appears to mimic the pattern of 
the light, expanding and repeating itself much as the light expands and diffuses. Here the 
passage is translated in full: ‘It seemed to her that this brightness had a circular shape, and that 
in the brightness there appeared a great red brightness, so resplendent and so beautiful that it 
illuminated with its great beauty all of the white brightness. And this brightness projected such 
a great splendour that it illuminated all of the redness so that each of these beauties illuminated 
the other so brightly that they radiated such a marvelous beauty and such a great splendour 
that one saw all of the beauty of the white brightness in the red brightness and the beauty of the 
red brightness in the beauty of the white brightness. And in that white brightness appeared a 
little child; she could not describe nor make anyone understand the great beauty of this child. 
Above this child there appeared a great brightness which looked like gold; it gave off such a 
vivid brilliance that it enfolded all the other brightnesses into itself and entered itself into the 
other brightnesses. And the other brightnesses enfolded that last one, while they themselves 
entered into it. These four visions manifested themselves in the same manner and with the same 
beauty and splendour. And it seemed to her that the beauty and splendour they had in 
common appeared united in that child. And the child appeared in the midst of this splendour.’ 
The Life of the Virgin Beatrice of Ornacieux, pp. 54-55.  
24 The Life of the Virgin Beatrice, p. 55, n. 1.  
25 Hildegardis, Scivias, ed. by Adelgundis Führkötter, Corpus Christianorum Continuatio 
Medievalis, 43 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1978), p. 124, ll. 15-20. ‘And that bright light bathed the 
whole of the glowing fire, and the glowing fire bathed the bright light; and the bright light and 
the glowing fire poured over the whole human figure, so that the three were one light in one 
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Similarly, the German Dominican nun Christina Ebner (1277-1356) 
and the French saint, Jeanne-Marie de Maille (1331-1414), both reported 
seeing a Christ-like figure raised with the host at mass.26 How Marguerite 
came into contact with this imagery is not clear, but light, luminosity and the 
human form are also amalgamated in Marguerite’s Speculum. However, in 
this instance, Marguerite reverses the imagery of the Via, and instead depicts 
Christ as the source of light, so that his body forms the outer frame whilst the 
light emanates from within: 
En ses tres nobles mayns e en ses pies appareyssant les 
glorioses playes que il suffrit per amour de nos. De cel 
glorious pertuis sallit una si tras granz clarta que co eret uns 
granz ebaymenz assi come si tota li beuta de la divinita sallit 
per mey.27 
 
Hildegard and, later, Marguerite, clearly conceptualise the divine in 
terms of both a luminous and a fleshly body, the former figured as spherical 
and expansive, possessed of an inner and an outer shape, capable of 
containing matter in a series of concentric shapes whose boundaries are 
permeable.28 To date, there has been little investigation into the sources of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
power of potential.’ Hildegard of Bingen, Scivias, Book 2, Vision 2, trans. by Mother Columba 
Hart and Jane Bishop, The Classics of Western Spirituality (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1990), p. 
161.  
26 See Kieckhefer, Unquiet Souls, pp. 171-172. For more on the symbolism of the Eucharist, see 
Ann W. Astell, Eating Beauty: The Eucharist and the Spiritual Arts of the Middle Ages (Ithaca and 
London: Cornell University Press, 2006).  
27 Speculum, p. 98, §24. ‘On His noble hands and feet appeared the glorious wounds that He 
suffered for the love of us. From these glorious wounds poured forth such a great light that one 
was stunned by it. It was as if all the beauty of the Divinity was passed on through it.’ Mirror, p. 
45. This depiction closely mirrors another portrayal of Christ found in the mystical visions of 
Marguerite’s contemporary, the Viennese Agnes Blannbekin (c.1244-1315). Agnes claims that 
‘She saw the blessed wounds of Christ inexpressibly glorified, translucent and radiating in a 
clear light […]. From one single puncture, an inexpressible light flowed.’ Agnes Blannbekin, 
Viennese Beguine: Life and Revelations, trans. by Ulrike Wiethaus, Library of Medieval Women 
(Rochester, NY: D. S. Brewer, 2002), p. 19. 
28 For a discussion of Hildegard’s imagery and the depiction of the human form within co-
centric luminous circles in the works of Dante and Joachim of Fiore, see Peter Dronke, The 
Medieval Poet and His World (Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1984), pp. 96-101.  
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Marguerite’s luminous imagery, or into her broader conceptualisation of 
corporeity and embodiment. That such motifs are so prevalent in her 
expression, however, is consistent with twelfth- and thirteenth-century 
developments in theological and philosophical thought.29 Although plotting 
a history of corporeity in the western Christian tradition lies beyond the 
scope of this study, briefly noting some examples of its prevalence in 
monastic and scholastic circles demonstrates that Marguerite was perhaps 
more deeply influenced by, and in textual dialogue with, her intellectual 
ancestors and contemporaries than has been acknowledged. 
 
 The generation of scholars immediately preceding Marguerite’s lifetime 
brought ideas concerning the physical world, matter and form to the fore in an 
unprecedented way with the advent of Aristotle’s scientific corpus in Latin 
translation. One of the earliest figures to engage with this corpus was 
Grosseteste, whose treatise De luce (c.1225) questioned the problem of body and 
corporeity in terms of light.30 Grosseteste considered corporeity as a universal 
phenomenon, arguing that the cosmos is constituted by a body in the same way 
as a body constitutes the human form, and that all bodies are brought into 
being by the conjunction of matter and light. Grosseteste understood light as 
the foremost and most perfect of bodies: ‘Formam primam corporalem quam 
corporeitatem nominant lucem esse arbitror.’31 He states clearly that light (‘lux’) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 This forms part of the subject matter of Suzannah Biernoff’s Sight and Embodiment in the 
Middle Ages (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), particularly Chapters Three and Four. 
Biernoff does not mention Marguerite’s visions in her study, but her observation of the 
interrelated nature of patristic and medieval thought on the body, light, vision and optics 
constitutes a fascinating contextual backdrop against which to place Marguerite’s description of 
her vision.  
30 Robert Grosseteste, ‘De Luce: A Critical Edition,’ ed. and notes by Cecilia Panti, in Robert 
Grosseteste and His Intellectual Milieu: New Editions and Studies, ed. by John Flood, James R. 
Ginther, and Joseph W. Goering, Papers in Medieval Studies, 24 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of 
Mediaeval Studies, 2013), pp. 193-238.  See also: Cecilia Panti, ‘The Evolution of the Idea of 
Corporeity in Robert Grosseteste’s Writings,’ in Robert Grosseteste: His Thought and Its Impact, ed. 
by Jack P. Cunningham (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2012), pp. 111-139.  
31 Grosseteste, De luce, p. 226. ‘The first corporeal form which some call corporeity is in my 
opinion light,’ Robert Grosseteste, ‘On Light: An English Translation,’ trans. by Neil Lewis, in 
Robert Grosseteste and His Intellectual Milieu: New Editions and Studies, ed. by John Flood, James R. 
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is spherical in form and is able both to expand and spread equally in all 
directions, and yet is also able to diffuse light (‘lumen’) from the farthest 
reaches of the sphere back into itself and therefore to contain itself.  Light, 
Grosseteste claimed, is at once both container and contained: it is, in many ways, 
embodied.  
 
Aristotle’s observations on bodies had similarly profound effects 
amongst other thirteenth-century Latin commentators and their 
development of doctrinal positions, particularly in the adoption and 
application of hylomorphism. Albert the Great (1206-1280), for example, and 
his student Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), broke with earlier traditions by 
suggesting that man consists not of a soul merely inhabiting the body, but 
rather is a being that consists of a soul of form united to a body. Corporeity, 
for Aquinas, was fundamental to his conceptualisation of the universe: 
Ergo oportet quod prima forma substantialis perficiat totam 
materiam. Sed prima forma quae recipitur in materia, est 
corporeitas, a qua nunquam denudatur […]. Ergo forma 
corporeitatis est in tota materia, et ita materia non erit nisi in 
corporibus. 32 
 
Late medieval conceptualisations of corporeity were inextricably 
linked to explorations of optics and vision, and were not only a matter of 
science, but also of Christian morality and doctrine. Towards the end of the 
thirteenth century, Peter of Limoges composed his De oculo morali, a manual 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Ginther, and Joseph W. Goering, Papers in Medieval Studies, 24 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of 
Mediaeval Studies, 2013), pp. 239-247. Here at p. 239.  
32 Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum super sententiis, ed. by R. P. Mandonnet, O. P., vol. 1 of 4 (Paris: P. 
Lethielleux, 1929), p. 229. See distinctio VIII, quæst. V, art. 2. ‘Therefore it is becoming that the 
first substantial form is accomplished in complete matter. But the first form to be received into 
matter is that of corporeity, from which it is never separated […] Therefore, all matter is clothed 
in the form of corporeity, and therefore matter will not exist except in corporality.’ My 
translation.  
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for preachers that describes the eye and vision physiologically, allegorically 
and analogically.33 The themes of vision, knowledge, and man’s relationship 
with God are all drawn together in the works of medieval scholars including 
Grosseteste, Aquinas, Roger Bacon and Peter of Limoges, and it appears that 
these tropes were, by the end of the thirteenth century, filtering into a wider 
discourse community. 34  With regard to the metaphorical bodies of 
Marguerite d’Oingt, it is not possible to suggest a direct relationship between 
the ideas emerging from the schools in Paris and Oxford and communities 
such as that of the Carthusian nuns at Poleteins. However, d’Oingt’s late 
medieval mystical expression clearly locates her within a wider intellectual 
environment that was receptive to, be it directly or indirectly, the scholarly 
philosophical and metaphysical thought of the previous century. 
Marguerite’s work therefore takes its place alongside other modes and 
registers of enquiry concerning the relationship between humanity, the 
cosmos and the divine, and in turn demonstrates that ‘embodied cognition’ 
was as much a part of medieval discourse as it is of modern.  
 
 The corporeal image, at once physically possible and yet paradoxical 
in its formation as container and contained, is one that appears repeatedly 
throughout Marguerite’s writings. 35  Prevalent in her writing are three 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Peter of Limoges, The Moral Treatise on the Eye, trans. and intro. by Richard Newhauser, 
Medieval Sources in Translation, 51 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies Press, 
2012). See also Biernoff, Sight and Embodiment, pp. 124-125.  
34 See Dallas G. Denery II, Seeing and Being Seen in the Later Medieval World: Optics, Theology, and 
Religious Life (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), especially Chapter Three, ‘Peter 
of Limoges, Perspectivist Optics and the Displacement of Vision.’ 
35 Other examples include Christ figured as both container and not contained by the world: 
‘Illum qui tam magnus quod totus mundus eum capere non poterat et qui tenebat totum 
mundum in suo pugno,’ Pagina meditationum, p. 73, §9. ‘He was so big that the world could not 
contain Him and who held the whole world in His hand,’ A Page of Meditations, p. 27. In the 
Speculum, meanwhile, Marguerite envisions Christ’s body as simultaneously transparent, 
reflective, and opaque, and with both a revelatory inside and an outside: ‘Ices glorious cors eret 
si tres nobles et si trapercans que l’on veoyt tot clarament l’arma per dedenz. Cil cors eret si tres 
nobles que l’on si poit remirer plus clarament que [en] un mirour. Ciz cors eret sit res beuz que 
l’on y veit los angelos et los sains assi come se il fussant peint en lui.’ Speculum, p. 98, §24. ‘This 
glorious body was so noble and so transparent that one could clearly see the soul inside of it. 
This body was so noble that one could see oneself reflected in it, more clearly than a mirror. 
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figurative ‘bodies’ upon which this discussion of her works focuses: those of 
the human body and the codex, and, as both a reflection and a container of 
these first two, the mirror. All three are widely acknowledged as common 
tropes of medieval literary expression, but a focus on their occurrence in 
Marguerite’s oeuvre suggests their primary function is to provide her 
writings, and by extension, thought, with an internal coherence and 
systematicity.36 These three source domains form an emergent pattern in 
which, at given points in her narratives, each of these three ‘bodies’ 
metaphorically represents one or both of the others, morphing as they do 
into each other, and back again to their original form. This polyvalent, almost 
kaleidoscopic, aspect to Marguerite’s prose is reminiscent of Ricoeur’s 
suggestion that the cognitive processing of metaphor involves a 
simultaneous correlation, or ‘flow,’ of numerous mental images. How and 
why Marguerite d’Oingt’s mystical writing evokes this ‘flow’ of image-
schemas in the mind lifts her prose from a series of static, visionary vignettes 
to a highly dynamic mode of expression, in which the invitation to imagine 
her experiences becomes a catalyst for the reception and interpretation of 
mystical thought afresh.  
 
 Marguerite’s hearing of Psalm 17:5, sung at mass, catalyses the 
experience she recounts in the Pagina meditationum.37 As such, her own book, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
This body was so beautiful that one could clearly see the angels and the saints, as if they were 
painted on it.’ Mirror, p. 45.  
36 The critical material on these three tropes in medieval literature is vast. Introductory reading 
on the trope of the mirror includes Herbert Grabes, The Mutable Glass: Mirror Imagery in Titles 
and Texts of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, trans. by Gordon Collier (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1982); Edward Peter Nolan, Now Through A Glass Darkly: Specular 
Images of Being and Knowing From Virgil to Chaucer (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
1990). A list of introductory reading on the role of the body in the medieval period can be found 
earlier in the chapter (see p. 130, n. 14); a list of similar material on the idea of the medieval 
codex as literary symbol is detailed below (pp. 140-41, n. 44) .  
37 Marguerite writes: ‘[E]go Margareta, ancilla Christi, eram in ecclesia in missa quando 
incipiebat cantari introitus misse, scilicet: “Circumdederunt me gemitus mortis.”’ Pagina 
meditationum, p. 71. ‘I Margaret, the maidservant of Christ, was in church at mass when, as an 
introduction to the mass, the following verse was being sung: “The signs of death will surround 
me.”’ A Page of Meditations, p. 25. The quotation differs slightly from the Vulgate, which reads: 
‘circumdederunt me dolores mortis.’ 
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the Pagina, is brought into existence through her engagement with Holy 
Scripture, thereby setting up a thematic and structural framework which is 
developed across all three of her works. That Scripture acts as a stimulus for, 
and the subsequent locus of, spiritual insight and self-conscious reflection is 
reminiscent of Augustine’s famous conversion to Christianity in his 
Confessiones.38 Whilst there are significant differences between these records 
of divine inspiration and self-reflection, namely that Augustine’s involves 
silent reading, whilst Marguerite’s takes place publicly on hearing the Psalm 
sung, both accounts involve a transition from the outer to the inner word; the 
externally perceived word of God motivating the composition of an inner 
book of divine experience. Marguerite’s description of her own conversion 
(‘Deinceps invenietis quomodo me converti’), and of her inner book are 
entirely bound up with cognitive processes.39 The first four paragraphs of the 
Pagina express this process using five different verbs of thought and 
cognition, reinforcing a sense of the varied and complex reflective activity 
associated with both forging a relationship with the divine, and bringing the 
metaphorical book of her inner experience, as well as her literal outer corpus 
of writing, to life.40  
 
 The interplay between cognition and the inner book of recorded 
experience finds a coherent structure in Marguerite’s use of the metaphor of 
the heart. In a long passage, she writes that her body acts as a container for 
her thoughts, and that God wrote all these thoughts into her heart: 
Ego cogitavi quod cor hominis et mulieris est ita mobile quod 
potest vix esse in uno statu, et ideo ponebam in scriptis 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 See Augustine, Confessions, Book VIII, Chapter 12, for an account of his conversion to 
Christianity. 
39 Pagina meditationum, p. 72, §5. ‘Now you will find out how I converted […].’ A Page of 
Meditations, p. 26.  
40 Marguerite says that she thought (‘cogitavi’), recalled (‘recolui’), considered (‘consideravi’) 
and contemplated (‘respicere’). See Pagina meditationum, pp. 71-72, §1-4; A Page of Meditations, 
pp. 25-26.  
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cogitationes quas Deus ordinaverat in corde meo ne perderem 
eas cum removissem illas a corde meo, et ut possem eas cogitare 
paulatim quando mihi Deus suam gratiam daret.41 
 
Blumenfeld-Kosinski and Barr both comment on the vivid imagery of this 
passage. 42 Both critics draw attention to the role of the Pagina as a 
‘transcription’ or textual model for meditation, Blumenfeld-Kosinski 
suggesting that Marguerite imagines herself as a ‘kind of spiritual 
scriptorium (original emphasis).’43 However neither Barr nor Blumenfeld-
Kosinksi situate Marguerite’s textual metaphors of the heart within their 
wider medieval literary context. The heart was a common metaphor in the 
Middle Ages, often figured as an inscriptional space or as an internalized 
stage for writing in which the imagery of book production could be 
combined with a pectoral consciousness of the heart as a seat of emotion, 
perception and cognition.44 Similarly, Marie Polo de Beaulieu suggests 
that the heart’s association with psychological and vital physical functions, 
coupled with its central location in the body, meant that it was widely 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Pagina meditationum, p. 72, §4.  ‘I thought that the hearts of men and women are so flighty 
that they can hardly ever remain in one place, and because of that I fixed in writing the 
thoughts that God had ordered into my heart so that I would not lose them when I removed 
them from my heart, and so that I could think them over little by little whenever God would 
give me His grace.’ A Page of Meditations, p. 26.  
42 See Blumenfeld-Kosinski, ‘The Idea of Writing,’ p. 75; Barr, Willing To Know God, pp. 51-55.  
43 Blumenfeld-Kosinksi, ‘The Idea of Writing,’ p. 75.  
44 Eric Jager, The Book of the Heart (London and Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2000). 
Jager explores numerous sources that dealt with the heart as both a metaphorical and literal site 
of memory, understanding, imagination, and emotion dating from antiquity to the later Middle 
Ages. Amongst these, he includes Aristotelian, Biblical, patristic, monastic, and popular literary 
sources written in Greek, Hebrew, Latin and the vernaculars. For more on the heart as a locus 
for memory, see Mary Carruthers, The Book of Memory: A Study of Memory in Medieval Culture, 
2nd edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, orig. publ. 1990), especially pp. 59-
60. Ernst Robert Curtius places the heart as a text metaphor within a broader schema of interior 
writing that dates back to the Classical period. See European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages, 
trans. Willard R. Trask (London and Henley: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979), especially Ch. 
16, ‘The Book as Symbol.’ First published in German as Europäische Literatur und lateinisches 
Mittelalter (Bern: A. Franke AG Verlag, 1948).  
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held to represent ‘le centre vital l’être’ and even ‘une sorte de microcosme 
de l’être.’45 
 
Marguerite was likely to have been drawing on a wide pool of 
literary sources in figuring her heart as both text and inner scriptorium.46 
The Old Testament mentions God’s law as written on the heart in both 
Deuteronomy 6:6 and 9:10, and in Proverbs 3.1:3, whilst in Jeremiah 31.33, 
God Himself acts as the scribe who writes on the heart. However it is in 
the works of St Paul that the dual role of the inner tablet of the heart as 
internalised Law and incarnate revelation is crystallised. In his epistle to 
the Romans, Paul writes: 
qui ostendunt opus legis scriptum in cordibus suis testimonium 
reddente illis conscientia ipsorum et inter se invicem 
cogitationum accusantium aut etiam defendentium in die cum 
iudicabit Deus occulta hominum secundum evangelium meum 
per Iesum Christum […].47  
 
The entailments of Paul’s pectoral metaphor are numerous: the heart serves 
as an internal record and as an outer reflection of the ‘secrets of men,’ a place 
to ‘bear witness’ and to ‘judge.’ Similarly, in 2 Corinthians, Paul discusses the 
notion of the letter and the Holy Spirit, in which he refers to the epistle of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Marie Polo de Beaulieu, ‘La Légende du coeur inscrit dans la littérature religieuse et 
didactique,’ in Le “Cuer” au moyen âge (Réalité et Senefiance) (Aix-en-Provence: Centre 
Universitaire d’Études et de Recherches Médiévales d’Aix, 1991), pp. 299-312. Here at p. 311.  
46 Amy Hollywood notes, for example, that in the third of his Sermones in Cantica canticorum, 
Bernard of Clairvaux argues that ‘one must look to the book of experience and compare it with 
the book of Scripture in the hopes that one might bring one’s own experience and that of the 
biblical text together.’ ‘Introduction,’ p. 27.  
47 Romans 2:15-16. ‘Who shew the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience 
bearing witness to them, and their thoughts between themselves accusing, or also defending 
one another, in the day when God shall judge the secrets of men by Jesus Christ, according to 
my gospel.’ 
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Christ as written ‘in tabulis cordis carnalibus.’48 Marguerite’s introduction to 
the Pagina draws heavily on this Pauline heart-text metaphor as a vehicle for 
interiority and revelation: 
idcirco precor omnes qui hoc scriptum legent ne faciant inde 
malum suum profectum quod presumpserim scribere hec, quia 
pensare debetis quod non habeam sensum nec clericatum in me 
quo scirem hec extrahere de corde meo, vel scribere sine alio 
exemplari nisi gratia Dei fuisset operata in me.49  
 
 That her text is both located within her and yet available for external 
examination, and written by her but according to the exemplar of God, divides 
Marguerite’s narrative voice into two, presenting her both as author and 
protagonist. Temporally situated within both the past and the narrated 
present, as both observer and recorder of her experience, this division is 
emblematic of the broader questions concerning mystical consciousness 
discussed in Chapter One. If inner mystical consciousness is only made 
possible by innate and indescribable experience, then its outer manifestation 
lies in its narration and reception as post-experiential expression. Marguerite’s 
protagonist may possess the capacity to experience, but it is the ability of the 
narrative voice to recollect and recount that gives Marguerite’s works their 
mystical quality.  
 
 Marguerite’s early disclaimer that her text is modelled on God’s 
exemplar is also, according to Blumenfeld-Kosinski, evidence that ‘like other 
mystical women,’ Marguerite feared being judged as presumptuous or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 2 Corinthians 3:3. ‘In the fleshly tables of the heart.’ 
49 Pagina meditationum, p. 72, §4. ‘I ask all those who read this text not to think badly [of me] 
because I had the presumption to write this, since you must believe that I have no sense or 
learning with which I would know how to take these things from my heart, nor could I write 
this down without any other model than the grace of God which is working within me.’ A Page 
of Meditations, p. 26. 
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‘audacious’ in the writing down of her pious thoughts.50 That Marguerite 
describes herself as ‘unus minimus vermiculus’ is, for Blumenfeld-Kosinski, 
only further confirmation that the nun was using the ‘topoi of modesty [so] 
that her male superiors approved of her.’51  However whilst the Pauline 
metaphor of the textual heart suggests that the interior book of the heart will 
be read and judged by God, there is no additional evidence to imply that 
Marguerite was troubled by external judgments involving her role as a female 
writer. It seems more likely that, given her skill in borrowing imagery from 
other literary sources, these self-deprecating statements are intended to 
demonstrate her dexterity in weaving authoritative quotations into her own 
narrative. That she likens herself to a small worm may indicate a borrowing 
from Psalm 27:7 (‘ego autem sum vermis’) or might suggest a familiarity with 
one of Augustine’s sermons in which he probes the universality of mortality, 
or indeed with a passage from Anselm of Canterbury’s (1033-1109) Cur Deus 
homo on human nature and creation.52  
 
 Modern scholars frequently remark on the modesty topoi found in 
medieval women’s writing and their notion of ‘fragilitas feminei sexus,’ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Blumenfeld-Kosinksi, ‘The Idea of Writing,’ pp. 75-76.  
51 ‘[E]go sim unus minimus vermiculus,’ Pagina meditationum, p. 73, §8. Blumenfeld-Kosinksi, 
‘The Idea of Writing,’ p. 76.  
52 ‘Videtis enim, fratres, quemadmodum non tantum ingentes bestiae et magna animalia, ut 
sunt boves aut cameli vel elephanti, sed et muscae, sed et vermiculi minimi, quomodo nolint 
mori, et diligant se.’ Augustine, Qui amat animam suam perdet illam, Sermon 368, Chapter 4, in 
Patrologia cursus completus, series latina, ed. by J.-P. Migne, 221 vols (Paris: Migne, 1841-1864), 
vol. 39, col. 1654. Henceforth Patrologia Latina. ‘After all, you can see, brothers and sisters, how 
not only huge wild beasts and large animals, like oxen and camels and elephants, but also flies, 
but also the tiniest little worms, how they don’t want to die, and how they love themselves.’ In 
Sermons, trans. by Edmund Hill, O.P., The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st 
Century, vol. 3 of 10, 341-700 (New York: New City Press, 1990), p. 301. ‘[N]ecesse est humanam 
naturam aut ad complementum eiusdem perfectionis esse factam, aut illi superabundare, quod 
de minimi vermiculi natura dicere non audemus.’ Anselm of Canterbury, Cur Deus homo, I.18, 
ed. by F. S. Schmitt, S. Anselmi Cantariensis archiepicopi opera Omnia, ad fidem codicum recensuit, 6 
vols. [the first printed at Sekau, 1938, the second at Rome, 1940, all reset for the Edinburgh, 
Nelson edition] (Edinburgh: Nelson, 1946-1961), vol. 2, p. 77. ‘It is necessarily the case that 
human nature was created either to complement the perfection of creation or to be superfluous 
to it. Now, we dare not make the latter statement with regard to even the smallest worm’s 
nature.’ Why God Became a [God-]man, 1:18, in Complete Philosophical and Theological Treatises of 
Anselm of Canterbury, trans. by Jasper Hopkins and Herbert Richardson (Minneapolis: The 
Arthur J. Banning Press, 2010), p. 328.  
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although their disclaimers are perhaps best read as devotional formulae, 
following the conventions of introductory topoi and rhetoric.53 This certainly 
appears to be the case in other women’s mystical writings, including those of 
Hildegard and the thirteenth-century Benedictine mystic, Gertrude the Great 
of Helfta (1241-1298).54 However it is also quite feasible that Marguerite’s 
apparent disclaimer draws on an older, biblical precedent. In Isaiah, a vision 
of God is described that echoes the claims made by Marguerite in the 
introductory passages of the Pagina: 
et erit vobis visio omnium sicut verba libri signati quem cum 
dederint scienti litteras dicent lege istum et respondebit non 
possum signatus est enim et dabitur liber nescienti litteras 
diceturque ei lege et respondebit nescio litteras.55  
 
 In drawing on the scriptural metaphor of heart as text, Marguerite 
frames her writings with a series of entailments that had also captured the 
imaginations of earlier patristic minds as well as those of her monastic 
contemporaries. The process of likening the inscribed heart to a textual record 
is a dominant theme in the works of the Church Fathers, occurring in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Katharina M. Wilson writes that ‘Medieval women writers do use a particular version of the 
affected modesty topos by adding fragilitas feminei sexu to the disclaimers.’ ‘Introduction,’ in 
Medieval Women Writers, ed. by Katharina M. Wilson (Athens, GA: The University of Georgia 
Press, 1984), pp. vii-xxix. Here at p. xxvii, n. 71. See also Wilson’s essay on Hrotsvit of 
Gandersheim in the same volume, in which she writes of the tenth-century Saxon canoness that: 
‘One stylistic characteristic may be attributable to her sex: she is exceedingly fond of using 
diminutives.’ ‘The Saxon Canoness: Hrotsvit of Gandersheim,’ pp. 30-46. Here at p. 42.  
54 ‘Sed ego, quamuis haec uiderem et audirem, tamen propter dubietatem et malam opinionem 
et propter diuersitatem uerborum hominum, tamdiu non in pertinacia, sed in humilitatis officio 
scribere recusaui, quousque in lectum aegritudinis flagello Dei depressa caderem […] manus ad 
scribendum apposui.’ Hildegard of Bingen, ‘Protestificatio,’ Scivias, p. 75. ‘But I, though I saw 
and heard these things, refused to write for a long time through doubt and bad opinion and the 
diversity of human words, not with stubbornness but in the exercise of humility, until, laid low 
by the scourge of God […] I set my hand to writing.’ Scivias, p. 60. On Gertrude the Great, see 
Petroff, ed., Medieval Women’s Visionary Literature, p. 229.   
55 Isaiah 29:11-12. ‘And the vision of all shall be unto you as the words of a book that is sealed, 
which when they shall deliver to one that is learned, they shall say: Read this: and he shall 
answer: I cannot, for it is sealed. And the book shall be given to one that knoweth no letters, 
and it shall be said to him: Read: and he shall answer: I know no letters.’ 
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writings of both the Greek and Latin traditions.56 However, with the rise of 
scholasticism and the founding of new monastic orders, in particular those of 
the Cistercians and the Carthusians, who placed a special emphasis on textual 
culture, the metaphor of the heart as book evolved to encompass new levels of 
complexity with vivid figurative imagery.  
 
 Monastic and scholastic writers of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries 
developed Augustine’s pectoral imagery by ascribing psychological meaning 
not only to the content of the heart-text, but also to the process by which the 
codex was produced and inscribed. In a treatise on the Last Judgment, Richard 
of St Victor (d.1173) focuses on a book of the heart that records the 
individual’s conscience, writing: ‘unusquisque enim in corde suo quasi 
scriptum gerit unde sua eum conscientia accusat, vel defendit.’57 As with 
Marguerite’s Pagina, Richard’s metaphorical heart is depicted as a textual 
record of human conscience, a theme he develops further in a sermon for the 
feast day of Saint Augustine. Taking one of the most inspiring metaphors of 
biblio-pectoral imagery, Psalm 44:2, Richard describes the book of the heart as 
being written by the Holy Spirit, dictated by the preaching of God’s word.58 
He extends this further by portraying the heart as a parchment that is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Jager provides an overview of how the heart developed to resemble a book in the hands of 
the Church Fathers in The Book of the Heart, pp. 17-26. Amongst the patristic writers responsible 
for interpreting this metaphor, Jager lists Basil of Caesarea (c.329-379), Ambrose of Milan (c.330-
397), John Chrysostom (c.347-407), Jerome (c.347-420), and Augustine (354-430). It is difficult to 
estimate just how familiar Marguerite may have been with patristic scholarship. However, it is 
likely that many of the allegorical expressions and associated ideas elaborated by these 
authoritative figures would have entered into widespread use amongst the medieval monastic 
communities and that, as a Carthusian prioress, Marguerite would have had some, albeit 
perhaps indirect, knowledge of the more vivid figurative imagery employed by the Church 
Fathers. For the reception of the Fathers in the medieval West, see Irena Backhus, The Reception 
of the Church Fathers in the West, 2 vols (Leiden: Brill, 1996).  
57 De judiciaria potestate in finali et universali judico, Patrologia Latina, 196: 1182A. ‘Each person 
carries in his heart a written record as it were, whereby his conscience accuses or defends him.’ 
Translated in Jager, The Book of the Heart, p. 49.  
58 ‘Lingua mea calamus scribae velociter scribentis’; ‘my tongue is the pen of a scrivener that 
writeth quickly.’ For Richard’s sermon, Sermo in festo sancti augustini, see Patrologia Latina, 177: 
1205B-1206D. For more detail on this passage, see: Boyd Taylor Coolman and Dale M. Coulter, 
Trinity and Creation: A Selection of Works of Hugh, Richard and Adam of St Victor (New York: New 
City Press, 2011), pp. 162-163, n. 20. 
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prepared for inscription:  
Corde quoque nostra, quae pergameno figurari diximus, et in 
quibus spiritualis haec scriptura spiritualiter scribitur, ad 
modum materialis pergameni conficiuntur per amaram 
poenitentiam, extenduntur […] raduntur […] et in 
quaternionem formantur.59 
 
 Richard was not the only scholar to employ the details of manuscript 
production in order to structure his exegesis on the workings of the inner 
self.60 However, the imaginative process with which heart and parchment 
become synonymous in his and his contemporaries’ works provides a 
stimulating backdrop to the development of Marguerite’s interchangeable 
source domains of the book and the body. The introductory passage to the 
Pagina closes with the implication that, with God’s help, the thoughts of her 
innermost self may be ordered in the way in which she remembered them: ‘ab 
hora qua cepi ea scribere donec omnia in scripto posuissem.’61 The form and 
content of Marguerite’s works are mirrored in the metonym of her heart: 
literary and fleshly corpora metaphorically embodying the other.   
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Richard of St Victor, Sermo in festo sancti augustini: Patrologia Latina, 177: 1205D-1206A. 
‘Truly our hearts, which we say are figured by parchment, and in which this writing of the 
spirit is spiritually inscribed are prepared by bitter penitence in the same way as a material skin. 
They are stretched […] they are scraped […] and they are formed into quires.’ English 
translation by Jager, The Book of the Heart, p. 50.  
60 Curtius observes a similar use of Psalm 44:2 in the sixth-century Etymologiae by Isidore of 
Seville, who transposes the metaphor onto the image of a ploughed field, and traces its 
development through Carolingian poetry and into the high Middle Ages. See European 
Literature, pp. 313-319. See also Jesse M. Gellrich, The Idea of the Book in the Middle Ages: Language, 
Theory, Mythology, and Fiction (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1985), p. 34. Jager 
similarly explores the use of the heart as a prepared parchment in the writings of Richard of St 
Victor’s teacher, Hugh (c.1096-1141), Peter Comestor (d. 1179/89) and in an anonymous twelfth-
century sermon from Durham Cathedral (Durham Cathedral Library Ms. B.IV.12, fols 37v – 38v). 
See The Book of the Heart, pp. 50-52.  
61 Pagina meditationem, p. 72, §4; ‘beginning with the hour in which I began to write this and up 
to the moment when I had put everything down in writing.’ A Page of Meditations, p. 26.  
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 The remainder of the Pagina focuses on Marguerite’s devotion to Christ. 
Some of her most striking imagery is associated with the birth and passion of 
Christ, two events that she both conflates and alternates between, eliding the 
passage of Christ’s life within the textual space of a sentence: 
certe iste amor duxit eum ad tantum quod fecit eum iacere in 
quodam parvo presepio inter unum bovem et unum asinum, et 
peius fecit eum adhuc suffere quia fuit derisus et consputus in 
facie et multe alie vilitates fuerunt.62 
 
Throughout her treatise, Christ’s corporeal form remains at the forefront of 
Marguerite’s visionary experience. As her account moves from Christ’s own 
labour, and her unusual description of him as a maternal figure, giving birth 
to the world, to his suffering on the cross via the shared imagery of blood 
across the two scenes, her detailing of the torture becomes particularly 
graphic: 
sudor tuus sanctus fuit ut gutte sanguinis […] unus dabat tam 
magnam alapam quod facies remanebat tota nigra […] te 
ligaverunt ad quamdam columpnam uni tam districte te 
verberaverunt quod videbatur quod esses excoriatus ita eras 
sanguine coopertus; et postquam ita verberaverunt te, posuerunt 
in tuo tenero capite quamdam coronam de spinis que 
perforabant tibi vitalia.63 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Pagina meditationum, p. 74, §10. ‘He whom love drove to so much that He had Himself 
thrown into a small manger between an ox and an ass, and made Himself suffer even worse 
things, since He was derided and [people] spit into His face and many other vile things.’ A 
Page of Meditations, p. 27-28. 
63 Pagina meditationum, p. 78, §33-35; ‘your holy sweat was like drops of blood […] one of them 
gave you such a blow that your face was left all black […] they tied you to a certain column 
where they whipped you so stretched out that it seemed you were stripped of your skin, so 
covered in blood were you, and after they had whipped you, they put on your tender head a 
crown of thorns that pierced your vital parts.’ A Page of Meditations, p. 31.  
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 Despite the shift in focus from the bibliophilic to the corporeal, 
Marguerite continues to draw from a manifestly textual source domain. Her 
emphasis on verbs of stripping or flaying (‘excoriare’), beating (‘verberare’), 
stretching (‘distringere’), tying to a column (‘ligare’), and piercing or pricking 
(‘perforare’) of Christ’s skin imaginatively re-structures his body as a 
parchment being prepared for inscription. Marguerite’s use of colour 
intensifies this metaphorical reconstruction of Christ’s body. Earlier in the 
Pagina, she writes that Christ was so tortured at his passion that he seemed to 
resemble a leper, implying that his skin was white.64 In the passage quoted 
above, meanwhile, Christ’s skin is described as ‘black’ and ‘red’ – two 
common colours of ink used in medieval book production.65 If Marguerite’s 
additional evocation of the whiteness of his skin metaphorically recasts his 
body as the highest grade of parchment, and the black and the red symbolise 
the inks required for writing, then encapsulated within this passion scene are 
all of the elements required for Christ to be metaphorically transformed from 
body to book, from incarnate Word to Gospel.66 Although Marguerite does not 
elaborate on the theological issues associated with the apparent paradox of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Allusions to leprosy occur throughout the Bible. In 4 Kings 5:27, a leper is described as 
‘leprosus quasi nix’ (‘a leper as white as snow’). For more on the symbolism of skin colour and 
whiteness, see Steven Connor, The Book of Skin (London: Reaktion Books, 2004), p. 163.  
65 See Amy Ione, Innovation and Vizualization: Trajectories, Strategies, and Myths, Consciousness, 
Literature and the Arts, 1 (Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi, 2005), p. 78. 
66 Writing on the body has a long history in Christian literature. In the fourth century, the 
Spanish-Roman poet Prudentius (c.348-c.413) compiled his Liber Peristephanon, a lyrical 
collection of martyrs’ legends in which St Eulalia compares the wounds inflicted on her by her 
torturers to purple writing in praise of Christ, whilst the schoolmaster Cassian is tortured by his 
own pupils who pierce him with their styluses. By the thirteenth century, Beryl Smalley 
suggests that the analogy between Christ’s body and the letter of scripture would become a 
Christian common place. However as James Kearney observes, it was in the fourteenth century 
that the image would truly capture the imaginations of scholars and writers anxious to capture 
something of the mystery of the incarnate Word. The Benedictine encyclopedist and author 
Pierre Bersuire (c.1290-1335) describes Christ as ‘a book written with the skin of the virgin […]. 
That book was spoken about in the disposition of the father, written in the conception of the 
mother, exposited in the clarification of the nativity, corrected in the passion, erased in the 
flagellation, punctuated in the imprint of the wounds, adorned in the crucifixion above from the 
pulpit, illuminated in the outpouring of blood, bound in the resurrection, and examined in the 
ascension.’ Taken from Bersuire’s Repertorium morae, translated in Gellrich, The Idea of the Book, p. 
17. See also Beryl Smalley, The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages (Notre Dame, Ind.: University 
of Notre Dame Press, 1964), p. 1, n. 2; James Kearney, The Incarnate Text: Imagining the Book in 
Reformation England (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009). Whilst Bersuire’s 
exposition of Christ as a book is clearly more elaborate than that of Marguerite d’Oingt, the two 
share a similar conceptual formulation and structure.  
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Christ as flesh and Christ as language, the idea appears to lie behind the 
analogy made here in the Pagina. In figuring Christ’s body as a metaphorical 
codex, Marguerite hints at many of the antithetical mysteries that underpin 
the Christian faith: the relationship between the celestial and the material; the 
letter and the spirit; the human word and the divine Word.  
 
 The double apotheosis of the body and the book, both of Marguerite’s 
heart and of Christ’s body and the respective books of both, undergoes a 
further transformation in the second of her writings, the Speculum. The work 
opens with the disclaimer that Marguerite is recounting the experiences of 
‘una persona que jo conoisso.’67 However, as with the Pagina, the catalyst for 
the visions that follow is the holy life of Jesus Christ, written: 
en son cor que oy li eret semblanz alcuna veis que il li fut 
presenz e que il tenit un livro clos en sa mayn per liey 
ensennier.68  
 
 In framing her second composition in the same way as her first, 
Marguerite gives a strong indication that the anonymous protagonist of the 
Speculum is carried over from one narrative to the next. The same symbiotic 
pattern is evoked here too: Marguerite’s body functions as a container for the 
divinely inspired text, while the text of the Speculum itself is metaphorically 
figured as an embodied version of its protagonist: 
citi creatura, per la graci de Nostre Seignor, aveit escrit en son cor 
la seinte vita que Deus Jhesu Criz menet en terra.69 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Speculum, p. 90, §1; ‘a person of my acquaintance.’ Mirror, p. 41. 
68 Speculum, p. 90, §2; ‘into her heart [so] that it sometimes seemed to her that He was present 
and that He held a closed book in His hand in order to teach from it.’ Mirror, p. 42. My addition 
in brackets.  
69 Speculum, p. 90, §2. ‘By the grace of our Lord, this creature had written into her heart the holy 
life that Jesus Christ had led on earth.’ Mirror, p. 41.  
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  Once again, the focus of Marguerite’s devotion is Christological, 
however in the Speculum, it is a book in Christ’s hand that acts as the vision’s 
initial focus. Echoing the colour imagery of the Pagina, Marguerite writes that 
the outside of the book was covered in red, black, and white letters, while its 
clasps bear letters of gold. The metaphorically-figured book of Christ of her 
earlier work is embodied in the form and structure of the ornamental book of 
the second vision; the outer body of Christ, which symbolised his life and 
deeds, now refigured in the outer binding of this holy book, which in turn, it is 
implied, will contain the Word.  
 
 Blumenfeld-Kosinksi questions Marguerite’s statement that ‘En les 
letres blanches eret escrita,’ and suggests that Marguerite may be referring to 
large initials containing intricately drawn images.70 However, if, Marguerite’s 
visions are conceptualised in terms of containment and embodiment, it is 
possible that ‘en les letres’ alludes to a subtler notion that the letters 
themselves function as containers, which encapsulate and propagate meaning. 
Just as Christ’s body can be transformed into a metaphorical, and then a literal, 
book within the mystical realm of Marguerite’s writing, so too the components 
of this symbolic transformation – the coloured letters themselves – may be 
reasonably imagined as transformatory in form and content, acting as a 
metaphorical gateway to further experience and understanding of the divine.71 
A similar potency is attributed to letter formation in Isidore of Seville’s 
Etymologiae. In his treatment of Grammar, the first of the seven arts, Isidore 
outlines the importance of letters, observing: 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Mirror p. 42, n. 1. For the quoted text, see Speculum, p. 90, §4; Mirror, p. 42.  
71 Mary Carruthers observes that ‘medieval and ancient writers do not distinguish between 
what we call “verbal” and “visual” memory; that the letters used for writing were considered to 
be as visual as what we call “images” today; and that as a result the page as a whole, the 
complete parchment with its lettering and all its decoration, was considered a cognitively 
valuable “picture.” The Craft of Thought: Meditation, Rhetoric, and the Making of Images, 400-1200, 
Cambridge Studies in Medieval Literature, 34, 2nd edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003, orig. publ. 1998), p. 122.  
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Litterae autem sunt indicies rerum, signa verborum, quibus tanta 
vis est, ut nobis dicta absentium sine voce loquantur […]. Usus 
litteram repertus propter memoriam rerum. Nam ne oblivion 
fugiant, litteris alligantur.72  
 
Isidore’s letters are imbued with a sense of mystery, imagination, and memory, 
able to conjure a representative image despite the lack of its original source. 
Conceived of as receptacles that bind (‘alligantur’) whilst simultaneously 
permitting memorial recovery (‘repertus’), Isidore’s letters resonate with the 
structure of the paradoxical container discussed earlier. As Mark E. Amler 
notes, Isidore possessed a ‘mythographic perception of language as a verbal 
construction motivated by extraverbal reality’: for the Spaniard, language 
possessed the capacity to transform from ‘an end into a means to a higher 
truth.’73 It is quite possible that Marguerite had some knowledge of Isidore’s 
work: the Etymologiae sive origines served as a foundational work in the early 
Middle Ages and was a crucial component in early medieval monastic 
elaboration of the reading of Scripture. 74  Given Marguerite’s monastic 
education at Poleteins, it is possible that she drew inspiration from Isidore’s 
transformatory mystical and metaphorical figuring of letters into her own 
conceptualisation of the holy book as represented in the Speculum.  
 
 Marguerite’s description of this book, inscribed in a trinity of colours 
and surrounded or bound by gold, also anticipates a vision narrated in her 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 See Liber 1.3 in Isidori Hispalensis Episcopi, Etymologiarum sive originum libri XX, ed. by W. 
J. Lindsay (Oxford: Clarendon Press , 1911). ‘Indeed, letters are tokens of things, the signs of 
words, and they have so much force that the utterances of those who are absent speak to us 
without a voice […]. The use of letters was invented for the sake of remembering things, 
which are bound by letters lest they slip away into oblivion.’ Isidore of Seville, The Etymologies, 
trans. by Stephen A. Barney, W. J. Lewis, J. A. Beach, and Oliver Berghof (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 39.   
73 Mark E. Amsler, Etymology and Grammatical Discourse in Late Antiquity and the Early Middle 
Ages, Studies in the History of Language Series, 44 (Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John 
Benjamins, 1989), p. 171.  
74 Amsler, Etymology and Grammatical Discourse, p. 135.  
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hagiographic work and discussed earlier in the chapter. The book figured in 
the Speculum bears a marked resemblance to the co-centric spheres of light in 
the Eucharistic vision of the Via Seiti Biatrix, which are both contained by, and 
contain a gold light. Marguerite thus shapes her audience’s own receptive 
experience, establishing in one piece of writing the signs and symbols that the 
audience will discover in the next. In creating this systematicity, Marguerite 
not only creates a logical coherence for the expression of her own visions, but 
also conditions their subsequent reception. The metaphors of her text function 
in an intratextual interchange, shaping an internal cognitive map that both 
protagonist and audience can navigate. Colours and structures repeatedly 
modulate with respect to their matter and form, but also remain conceptually, 
and importantly, theologically, consistent due to Marguerite’s manipulation of 
metaphors of embodiment.  
 
 The outer appearance of the holy book provokes the protagonist to 
reflect on the inner ‘livro de sa concienci,’ which she finds to be antithetical in 
content to that of the life of Christ.75 It is only in meditating on the book of her 
vision that she is able to correct her own book of her conscience. In doing so, 
Barr suggests that Marguerite presents her audience with a ‘series of 
telescoping books, each giving rise to the next.’76 However, it would perhaps 
be more accurate to describe Marguerite’s account as a ‘kaleidoscope’ of 
books: the appearance of one book may catalyse that of the next, and the form, 
structure and content of these visionary books may shift according to the 
perception of the viewer or reader, but all of the books brought into view here, 
be they scriptural, mystical, or metaphorical, coexist symmetrically across 
Marguerite’s body of works and within the cognitive field of both the 
narrator’s and the audience’s imaginative reality.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 Speculum, p. 92, §7. Mirror, p. 42.  
76 Barr, Willing to Know God, p. 56.  
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 Meditating on her own imagined book causes it to transform, opening 
and revealing ‘uns beauz mirors, et no hy aveit fors que due page.’ 77 
Occurring at the mid-point of the Speculum, the opening of this book evokes 
that of the great book of life in Revelation: 
 et libri aperti sunt et alius liber apertus est qui est vitae et 
iudicati sunt mortui ex his quae scripta erant in libris secundum 
opera ipsorum.78  
 
The structure and composition of Marguerite’s book represent a myriad of 
symbolic connotations. Conceived as a mirror, the open book is, James 
Wimsatt notes, ‘designed to be an image of truth,’ whilst its composition of 
two facing pages causes the codex to structurally reflect the purpose of the life 
of Christ. 79 In Jesus, the books of the two Testaments are made possible; one 
prefiguring the life reflected in the other. If, in Marguerite’s works, books and 
fleshly bodies are synonymous, then the opened book of the Speculum 
simultaneously symbolises the fulfilment of the Old Testament’s prophecy 
and the judgement of Revelation. The entailments of Marguerite’s metaphor 
point towards the notion that at the heart of Marguerite’s mystical narrative 
lies the encapsulation of Scripture.  
  
 The opening of the third and final chapter of the Speculum echoes the 
introductory lines of the second, but transforms the earlier symbolism found 
in the first two chapters of the work. Whilst Marguerite meditates on Jesus’ 
position at the right hand of the Father, she describes her heart as ‘si elevas.’ 
Her heart has replaced the book of the two earlier visions and is now the agent 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Speculum, p. 94, §15; ‘a beautiful mirror, and there were only two pages.’ Mirror, p. 43.  
78 ‘[E]t libri aperti sunt: et alius liber apertus est, qui est vitae: et judicati sunt mortui ex his, 
quae scripta erant in libris, secundum opera ipsorum.’ [A]nd the books were opened; and 
another book was opened, which is the book of life; and the dead were judged by those things 
which were written in the books, according to their works.’ Revelation 20:12.  
79 James I. Wimsatt, Allegory and Mirror: Tradition and Structure in Middle English Literature (New 
York: Western Publishing Company, 1970), p. 29.  
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that transports her, as in chapter two of the Speculum, to ‘un lua qui eret plus 
granz que toz li monz et plus reluysanz que li solouz de totes pars.’80  Here, 
Christ is refigured too. Her vision is one of Christ’s resurrected body, not of 
his book, introduced in terms of his birth before again being elided with the 
Passion. Jesus, she writes: 
eret vestiz de cella gloriousa roba qu’il prit el tres noble cors de 
Nostra Donna. En ses tres nobles mayns e en ses pies apparyssant 
les glorioses playes que il suffrit per amour de nos.81  
 
Christ is conceptualised in terms of both containment and permeability: ‘vestiz’ 
in flesh and matter, and radiating light from his wounds. Like the triune 
spheres of light and the holy book, both of which contain and are contained by 
divine truth (the light by the golden light, the book by the golden clasps), so 
too the corporeal Christ is imagined in terms of Marguerite’s key conceptual 
metaphor, embodied containment. The Speculum has come full circle, from 
Marguerite’s outer, narrated book, to the book of Christ, through which she is 
able, through prayer, to look into the book of her heart.  
 
 The Speculum ends with an outpouring of abstract metaphors to 
describe the divine, beginning with his beauty (‘beuta’), his freedom (‘frans’), 
and his joy (‘delyez’), and ending with his eternity (‘eternauz’).82 It is at this 
point in her writing that Marguerite is perhaps at her closest, stylistically and 
theologically, to the mystical expression of Marguerite Porete. The allusions to 
joy, freedom, and love echo the descriptions of soaring ecstasy of Porete’s 
annihilated soul, whilst her portrayal of the saints and their reciprocal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Speculum, p. 98, §23; ‘a place much larger than the entire world, and more brilliant all over 
than the sun.’ Mirror, p. 45. 
81 Speculum, p. 98, §24; ‘was clothed in this glorious garment which He assumed in the noble 
body of Our Lady. On His noble hands and feet appeared the glorious wounds that He suffered 
for love of us.’ Mirror, p. 45. 
82 See Speculum, pp. 98-100, §25-34. Mirror, pp. 45-46.  
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relationship with God is markedly similar to that depicted by Porete of l’ame 
adnientie. Of the saints, Marguerite d’Oingt writes: 
[Deus] los ha fait si beuz et si glorious que la Trinita veit chacuns 
en se, assi come un veit en un bel mireour co que li est devant.83  
 
The saints themselves are figured as receptacles of the divine, but Marguerite 
is careful not to assert that they are in any sense equivalent to the Trinity 
reflected in them. Whereas earlier in the Speculum, Jesus’ body is described as 
‘si tres nobles que l’on si poit remirer plus clarament que [en] un mirour,’ this 
closing account of the saints is semantically different; their bodies are 
described in terms of their similitude to a mirror, not their equivalence or 
superiority. Humanity, meanwhile, is portrayed not by means of a 
metaphorical mirror, but with the metaphor of painting.84 As such, Marguerite 
creates a hierarchy arranged around resemblance, perception and truth. At the 
top is Christ, seen ‘more clearly than in a mirror.’ His image is pure: there is 
no intermediary matter or substance with which to gain access or to give it 
form. At the mid-point are the saints, who see the Trinity within themselves 
‘as in a mirror,’ and at the bottom is man, created in God’s image. Man is 
likened to a painting; he can be represented in the form of God, but can only 
ever constitute a representation of divine truth. 
 
 The Speculum’s final lines resolve the thematic arc of Marguerite’s work, 
bringing the focus back to its original theme of revelation understood through 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 Speculum, pp. 100-102, §35. ‘[God] made them so beautiful and so glorious that each of them 
sees the Trinity in himself, as one sees in a beautiful mirror that which is in front of it.’ Mirror, p. 
46.  
84 ‘Et tot assi com li saint se delectunt en veir la beuta Nostron Seignour, se deduit nostre bons 
creares en la beuta y en l’amour de se beles creatures qu’il a fait a sa ymagi et a sa semblanci, 
assi come li bons meitres regardet volunteyrs una bela carta, quant il l’a bein fayta.’ Speculum, p. 
102, §36. ‘And just as the saints take pleasure in seeing the beauty of Our Lord, so our good 
Creator takes pleasure in the beauty and love of the beautiful creatures He has made in His 
image and semblance: thus a good master likes to look at a beautiful painting when he has 
painted well.’ Mirror, p. 46.  
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bibliophilic metaphor. The prioress ends her visionary account by extending 
the optimism and potential of mystical experience to all those who believe in 
God: 
 et per co sont benatru li net de cuor, quar il verent Deu tot 
apertament. Et il memes lo promet en l’avangelo et dit que 
benatru sont li ne de cuor, quar il verrent Deu faci a faci, en sat re 
grant beuta.85 
 
Drawing on Paul’s celebrated expression of 1 Corinthians 13:12, 
Marguerite suggests that the faithful will one day see God ‘face to face’ – that 
the terrestrial hierarchy she has constructed to illustrate man’s relationship to 
God will be overturned.86 In choosing to end with the words of St Paul, 
Marguerite once again frames her own work with the macrocosmic account 
of Scripture. Literal and metaphorical books contain and reflect one another, 
structured symbolically in much the same way that Marguerite shapes her 
understanding of the triune God and his relationship with man through 
Christ.  
 
The final extant mystical work by Marguerite, the hagiographic Li Via 
Seiti Biatrix Virgina de Ornaciu, completes the staged division of the authorial-
protagonist voice across her corpus. Whereas the Pagina merges the voices of 
the two figures, and the Speculum blurs the distinction between Marguerite 
and the anonymous ‘creatura’ of the narrative, the Via marks a clear 
distinction between the figures of Marguerite and Béatrix, although 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Speculum, p. 102, §39; ‘and that is why the pure of heart are blessed, because they will see 
God clearly. He himself promises this in the gospel and He says that blessed are the pure of 
heart, for they will see God face to face in His great beauty.’ Mirror, p. 47. 
86 ‘Videmus nunc per speculum in enigmate tunc autem facie ad faciem nunc cognosco ex parte 
tunc autem cognoscam sicut et cognitus sum.’ 1 Corinthians 13:12. ‘We see now through a glass 
in a dark manner; but then face to face. Now I know in part; but then I shall know even as I am 
known.’As Blumenfeld-Kosinksi notes, the Francoprovençal word apertement is ‘frequently used 
in medieval texts to describe things that will be revealed.’ See the Mirror, p. 47, n. 3.  
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paradoxically, it is in this distinction that the thematic trajectory of 
Marguerite’s works will find its resolution. Unlike her earlier works, in 
which bibliophilic and corporeal images gave way to each other, 
Marguerite’s portrayal of Béatrix invites the unison of both the book and the 
body in a single representation. In writing the life of another mystic, 
Marguerite metaphorically reconstructs Béatrix’s body through the text, 
whilst literally constructing the book of Béatrix’s life. Béatrix’s body and 
book now serve as an alternative expression of pious devotion, achieved 
through the ascetic imitation and Eucharistic transubstantiation of Christ’s 
life and body.  
 
As with the protagonists of the Pagina and the Speculum, Béatrix’s 
mystical experience finds its expression in her heart: 
illi sentivet si grant graci et si grant gloyri en son cuor de la 
amour de Nostrum Segnour que a peynes que illi la poet 
sustinir.87 
 
Whilst Marguerite’s references to her own heart are, on the whole, 
intellectualised allusions to it acting as a vehicle for God’s law, or as a 
receptacle for her experience of her conscience, Béatrix’s heart assumes a 
more physical and affective response to the divine.88 To a certain extent, this 
reflects the general style and tone of the narrative: the work is longer, 
broader in scope, and more vividly described than the more economical 
expression of the Pagina and the Speculum.89 However, it also signals a shift 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 Li Via Seiti Biatrix, p. 106, §45; ‘she felt […] such great grace and such a radiance of the Lord’s 
love in her heart that she could hardly bear it.’ The Life of Saint Beatrice, p. 48.  
88 Marguerite ends the Pagina with the words: ‘Domine dulcis, scribe in corde meo illud quod 
vis ut faciam. Scribe ibi tuam legem, scribe ibi tua mandata ut nunquam deleantur.’ p. 88, §109. 
‘Sweet Lord, write into my heart what you want me to do. Write your law, write there your 
orders so that they will never be erased.’ A Page of Meditations, p. 41.  
89 Marguerite’s economic use of language and imagery, particularly toward the end of the 
Pagina, is reminiscent of the sparse style of Guigo I, the codifier of the Carthusian order and 
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in tone and emphasis, suggesting that Béatrix’s piety is characterised in 
terms of the aspiring lover of Christ, rather than in the moralising devotion 
of Marguerite. Despite the shift in style, genre, and narrative voice, the 
metaphorical focus remains consistent. As with the rest of Marguerite’s 
corpus, the dominant source domain in the Via draws from the 
transformation of form and matter, both ethereal and tangible. 
 
The extent of Béatrix’s holiness is emphasised in the narrative’s 
introduction. Drawing on familiar tropes from both ancient and 
contemporary hagiographic sources, Marguerite depicts the young 
Carthusian as the archetypal ‘puella senex’; spiritually precocious and 
concerned with the welfare of her community.90 Yet whilst these early topoi 
consolidate and confirm Béatrix’s character, creating extra-textual resonances 
with other hagiographic narratives with which Marguerite’s audiences 
would no doubt have been familiar, it is the portrayal of the self-inflicted 
torture during her conflict with the devil that draws the corporeal figure of 
Béatrix into sharp relief.91  
 
Béatrix’s self-injurious practices are said to exceed the fasting and 
abstinence associated with strict monastic life, and are instead driven by a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
author of the Meditationes, a series of 476 aphorisms concerning the mysteries of Christian belief 
and practical rules for the Carthusian monk to live by. See Guigo Ier: Les Méditations (Recueil de 
pensées), Introduction, texte critique, traduction et notes par Un Chartreux, Sources chrétiennes, 
308 (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1983). 
90 For more on the figure of the puella senex, see John Anthony Burrow, The Ages of Man: A Study 
in Medieval Writing and Thought (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986); Alison Goddard Elliott, Roads 
to Paradise: Reading the Lives of the Early Saints (Hannover and London: University Press of New 
England, 1987).  
91 Marguerite’s apparent disapproval of Beatrix’s excessive self-injuries (‘que erant acunes veys 
senz grant discrecion’) echoes a common feature of descriptions of ascetic holy men and women. 
Giles Constable cites a number of medieval figures who called for moderation in ascetic 
practices, including Basil of Caesarea and John Chrysostom among the Church Fathers, 
Benedict of Nursia, Bruno of La Chartreuse, and Bernard of Clairvaux. See Giles Constable, 
‘Moderation and Restraint in Ascetic Practices in the Middle Ages,’ in From Athens to Chartres: 
Neoplatonism and Medieval Thought, ed. by Haijo Jan Westra (Leiden and New York: Brill, 1992), 
pp. 315-327.  
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focus on burning and puncturing her body. Highlighting the disparity 
between her charity to others and the extreme tortures she inflicts on herself, 
Marguerite writes: 
Quant illi eret cusinyeri y enfermeri, illi o feyseyt mout 
cheritousament. Et quant oy li coventavet fayre alcunes choses 
al fua, illi meteyt tant faci sus la chalour del fua que oy li eret 
vyayres que li cervella li brulat en la testa et que li huel li 
erragissant de la testa et mente vez illi attendeyt qu’il volassant 
en terra.92 
 
The use of colour in this passage is highly evocative. The mention of 
fire and burning recalls the dominant colours of Marguerite’s earlier writings, 
red and black, and echoes both the Pagina and the Speculum by placing the 
emphasis on human skin as the locus where the torture is both realised and 
symbolised. The young nun is also described as walking barefoot through 
the snow and ice and carrying hot coals to burn the skin on her hands in 
another pair of images designed to draw the audience’s attention to the 
colours white, red, and black. Béatrix’s flesh is emblematic of Christ’s body 
as it is figured in Marguerite’s first work, and of the book of Christ in the 
second. Imitation of Christ as both divine body and Word converge 
simultaneously in the figure of the Carthusian ascetic.93  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 Li Via Seiti Biatrix, p. 106, §47. ‘When she was a cook and a nurse, she showed great charity. 
And when she had to do something on the fire, she moved her face so close to the heat that it 
seemed to her that her brain was on fire and that her eyes came out of her head, and often she 
expected to see them falling on the floor.’ The Life of Saint Beatrice, p. 49.  
93 Béatrix also displays self-induced stigmata, piercing her hands with nails. Marguerite writes 
that on doing this, however, clear water flows from her wounds as opposed to blood. This may 
be in reference to Béatrix’s physical purity, or may be indicative of a more complex combination 
of images. A popular prayer of the early fourteenth century, often performed during mass, the 
Anima Christi, took the body, blood, and, strangely, water from the side of Christ as its focus: 
‘Anima Christi sanctifica me. Corpus Christi, salva me. Sanguis Christi, inebria me. Aqua lateris 
Christi, lava me. Passio Christi, conforta me.’ It is possible that Marguerite was drawing on the 
imagery of this prayer when she composed this passage in Béatrix’s vita. Stigmata, however, 
were increasingly common in accounts of holy lives. Miri Rubin gives details of the use and 
circulation of the Anima Christi in Corpus Christi: The Eucharist in Late Medieval Culture 
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There is, however, another role ascribed to Béatrix’s body that is 
antithetical to its metaphorical re-enactment of the holy book and body of 
Christ. Her body also acts as a figurative battleground upon which she and the 
devil struggle to claim ownership of her body and her mind.94 As the devil 
torments her physically, so too Béatrix tortures her body: ‘mout grant penenci 
fayre.’95 Béatrix’s corporeity thus becomes a commodity for which the nun and 
the devil bargain in vain, neither able to transform it sufficiently to succeed in 
their aims. Whilst the devil continues to attack Béatrix’s body, the narrative 
denies the audience any detail on the devil’s part. Yet when the devil attacks 
Béatrix’s cognitive faculties, the emphasis turns towards the dangers posed by 
the devil’s evil: 
Adon ne layssiet neguna chosa que il poet damagier l’arma ne 
lo cors al deplaisir de son creatour, qu’il totes ne les li mit avant 
per semblances et per figures ta[n]t vilment quant el poeyt. Les 
granz viutas et ordures que il li amenavet devant per diverses 
maneres non oserit negunt recontar […].96 
 
Spiritual attack is clearly more perilous than physical assault, and it is 
from this point in the narrative that Béatrix’s piety undergoes a radical 
transformation, from being predominantly physical to visionary. She is saved 
from the devil by praying to the Virgin, who appears, saying: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 156-157. Following the composition and 
widespread dissemination of the life of St Francis (1181-1226) in St Bonaventure’s Legenda major 
(1265) in which St Francis receives the stigmata, numerous holy men and women are described 
as stigmatics. For more on mystical stigmata, see Augustin Poulain, ‘Mystical Stigmata,’ in The 
Catholic Encyclopedia, vol. 14 (New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1912). Available online: 
http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/14294b.htm. Accessed 23/01/14. 
94 Kieckhefer writes that hagiographic descriptions of saints’ struggles with the devil represent 
‘a darker side to mystical experiences.’ Following the classic temptation of St Anthony, ‘Bridget 
of Sweden, Catherine of Siena, Peter Olafsson and John Ruysbroeck all encountered the devil 
almost as a counterthrust to the joy of mystical revelation.’ Unquiet Souls, p. 174.  
95 Li Via Seiti Biatrix, p. 106, §46; ‘impose a great penance.’ The Life of Saint Beatrix, p. 49.  
96 Li Via Seiti Biatrix, p. 108, §53. ‘He omitted none of the things that could do harm to her soul 
or body […] and he offered them to her in her imagination through images as nastily as he 
could. Nobody would dare describe the horrible foulness and filth which he paraded before her 
eyes.’ The Life of Saint Beatrice, p. 50.  
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non aes pour ne neguna dotanci, car […] ju preno l’arma et lo 
cors de toy en ma garda y en ma deffension; et te garderey et 
deffendrey del poyr del dyablo et de sos enginz.97 
 
The imagery implicit in the Virgin’s promise to Béatrix is particularly 
noteworthy. Mary offers to take both Béatrix’s body and soul into, or under, her 
guard and protection: metaphorically she promises to subsume that makes 
Béatrix a corporeal being (composed of body and soul, in accordance with 
hylomorphic philosophy, into the meta-structure of holy corporeal essence). 
One body thus incorporates another in the Christian message of salvation, 
echoing and reinforcing the imagery used within Marguerite’s schema of 
corporeity, permeability, and transformation. Just as earlier corporeal matter 
such as light, human flesh, and the codex are metaphorically imagined as 
potential representations of the same essential structure, so too the envisioned 
Mary possesses the metaphoric potential to incorporate Béatrix.  
 
 It is important to note that whilst divine corporeity is imagined as 
possessing the capacity to subsume humanity’s corporeal form, Marguerite is 
careful never to suggest that the reverse might also be possible. Over the course 
of her three works, Marguerite frequently alludes to God being ‘in her heart’ or, 
as in the case of Béatrix, ‘li graci de Nostrum Segnour fut toz jors en liey.’98 
However, as becomes apparent in a later episode in the hagiography, the 
containment of the divine within the human corpus is a more problematic idea.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 Li Via Seiti Biatrix, p. 108-110, §57; ‘do not fear anything, [for] I take your soul and your body 
under my guard and protection and I will protect and defend you against the power of the 
devil and his tricks.’ The Life of Saint Beatrice, p. 50.  
98 Li Via Seiti Biatrix, p. 112, §67; ‘the grace of our Lord was always within her.’ The Life of Saint 
Beatrice, p. 52, §67. See also: Pagina, p. 72, §4; A Page of Meditations, p. 26.  
	  	   164	  
Her vita reports that around Advent, Béatrix began to feel troubled by 
her apparent lack of devotion. On Christmas Day, she is reluctant to join her 
fellow nuns in receiving the Host, but feels compelled to do so by a feeling of 
desire for her ‘creatour.’99 Throughout the vita, the Host is never referred to 
either in the Latin as the ‘hostia,’ or in its Francoprovençal translation, the ‘oti.’ 
Rather, it is personified as the ‘salvour,’ the ‘creatour,’ and, as Béatrix finally 
takes the Host, ‘lo beneyt cors de Nostrum Segnour.’100 As Béatrix consumes the 
consecrated bread, the Host develops an increasingly embodied form. In a 
graphic image, the Host remains in Béatrix’s mouth: ‘lo gros de una lentili de 
l’oti.’101 In one of the few images drawn from a domestic source domain, the 
body of Christ is figured as a tiny piece of food; conceptually, corporeity is 
paradoxically imagined as simultaneously abstract, infinite and omnipotent, 
whilst also being tangible, miniscule, and ordinary.102  
 
As in previous passages, Marguerite manipulates the chronology of 
these events. The narrative oscillates from the Incarnate Christ of the Nativity, 
alluded to in this episode taking place on Christmas Day, to the events of the 
Last Supper, symbolised by the Eucharist, and finally to the Passion in the 
broken body as represented by the singular piece of the Host. Once again, 
Marguerite telescopes the events of the Gospels into the span of her own work, 
transposing the meta-narrative of salvation onto a singular mystical experience.  
 
This notion of the Host as both symbol of, and catalyst for, the 
consumption of Christ’s flesh is a prevalent theme in thirteenth- and 
fourteenth-century narrative accounts of female mystical experience, discussed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 Li Via Seiti Beatrix, p. 122, §91; ‘creator,’ The Life of Saint Beatrice, p. 56.  
100 Li Via Seiti Beatrix, p. 122, §89, 91, 92; ‘the blessed body of our Lord.’ The Life of Saint Beatrice 
p. 56.   
101 Li Via Seiti Beatrix, p. 122, §92; ‘a lentil-sized piece of the Host.’  The Life of Saint Beatrice, p. 56.  
102 Blumenfeld-Kosinksi remarks on Marguerite’s ‘homely similes’ in a note to her translation. 
See the Mirror, p. 40, n. 1.  
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in detail by Caroline Bynum in Holy Feast and Holy Fast. Bynum notes that 
sensual experiences associated with the sacrament feature in the lives of the 
Low Country mystics Marie d’Oignies (1177-1213), Ida van Leuven (c.1211-
1290), and Marguerite d’Ypres (d.1237), and in the account of the life of the 
Italian Angela of Foligno (1248-1309).103 One possible source for this imagery, 
Bynum suggests, can be found in Bernard of Clairvaux’s comparison of the 
consumption of the sacrament with the process of chewing, eating, and 
digesting the divine.104 However, she also places the increasing preoccupation 
with the physicality of Christ within a broader theological and historical context, 
citing the rise in heretical movements such as those of the the Cathars and the 
Albigensians, both of whom denounced the role of the body, flesh, and matter, 
as a further reason for the Church’s late medieval emphasis on the bleeding, 
suffering Christ.105  
 
It was perhaps a combination of both of these trends, the textual and the 
contextual, that influenced Marguerite’s imagery in this episode of Eucharistic 
devotion and its effect on Béatrix is profound. Marguerite describes her 
struggling to swallow the Host, and that ‘li oti que illi aveyt en la bochi se vayt 
si creytre que illi ot tota la bochi pleyna […] et li aveyt tal savour come de cher 
et de san.’106 Throughout the vita, Béatrix has been depicted in the role of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 Bynum, Holy Feast and Holy Fast, pp. 116-119 and p. 141. There are a number of parallels 
between episodes in Marguerite’s writings and The Book of Blessed Angela of Foligno. Angela was 
said to see the Christ child during the Elevation of the Host on several occasions in her 
Memoriale: ‘Alia vice dixit quod vidit in hostia sicut puerum Christum, sed videbatur esse 
magnus et multum dominans sicut qui teneret dominationem.’ Angela de Fulginio, Memoriale, 
ed. by L. Thier and A. Calufetti, Spicilegium Bonaventurianum, 25 (1985): 125-400. Here at p. 
196.‘The Memorial,’ in Angela of Foligno: Complete Works, trans. by Paul Lachance (Mahwah, NJ: 
Paulist Press), pp. 146-147.  
104 See Bynum, Holy Feast and Holy Fast, p. 116. See also Sermon IV.5 in Bernard of Clairvaux: 
Selected Works, trans. by G. R. Evans, The Classics of Western Spirituality (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist 
Press, 1987), p. 233. Lakoff and Johnson develop the metaphor of eating as the acquisition of an 
abstract concept in Philosophy in the Flesh, pp. 241-243.  
105 See Bynum, Holy Feast and Holy Fast, pp. 252-53.  
106 Li Via Seiti Biatrix, p. 122, §93; ‘the Host that she still had in her mouth began to grow until 
her mouth was completely filled by it […] and she tasted flesh and blood.’ The Life of Saint 
Beatrice, p. 56. Angela da Foligno describes a similar experience in her Memorial. Her scribe, 
Brother Arnaldo, writes: ‘quando communicat, hostia extenditur in ore’; ‘when she receives 
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imitatio Christi. Yet as she consumes Christi’s crucified body, the narrative 
makes it clear that she cannot simply incorporate Christ into her own body. It is 
only by engaging in prayer that she is able to swallow the Host, at which point 
‘illi o sentit ferir el cuor.’107  
 
Bynum suggests that the fourteenth-century preoccupation with 
‘becoming Christ’ was made ideologically possible ‘in eating Christ’s crucified 
body.’108 However, as Marguerite’s hagiography makes clear, incorporating 
Christ alone is not sufficient a devotional practice. ‘Imitatio’ is not simply a case 
of incorporating ‘flesh into flesh.’109 Conceptually, it may be structured as 
incorporating one corporeal form into another, but, as Béatrix’s hagiography 
makes clear, for humanity at least, this can be neither a permanent nor an 
objective state of affairs. Béatrix senses a joyful feeling in her heart during ‘los 
tres jors de Chalendes,’ but on the fourth, ‘li granz consolacions se departit en 
partia de son cuor’: for its duration, the mystical experience of consuming 
Christ is expressed in terms of embodied realism.110 It is made possible – made 
‘real’ within the confines of the post-experiential narrative – due to the 
interaction between corporeal forms, but, for the mystic, the experience itself 
can only ever consist of metaphorical representation when compared to the 
meta-incorporation of the human by the divine.  
 
Within the narrative arc of Béatrix’s vita, Marguerite captures a sense of 
the entirety of her textual corpus and its associated imagery. Béatrix’s own 
body and book reflect those of Christ illustrated in the Pagina and the Speculum 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
communion, the host lingers in her mouth.’ However, unlike Béatrix, Angela tells Arnaldo that: 
‘quando descendit in corpus meum, dat mihi unum sentimentum maximum placibile’; ‘when it 
[the host] descends into my body it produces in me a most pleasant sensation.’ See Memoriale, 
pp. 308-310; Angela of Foligno: Complete Works, p. 186. 
107 Li Via Seiti Biatrix, p. 124, §95; ‘she felt it penetrate her heart,’ The Life of Saint Beatrice, p. 56. 
108 Bynum, Holy Feast and Holy Fast, p. 256.   
109 Bynum, Holy Feast and Holy Fast, p. 257.  110	  Li Via Seiti Biatrix, p. 124, §98; ‘the three days of Christmas’; ‘the feeling of consolation left 
her [heart] –but not completely,’ The Life of Saint Beatrice, p. 57. 	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respectively, and the chronology of Béatrix’s life, from childhood to Carthusian 
mystic, is imagined through the lens of the life of Christ, from Incarnation to 
Passion. The law of God, as it is written in the Old Testament, and, in 
Marguerite’s heart in the Pagina, thus becomes lived experience: Béatrix 
embodies the experience of the Gospels through the metaphorical expression of 
her mysticism. Béatrix’s book, her vita, is therefore both Marguerite’s book, 
figured literally and metaphorically, and a representation of the meta-book of 
Scripture. Marguerite’s oeuvre comes full circle, finding its conclusion in the 
word of God.  
 
 Form and content constitute a symbiotic structure in the writings of 
Marguerite d’Oingt. Her textual corpus contains, and is contained and 
contextualised by, the holy book of Scripture in the same way that her mystical 
experiences and her account of Béatrix’s experience find shape and meaning in 
the experience of Christ. The apotheosis of the book becomes a means through 
which to express the mysteries of the divine, the corporeity of the flesh and the 
codex providing structure to the otherwise inexpressible. Throughout the 
Pagina, the Speculum and the Via Seiti Biatrix, Marguerite manipulates colour, 
spatial relations, and aspectual or event-structuring concepts, as defined by 
Lakoff and Johnson in Philosophy in the Flesh, to give a sense of tangible reality 
to her mystical expression.111 Despite the repeated refrain that language fails 
her, Marguerite presents mystical experience in both sensual and material terms, 
creating coherence from an imaginative conceptualisation of corporeity and the 
way in which it interacts with its environs. She is careful never to ascribe 
objective truth to the experiences she reports: the imagery she draws on – the 
ornate book of Christ, the mirror of the Speculum - are not objects or substances 
of the everyday world. Yet nor are her works to be regarded as subjective 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 See Lakoff and Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh, especially pp. 16-36.  
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representations: mystical expression is clearly not a ‘figment of our 
imaginations nor spontaneous creations of our brains.’112  
 
Rather, in drawing on the container/contained paradox, Marguerite 
creates a logical coherence for her mystical experience based on its image-
schematic structure. In locating metaphors of corporeity in Marguerite’s works, 
an image-schema composed of insides, outsides, and permeable boundaries 
forms naturally and rationally to support her metaphors of embodiment in 
what Lakoff and Johnson would call a ‘gestalt-structure in the sense that no 
parts make sense without the whole.’113 Mystical experience in Marguerite’s 
narratives is coherent precisely because she expresses it in these image-
schematic terms: the book of the Speculum is the book of Christ because it is 
possible to map the image-schema from the body of Christ in the Pagina onto it. 
If these gestalt structures did not form part of the mystical narrative, mystical 
expression would not make sense – it would be ungrounded and 
decontextualized, just as it is figured in the philosophy of Forman’s Pure 
Consciousness Events.  
 
Themes of embodiment and a privileging of corporeity may not initially 
appear to correlate with the strict ascetic traditions of the Carthusian order as 
outlined in the previous chapter. Indeed, Marguerite herself repeatedly 
privileges non-corporeal experience over physical, bodily action.114 However, as 
her writings illustrate, being embodied constitutes being part of a greater, all-
encompassing whole. Marguerite is very much part of her world, of her order’s 
ascetic and meditational practices, and of their bibliophilic affinities. As Lakoff 
and Johnson observe, embodiment and the embodied mind are largely 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 Lakoff and Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh, p. 25.  
113 Lakoff and Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh, p. 32.  
114 Marguerite makes frequent allusions to her (and Béatrix’s) ‘uouz del cor’ (her ‘spiritual 
eyes’) and writes that the ‘caro est tota plena pigricia et sompnolencia et vult semper contra 
spiritum’ (‘the flesh is full of laziness and sleepiness and always goes against the spirit.’). Pagina, 
p. 87, §107; A Page of Meditations, p. 40. 
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concerned with empathy: ‘imaginative projection,’ they conclude, ‘is a vital 
cognitive faculty.’115   
 
Imaginative projections of the mystical experience lie at the heart of 
Marguerite d’Oingt’s corpus and her theology. The body and book of the divine 
both frame and structure the body of her work and her belief, and in turn shape 
a mystical reality for protagonist, author, and audience. For Marguerite, 
metaphor captures the inexpressibility of the mystical experience, if only in part, 
and provides it with an experiential structure. As she writes of Christ: 
illum qui tam magnus quod totus mundus eum capere non 
poterat et qui tenebat totum mundum in suo pugno.116 
 
Metaphor is, in this case, to be lived by. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 Lakoff and Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh, p. 565.  
116 Pagina meditationum, p. 73, §9. ‘He who was so big that the whole world could not contain 
Him and who held the whole world in His hand,’ A Page of Meditations, p. 27.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Metaphors To Imagine By:  
Metaphorical Annihilation in Marguerite Porete’s Mirouer des simples ames 
 
The metaphorical nature of Marguerite Porete’s text is apparent in its 
very title, the Mirouer des simples ames.1 As the work of Sister Ritamary Bradley, 
Herbert Grabes, and Margot Schmidt, amongst others, has shown, the 
perceptual and interpretative qualities of the mirror constituted a vital source of 
imagery for medieval writers; a source deeply rooted in the classical and early 
Christian traditions.2 The range of meanings attributed to the Latin noun 
‘speculum’ is vast, incorporating ‘mirror,’ ‘image,’ ‘representation,’ ‘painting,’ 
‘picture,’ ‘description’ and a ‘means of knowledge […] either purely 
informative or normative,’ whilst its adjectival counterpart, ‘mirus,’ evokes the 
sense of something being ‘marvellous’ or ‘extraordinary’ – all terms that might 
legitimately be applied to the l’Ame’s experience of the divine in Marguerite 
Porete’s Mirouer.3  
 
The connotations inherent in the Old French translation of ‘speculum,’ 
‘miroir,’ similarly give rise to notions of looking, recognising, thinking and 
perception.4 As such, the text’s title is immediately suggestive of a series of 
dialectic relationships: the seen and the known, the reflective and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 For a discussion of the controversy surrounding the title of the work and the decision here to 
use the shortened version of the title, see the Introduction.  
2  Sister Ritamary Bradley, ‘Backgrounds of the Title Speculum in Mediaeval Literature,’ 
Speculum, 29, 1 (Jan. 1954): 100-115; Grabes, The Mutable Glass; Margot Schmidt, ‘Miroir,’ in 
Dictionnaire de spiritualité, ascétique et mystique, doctrine et histoire, ed. by M. Viller et al., vol. 10, 
part II, cols 1290-1303 (Paris: Beauchesne, 1937-). See also Sabine Melchior-Bonnet, The Mirror: A 
History, trans. by Katharine H. Jewett (New York and London: Routledge, 2001); Nolan, Now 
Through a Glass Darkly; Hamburger, ‘Speculations on Speculation.’ 
3 Kocher, Allegories of Love, pp. 8-10; Schmidt, ‘Miroir,’ cols 1290-1291.  
4  See the Dictionnaire du moyen français, available online at www.atilf.fr/dmf. Accessed 
30/04/2014. See also A.J. Greimas, Dictionnaire de l’Ancien Français: Le Moyen Âge, 2nd edition 
(Paris: Larousse, 1992), p. 389, and Kocher, Allegories of Love, pp. 8-9.  
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introspective, the literal and the metaphorical. This continuing dialectical 
element within the Mirouer carries its protagonist, l’Ame, towards the cusp of 
achieving a state of ‘unitas indistinctionis’ with the divine as she proceeds 
through a series of seven mystical stages, which centre on the relinquishment of 
her will.5 However, as this chapter will suggest, the metaphors she chooses to 
express this state of union, the entailments they give rise to, and, by extension, 
the conceptual structures that underpin them, keep both the Soul and, by 
implication, the reader, from making the ultimate transition from human to 
divine, either within the scope of the text or, indeed, within the earthly lifespan 
of the human self. 
 
Following Guarnieri’s linkage of the historical figure of Marguerite 
Porete to her enigmatic treatise, treatments of her life and work have frequently 
been caught in a circular logic, trying to match the historical figure of the author 
to the text, and in turn, trying to bring the text into harmony with the wider 
notion of the canon of late medieval mystical writing or the historical period in 
which she was writing.6 Although the need for contextual information has been 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 ‘Unitas indistinctionis,’ the state of indistinct union of the soul with God, is often considered a 
defining feature of mystical expression, found in accounts of spiritual union as early as those of 
Plotinus (204-70) and Proclus (412-485). In an overview of the subject, Bernard McGinn traces 
the development of such expression from Biblical accounts in 1 Corinthians 6:17 and John 17:21 
through Patristic expression and notes that ‘extensive analyses of the forms of union began in 
the twelfth century.’ However it was with the advent of the thirteenth century that ‘there was a 
surge of accounts that speak of union of identity or indistinction with God (unitas identitatis/ 
unitas indistinctionis). Although this form of union often used philosophical categories drawn 
from Neoplatonic philosophy, it was not an academic revival, but part of the lived experience of 
the exponents of the New Mysticism.’ McGinn cites Meister Eckhart as the ‘foremost 
spokesman of the union of identity in which the soul becomes annihilated in order to be totally 
merged with God,’ although a significant number of scholars have suggested that Eckhart was 
familiar with Porete’s writings and that his theology of the ‘poverty of the spirit’ was influenced 
by them. See Bernard McGinn, The Essential Writings of Christian Mysticism (New York: Random 
House, 2006), pp. 427-429; see also The Flowering of Mysticism, p. 217; ‘Love, Knowledge, and 
Unio Mystica in the Western Christian Tradition,’ in Mystical Union and Monotheistic Faith: An 
Ecumenical Dialogue, ed. by Moshe Idel and Bernard McGinn (New York: Macmillan, 1989), pp. 
59-86. A comprehensive analysis of the relationship between Marguerite Porete’s writings and 
those of Meister Eckhart is given by Hollywood in The Soul As Virgin Wife, passim.  
6 See, for example, Grace M. Jantzen’s essay, ‘ Disrupting the Sacred: Religion and Gender in 
the City,’ in Mysticism and Social Transformation, ed. by Janet K. Ruffing (New York: Syracuse 
University Press, 2001), pp. 29-44. Jantzen argues that ‘various modern interpretations of 
Marguerite [continue […]], in the guise of scholarly exposition, [to show] assumptions about 
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highlighted here, critical studies must remain sensitive to, if not sceptical of, the 
dangers of assuming and privileging a historical or ideological stance over and 
above what is presented by the textual material in question. As Chapter Two 
illustrated, the period in which Porete was writing and the circumstances 
surrounding her trial were far more complicated than the absolutist nature of 
her condemnation allows for, and, as a result, critical approaches to the Mirouer 
need to remain vigilant as to the various agendas at work in both medieval and 
modern receptions to both author and text.  
 
Newman suggests that these hurdles can, in the case of medieval 
women’s literary production, be lessened if the texts in question are read not as 
participating in (or attempting to dismantle) some falsely static state of affairs.7 
These might include a ‘monolithic’ vision of the medieval Church, or, as 
Kieckhefer points out, an overstating of the sophistication and efficacy of the 
inquisition.8 Rather, literary texts of the medieval period must be read as 
articulations of, and reflections on, ‘the capacious as well as contentious 
breadth of Christian discourse.’ ‘In pretending otherwise,’ Newman writes, ‘we 
merely perpetuate the inquisitors’ program of defining Insiders and Outsiders, 
even if we praise what they damned and damn what they praised.’9  
 
In its reading of Porete’s work and analysis of her use of metaphor, this 
chapter follows Newman’s counsel by seeking neither to condemn nor to 
condone Porete’s status as a relapsed heretic. Rather, it takes its lead from the 
methodological approach adopted in the previous discussion of Marguerite 
d’Oingt’s writings, and gives primacy to the text and its implications. In 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
women, religion, and the city […] uncomfortably parallel to Philip’s inquisitorial regime in the 
fourteenth century.’ She cites Jean Leclerq, Edmund Colledge, and Ernst McDonnell as guilty of 
turning to Porete’s text and trial documents ‘to justify her burning anew.’ See p. 32 and pp. 42-
43.  
7 Newman, From Virile Woman to WomanChrist, p. 246.  
8 Kieckhefer, ‘The Office of Inquisition.’ 
9 Newman, From Virile Woman to WomanChrist, p. 246. 
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particular, this exploration of the Mirouer focuses on a similar triadic structure 
of symbols – the protagonist’s voice, the book, and the mirror – and questions 
the portrait of language, cognition and mystical experience Marguerite Porete 
presents to, or indeed problematizes for, both her medieval and modern 
readership. 
 
In any analysis of the Mirouer des simples ames, it is often simpler to 
account for what the text does not assert rather than what it does. Porete does 
not suggest that the attainment of the mystical states of consciousness she 
describes is a universal possibility; nor does she, unlike her mystical 
counterpart Marguerite d’Oingt, claim to provide a record of lived 
‘experience.’10 The Mirouer does not constitute a vision-narrative; it does not 
recount a mystical experience ordered in accordance with the deeply ritualised 
liturgy of the Christian ecclesial tradition, and nor does it attempt to explain 
mystical experience using the schemas characterised by a tangible reality. There 
are no sustained descriptions of the Passion, for example, and the dialogic 
voices offer no sense of time or space. It presents an uncompromising view of 
what the Soul perceives to be humanity’s failings – an over-dependency on 
literal or rational thought and an over-attachment to the material trappings and 
manifestations of the Christian church – and frequently despairs over the fallen 
medium of human language as a tool with which to transmit Dame Amour’s 
theology.11 Yet the Mirouer is also a text that seeks to inspire hope. Although 
literal language and the notion of embodied thought are marks of humanity’s 
distance from God, the Mirouer des simples ames is both suggestive of, and 
testament to, the idea that humanity possesses a cognitive ability to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 See, for example, the opening lines of the Mirouer: ‘Vous qui en ce livre lirez,/ Se bien le 
voulez entendre/ Pensez ad ce que vous direz/ Car il est fort a comprendre.’ Mirouer, p. 8. ‘You 
who would read this book,/ If you indeed wish to grasp it,/ Think about what you say,/ For it 
is very difficult to comprehend.’ Mirror, p. 79.  11	  The Soul says to Dame Amour: ‘Vrayement, dame Amour, tout ce que vous avez dit de ceste 
grace parmy bouche de creature n’en feroit fors que barbetez, au regart de vostre oeuvre.’ 
Mirouer, ch. 38, p. 122. ‘Truly, Lady Love, everything you have said about this grace through the 
mouth of a creature would only be muttering compared to your work.’ Mirror, pp. 118-119.   
	  	   174	  
progressively alter its perceptual mode of approaching the world, and that, in 
turn, the soul may be rewarded by means of an alteration by the divine. As 
such, Porete’s text, in both theory and praxis, can be seen to enact the cognitive 
qualities of metaphor outlined in the opening chapter.  
 
The condemnation of 1310 pronounced the subversive nature of the 
Mirouer in relation to church doctrine of the late medieval West. A closer 
reading of Porete’s metaphorical structures suggests, however, that her 
challenge was not directed at the Church per se, but instead towards mankind’s 
perception of reality and truth. As the following discussion will suggest, the 
language, structure, and conceptual underpinnings of the Mirouer function in 
much the same way as Ricoeur suggests that metaphor operates. Echoing his 
words quoted in the first chapter, Porete’s mystical expression serves as a kind 
of poesis, ‘lifting’ her audience into a more participatory kind of knowing in the 
hope of a new imaginative reality and capacity to make meaning.12   
 
The seven-stage journey made by the Soul, and the dialogue between the 
three main characters, Dame Amour, Raison, and l’Ame, possesses a dual function, 
both propeling its protagonists through the narrative whilst clarifying the 
mystical trajectory for its audience, and, as a result, constitutes what might be 
regarded as a study in cognitive transcendence. Porete’s Mirouer is a 
representation, or ‘mirouer,’ of the imagination, personified by l’Ame and 
represented by the text, and, as it shifts in its focus from the literal to the 
figurative, it evokes the schematization of a new, spiritualised world-view. 
Drawing on the earlier suggestion that mystical writings function as spaces or 
loci that contain their own schematic structures, logic, and rationale, a principal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Ricoeur, ‘Towards a Hermeneutic of the Idea of Revelation,’ p. 100 and p. 104.   
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aim of this investigation is to explore the means by which Porete is seen to 
shape the parameters of that world-view.13  
 
To return to the opening comments concerning Marguerite’s choice of 
title, the Mirouer clearly draws on classical and medieval notions of the 
speculum/miroir as an evocative symbol of illusion and deception, and, as both 
figurative object and book title, it is undoubtedly indicative of the text’s didactic 
aims of self-knowledge and introspection.14 Medieval audiences would have 
been familiar with the two-fold capacity of the mirror at once to show to the 
world what it is and what it ought to be, a model which most likely filtered into 
the medieval consciousness from Augustine’s reflections on St Paul’s celebrated 
phrase in 1 Corinthians 13:12.15 Didactic manuals such as those known as the 
speculum principum, compendiums encompassing history, doctrine or morals, 
and single-volume encyclopaedias, were popular compositions between the 
twelfth and sixteenth centuries, and indeed, as Kocher observes, the Mirouer’s 
intent to teach its audience is made apparent in its repeated use of dialogic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Lichtmann, for example, suggests that Marguerite’s creativity is mainly linguistic: ‘[using] all 
the linguistic means at her disposal, particularly paradox and contradiction, to annihilate in 
language as in reality all understanding, will, love, and even the self itself [… in her] dissent 
from and subversion of the predominant patriarchal order.’ See ‘Marguerite Porete and Meister 
Eckhart,’ p. 72 and p. 74. 
14 For a reading of Porete’s Mirouer in relation to the mirror-imagery in the myth of Narcissus 
and the alternative title that Jean de Meun gave to the Roman de la Rose, the Miroir des amoreus, 
see Newman, ‘The Mirror and the Rose.’ Drawing on the work of Herbert Grabes, Hollywood 
also highlights the capacity of the mirror in the medieval consciousness to act as an agent for 
deception and deformity. See The Soul As Virgin Wife, p. 87. Schmidt suggests that within the 
genre of ‘la littérature des Miroirs […] ces ouvrages peuvent globalement être divisés en deux 
groupes: les Miroirs instructifs et les Miroirs exemplaires, ou normatifs, selon qu’ils visent à 
enrichir la connaissance ou à éclairer la vie morale et spirituelle (original emphasis).’ ‘Miroir,’ 
col. 1292. 
15 For the Latin quotation of 1 Corinthians 13:12 and its English translation, see p. 7, n.3. See 
also the Epistle of St James 1:23-24. Sister Bradley traces the resonances of Augustine’s 
commentary on these verses and in particular on the conception of the mirror, found in his 
Enarratio in psalmum, 103 and in the Soliloquies, from the fifth to the twelfth centuries, in the 
works of exegetical writers including Pseudo-Dionysius, Gregory the Great, Alcuin, Bernard of 
Clairvaux, Alain of Lille, and Hugh of St Victor. Bradley also notes the transmission of the 
metaphorical mirror into secular works by Jean de Meun, Dante, and later, Chaucer and 
Hocleve, and suggests that the thematic kernel of all of these writers is broadly similar: the 
mirror acts as a portal through which man may know himself and God. See ‘Backgrounds of the 
Title Speculum.’  
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questions and answers, and narrative examples in the form of parables and 
glosses.16  
 
Marguerite Porete’s figurative imagery suggests, however, that the 
mirror, in its metaphorical sense, plays a more central role in terms of the text’s 
conceptual structure than Schmidt allows for in her conclusion that the 
Mirouer’s title is merely a technical one, used to signal its pedagogical intention. 
In contrast to Marguerite d’Oingt’s writings, Porete’s Mirouer does not include 
specific mirror-imagery, nor does it relate events or scenes in which the 
characters make use of a mirror-like metaphor.17 However, as a conceptual 
metaphor, the inherent qualities of the mirror permeate every aspect of the 
Mirouer and encapsulate many of the work’s aspects that have proven so 
enigmatic. In its capacity to reflect apparent realities, the mirror possesses the 
ability to simultaneously conjure, manipulate, and in some cases, seemingly, if 
only momentarily, resolve a number of dialectical paradoxes: the nature of 
truth-based perception, presence and absence, contained and container, and 
emanation from and return to the same ‘originary source.’18  
 
In this sense, the specular qualities of the mirror might be equated with 
the conceptual capacities of metaphor. Object and reflection, and the relational 
dynamics between the two, which catalyse what the viewer believes he or she 
sees in the mirror, might be seen to echo the cognitive relationship between 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Kocher, Allegories of Love, p. 10. Newman argues that in naming her text the Mirouer, 
‘Marguerite was following a thirteenth-century fashion,’ and as such, ‘there would be little 
point in positing a specific source for the title.’ ‘The Mirror and the Rose,’ p. 110.  
17 In contrast to, for example, Guillaume de Lorris’ comparison of the Fountain of Love to the 
mirror of Narcissus, found towards the beginning of the Roman de la rose, or indeed Jean de 
Meun’s revisiting of the same subject some sixteen thousand lines later. See Newman, ‘The 
Mirror and the Rose,’ pp. 109-112.  
18 McIntosh discusses the writings of Marguerite Porete and Meister Eckhart in relation to those 
by a number of modern philosophers and theologians including Emmanuel Levinas, Edith 
Wyschogrod and Michel de Certeau. He finds the idea of human personal awakening, its origin 
in a prior ‘originary dynamic,’ and humanity’s need, or ‘telos,’ to surrender itself back into the 
divine infinity a feature of Porete’s writing that is ‘almost to be considered postmodern’ for her 
time. Mystical Theology, pp. 220-224.    
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Lakoff and Johnson’s ‘source’ and ‘target domains.’ Located between the object 
and its true reflection is a third, cognitive ‘image’; that which the viewer believes 
themselves to see. 19 This third ‘image’ is a manipulation of the ‘true’ reflection, 
shaped by the cognitive and emotional forces of the viewer, and made coherent 
by his or her expectations of the object, causing it to adopt what the viewer calls 
the object’s reflection. One entity, the object, comparable to Lakoff and 
Johnson’s ‘source domain,’ sheds light on the other, the true reflection, or 
‘target domain.’ In seeing the reflection, however, the viewer only selectively 
maps certain elements of the object onto certain elements of the ‘true reflection,’ 
and thus sees the reflection, or as Fauconnier and Turner might call it, the 
‘blend.’ What is seen in a reflection is the figurative or ‘perceived’ reflection; in 
other words, the metaphor. Looking into a mirror is therefore akin to ‘seeing 
metaphorically.’  
 
Although Thomas Tomasic’s observations relate to earlier monastic 
literature, his analysis of perceptual truth-value systems provides some helpful 
additions to this argument.20 Writing on neoplatonic logic in the works of 
William of St Thierry, Tomasic argues that in a mystic’s use of seemingly 
contradictory ideas (such as God being both transcendent and immanent), these 
are only seen to be contradictory or nonsensical when judged according to a 
two-valued or bivalent logic, predicated on two truth propositions, ‘true’ and 
‘false.’ Rather, Tomasic suggests, mystical statements are better understood 
when regarded in accordance with a three-value propositional logic based on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 This notion is similar to that voiced by Plato in a celebrated parable taken from Book X of the 
Republic, in which Socrates argues that a ‘painting of a bed represents a third degree from 
reality: the Form of the bed is first, the artificial bed, as imitation of the first, stands second and 
the painting of the bed, as imitation of the second, stands third.’ Quoted in Frederic M. 
Schroeder, Form and Transformation: A Study in the Philosophy of Plotinus, McGill-Queen’s Studies 
in the History of Ideas, 16 (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s Press, 1992), pp. 55-56. See Nolan for a 
discussion of Augustine’s theory of spectral perception, mirrors, and ‘antisimilitude’ in De 
Trinitate, Book X, in Now Through a Glass Darkly, pp. 57-58; Grabes also gives a useful overview 
of the function of the mirror-symbol in medieval thought in The Mutable Glass, Chapter One, ‘A 
Typology of Works Bearing Mirror-Titles.’  
20 See Thomas Michael Tomasic, ‘Neoplatonism and the Mysticism of William of St.-Thierry,’ in 
An Introduction to the Medieval Mystics of Europe, ed. by Paul Szarmach (Albany, NY: State 
University of New York Press, 1984), pp. 53-75. Here at p. 60. 
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true, false, and middle (or indeterminate). As as result, the mystic may make 
statements about the simultaneous immanence and transcendence, or 
unknowability and familiarity, of God without asserting the possibility of 
‘forming any informative concept, or predicate’ about God.  
 
This three-value truth system is helpful to a discussion of ‘metaphorical 
seeing.’ The viewer’s ‘perceived’ reflection in the mirror, discussed above, is 
comparable to Tomasic’s ‘middle’ truth system; neither true nor false, it is a 
positive representation of what is simultaneously there, and what is not. In 
terms of metaphor theory, these observations can be seen, once again, to engage 
with conceptual blending theory. As with Tomasic’s ‘middle’ truth system, 
Fauconnier and Turner argue that, in metaphor, ‘mental spaces’ combine to 
create a ‘blended space,’ which neither wholly reflects, nor exists independently 
of, the elements that make up the input spaces. The ‘blended space’ possesses 
its own truth-system and its own rationale, constructed from the dominant 
features that it draws on from the other various inputs. It does not, however, 
purport to reflect a truth-system beyond its own parameters. Within the 
blended space, truth is ‘seen’ metaphorically.  
 
‘Seeing metaphorically’ is central to the Soul’s discourse in the Mirouer. 
Throughout her ascent towards God, the Soul speaks of the process as one of 
increasing illumination, in which she becomes ‘pure et clariffiee.’21 As she 
reaches the sixth stage, Porete writes that the Soul is in such a state of humility 
that she sees nothing: 
ceste Ame, ainsi pure et clariffiee, ne voit ne Dieu ne elle, mais 
Dieu se voit de luy en elle, pour elle, sans elle; lequel (c’est 
assavoir Dieu) luy monstre, que il n’est fors que lui. […] Et si 
n’est, fors cil qui est, qui se voit en tel estre de sa divine majesté, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Mirouer, ch. 118, p. 330; ‘pure and clarified.’ Mirror, p. 193.  
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par muance d’amour […] Et pource se voit de luy en telle 
creature.22 
 
This passage is emblematic of Marguerite Porete’s expression of the 
reciprocal mystical relationship between the Soul and God. The clarified and 
unblemished Soul is figured as God’s reflection, as the locus, receptacle, and 
unmediated experience of the absolute presence of the divine. The Soul acts as 
mirror for God, although the extent to which she reflects, or is reflective of, Him 
is unclear. The implications of either assertion, when taken to be a literal 
statement, would have been sufficient alone to bring Marguerite Porete to the 
attentions of the ecclesiastical authorities, and were no doubt responsible for 
her condemnation for heresy. Yet they also imply that the ambiguities found in 
the passage above are part of the Mirouer’s broader thematic and schematic 
pattern, in which the negotiation of the parameters between the literal and the 
figurative, the object and its reflection, or indeed the source and target domain, 
form one a vital tool in Porete’s attempt to articulate the ineffability of mystical 
union.  
 
 This is primarily conveyed by means of the symbiotic relationship 
between the Soul and her book, established in the Prologue. Addressing a 
fictional audience, Dame Amour entreats the text’s listeners to first hear another 
narrative: ‘entendez par humilité ung petit exemple de l’amour du monde, et 
l’entendez aussi pareillement de la divine amour.’23 Within two paragraphs, 
then, the original narrative has been supplanted by a counterpart; one text 
mirrored by a second, which, in turn, is designed to influence the audience’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Mirouer, ch. 118. pp. 330-332; ‘this Soul, thus pure and clarified, sees neither God nor herself, 
but God sees Himself of Himself in her, for her, without her. God shows to her that there is 
nothing except Him. […]. And so nothing is, except He who is, who sees Himself in such being 
by His Divine Majesty through the transformation of love […]. And thus also He sees Himself 
of Himself in such a creature.’ Mirror, pp. 193-194. 
23 Mirouer, ch. 1, p. 10; ‘listen with humility to a little exemplum of love in the world and listen 
to it as a parallel to divine love.’ Mirror, p. 80.  
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perception of the former. This ‘petit exemple,’ widely acknowledged to be a 
borrowing of the Old French romance, the Roman d’Alexandre by Alexandre de 
Paris, tells of a princess who has fallen in love with a faraway king.24 The 
princess has the king’s portrait painted (‘fist paindre ung ymage qui 
representoit la semblance du roy’), and by means of this image, the princess, 
‘avec ses autres usages songa le roy mesmes.’25 The focus of the narrative has 
slipped seamlessly from the text, the exemplum, to the image, the speculum.  
 
The Ame responds to Dame Amour with her own narrative, 
‘[s]emblablement vrayement, dit l’Ame qui ce livre fist ecrire’: she too loves a 
distant king, but the image she possesses of him is ‘ce livre,’ which he gave to 
her and which ‘represente en aucuns usages l’amour de lui mesmes.’ 26 
Although the Soul borrows from the courtly world of the exemplum, the 
transposition of her relationship with the faraway king into a sacred register is 
significant. ‘Ce livre,’ her textual creation and God’s gift to her, is the Mirouer. 
Neither the princess’ image nor the Soul’s book are ‘true’ reflections or 
representations in the sense of the mirror metaphor discussed earlier, but rather 
both are conditioned by the love felt for the representation, and as such, are 
both metaphorical. Yet the phrase ‘l’amour de lui mesmes,’ as Hollywood notes, 
is ambiguous. It points not only towards the Soul’s love for God, but also God’s 
love for the Soul, a reciprocal element not alluded to in the Alexandre narrative. 
As Hollywood observes, ‘in Porete’s mystical theology, as in traditional 
Christian thought, God is identified with love, a representation of his love is a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Alexandre de Paris, Le Roman de Alexandre, ed. by Edward C. Armstrong and others, trans. by 
Laurence Harf-Lancner (Paris: Lettres Gothiques/ Livre de Poche, 1994). See Emilie Zum Bruun 
and Georgette Epiney-Burgard, Women Mystics in Medieval Europe, trans. by Sheila Hughes 
(New York: Paragon House, 1989), p. 153; also Kocher, Allegories of Love, pp. 68-69.  
25 Mirouer, ch. 1, p. 12; ‘she had an image painted which would represent the semblance of the 
king’; ‘with her other habits she dreamed of the king.’ Mirror, p. 80.  
26 Mirouer, ch. 1, p. 12; ‘this book’ […] ‘which makes present in some fashion His love itself.’ 
Mirror, p. 80.  
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representation of God him/herself.’27 The Soul, whose narrative this is, finds 
divine inspiration in the book that God gave to her, itself a reflection of God.  
 
Within the Prologue’s narrative arc, the Mirror has already come full 
circle. The Soul, through her correct interpretation of the reflective properties of 
the book, has ascertained the correct way towards God. In part, the Soul 
achieves this because, she says, God gave her this book ‘pour moy souvenir,’ for 
her memory of him.28 As Mary Carruthers observes, medieval readers were 
conscious of the mind’s need to construct images in order to process, categorise, 
and make sense of information, as well as to conjure ‘new’ thoughts based on 
the ‘florilegia’ of the memory.29 Mnemonic images, both visual, as in the 
princess’ painting, and verbal, as in the Soul’s book, were used as the platform 
or catalyst for memorisation or conceptualisation, and were assigned a two-fold 
function. The material likeness (‘similitudo’) of the mnemonic device served as 
an aid in the recall of the object remembered, whilst the affective or attitudinal 
association with the object (‘intentio’) and mood (‘modus,’ ‘color’) functioned to 
retrieve or fix the referent as something ‘known.’ For the Soul, the book 
operates as an aid to retrieve and establish the memory of her distant king in 
her mind, but ultimately, for the ame adnientie, it is her love, her ‘intentio,’ that 
forms the crucial component of her ability to conceptualise her divine lover. 
The Soul must surpass the materiality of the book in order to truly love God, a 
feat that, implicitly, the princess of the exemplum does not achieve. Just how the 
Soul is capable of loving God thus constitutes the main focus of the Mirouer’s 
narrative: 
elle se dispouse a tous estres, ains qu’elle viengne a parfait 
estre; et vous dirons comment, ains que ce livre fine.30 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Hollywood, The Soul as Virgin Wife, p. 89.  
28 Mirouer, ch. 1, p. 12; Mirror, p. 80.  
29 See Carruthers, The Craft of Thought, pp. 116-170. Here at pp. 116-117.  
30 Mirouer, ch. 1, p. 14; ‘the Soul disposes herself to all the stages before she comes to perfect 
being. And we will tell you how before this book ends.’ Mirror, p. 81.  
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By the close of the prologue, ‘ce livre’ has been transformed into a 
metaphorical space in which the main protagonists, l’Ame, Dame Amour, and 
Raison, can play out the Soul’s progression towards ‘parfait estre.’ The Mirouer, 
the two exempla, and now the gifted book, structured symbiotically in a similar 
way to the works of Marguerite d’Oingt, become a bibliophilic representation of 
the interior life of the Soul. Just as the Carthusian prioress claims textual 
authority from the divine for her writings, so too in the Prologue, Porete’s Soul 
diverts authorial authority from the power of her own, human, creativity, to 
that of the divine.31 In doing so, the book also becomes a metaphor for the Soul. 
As l’Ame has her originary source in God, so too the textual Mirouer finds its 
genesis located in God.32  
 
If to read the Mirouer is to look at, or into, the Soul, then, as the focus of 
the narrative shifts from the didactic moral allegory of the exemplum to the inner 
journey of the Soul, the body of the book itself might be seen to represent the 
inner mind of the Soul. Techniques of personification, whereby the central 
combatants or debaters are figured as voices that dramatize internal conflict, 
were a common theme of both Old French romance and twelfth-century 
mystical theologies, finding their inspiration in the dialogic tendencies of the 
schools.33 In the personified figures of Dame Amour, Raison and l’Ame, therefore, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 It is frequently remarked in modern analyses of Porete’s writings that her works differ 
substantially from those of other late medieval women mystics because she does not rely on a 
male amanuensis or apologise for the lowliness of her work. As Lichtmann writes: Marguerite’s 
mysticism ‘laid claim to authenticity and spoke with the authority of its own experience.’  
However, in claiming in the Prologue that the Mirouer was a gift from God, Porete effectively 
shifts authorial license from her own hand to that of the divine. Lichtmann, ‘Marguerite Porete 
and Meister Eckhart,’ p. 69. See also Hollywood, The Soul as Virgin Wife, pp. 89-90.  
32 One of the main tenets of Porete’s theology is the notion that humanity is formed from, and 
should desire to return to, a state of pre-creational unity with the divine. The Soul tells her 
audience that she was created from nothing in a moment of outpouring of God’s love, in a 
moment when ‘le vray noyau affiné de divine Amour, qui est sans matere de creature, et donné 
du Creatour a creature.’ Mirouer, ch. 18, pp. 72-74; ‘the true pure seed of divine Love, without 
creaturely matter, which is given by the Creator to the creature.’ Mirror, p. 101.  
33 See Hollywood, The Soul as Virgin Wife, pp. 94-95. Hollywood draws here on the work of 
Charles Muscatine, ‘The Emergence of Psychological Allegory in Old French Romance,’ PMLA, 
68 (Sept. – Dec. 1953): 1160-1182. Kocher also comments on the capacity of the Mirouer to be 
read as a ‘private verbal psychomachia.’ See Allegories of Love, p. 13.  
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Porete presents her audience with a textual stage upon which the faculties of 
human cognition can perform, acting out the mental ‘imitatio’ necessary for the 
Soul, and the book, to achieve their mystical resolution.  
 
If, at a microcosmic level, the book is conceived as a container for the 
faculties of the mind, then so too, the personified faculties can be seen as 
behaving as collective entities themselves, microcosmically representing the 
shared inner, cognitive, faculties of a macrocosmic humanity. At an early 
juncture in the text, Dame Amour, having previously spoken of the ‘franches 
Ames,’ instructs Raison to subsequently speak only of one soul: ‘pour plus 
brefment parler, prenons une Ame pour toutes, dit Amour.’34 The voice of the 
Soul is cast as an Everyman, with whom the audience, both as imagined within 
the confines of the text, and actual, might relate. Caught between the voices of 
Dame Amour and Raison, the Soul’s purpose is to progress spiritually from the 
lower world of logic, literalism, and materiality, to the higher spiritual state 
symbolised by Love. As such, she shares elements of the faculties personified 
by both of the other protagonists, and it is the shared discourse of questions and 
answers that both symbolises and catalyses the Soul’s cognitive journey. The 
role of the Soul is both to teach and to represent; once again, Porete transforms 
her protagonist into the conceptual metaphorical underpinning of both the text 
and the mirror.  
 
The self-conscious nature of the dialogue between these characters 
frequently manifests itself in terms of a ‘textual consciousness,’ particularly 
with regard to Raison. Almost as if breaking through an imaginary fourth wall, 
all three principal characters often make reference to ‘ce livre,’ whilst Dame 
Amour reveals in the second chapter of the Mirouer that the structure and plot-
line of the narrative will be shaped ‘par l’Entendement d’Amour aux demandes 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Mirouer, ch. 9, p. 32. ‘To speak more briefly, let us take one Soul as an example, says Love.’ 
Mirror, p. 87.  
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de Raison.’35 Raison’s questions, however, are predicated on the basis that she 
cannot understand Dame Amour’s depictions of the Soul’s journey towards God. 
Their dialogue is punctuated by Raison’s pitiful refrain: ‘Hee, pour Dieu, Amour, 
dit Raison, dictes que c’est a dire.’36 In both Dame Amour and l’Ame blame 
Raison’s failure to understand their discourse throughout the length of the book, 
Porete subtly and partially shifting authorial authority from her own hand to 
that of Raison.37  
 
Yet Raison’s inability to comprehend the text’s message does not only 
function as a rhetorical device, designed to drive the narrative forward. In 
attempting to explain the mystical trajectory of the annihilated soul, Dame 
Amour and l’Ame furnish their discourse with parables and proverbs drawn 
from scriptural and secular sources, which they refer to as ‘gloses.’38 Designed 
to reinforce, reflect, and expose the subtleties of the language of mystical 
consciousness, the ‘gloses’ might be seen to act as conceptual containers for the 
main message of the text, structured conceptually as possessive of a core (‘un 
noyau’) and by implication, an inner and an outer surface.39 Yet even with the 
aid of such didactic tools, Raison is unable to comprehend what is being 
explained to her: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Mirouer, ch. 2, p. 14; ‘through the Intellect of Love and following the questions of Reason.’ 
Mirror, p. 81.  
36 Mirouer, ch. 11, p. 42. ‘Ah, for God’s sake, Love, says Reason, say what this means.’ Mirror, p. 
90.  
37 ‘Raison […], <Ain>si ont honny <et> gasté voz demandes ce livre, car pluseurs sont, qui 
l’eussent entendu a bresves paroles, et voz demandes l’ont fait long pour les responces dont 
vous avez besoing, pour vous et pour ceulx que vous avez nourriz, qui vont le cours du 
lymaçon.’ Mirouer, ch. 53, p. 156. ‘Reason […], your questions have dishonoured and ruined this 
book, for there are many who would have understood it with few words. But your questions 
have made it long because of the answers you need, both for yourself and for those whom you 
nourish who move along at a snail’s pace.’ Mirror, p. 131. 
38 See, for example, chapter 55 for the proverbs of the one-eyed king and the mother owl, and 
chapter 124 for the parable of the farmer. Kocher discusses these proverbs in Allegories of Love, p. 
161, and the parable at pp. 148-152.  
39 This forms an interesting parallel with an observation in the previous chapter concerning 
Marguerite d’Oingt’s imagery. In the Speculum, Marguerite describes letters as having a 
‘content,’ perhaps drawing on Isidore of Seville’s comment.in the Etymologiae, ‘Litterae autem 
sunt indicies rerum, signa verborum […].’ Conversely, Raison in the Mirouer struggles to read 
the ‘content’ of the words; the ‘gloses’ do nothing to aid her spiritual insight.  
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Glosez ces mots, se vous les voulez entendre, ou vous les mal 
entendrez, car ilz ont aucune semblance de contrarieté, qui 
n’entend le noyau de la glose, mais semblance n’est mie verité, 
mais verité est, et nulle aultre chose.40  
 
Interpretation and access to spiritual truth are, then, inextricably linked 
to modes of cognition, perception, and figurative vision. Apparent 
contradiction is a recurring obstacle for Raison; she remains unable to surpass 
the dialectical elements of the Mirouer and is confused by its paradoxes. She 
symbolises an inability to process anything other than in accordance with a 
literal order of signification, regarding the world in terms of Tomasic’s bivalent 
logic. Raison’s mode of cognition is rooted entirely in the realm of the literal: 
Hee, Raison, dit Amour, tousjours serez borgne, et vous et tous 
ceulx qui sont nourriz de vostre doctrine. Car celuy est bien 
borgne, qui voit les choses devant ses yeulx, et ne les cognoist 
mie, et ainsi est il de vous.41 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Mirouer, ch. 97, p. 270. ‘Gloss these words, if you want to grasp them, or you will grasp them 
poorly, for they have some appearance of contradiction for the one who does not attend to the 
core of the gloss. But appearance is not truth, but truth is, and not some other thing.’ Mirror, p. 
171.  
41 Mirouer, ch. 43, p. 132. ‘Ah Reason, says Love, you will always be one-eyed, you and all those 
who are fed by your doctrine. For, to be sure, one has faulty vision who sees things before his 
eyes and does not understand them at all. And so it is with you.’ Mirror, p. 122. In the notes to 
her translation, Babinsky remarks that Porete may here have been drawing on the ‘traditional 
concept of spiritual progress, that reason and love are the two eyes of the soul.’ For an example 
of this trope in monastic literature, with which Porete may have been familiar, see William of St 
Thierry’s commentary on the Song of Songs, in which he writes: ‘Duo sunt oculi 
contemplationis, ratio et amor […]. Fiuntque saepe duo isti oculi unus oculus, cum fideliter sibi 
cooperantur, cum in contemplatione Dei, in qua maxime amor operator, ratio transit in amorem 
et in quemdam spiritualem vel divinum formatur intellectum, qui omnem superat et absorbet 
rationem.’ Exposé sur le Cantiques des Cantiques: Texte Latin, Introduction et Notes, ed. by J.-M. 
Déchanet, O. S. B., trans. by † M. Dumontier, O. C. S. O., Sources chrétiennes, 82 (Paris: Éditions 
du Cerf, 1962), §92, p. 212. ‘Contemplation has two eyes, reason and love […]. Often when these 
two eyes faithfully cooperate, they become one; in the contemplation of God, where love is 
chiefly operative, reason passes into love and is transformed into a certain spiritual and divine 
understanding which transcends and absorbs all reason.’ Exposition on the Song of Songs in The 
Works of William of St. Thierry, trans. by Mother Columba Hart, Cistercian Fathers Series, 6, vol. 2 
of 2 (Shannon: Irish University Press, 1970), p. 74. The resonances between William’s and 
Porete’s articulations are clear.  
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Being ‘borgne,’ or ‘one-eyed,’ is a metonym for Raison’s cognitive limitations. 
With only one ocular faculty, speculative thought is rendered impossible; she 
cannot focus on the dialectical composite parts of paradox, contradiction, or 
indeed metaphor, simultaneously. Raison epitomises precisely how not to 
interpret or perceive spiritual discourse and the experiences with which it is 
associated. She represents a study of the dangers of too rigid an epistemology, 
and her incapacity to be guided across the boundary of literal into figurative 
thought is ultimately responsible for her death. In chapter 87, Raison cries out: 
Hay Dieux, dit Raison, comment ose l’en ce dire? Je ne l’ose 
escouter. Je deffaulx vrayement, dame Ame, en vous oïr: le 
cueur m’est failly. Je n’ay point de vie.42 
 
There is more than a hint of comic irony surrounding the circumstances 
of Raison’s death. The personification of the ‘plodding logic’ of the ‘excessively 
intellectualised’ theological and scholastic environments of Saincte Eglise la 
Petite and the schools is killed by the very forms of language on which she is 
thought, as an embodiment of worldy logic, to thrive: those of exposition and 
dialogue.43 That her demise is also attributed to heart failure is striking too. 
Reminiscent of the pectoral imagery used by Marguerite d’Oingt, Raison’s heart 
functions as a metonym for her experience and record of thought and emotion. 
Her heart, like her vision, is flawed, and unable to cope with the demands of 
spiritual feeling and vision, therefore setting her up as a foil to the Soul’s 
superior spiritual and ocular abilities. Indeed, it is to the representation of these 
affective qualities, and the mystical possibilities to which they give rise, that 
this chapter now turns.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Mirouer, ch. 87, p. 246. ‘Ah God! says Reason. How dare one say this? I dare not listen to it. I 
am fainting truly, Lady Soul, in hearing you; my heart is failing. I have no more life.’ Mirror, p. 
163.  
43 Kocher, Allegories of Love, p. 167.  
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 The text frequently alludes to a fictionalised audience, characterised 
within the imaginary confines of the text, some of whom are already ‘adnientifs 
par vraie amour,’ whilst others, like Raison, are expected to wrestle with the 
Mirouer’s meaning.44 In what has been described, somewhat contentiously, as 
the text’s ‘postscript,’ the Soul announces: 
Aucuns regars veulx je dire pour les marriz qui demandent la 
voye au pays de franchise, lesquelx regars moult de bien me 
firent ou temps que j’estoie des marriz, et que je vivoie de lait et 
de papin et que encore je sotoioie. Et ces regars me aydoient a 
souffrir et endurer durant le temps que j’estoie hors de voie […] 
car par demandes vait l’en moult loing, et par demandes 
s’adresse l’en a sa voie, et radresse l’en, quant on en est yssu.45 
 
This passage condenses several of the Mirouer’s thematic strands. Addressing 
‘les marriz,’ the sad souls, whom she will later call ‘les enfants,’ the Soul evokes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Mirouer, ch.1, p. 10; ‘annihilated by true love,’ Mirror, p. 80.  
45 Mirouer, ch. 123, p. 348. ‘I wish to speak about some considerations for the sad ones who ask 
the way to the land of freeness, considerations which indeed helped me at the time when I was 
one of the sad ones, when I lived from milk and pabulum, and when I was still ignorant. And 
these considerations helped me to suffer and endure during the time when I was off the path 
[…]. For by questions one can wander very far, and by questions one is directed to the way; one 
returns after one has gone away from [the path].’ Mirror, p. 202. Nicolas Watson suggests that 
the Mirouer’s last seventeen chapters constitute a ‘postscript’ to the original composition of the 
Mirouer. The Chantilly manuscript contains two mentions of an explicit, the first after chapter 
122, and the second at the text’s close, after chapter 139, which provides the rationale for 
Watson’s argument. Watson suggests that this ‘postscript’ clarifies and concludes the Mirouer 
without apology or a plea for forgiveness. Its subject matter is no different than the main body 
of the text, but both its structure and content appear more in-keeping with scriptural precedent: 
the Apostles, Mary Magdalene, and John the Baptist appear in the narrative for the first time 
and the plot is driven by parables rather than the soul’s own spiritual trajectory. Watson, 
‘Translating the Untranslatable,’ p. 131. Bernard McGinn also takes this view of the work’s later 
chapters, suggesting that they were later additions to the original text, supplemented by 
Marguerite as part of her defence of the Mirouer after its initial condemnation. See McGinn, 
“Evil-sounding, Rash, and Suspect of Heresy’: Tensions Between Mysticism and Magisterium in 
the History of the Church,’ The Catholic Historical Review, 90 (2004): 193-212. Here at p. 196, n. 13. 
Robert Lerner takes issue with these assumptions. He suggests that a closer reading of the 
Middle English and Latin manuscripts of the text demonstrate that the chapters following the 
Chantilly’s explicit at the end of chapter 122 are unlikely to be evidence of the composition of 
new material in the aftermath of Marguerite’s first condemnation. See ‘New Light,’ especially 
pp. 100-101.  
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the double metaphor of the spiritual journey and the mystical landscape, and 
suggests that it is in the processes of questioning and understanding that 
progress may be catalysed in both metaphorical spheres.46 Read in the context 
of the work, however, Porete’s idealised readers, those ‘adnientifs par vraie 
amour,’ are expected to understand that questions alone are insufficient, hence 
the death of Raison.47 The Soul’s advice to the ‘marriz’ implies that it is the mode 
in which these questions are asked that is of import, not their form or content 
per se. For l’Ame, spiritual enlightenment is not derived from knowledge 
acquired during logical questioning, but from symbolic or figurative 
understanding gained subsequent to a shift in the structures of cognition. Dame 
Amour pleads: 
Entendez ces motz divinement, par amour, auditeurs de ce 
livre! Ce Loingprés, que nous appellons esclar a maniere 
d’ouverture et de hastive clousure, prent l’Ame ou cinquiesme 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 The metaphor of the spiritual journey is found in all major world religions and is deeply 
embedded in the Christian mystical tradition, featuring widely in many of its writings, both 
biblical and exegetical. For example, Origen’s Homily XXVII On Numbers draws on the theme of 
the wandering of Israel in the wilderness as symbolic of the Christian pilgrim’s meditation on 
his destiny. Origen’s journey is full of persecution and, like that of Marguerite’s sad souls in the 
quotation above, does not follow a straight line. Instead, the difficulties of the journey constitute 
their own logic and are an integral part of both its trajectory and completion. The metaphor of 
the journey can be traced, thread-like, throughout the canon of Christian mystical literature, 
from Augustine to a contemporary of both Marguerite d’Oingt and Marguerite Porete, St 
Bonaventure. Michelle Karnes reads Bonaventure’s Itinerarium mentis in Deum as a medieval 
study of human cognition, in which, though reflection on the figure of Christ, the individual 
progresses from the human to the divine through the process of understanding. Karnes writes: 
‘The triple way of gazing at [the] wonders that the Itinerarium describes – seeing external things 
and then internal things and finally divine things –“reflects,” Bonaventure explains, “the 
threefold existence of things in matter, in the understanding, and in the Eternal Art.” In 
Bonaventure’s Christian theory of cognition, the process of understanding is only complete 
once a thing’s relationship to God has been grasped.’ Such a reading of Bonaventure’s writing 
may be mapped onto what Porete appears to be extolling to the sad souls at the beginning of 
chapter 123. Understanding is the key to ascending to the state of annihilation, but, Porete 
stresses, understanding alone is insufficient. How the soul understands, and how it arrives at 
such a state of illumination are equally, if not more, important elements in the cognitive journey 
towards spiritual union. Questions, answers, and the realization of understanding form the 
framework of this journey, and, in turn, the textual framework of the Mirouer itself. See Origen, 
Homily XXVII On Numbers in An Exhortation to Martyrdom, Prayer, First Principles: Book IV, 
Prologue to the Commentary on the Song of Songs, trans. by Rowan A. Greer, The Classics of 
Western Spirituality (Mahwah, NY: Paulist Press, 1979), pp. 245-269; Michelle Karnes, 
Imagination, Meditation, and Cognition in the Middle Ages (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 2011), especially pp. 99-110.  
47 Kocher, Allegories of Love, p. 167.  
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estat et la mect ou siziesme, tant comme son oeuvre demoure et 
dure, et ainsi est aultre […].48  
 
Her plea encompasses two points of interest. The ‘auditeurs,’ both real and 
imagined, are not provided with a literal framework in order to interpret the 
text, but rather a figurative one, rooted in the affective, rather than the rational, 
intellect.  Correct interpretation and understanding, Dame Amour suggests, will 
occur in relation to two key faculties of human consciousness, those of love and 
of knowledge, but will only come to fruition when employed ‘divinement.’ 
Learning to distinguish between the various modes and registers of language 
and discourse, and, where need be, overcoming conceptual boundaries, forms 
one of the primary navigational aids in understanding the text and the 
experiences that it points towards. As such, the Mirouer might be read as an 
exposition of, and study in, the use, effect, and cognitive processing of 
metaphor. The key to Porete’s epistemology lies not in the specifics of her literal 
language, but in its use as a means to unlock new cognitive registers of meaning. 
As Nicholas Watson suggests, Marguerite Porete’s use of metaphor ‘is not 
merely a rhetorical trope but almost a metaphysical principle.’49  
 
The second point of interest in Dame Amour’s plea concerns the Soul’s 
encounter with Loingprés, the divine manifestation of the courtly lover with 
whom the Soul participates in the paradigm of ‘amor de lonh,’ transposed by 
Porete into a spiritual dimension.50 The pinnacle of the Soul’s ascent, and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Mirour, ch. 58, pp. 168-170. ‘Understand these divine words in a divine manner through Love, 
hearers of this book! This Farnearness, which we call a spark in the manner of an aperture and 
quick closure, receives the Soul at the fifth stage and places her at the sixth as long as His work 
remains and endures. And therefore she is other.’ Mirror, p. 135.  
49 Watson, ‘Translating the Untranslatable,’ p. 131.  
50 Kurt Ruh places Marguerite Porete’s use of Loingprés in the context of other Beguine writers, 
namely Hadewijch and Mechthild. Like Porete’s Loingprés, Hadewijch writes of a figure known 
as Verre-bi, the personification of the paradoxical proximity and distance of God. See ‘Le Miroir 
des simples âmes der Marguerite Porete,’ in Verbum et Signum: Festschrift für Friedrich Ohly, ed. by 
Hans Fromm, Wolfgang Harms and Uwe Ruberg (Munich: Fink, 1975), pp. 365-387. McGinn 
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realisation of her conceptual journey towards the divine, is captured by Dame 
Amour in her description of Loingprés’s revelation to the Soul, which propels her 
temporarily from the fifth to the sixth stage and causes her to be ‘aultre.’ From 
the depths of the abyss of humility, where the Soul rests at peace in the fifth 
stage, having returned her will to God, she is occasionally transported up to the 
sixth where she experiences the divine by means of an opening, as a peak of 
consciousness characterised as an ‘esclar’ or ‘spark.’51 At this point, the Soul 
ceases to be aware of herself, and instead: 
Dieu se voit en elle de sa majesté divine, qui clarifie de luy ceste 
Ame, si que elle ne voit que nul soit, fors Dieu mesmes, qui est, 
dont toute chose est; et ce qui est, c’est Dieu mesmes; et pource 
ne voit elle sinon elles mesmes; car qui voit ce qui est, il ne voit 
fors Dieu mesmes, qui se voit en ceste Ame mesmes, de sa 
majesté divine.52  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
follows Newman ‘s observations in Virile Woman in grouping these writers as exponents of a 
‘courtly mode’ of mystical language who characterise their spiritual experiences as a ‘yearning 
for the beloved,’ but suggests that the textual influences on which they draw are two-fold; that 
they emanate both from monastic exegesis on the Song of Songs 3:1-2 and from more 
contemporary troubadour lyric concerning the absent lover. See The Flowering of Mysticism, p. 
169. Newman terms Porete’s blend of mystical and courtly imagery ‘mystique courtoise’ in 
From Virile Woman to WomanChrist, p. 137. Kocher pays particular attention to the motifs of 
courtly love, especially in relation to troubadour poetry, in the Mirouer in Allegories of Love, pp. 
56-79. See also Ellen L. Babinsky, ‘The Use of Courtly Language in Le Mirouer des simples ames 
anienties [sic] by Marguerite Porete,’ Essays in Medieval Studies, 4 (1987): 91-106.   
51 The reference to the ‘esclar’ as the highest stage of contemplation, or the essence of the soul, 
is a common motif in mystical expressions of the Christian West. The neoplatonic belief that the 
human soul possesses the intellectual and affective capacity to contain or comprehend a ‘spark’ 
of the divine can be traced through the writings of Jerome, Augustine, Gregory the Great, 
Thomas Aquinas, Thomas Gallus, Bonaventure, and later in the writings of Meister Eckhart, 
John Tauler, and Julian of Norwich, amongst others. For a survey of the complex medieval 
theology of scintilla, see Robert A. Greene, ‘Synderesis, the Spark of Conscience, in the English 
Renaissance,’ Journal of the History of Ideas, 52 (1991): 195-219. Denise N. Baker traces the role of 
scintilla in the mystical theology of Julian of Norwich in ‘The Structure of the Soul and the 
‘Godly Wylle’ in Julian of Norwich’s Showings,’ in The Medieval Mystical Tradition in England: 
Exeter Symposium VII: Papers Read at Charney Manor, July 2004, ed. by Edward Alexander Jones 
(Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 2004), pp. 37-50.  
52 Mirouer, ch. 118, p. 330. ‘God sees Himself in her by His divine majesty, who clarifies this 
Soul with Himself, so that she sees only that there is nothing except God Himself Who is, from 
whom all things are. And He who is, is God Himself. And thus she does not see according to 
herself, for whoever sees the One who is does not see except God Himself, who sees Himself in 
this same Soul by His divine majesty.’ Mirror, p. 193.  
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The contents of this passage, and its ramifications within the text, have 
been the subject of considerable debate. It has been mined for evidence 
suggesting that Porete was an adherent of a number of different theological 
positions, including the annihilation of the self, deification, and the heresy of 
the free spirit, although as previously noted, scholarly conclusions as to the 
text’s subversive nature have rarely proven definitive.53 However, for the 
purposes of this discussion, the Soul’s description of the exalted sixth stage 
proves a point of departure for three rather different, but related, enquires 
concerning the Mirouer des simples ames. 
 
The Soul’s depiction of the ‘ouverture’ and the ‘esclar’ suggests a dramatic 
change in her conceptual faculties, which is all the more profound when 
juxtaposed with the prior description of the fifth stage, and the ‘abysme sans 
fons,’ in which: 
Or est telle Ame nulle, car elle voit par habondance de divine 
cognoissance son nient, qui la fait nulle, et mectre a nient. Et si 
est toute, car elle voit par la profondesse de la cognoissance de 
la mauvaistié d’elle, qui est si parfonde et si grant, que elle n’y 
trouve ne commencement ne mesure ne fin.54 
 
Whilst resting in the fifth stage, the Soul exists in a series of cognitive and 
physical paradoxes, ‘seeing her nothingness,’ ‘placed in nothingness,’ with 
‘neither beginning nor middle nor end.’ Yet she is also subject to an ‘abundance 
of divine Understanding’ and possesses an embodied perception of space and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 McGinn notes that this suggestion in the Mirouer that ‘a person can become God’ because a 
‘soul united to God is made divine’ constitutes one of the text’s key condemnatory passages and 
is responsible for its reception as a founding tenet of a ‘new spirit’ heresy propagating 
‘blasphemies.’ See The Essential Writings of Christian Mysticism, p. 491.  
54 Mirouer, ch. 118, p. 326. ‘Now such a Soul is nothing, for she sees her nothingness by means 
of the abundance of divine Understanding, which makes her nothing and places her in 
nothingness. And so she is all things, for she sees by the means of the depth of the 
understanding of her own wretchedness, which is so deep and so great that she finds there 
neither beginning nor middle nor end.’ Mirror, p. 192.  
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motion in being ‘assise ou fons de bas.’55 These inconsistencies are resolved, 
however, in the descriptions of the sixth stage, found in chapters 58 and 118. 
Here, the Soul ‘sees’ in a new way, ‘et si est souvent ou siziesme ravie, mais pou 
ce luy dure.’56 The inertia of vision, time, and space that characterise the fifth 
stage are both put into perspective and also overcome by the new cognitive 
faculties the Soul possesses in the sixth, although it is important to note that 
these are not her own, autonomous, faculties, but rather those through which 
the grace of God functions.  
 
This new mode of ‘seeing’ can perhaps be better explained in light of the 
observations made in Chapter One, in that it correlates with some, but 
importantly not all, of the imaginative attributes of metaphor as articulated by 
Paul Ricoeur. In his discussion of the imaginative effects that metaphor is able 
to induce in a recipient of metaphor, Ricoeur provides a stimulating series of 
observations with which it is possible to frame Porete’s description of the sixth 
stage. Echoing the Aristotelian theory found in the Rhetoric, that metaphor 
possesses the capacity to ‘set before the eyes’ the sense that it wishes to convey, 
the means by which Ricoeur suggests that it does so are especially useful here. 
This overcoming of objectivity and rational thought is represented in the 
Mirouer by the death of Raison in chapter 87, which, if Reason and the Soul are 
seen to be share elements of the same cognitive faculties, may equally be read 
as a tipping point in the narrative following which the Soul also surpasses the 
rational limits of an objectively structured world. As the Soul falls into the 
‘abysme sans fons’ in the fifth stage, she might be said to become something 
akin to the sublime: in her nothingness, her form is represented by 
boundlessness and her consciousness is subsumed by an awareness of the 
absolute greatness of la divine Bonté.57 The Soul is unable to grasp the enormity 
of her fall into the abyss – ‘elle voit elle mesmes, et si ne se voit’ – and yet is able 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Mirouer, ch. 118, p. 328; ‘at rest in the bottomless depths.’ Mirror, p. 192.  
56 Mirouer, ch. 58, p. 168; ‘and so she is often carried up to the sixth, but this of little duration.’ 
Mirror, p. 135.  
57 Mirouer, ch. 118, p. 324; ‘the Divine Goodness,’ Mirror, p. 191. 
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to comprehend the singularity and wholeness of the event in willing one thing, 
‘Et pource ne veult que ung: l’Espoux de sa jouvance, qui n’est <que> ungs.’58  
 
 The only description that Dame Amour provides to the ‘auditeurs’ of this 
sixth stage is that: 
l’oeuvre de l’esclar, tant comme elle dure, n’est aultre chose que 
la demonstrance de la gloire de l’Ame. Ce ne demoure en nulle 
creature longuement, sinon seulement en l’espace de son 
mouvement.59 
 
The revelation of the sixth stage is simply portrayed in terms of an ‘overflowing 
from the ravishing aperture’ and a ‘goodness [that] pours out’ from the 
Divine.60 This outpouring, an experience that the Soul ‘ne elle n’eust oncques 
mere, qui de ce sceust parler,’ is strikingly similar to the description that 
Ricoeur gives of the work of the imagination when engaged in metaphor 
processing.61 When prompted by the ‘pictorial’ character of metaphor, Ricoeur 
observes, the imagination does not conjure a static mental image, but rather 
exposes the mind to a ‘flow of images.’62 The phenomena that both Porete and 
Ricoeur describe, be they mystical or metaphorical, or, indeed, a combination of 
the two, are suggestive of what might be termed ‘cognitive transcendence’.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Mirouer, ch. 118, p. 328. ‘Therefore she wills [but] only one thing: the Spouse of her youth, 
who is [but] only One.’ Mirror, p. 193. My additions.  
59 Mirouer, ch. 58, p. 170; ‘the work of the Spark, as long as it lasts, is nothing other than the 
showing of the glory of the Soul. This does not remain in any creature very long, except only in 
the moment of His movement.’ Mirror, pp. 135-136.	  	  
60 Mirror, p. 135 and p. 194. ‘L’ouverture ravissable de l’espandement de celle ouverture’; 
‘Mirouer, ch. 58, p. 168; ‘bonté espandue,’ Mirouer, ch. 118, p. 332.  
61 Ricoeur, ‘The Metaphorical Process,’ p. 235. 
61 Ricoeur, ‘The Metaphorical Process,’ p. 235. 
61 Ricoeur, ‘The Metaphorical Process,’ p. 235. 
62 Ricoeur, ‘The Metaphorical Process,’ p. 235. 
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There is a distinction to be made here between the types of 
conceptualisation articulated by Porete in the Mirouer and that articulated by 
d’Oingt in all three of her writings. What Ricoeur appears to suggest, and 
Porete’s Soul appears to exemplify, is that the ‘seeing’ of the fifth and sixth 
stages is not merely, to use Donald Davidson’s phrase, ‘seeing one thing as 
another.’63 In its analysis of Marguerite d’Oingt’s use of conceptual imagery, the 
previous chapter concludes that d’Oingt imaginatively projects structurally 
similar entities – the body and the book – onto both her work and her belief, 
which in turn shape her mystical reality. As such, she ‘sees’ one entity in terms 
of another, and, in so doing, captures something of the absent point of reference. 
In the case of Porete’s Soul, however, the attainment and verbalisation of the 
fifth and sixth stages occurs differently. The Ame’s is a relational ‘seeing’; the 
fifth stage makes sense when analysed in relation to, and juxtaposed with, the 
stages that precede and follow it. The Soul’s conceptualisation of the seven 
stages of ascent is one of proportionality, and, after the death of Raison, her 
sense of relation and proportion changes.  
 
Crucially, the Soul still inhabits the body when she participates in the fifth 
and sixth stages, and therefore still inhabits the physical world that she 
occupied as she moved through stages one to four. Only once she has fallen into 
the abyss, and relinquished her will by giving it back to God, does she no 
longer possess the ability to ‘see’ for herself. Instead, she ‘sees’ because God 
sees through her: 
Et pource se voit Bonté de sa bonté par divine lumiere, ou 
siziesme estat, duquel l’Ame est clariffiee. Et si n’est, fors cil qui 
est, qui se voit en tel estre de sa divine majesté, par muance 
d’amour de bonté espandue et remise en luy.64 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Davidson, ‘What Metaphors Mean,’ p. 218. 
64 Mirouer, ch. 118, p. 332. ‘And thus Goodness sees itself by His goodness through divine light, 
at the sixth stage, by which the Soul is clarified. And so nothing is, except He who is, who sees 
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This new mode of ‘seeing’ represents the Soul’s newfound mystical reality. Still 
able to perceive the trappings of her former existence, the Soul does not merely 
compare old with new existences. Rather, she ‘sees’ as God ‘sees’ through her, a 
notion comparable to what Ricoeur describes as metaphor producing meaning 
by assimilation; the new meaning produced ‘in spite of and through’ the older 
subjects.65  
 
The notion that the Soul’s mystical experience is depicted as ‘seeing 
though’, or seeing metaphorically, has important implications for the rest of the 
Mirouer, and on how Marguerite Porete may have conceived of the parameters 
of her spiritual relationship with the divine. The religious and intellectual 
milieu in which Marguerite Porete was writing was influenced in particular by 
two strands of theology: first, the re-emergence of pseudo-Dionysian thought, 
and its emphasis on the notion of ascent towards, and union with, God, and 
second, the flourishing of new modes of expression in the form of vernacular, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Himself in such being by His Divine Majesty through the transformation of love by the 
goodness poured out and placed in her.’ Mirror, p. 194.  
65 Ricoeur, ‘The Metaphorical Process,’ p. 234. This idea of the Soul ‘seeing through’ the facets 
of her previous existence engages with the debate regarding Porete’s ethical piety and the 
extent to which the Mirouer can be read as an antinomian text, which expounds an amoral or 
anarchical position contrary to the theological foundations of the church. The Soul’s 
relationship with, and apparent rejection of, the Virtues, and her transformation into an entity 
that no longer requires the norms, the sacraments, or the church in order to mediate the 
distinction between her consciousness and that of the Godhead has caused some critics to label 
the Mirouer an example of the heresy of autotheism. However, as Dame Amour states in chapter 
21: ‘C’est vérité que ceste Ame a prins congé aux Vertuz, quant a l’usage d’elles et quant au 
desir de ce que elles demandent, mais les Vertuz n’ont mie prins congié a elles, car elles sont 
tousjours avec elles; mais c’est en parfaicte obedience d’elles.’ Mirouer, pp. 78-80. ‘It is true that 
the Soul takes leave of the Virtues, insofar as the practising of them is concerned, and insofar as 
the desire for what they demand is concerned. But the Virtues have not taken leave of her, for 
they are always with her, but this is from perfect obedience to them.’ Mirror, p. 103. In the 
earlier stations of the seven-stage ascent, the Soul’s piety is marked by her excellence in 
achieving the standards of the Virtues. However by the fifth stage, she no longer needs to 
appropriate the Virtues, for they have become so much a part of her nature that she ‘sees 
through’ them. They have become part of the very fabric of the Soul, a metaphorical lens as 
opposed to the frame through which she sees the world. For more on the Soul’s relationship to 
the Virtues, see John A. Arsenault, ‘Authority, Autonomy, and Antinomianism: The Mystical 
and Ethical Piety of Marguerite Porete in The Mirror of Simple Souls,’ Studia Mystica, 21 (2000): 
65-94; David Kangas, ‘Dangerous Joy: Marguerite Porete’s Good-bye to the Virtues,’ The Journal 
of Religion, 91, 3 (July 2011): 299-319.   
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or ‘vulgar’ theology.66 The interaction of these two modes of thought witnessed 
what Juan Marin calls new, ‘radical exploration[s] of mystical union,’ in which 
the mystic appears to write of a ‘union without difference’ between the soul’s 
identity and that of God.67 Along with Hadewijch and Mechthild, Marguerite 
Porete is frequently cited as responsible for teaching that ‘the soul herself can 
and must be refigured or reimagined, and as such become united without 
distinction in and with the divine.’68 Amy Hollywood takes this idea even 
further. Porete’s Soul, Hollywood argues, moves beyond a volitional unity with 
God, and experiences a ‘transformation […] into the divine through its 
annihilation.’69  
 
Having located such ostensibly dramatic ideology at the heart of Porete’s 
theology of ‘anéantissement,’ it is perhaps understandable that so much 
modern critical analysis of the Mirouer is concerned with asserting the text’s 
heterodox nature. Indeed, Joanne Maguire Robinson considers that Porete’s 
‘doctrine of the annihilation of the soul was never a mainstream theological 
doctrine before or after Marguerite Porete, yet it reveals profound insights into 
the possible relationship between God and the soul.’70 Whilst the latter half of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Sean Field highlights a passage by the Franciscan preacher, Gilbert of Tournai (c.1205-1284), 
which points towards the scepticism and mistrust felt by some churchmen regarding the spread 
of vernacular theology, particularly among laywomen, in the second half of the thirteenth 
century. Written for the Second Council of Lyon in 1274, Gilbert protests: ‘Sunt apud nos 
mulieres, que Beghine vocantur, et quedam earum subtilitatibus vigent et novitatibus gaudent. 
Habent interpretata scripturarum mysteria et in communi idiomate gallicata, quae tamen in 
sacra Scriptura exercitatis vix sunt pervia.’ See ‘Annihilation and Perfection,’ p. 256. Field is 
quoting from Gilbert’s Collectio de scandalis ecclesiae, reproduced in P. A. Stroick, ‘Collectio de 
scandalis Ecclesiae,’ new edition, in Archivum franciscanum historicum, 24 (1931): 33-62. This 
‘communi idiomate gallicata,’ Romana Guarnieri suggests, used a variant of Old French, the 
vulgar piccado in which, she speculates, Porete wrote the original text of the Mirouer. See 
Romana Guarnieri, Donne e chiesa tra mistica e istituzioni (secoli XIII-XV) (Rome: Edizioni di storia 
e letteratura, 2004), p. 268. Amy Hollywood also suggests that the original Mirouer was 
‘presumably’ composed in ‘Picard, the dialectic of the French-speaking Southern Low 
Countries.’ See ‘Reading as Self-Annihilation,’ in Polemic: Critical or Uncritical, ed. by Jane 
Gallop (New York and Abingdon: Routledge, 2004), pp. 39-63. Here at p. 59, n. 18. 
67 Marin, ‘Annihilation and Deification,’ p. 92.  
68 Hollywood, The Soul as Virgin Wife, p. 24.  
69 Hollywood, The Soul as Virgin Wife, p. 109.  
70 Robinson, Nobility and Annihilation, p. xii.  
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Robinson’s observation is difficult to dispute, a closer examination of the pool 
of ideological resources and imagery on which Marguerite chose to draw in 
order to articulate the soul’s apparent dissolution in God is far more profound 
and complex than Robinson’s study of the text acknowledges.  
 
A focus on the metaphors that Porete chooses to represent her doctrine 
of ‘anéantissement,’ viewed in light of the earlier discussion regarding 
‘metaphorical seeing’ and relativity, demonstrates that Porete conceptualises 
the soul’s union with God in a highly nuanced way. The Soul speaks not of an 
absorptive union of undistinguishable consciousness with God, but rather of a 
spiritual relationship characterised by a continuing sense of dialectical union: in 
the upper reaches of her ascent towards God, the soul metaphorically 
characterises herself, much like the triumvirate of the Holy Trinity, as being at 
one with, and yet wholly separate from, the divine.  
 
 As the Soul takes her ‘leave from the Virtues,’ Robinson remarks that 
Porete makes use of numerous ‘traditional mystical metaphors’ in order to give 
shape to what Robinson describes as the ‘soul’s merging with God.’71 A closer 
analysis of these metaphors, however, suggests that not only do they all draw 
on the same conceptual idea, mirroring each other theoretically, but also that 
their entailments imply a very different theology to that suggested by those 
who find the Mirouer guilty of extolling the heresy of autotheism.72  
 
 These metaphors of union are best conceptualised in terms of an idea 
often denied by critical analyses of Porete’s writing: that of corporeity. Indeed, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 These metaphors include those of ‘spiritual growth and maturity,’ ‘the giving of gifts from 
lover to beloved,’ and ‘intoxication,’ all of which, Robinson argues, ‘show the perfect 
consummation of human and divine, in which the soul […] becomes what God is.’ Robinson, 
Nobility and Annihilation, p. 86. 
72 See, for example, Colledge, Marler, and Grant, ‘Introductory Interpretative Essay,’ in which 
they argue that Porete’s text contains passages of ‘dubious theology,’ p. lvii.  
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within the canon of medieval women’s literature, Marguerite Porete is 
frequently regarded as something of an anomaly. The Mirouer does not conform 
to the commonly held notion that female mystical writing constitutes a genre in 
which the protagonist’s physicality takes centre stage. In her oft-cited study, 
Holy Feast and Holy Fast, Bynum sets out what has become something of a 
checklist in the scholarship on and categorization of medieval women’s studies:   
As many recent scholars have argued, the spiritualities of male 
and female mystics were different, and this difference has 
something to do with the body. Women were more apt to 
somatise religious experience and to write in intense bodily 
metaphors; women mystics were more likely to receive 
graphically physical visions of God; both men and women were 
inclined to attribute to women and encourage in them intense 
bodily asceticisms and ecstasies.73    
 
Bynum’s definition and observations concerning such forms of medieval 
women’s pious spiritual expression were a topic for debate in the previous 
chapter, although Marguerite Porete’s Mirouer is, on the whole, absent from 
Bynum’s critical analysis and does not appear to conform to her typology.74 The 
reasons for this exclusion are, at first glance, apparent from the text itself. In her 
doctrine of annihilation, Porete appears to argue for a negation of human 
creatureliness, writing that, in her hierarchy of spiritual ascendency, it is only in 
the lower stages of mystical ascent that the soul is bound to the body and 
likewise to the material symbolism of the Church. In the higher stages, 
meanwhile, once the soul has renounced both will and reason, she is no longer 
bound to the fleshly or corporeal influences of human nature, except in so far as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Bynum, Fragmentation and Redemption, p. 194. See also Bynum, Holy Feast and Holy Fast, 
passim. 
74 Where Bynum does make use of the Mirouer, it is with the intention of highlighting Porete’s 
alterity in contrast to the images employed by other female religious and their hagiographers: 
‘Margaret [sic] Porete […] rejected the whole tradition of affective spirituality with an attack on 
“works” (such as fasting and communion) that went far beyond Tauler’s or Eckhart’s.’ Holy 
Feast and Holy Fast, pp. 186-87.  
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they are necessary to sustain life.75 This apparent rejection of the corporeal, and 
Porete’s focus on ‘deemphasizing the body as a locus of sinfulness [… and also] 
as the locus of salvation,’ are fundamental factors in her marginalization in the 
medieval literary canon of affective, highly physicalized women’s piety as 
established by Bynum.76  
 
Jennifer M. Schuberth speculates, meanwhile, that Porete’s apparent 
refutation of ‘the very means by which women gained authority for their 
writing and religious practices’ and her lack of conformity in refusing to 
comply with the ‘cultural norms that identified women with the body and 
suffering’ may have been contributing factors in her chronicler’s decision to 
label her a pseudomulier as opposed to naming her in the Chronicle of Nangis.77 
‘One might argue,’ Schuberth writes, ‘that Porete was not burned because she 
was a woman, but because she was not enough of a woman, which is to say, not 
bodily enough.’78  
 
Schuberth’s reflections are thought-provoking and not without a hint of 
irony, suggesting that it may have been Porete’s lack of conformity to the very 
category she could perhaps most easily have fitted into – that of created 
humanity – that contributed to her demise. Such a reading of Porete’s text, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 Chapter 118 of the Mirouer contains Porete’s most detailed description of the seven stages of 
the soul. Once the Soul has surpassed stages one to four, Dame Amour proclaims that ‘Such a 
Soul neither desires nor despises poverty nor tribulation, neither mass nor sermon, neither fast 
nor prayer.’ Mirror, ch. 9, p. 87. Instead, she is ‘in such love without the work of the body, 
without the work of the heart, without the works of the spirit’ that Porete likens the annihilated 
soul to the Virgin Mary, who had, without ‘any intermediary in her soul, the glorious life of the 
Trinity in her mortal soul.’ Chapter 93, pp. 168-169.  
76 Hollywood, The Soul as Virgin Wife, p. 107.  
77 Jennifer M. Schuberth, Allegories of Annihilation: Porete’s “Mirror” and the Medieval Self, PhD 
dissertation (University of Chicago, 2008), p. 12. For the reference to Porete as a pseudomulier, 
see Verdeyen, ‘Le procès d’inquisition,’ pp. 88-89. See also Lerner, The Heresy of the Free Spirit, 
pp.70-71, n. 26. More detail is provided in a footnote in Chapter Two.  
78 Schuberth, Allegories of Annihilation, p. 12. McGinn also notes Porete’s lack of conventionality 
in relation to the affective subject matter of her female contemporaries: see The Flowering of 
Mysticism, p. 247.  
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however, is predicated on the notion that both medieval text and its 
contemporary reception correlate neatly with the modern category of female 
affective piety as outlined by Bynum. In her analysis of Porete’s use of allegory, 
Kocher argues that, whilst the Mirouer does, in fact, adhere to some of the 
‘democratising, lay tendencies of late medieval piety,’ it does not do so in terms 
of bodily metaphor. Quoting Bynum, Kocher writes:  
[Porete’s] treatise shows only infrequent interest in what 
Bynum calls the ‘cultivation of bodily experience as a place for 
encounter with meaning, a locus of redemption.’ A reader who 
set out to study bodies in the Mirror would discover few, and 
find them used figuratively rather than literally.79 
 
The Mirouer does not engage with the type of corporeal imagery used so 
vividly and dramatically by Marguerite d’Oingt. Vision-narratives that derive 
their stimuli from the imagery of Christ’s birth and Passion and from the 
Eucharist are all but absent from Porete’s prose, whilst those who advocate 
such methods are scorned by l’Ame as being overly dependent on material 
artefacts for spiritual progress. In a series of statements made throughout the 
work, the Soul claims: 
laquelle Ame ne desire ne ne desprise pouvr<e>té ne 
tribulation, ne messe ne sermon, ne jeune ne oraison […] tous 
les maistres de sens de nature, ne tous les maistres d’escripture, 
ne tous ceulx qui demourent en amour de l’obedience des 
Vertuz, ne l’entendent et ne l’e<n>tendront, la ou il a fait a 
entendre […] et n’est pas ce merveille, car le corps est trop gros 
pour parler des emprises de l’esperit. […] anges et ames nulz 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Kocher, Allegories of Love, p. 180. Kocher’s quotations are taken from Sarah Beckwith, Christ’s 
Body: Identity, Culture and Society in Late Medieval Writings (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 32; 
Bynum, ‘Why All the Fuss About the Body?,’p. 15.  
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corps n’est a la value de veoir, et par plus forte raison ne peut 
veoir nulz corps la Trinité.80 
 
This rejection of the body, Kocher rightly notes, is not motivated by 
asceticism: Porete’s perspective ‘turns not against the body but away from it.’81 
Kocher’s interpretation of the Mirouer’s renouncement of the body and reason, 
and its repudiation of traditionally embodied Christian symbolism leads her to 
suggest that ‘this bodilessness facilitates descriptions of the Soul’s 
disappearance into God, an event that the mystic might find more difficult (or 
disturbing, or inaccurate) to describe in more physical terms.’82 As was the case 
in the previous chapter’s discussion of corporality and corporeity, however, 
Bynum’s influential perspectives on medieval women’s piety and physicality, 
and Kocher’s subsequent reading of the Mirouer as a text which ‘eschews 
bodies,’ is founded on a notion of bodiliness that privileges human corporality 
over all other forms of physical substance and matter.83  
 
Two adjustments can be made to Kocher’s reading of the Mirouer, based 
on the earlier reflections concerning ‘metaphorical seeing.’ These adjustments 
will form the basis of the final task of this chapter: an analysis of Porete’s 
‘traditional mystical metaphors’ and the extent to which they, and the 
theoretical framework that underpins them, represent her particular 
conceptualisation of mystical union with the divine. The first adjustment 
proposed to Kocher’s thesis is that the human body is not rejected entirely by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Mirouer, ch. 9, p. 32 and p. 34; ch. 32, p. 108; ch. 33, p. 110. ‘Such a Soul neither desires nor 
despises poverty nor tribulation, neither mass nor sermon, neither fast nor prayer […] none of 
the masters of the natural senses, nor any of the masters of Scripture, nor those who remain in 
the love of the obedience to the Virtues, none perceive this, nor will they perceive what is 
intended. […]. And this is not surprising because the body is too heavy to speak of the 
enterprises of the Spirit. […]. Corporality is not worthy to see such angels and souls and, by 
greater reason, corporality cannot see the Trinity since it cannot see the angels nor the souls.’ 
Mirror, p. 87 and p. 114.  
81 Kocher, Allegories of Love, p. 180.  
82 Kocher, Allegories of Love, p. 183.  
83 Kocher, Allegories of Love, p. 183.  
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the ame adnientie. Rather, the Soul describes those who have returned their will 
to God and turned away from the practices of Saincte Eglise la Petite as: 
gens a piez sans voie, et a mains sans oeuvre, et a bouche sans 
parole, et a yeulx sans clarté, et a oreilles sans oïr, et a raison 
sans raison, et a corps sans vie, et a cueur sans entendement, de 
tant comme touche cest estre.84 
 
Just as when the Soul takes leave of the Virtues, but they do not leave her, 
so too here the Soul is portrayed as having taken leave of her physical faculties 
as she progresses towards a state of annihilation in God, but they remain with 
her in spite (or perhaps because) of the fact.85 The sensual capacities associated 
literally with the physical attributes, such as the mouth speaking or the ears 
hearing, recede, but the implication is that the Soul’s ability to conceptualise 
and perceive figuratively is no less acute.  
 
 Second, a continuing sense of embodiment pervades the Mirouer, even as 
the materiality associated with the human body is shunned. Throughout the 
course of the text, the Soul continues to be conceptualised in embodied terms, 
either as a physical entity capable of containment, or as a substance that may be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Mirouer, ch. 86, p. 242; ‘folk with feet but no path, hands but no work, mouth but no words, 
eyes but no vision, ears but no hearing, reason but no reasoning, body but no life, and with a 
heart but no intellect, as long as they are at this stage.’ Mirror, p. 161.  
85 The Soul’s liberation from the Virtues has been the source of considerable scholarly interest. 
Chapter 21 of the Mirouer contains the controversial statement: ‘ C’est vérité que ceste Ame a 
prins congé aux Vertuz, quant a l’usage d’elles et quant au desir de ce que elles demandent, 
mais les Vertuz n’ont mie prins congié a elles, car elles sont tousjours avec elles; mais c’est en 
parfaicte obedience d’elles […]. Or est il ainsi que ceste Ame a tant gaigné et aprins avec les 
Vertuz, que elle est dessus les Vertuz, car elle a en elle tout ce que les Vertuz scevent aprendre, 
et encore plus, sans comparaison.’ Mirouer, pp. 78-80. ‘It is true that this Soul takes leave of the 
Virtues, insofar as the practicing of them is concerned, and insofar as the desire for what they 
demand is concerned. But the Virtues have not taken leave of her, for they are always with her, 
but this is from perfect obedience to them. […]. So this Soul has gained and learned so much 
with the Virtues that she is now superior to the Virtues, for she has within her all that the 
Virtues know how to teach and more, without comparison.’ Mirror, pp. 103-104. Lichtmann 
notes that this claim was responsible for the first of the Inquisition’s articles in the process 
against her and was condemned again at the Council of Vienne. See ‘Marguerite Porete and 
Meister Eckhart,’ pp. 79-80.  
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enveloped by another container of form. Even at the pinnacle of her earthly 
ascent towards God, the Soul retains spatial, orientational, and motor faculties: 
Porete draws on all that constitutes physical humanity in order to figuratively 
depict the Soul. For example, at the point in the narrative when the Soul ‘est 
venue en cognoissance de son nient,’ Dame Amour describes her as follows: 
Or avez vous ouy comment ceste Ame est venue en croyance 
du plus. Or vous diray, dit Amour, comment elle est venue en 
cognoissance de son nient. C’est en ce qu’elle cognoist, que elle 
ne aultres ne cognoist nient de ses horribles pechez et deffaultes 
[…]. Telle Ame, dit Amour, n’a retenu nul vouloir, ainçoys est 
venue et cheue a nient vouloir, et en certain saviour de nient 
savoir, et ce nient savoir et ce nient vouloir l’ont excusee et 
enfranchie. […]. Ceste Ame a en tous lieux sa paix, car elle 
porte paix tousdis avec elle, si que pour telle paix luy sont tous 
lieux convenables, et toutes choses aussi.86 
 
The verbs used by Dame Amour are striking: ‘retaining,’ ‘falling,’ releasing,’ and 
‘carrying’ all structure the way in which Porete’s audience is impelled to 
conceptualise the Soul as possessing, metaphorically at least, an embodied, 
physical quality. Indeed, it is not until the Soul has reached the seventh stage of 
her mystical ascent, a stage not recounted by the ame adnientie, that there is any 
suggestion of a complete divide between the soul and the human body.87 The 
seventh stage lies beyond language, in a ‘close silence de l’amour divine,’ but 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Mirouer, ch. 47, pp. 142-144. ‘Now you have heard how this Soul arrived at belief in the 
greater part. Now I will tell you, says Love, how she arrived at understanding of her 
nothingness. Thus she understands that neither she nor any other understands the nothingness 
of her horrible sins and faults […]. Such a Soul, says Love, has retained no will, but instead has 
arrived at and fallen into willing nothing and the certain knowledge of knowing nothing. And 
this knowing-nothing and willing-nothing have released and freed her. […]. This Soul has her 
peace in all places, for she carries peace with her always, so that, because of such peace, all 
places are comfortable for her, and all things also.’ Mirror, p. 126.  
87 Mirouer, ch. 118, p. 332: ‘Et le septiesme garde Amour dedans elle, pour nous donner en 
parmanable gloire, duquel nous n’aurons cognoissance jusques ad ce que nostre ame ait nostre 
corps laissé.’ ‘The seventh stage Love keeps within herself in order to give it to us in eternal 
glory, of which we will have no understanding until our soul has left our body.’ Mirror, p. 194.  
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for the duration of the preceding six stages – the length of the Mirouer – the 
Soul’s description of her mystical ascent remains conceptually embodied, 
verbally communicated, and cognitively conceptualised.88 As the Soul explains:  
Hee, sire, […] comment suis je en mon sens demouree, quant 
j’ay pensé aux dons de vostre bonté, qui avez donné a mon ame 
la vision du Pere et du Filz et du Saint Esperit, que mon ame 
verra sans fin?89 
 
These observations suggest that a reading of Porete’s mystical expression need 
not be, as Kocher argues, bodiless, and that instead, the conceptual embodiment 
of the Soul serves as an aid to the reader’s understanding of Porete’s mystical 
theology of union with the divine. Substance, form, and matter are, in fact, 
central to the Soul’s advancement towards God, and it is the way in which 
Porete employs and develops such imagery that provides the clearest message 
as to how she may or may not have preached an identity of absorptive union 
with the divine, and, by extension, what kind of mystical consciousness the 
Mirouer points towards.  
 
Consistent with the Mirouer’s theme of textual consciousness and 
bibliophilic imagery, Porete makes use of a striking metaphor that emphasises 
the Neoplatonic idea that the soul carries within it the image of God from 
which the soul originally emanated. In chapter 50, Porete writes: 
Ceste Ame est emprainte en Dieu, et a sa vraye emprainture 
detenue par l’union d’amour; et a la maniere que la cire prent la 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 Mirouer, ch. 94, p. 262; ‘a hidden silence of divine love,’ Mirror, p. 169.  
89 Mirouer, ch. 33, p. 108. ‘Ah Lord, […] how I am still remaining in my mind when I ponder the 
gifts of your goodness, you who have given my soul the vision of the Father and the Son and 
the Holy Spirit whom my soul will see for eternity?’ Mirror, p. 114. 
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forme du seel, en telle maniere a ceste Ame prinse l’emprainte de 
cest vray exemplaire.90 
 
The implication that the soul receives her form and identity directly from God, 
without any form of mediation, is frequently cited as one of the main tenets of 
Porete’s apparent antinomianism.91 However Dame Amour’s wax metaphor 
gives rise to several entailments that suggest that Porete’s choice of imagery 
need not signify an unmediated and purely symbiotic relationship of mystical 
union. The soul originates in God, is given the form of wax, and, in re-
establishing her relationship with God, takes on the shape and appearance of 
God.92 However, at no point does Porete suggest that the wax itself disappears. 
The distinctions of form and substance remain, even though mystical union has 
been achieved. As such, the soul may metaphorically be seen as God, but never 
indistinct from God.93  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 Mirouer, ch. 51, p. 148. ‘This Soul is engraved in God, and has her true imprint maintained 
through the union of God. And in the manner that wax takes the form of the seal, so has this 
Soul taken the imprint of this true exemplar.’ Mirror, p. 128. For a discussion of the seal-in-wax 
metaphor, see Carruthers, The Book of Memory, p. 21 and p. 55. The image is attributed to 
Aristotle, but re-emerges in a Christian context in the works of Pseudo-Dionysius and later, in 
those of Aquinas.  
91 See Arsenault, ‘Authority, Autonomy and Antinomianism.’  
92 As such, it may be argued that Porete’s text is suggestive of a double-genesis: the Soul is 
formed twice in the process of becoming separated from God. The origins of this double 
creation are uncertain, although McGinn notes that the fourth-century monk and ascetic, 
Evagrius Ponticus, follows Origen in positing the theory of a two-stage creation: ‘In the 
beginning, God created the ideal world of minds, or spiritual beings (logikoí), perfectly united 
with him in ‘essential gnosis of the Trinity.’ When these beings fell away from contemplative 
unity, he then made the universe we experience, characterized by multiplicity, differentiation, 
and varying degrees of materiality.’ McGinn does not argue for a direct link between the 
theology of Evagrius and that of Porete, although the similarities that the two share are striking. 
See Bernard McGinn, ‘Ocean and Desert as Symbols of Mystical Absorption in the Christian 
Tradition,’ The Journal of Religion, 74, 2 (April 1994): 155-181. Here at p. 159.  
93 Carruthers discusses the ‘seal impressed in wax’ imagery in relation to Thomas Aquinas’s 
reading of Aristotle’s De anima and the process of sensory perception as involving either 
‘material’ or ‘spiritual’ change. Describing sight perception, Aquinas writes that this involves a 
‘spiritual’ change, and uses Aristotle’s example of the imprint of a seal on wax to demonstrate 
this. Carruthers explains: ‘For [Aquinas] the wax does form a physical likeness of the original 
seal. What he evidently means by ‘spiritual’ is that the wax material does not take on the gold 
or the bronze of the original, but not that nothing physiological at all happens to it. As Myles 
Burnyeat has argued, for Aquinas Aristotle’s notion of ‘spiritual’ change is the act of perceiving 
itself, which certainly affects us even though the sense organ itself does not change […]. The 
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That Marguerite Porete has recourse to metaphor in order to express 
such experience with the divine is not surprising. Yet comparing the theological 
underpinnings of her use of metaphor with modern cognitive theories of 
metaphor reveals striking similarities. As the first chapter observed, 
metaphorical mappings never involve a complete mapping of all of the 
properties of the source domain onto the target domain, or, to use Fauconnier 
and Turner’s methodology, the blended space is never representative of all of 
the elements contained in all of the input spaces. In a similar manner, the Soul 
appropriates some of the properties of wax, and, in turn, the appearance of 
some of the attributes of the divine. The Soul is not an exact representation of the 
Trinity or of the divine, but a partial (or selectively mapped) imprint. She 
simultaneously represents both something gained and something lost, just as 
she took ‘leave of’ and yet subsumed the Virtues as part of her very essence. 
Indeed, the Ame herself might be thought of as a ‘blended space’, a site at which 
a profound change has taken place, predicated on her appropriation of a new, 
mystical world-view.  
 
This duality lies at the heart of the soul’s repeated statements that the 
perfected soul is ‘sans nul pourquoy’ (‘without a why’), ‘sans volounté’ 
(‘without will’), or, more radically still, ‘sans se’ (‘without herself’). In ‘being 
without,’ the ame adnientie lacks nothing, but similarly, Porete does not argue 
that, in this life at least, the Soul possesses ‘All.’ Robinson suggests that ‘the 
soul is both “All” and “nothing”, the intersection of which [being] where God 
and human meet.’94 However, such an interpretation problematizes the Mirouer 
on two fronts. First, it suggests that the ‘end-point’ for the Soul is contained 
within the text’s narrative. Yet following the fullest of her accounts of 
absorption into God, the Soul continues to speak for some twenty-two chapters, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
seal’s image is not just ghostly like that of a photographic slide projected onto a screen, but is a 
sort of imprint that effects a real change in the perceiver.’ The Book of Memory, pp. 69-70. 
Carruthers’ reading of Aquinas’ uses of the seal imagery bears a strong resemblance to this 
reading of Porete’s appropriation of the same metaphor. 
94 Robinson, Nobility and Annihilation, p. 48.  
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indicating that she cannot yet have accomplished the ascent to the seventh stage, 
‘que nous aurons en gloire, dont nul ne sçait parler.’95 Second, as David Kangas 
argues, reading the Soul’s experience solely in terms of a dialectic of all and 
nothing, in which only when the Soul becomes ‘nothing’ can she receive 
‘everything,’ is potentially obscuring and reductive.96 Doing so ties the text into 
the paradigm of paradox, which the audience is either asked to accept or try to 
resolve. Reading the Mirouer solely in terms of paradox implies that the text 
possesses no viable didactic or spiritual purpose. Yet analysing it by attempting 
to resolve the paradox is to force the text to adhere to logic and reason – 
precisely the format that the Soul rejects. Instead, annihilation, or ‘to will 
nothing’ is to shed all perception of the world that pertains to its created value, 
and instead, both actively and passively, to transform the frame of perception 
from the literal to the figurative. The Soul does not convert into God, but rather 
consents to ‘see’ and ‘be seen’ in terms of the unmediated divine.  
 
In discussing the Soul’s experience of mystical union, scholars have 
drawn attention to other metaphors of transformation in the Mirouer, namely 
those of her being like iron in fire, and like a river flowing into the sea. It is in 
these two metaphors, Juan Marin suggests, that Porete’s Mirouer demonstrates 
most clearly her theology of annihilation.97 Both images are, Marin argues, 
indicative of an overt ideological shift from the radical yet orthodox idea of 
deification to a ‘consciousness of indistinction.’98 The two images, of iron and of 
water, appear to have their roots in an earlier passage written by Bernard of 
Clairvaux, although Porete makes some alterations to his metaphors that will 
receive further scrutiny below. In his De diligendo Deo, Bernard writes of the 
experience of union that lies at the pinnacle of the mystical journey of ascent 
towards God: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 Mirouer, ch. 118, p. 330; ‘which we will have in glory, of which none know how to speak.’ 
Mirror, p. 193.  
96 Kangas, ‘Dangerous Joy,’ p. 313, also n. 22.  
97 Marin, ‘Annihilation and Deification.’  
98 Marin, ‘Annihilation and Deification,’ p. 101.  
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Quomodo stilla aquae modica, multo infusa vino, deficere a se 
tota videtur, dum et saporem vini induit, et colorem, et 
quomodo ferrum ignitum et candens, igni simillimum fit, 
pristina propria que exutum forma, et quomodo solis luce 
perfusus aer in eamdem transformatur luminis claritatem, adeo 
ut non tam illuminatus quam ipsum lumen esse videatur, sic 
omnem tunc in sanctis humanam affectionem quodam ineffabili 
modo necesse erit a semetipsa liquescere, atque in Dei penitus 
transfundi voluntatem.99 
 
Although the Cistercian abbot’s metaphors of union appear to suggest a 
dissolution of the mystic in God, Bernard is careful never to assert any form of 
substantial unification.100 In his descriptions of the transformation of water, iron, 
and air, he makes sure that it is only the appearance that is transformed, not the 
substance itself. Using visual qualifiers (‘videtur,’ ‘simillimum’), Bernard 
engages with what might be referred to as the ‘metaphorical seeing’ discussed 
earlier. The source domains he uses to describe the soul – water, iron, and air – 
may all be able to be transformed by some form of omnipotent power, and may, 
conceptually at least, be infinite in volume or source, but they never lose their 
essential identity. Rather, they unite with the form of God in a perfect mirroring 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 Bernardus Claraeuallensis, Liber de diligendo Deo, in Sancti Bernardi Opera, ed. by J. Leclercq, C. 
H. Talbot, and H.M. Rochais, vol. 3 of 9 (Rome: Editiones Cistercienses, 1963), p. 143. ‘As a drop 
of water seems to disappear completely in a big quantity of wine, even assuming the wine’s 
taste and colour; just as red, molten iron becomes so much like fire it seems to lose its primary 
state; just as the air on a sunny day seems transformed into sunshine instead of being lit up; so 
it is necessary for the saints that all human beings melt in a mysterious way and flow into the 
will of God.’ Bernard of Clairvaux, On Loving God, trans. by Robert Walton, with an analytical 
commentary by Emero Stiegman, Cistercian Fathers, 13B (Kalamazoo, MI: Cistercian 
Publications, 1995), p. 30. Robert Lerner suggests that Bernard borrowed the images of fire and 
air from Scotus Erigena’s translation of Maximus the Confessor’s Ambigua, but speculates that 
the image of the wine and the water was Bernard’s own. See ‘The Image of Mixed Liquids in 
Late Medieval Mystical Thought,’ Church History, 40, 4 (Dec. 1971): 397-411. Here at p. 397, n. 3. 
For a detailed history of these three metaphors in religious writing, see Jean Pépin, ‘“Stilla 
aquae modica multo infusa vino, ferrum ignitium, luce perfusus aer”: L’origine de trois 
comparaisons familières à la théologie mystique médiévale,’ Divinitas (Miscellanae André 
Combès), 11 (1967): 331-375.  
100 See Etienne Gilson, The Mystical Theology of St Bernard, trans. by A.H.C. Downes (Kalamazoo, 
MI: Cistercian Publications, 1990), pp. 120-123.  
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of structures, or as Bernard expresses it, they unite, ‘non tam essentiarum 
cohaerentia facit, quam conniventia voluntatum.’101 Once again, the mapping of 
essential characteristics is only partial between the soul and the divine, the 
underpinnings of metaphorical thought echoing those of its mystical subject 
matter. 
 
The Mirouer repeats Bernard’s iron and fire imagery in chapter 52. Dame 
Amour tells Raison that the Soul enters into and remains within the ‘abundances 
and flowings of divine love’: 
comme le fer est vestu du feu, et a la semblance perdue de luy, 
pource que le feu est le plus fort qui l’a mue<e> en luy; tout aussi 
est ceste Ame vestue de ce plus, et nourrie et muee en ce plus, 
pour l’amour de ce plus, sans faire compte du moins.102 
 
In the introduction to her translation of the text, Ellen Babinsky maintains that 
Porete ‘insists that the iron becomes fire itself by virtue of the strength of the fire 
(original emphasis).’103 However, on closer inspection, Marguerite appears to 
echo Bernard’s phrasing more carefully than has been previously noted. Like 
the Cistercian, Porete uses qualifiers (‘vestu,’ ‘semblance’) to shift her imagery 
away from the literal and towards the figurative, mitigating any suggestion that 
the iron itself turns into flame, and, once again, the active emphasis is on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 Sermones super Cantica Canticorum, Sermon 71. 7, in Sancti Bernardi Opera, ed. by J. Leclercq, C. 
H. Talbot, and H.M. Rochais, vol. 2 of 9 (Rome: Editiones Cistercienses, 1958), p. 220; ‘not so 
much by the identity of essences as by the concurrence of wills.’ Bernard of Clairvaux, On the 
Song of Songs, trans. by Irene M. Edmonds, Cistercian Fathers Series, 40, vol. 4 of 4, (Kalamazoo, 
MI: Cistercian Publications, 1980), p. 54. Bernard appears to be drawing on the Pauline notion 
found in 1 Corinthians 6:17, ‘Qui autem adhaeret Domino, unus spiritus est.’ ‘But he who is 
joined to the Lord, is one spirit.’  
102 Mirouer, ch. 52, p. 152; ‘like iron invested with fire which has lost its own semblance because 
the fire is stronger and thus transforms the iron into itself. So also this Soul is completely 
invested with this greater part, and nourished and transformed into this greater part, taking no 
account of the lesser.’ Mirror, p. 130. Babinsky translates the Middle French ‘vestue’ as 
‘invested,’ although it would perhaps be more accurate to translate it as ‘clothed’ or ‘shrouded,’ 
assuming ‘vestue’ is the past participle of the Old and Modern French verb ‘vestir.’  
103 Mirror, p. 45.  
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appearance as opposed to being grounded in any form of physical, objective 
reality. Iron appears to become fire when it is taken over by the potency of the 
divine flames. But molten iron is not fire: Porete’s conceptualisation of union, 
like that of Bernard, is that of a partial mirroring of form as opposed to content. 
In this case, the substances remain separate, even when they appear united.  
 
The second of Marguerite’s metaphors of mystical union under scrutiny 
here also takes its influence from Bernadine expression, although her 
manipulation of the imagery seems unique within the corpus of Christian 
spiritual writing.104 Whilst explaining how the Soul no longer has a will and has 
given it over to God, Dame Amour says: 
Ainsi comme feroit une eaue qui vient de la mer, qui a aucun nom, 
comme l’en pourroit dire Aise, ou Sene, ou une aultre riviere; et 
quant celle eaue ou riviere rentre en mer, elle pert son cours et le 
nom d’elle, dont elle couroit en plusieurs pays en faisant son 
oeuvre. Or est elle en mer, la ou elle se repouse, et ainsi a perdu tel 
labour. Pareillement il est de ceste Ame.105 
 
The correlation between Bernard’s drop of water in the wine and Marguerite’s 
rivers flowing into the sea is clear, although Porete is not alone amongst her 
contemporaries in drawing on aqueous imagery in order to express the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 Borrowings from oceanic imagery are, however, common in the Mirouer. See, for example, 
chapters 28, 80, 81 and 83. McGinn traces the metaphors of ‘ocean’ and desert’ in mystical 
literature in ‘Ocean and Desert.’  
105 Mirouer, ch. 82, p. 234-36. ‘Thus she would be like a body of water which flows from the sea, 
which has some name, as one would be able to say Aisne or Seine or another river. And when 
this water or river returns into the sea, it loses its course and its name with which it flowed in 
many countries in accomplishing its task. Now it is in the sea where it rests, and thus has lost all 
labor. Likewise it is with this Soul.’ Mirror, p. 158. See Lerner, ‘New Light,’ for a discussion of 
the names of the river in the Middle French and Middle English manuscript traditions. See also 
the Introduction.  
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experience of being mystically united with the divine.106 For Juan Marin, this 
passage condenses the essence of Porete’s theology: 
Dissolution is to be completed, a mutual melting where nothing 
remains of the human nature, not even its name. Annihilation 
leads to total deification. […]. No metaphorical drop of wine will 
serve. By stretching Bernard’s metaphor to the point that it breaks 
down, changing it into one substance divided only in terms of 
magnitude, she sets the stage for her claim that it is the chasm 
between humanity and divinity that seems real. While in Bernard 
human consciousness of distinction is lost, in Porete divine 
consciousness of indistinction is regained.107 
 
However, the ‘dissolution’ of which the Mirouer speaks is not complete, and nor 
is annihilation equated literally with deification.108 Whilst Marguerite’s choice 
to depict the relationship between the annihilated soul and the divine as a river 
flowing into the sea does, at first sight, appear to break with the Bernadine 
paradigm of soul and God as two separate substances, in her decision to name 
the rivers, her chosen imagery resonates more strongly with Bernard’s theology 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 In her poetry, Hadewijch also wrote of sinking in the sea of love: ‘My soul melts away/ In 
the madness of Love, / The abyss into which she hurls me/ Is deeper than the sea’. Hadewijch, 
The Complete Works, trans. Mother Columba Hart (Mahwah, NY: Paulist Press, 1980). See poem 7, 
‘The New Path’, stanza 4, ll. 43-45, at p. 145. For the Dutch, see Hadewijch, Strofische Gedichten, 
ed. by Josef Van Mierlo, S. J., 2 vols, Leuvense studiën en tekstuitgaven, 13 (Antwerp: Standaard 
Boekhandel, 1942). Mechthild of Magdeburg similarly makes use of watery imagery in order to 
convey her mystical experiences in Das fließende Licht der Gottheit, ed. by Hans Neumann, 2 vols 
(Munich: Artemis, 1990). For the English translation, see The Flowing Light of the Godhead, trans. 
by Frank J. Tobin, The Classics of Western Spirituality (Mahwah, N. J.: Paulist Press, 1998). For 
an analysis of the possible origins, and subsequent use of these metaphors in Mechthild’s work, 
see James C. Franklin, Mystical Transformations: The Imagery of Liquids in the Work of Mechthild von 
Magdeburg (Madison, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1978).  
107 Marin, ‘Annihilation and Deification,’ pp. 100-101.  
108 Marin is not the only scholar to read the metaphor of the rivers and the sea as symbolic of 
the soul’s complete unification with God. Robinson writes: ‘This is a perfect representation of 
the journey of the soul to annihilation: it comes from the sea, follows its own path, and 
eventually finds its way back to its origin. […] The river, or the soul, is transformed into the sea 
and becomes indistinguishable with it.’ Nobility and Annihilation, pp. 96-97.  
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than has previously been acknowledged.109 Although Kocher asserts that the 
Mirouer ‘contains […] no physical portrayal of its characters, nor landscape, 
time, or seasons’, the allusions to natural and geographical imagery in the text 
are, in fact, numerous, and the relationship between rivers and the sea is not 
without a particular significance here.110 Rooting the Soul firmly in her own, 
unspecified, physical landscape, Marguerite makes a clear distinction between 
the terrestrial, or earth-bound nature of the human soul, and the distant, 
abstract notion of the sea.111 To take the entailment of the metaphor further, 
whilst the waters of the river flow into the sea, losing their identity as they do 
so, the rivers themselves never cease to exist or disappear.112 This constitutes a 
subtle echoing of Bernard’s imagery. Just as the Cistercian follows his metaphor 
with the insistence that the soul’s substance, though transformed, ‘manebit 
quidem,’ so too the implications of Porete’s example suggest that the river 
remains, physically established and evocative of the annihilated soul on earth, 
and yet part of a larger chain of events that will ultimately take it to its 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 An earlier example of this metaphor occurs in chapter 61 of the Mirouer: ‘car d’autant 
comme il y a a dire d’une goute d’eaue envers toute la mer, qui est moult grant, autant a il a 
dire du premier estat de grace envers le second’, ch. 61, p. 176. ‘As one might compare a drop of 
water to the total ocean, which is very great, so one might speak of the difference between the 
first stage of grace and the second,’ Mirror, p. 138.  
110 Kocher, Allegories of Love, p. 10. Instances of natural and geographical imagery occur, for 
example, in chapter 9: ‘Ceste Ame […] si siet en la vallée d’Umilité, et en la plane de Verité, et se 
repouse en la Montaigne d’Amour.’ Mirouer, ch. 9, p. 34. ‘This Soul […] sits in the valley of 
Humility and on the plain of Truth, and rests on the mountain of Love.’ Mirror, p. 87. Also 
chapter 80: ‘Ceste Ame a apparceu par divine lumiere l’estre du pays dont elle doit estre, et a 
passé la mer, pour succer la mouelle du hault cedre. Car nul ne prent ne n’ataint a ceste mouelle, 
s’il ne passe la haulte mer, et se il ne noye sa voulenté es ondes d’icelle.’ Mirouer, ch. 80, p. 226. 
‘This Soul has perceived by divine light the being of the land of which she must be. And [she] 
has crossed the sea in order to suck the marrow of the high cedar. For no one receives or attains 
this marrow if he does not cross this high sea, if he does not plunge his will into the waves.’ 
Mirror, p. 155. For other allusions to geographical and natural imagery, see chapters 54, 91, 95, 
98, 123, 124.  
111 As discussed in Chapter Two, Marguerite Porete was most likely from the province of 
Hainault in north western France (now Wallonia, part of modern Belgium). The Aisne forms the 
left-bank tributary of the River Oise, which in turn forms a right-bank tributary of the River 
Seine. The source of the Oise is in Hainault province, to the south east of Valenciennes. See also 
Lerner ‘New Light.’ 
112 Marguerite likens the river to the soul that loses its name in chapters 82-83: ‘Vous avez de ce 
pour ce assez exemple, pour gloser l’entente comment ceste Ame vint de mer, et eut nom; et 
comment elle rentre en mer, et ainsi pert son nom, et n’en a point, fors le nom de celluy,’ 
Mirouer, ch. 82, p. 236. ‘You have from this enough of an example to gloss the intention of how 
this Soul came from the sea and had a name, and how she returns into the sea and so loses her 
name and has a name no longer, except for the name of Him,’ Mirror, p. 158.  
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promised source.113 As such, the entailments of Marguerite’s metaphor imply 
that what the Mirouer is indicating is not a ‘consciousness of indistinction’, but 
rather a subtler notion whereby metaphor allows for the Soul’s spiritual or 
affective ability to imagine her mystical and cosmic relation to the divine, whilst 
maintaining the enduring distinction between man and God.  
 
Read in this light, l’Ame’s statement that ‘tel estre fait avoir une amour et 
ung vouloir et une oeuvre en deux natures’ resonates with Bernard’s expression. 
In the same way, in the De diligendo Deo, the promised union of the human and 
the divine is decribed as: ‘nothing less, but also nothing more, than a perfect 
accord between the will of the human substance and the will of the Divine 
substance, in a strict distinction of the substances and the wills.’114 In spanning 
the divide between the literal and the figurative, the imagery of the river and 
the seas allows for a ‘double-vision’ of both geographic reality and mystical 
metaphor in which, providing both are understood correctly, both mystic and 
audience are allowed to cognitively grasp what is being conveyed. The ‘rivers’ 
and the ‘sea’ are indeed two substances, or two ‘natures’, but it is the ‘flow’ 
from one to the other, and the symbiotic relationship between the two, that 
Marguerite expresses as being of ‘one work.’ Total deification is not an 
entailment of this metaphor, only the imaginative possibility of the soul’s 
capacity to conceptualise her union with the divine.  
 
In her recent linguistic study of the Mirouer, Wendy Terry draws 
attention to Porete’s grammatical structuring in these metaphors of union.115  
Terry notes that, in all of Porete’s expressions of union with the divine, the 
verbs relating to the Soul are passive: ‘le fer est vestu du feu, et a la semblance 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 Liber de diligendo Deo, p. 143. ‘Will indeed remain.’ On Loving God, p. 30.  
114 Mirouer, ch. 52, p. 154. ‘Such being makes me have one love and one will and one work in 
two natures.’ Mirror, p. 130. Gilson, The Mystical Theology of St Bernard, p. 125.  
115 Wendy Rachele Terry, Seeing Marguerite in the Mirror: A Linguistic Analysis of Porete’s ‘Mirror 
of Simple Souls’ (Leuven: Peeters, 2011), especially pp. 127-129.  
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perdue de luy, pource que le feu est le plus fort qui l’a mue<e> en luy’ [my 
emphasis].116 Even when the metaphor suggests total absorptive union between 
the Soul and the divine, the agency of the activity remains distinct from its 
subject: 
Le sourhaulcement ravissable qui me sourprent et joinct au 
millieu de la mouelle de Divine Amour en quoy je suis fondue, 
dit ceste Ame; c’est donc droit qu’il me souviengne de luy, car 
je suis remise en luy.117  
 
Not only does Porete conceptualise the divine and the Soul as separate 
substances, or as having separate structural (or corporeal) identities in the 
metaphor of the river and the sea, she is also consistent in asserting that it is 
God, not the Soul, who is responsible for her annihilation. One constituent of 
the partnership is transformed by another in a process that may be likened to 
the interaction suggested by cognitive metaphor theory between the source and 
target domains. Just as the target domain is partially transformed by its contact 
with, and appropriation of, certain elements of the source domain, so too 
Porete’s Soul is partly transformed by the activity of the divine within her.   
 
As the opening chapter discussed, which particular aspects of a source 
domain are mapped onto the corresponding target domain may be influenced 
by any number of contextual factors. In the metaphors of mystical union in the 
Mirouer, Marguerite Porete is careful to control the mappings generated 
between the Soul and the divine by repeatedly figuring the Soul in a lower, 
subservient position relative to God. The Soul is ‘une riviere’ to the ‘mer’ that is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 Mirouer, ch. 52, p. 152; ‘iron invested with fire which has lost its own semblance because the 
fire is stronger and thus transforms the iron into itself.’ Mirror, p. 130 [my emphasis].  
117 Mirouer, ch. 80, p. 228 ‘The Ravishing Most High who overtakes me and joins me to the 
center of the marrow of divine Love in whom I am melted, says this Soul. Thus it is right that 
He come to my aid of Himself, for I am dissolved in Him.’ Mirror, pp. 155-156.  
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God; ‘une mauvaisté’ to the ‘bonté’ that is the divine.118  The Soul is permitted 
to appropriate some of the greater qualities of God, and therefore may 
perceives herself to have been taken into a higher and transformed state, but, 
within the remit of the text at least, this transformation is never seen to fully 
take place.  
 
One of the purposes of the Mirouer is to convey this sense of transformed 
metaphorical self to the reader. Although the text makes frequent reference to 
those who will not understand the subtleties of Dame Amour’s discourse, there 
is an implicit notion that a community of similar ames adnientie also exists with 
whom the Soul identifies, and who are also privy to the mystical secrets of the 
text.119 Exemplifying how the annihilation of the Soul comes about, the text calls 
on those who are also able to ‘see metaphorically’ to join with l’Ame and Dame 
Amour and undergo a similar transformation of literal to mystical vision. Both 
the theme and the content of Porete’s narrative involve the explicit application 
of the truths communicated by its protagonists to the imagined reality of her 
reader, inviting them to join the Soul in a metaphorically parallel vision, in ‘une 
aultre vie.’120  
 
In his analysis of the text, Patrick Wright remarks that ‘the book, the 
image, the soul, the love and the lover are all self-reflecting mirrors.’121 Yet, as 
this chapter has sought to demonstrate, this statement both reduces the potency 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 Mirouer, ch. 130, pp. 372-374. Mirror, pp. 210-211.  
119 See, for example, the Mirouer’s prologue, in which an ‘authorial voice’ can be heard: ‘Et 
pource nous vous dirons […]’ and later, in chapter three, Dame Amour begins: ‘Pource ycy 
commencerons […].’ The voice of l’Acteur, which is occasionally assumed to be that of 
Marguerite, makes only one appearance in the Mirouer. However its use of ‘nous’ suggests that 
the authorial voice, together with those of l’Ame and Dame Amour, constitutes part of a wider 
community, all of whom have attainted the state of annihilated perfection. See Mirouer, p. 14 
and p. 16. Mirror, p. 81. Kocher discusses the figure of ‘l’acteur’ and the dangers of conflating 
this figure with the historical Marguerite Porete in Allegories of Love, p. 167. See also Müller, 
Marguerite Porete et Marguerite d’Oingt, p. 62.  
120 Mirouer, ch. 5, p. 18. Mirror, p. 82.  
121 Patrick Wright, ‘Marguerite Porete’s Mirror of Simple Souls and the Subject of Annihilation,’ 
Mystics Quarterly, 35, 3-4 (2009): 63-98. Here at pp. 72-73.  
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of metaphorical thought and gives no agency to the divine, the source from 
which, Porete suggests, all entities emanate, and to which all must return. 
Rather, the Mirouer is a study in the potentiality of the metaphorical 
imagination. It is not a record of claimed ‘experience,’ nor does not imply that ‘a 
perfected state of oneness is possible with God in this life.’122 Instead it points to 
‘a shift in the centre of [the Soul’s] awareness from the self to a point beyond 
the self,’ a point between the reality of the self and its ‘true’ representation in 
the mirror.123 It is within this third realm of perceived reality, that of the 
metaphor, that union between the ame adnientie and God occurs. Towards the 
close of the text, the Soul sings the words: ‘Si beste estoie.’124 Grammatically, the 
tense has changed from the present to the past, and yet she continues to speak. 
This encapsulates the very essence of the ame adnientie. Caught in the liminal 
space between the terrestrial and the celestial, she is both of the world and its 
imagery and not. Presence and absence, mediation and immanence, bounded 
and unbounded, distinct and indistinct: the Soul becomes a space in which, like 
the text she narrates, all of these possibilities can be encountered 
simultaneously and without conflict. 
 
Marguerite’s Mirouer does not guide its reader towards an 
understanding of mystical experience by means of metaphorical descriptions of 
objects, nor does it purport to offer an account of a realisation of mystical 
knowledge that is tangibly related to the physical world of lay religiosity at the 
turn of the fourteenth century. Rather, Porete’s work presses for the realisation 
of a perceptive intelligence, in both the Soul and her reader, which is able to 
make judgements about humanity’s relationship to the divine based on feeling 
and aesthetic sense, as opposed to reason and logic. The text argues for a 
mysticism grounded in intuition and specularity, free from empirical universals 
or conceptions. In this sense, Mark McIntosh remarks, there is a quality to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 Wright, ‘Marguerite Porete’s Mirror,’ p. 65.  
123 Louis Dupré, ‘The Christian Experience of Mystical Union,’ The Journal of Religion, 69, 1 
(January 1989): 1-13. Here at p. 4.  
124 Mirouer, ch. 122, p. 340. ‘Such a beast I was,’ Mirror, p. 198. 
	  	   217	  
Marguerite Porete’s mystical expression that is remarkably both of its time and 
yet indicative of a postmodern mode of thought and anthropology.125  It is at 
once an account of the Soul’s existence and its desire to remove those 
boundaries of existence; a call both to consciousness and pre-consciousness, 
participating in a constant process of becoming metaphorically ‘other.’  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 McIntosh, Mystical Theology, pp. 213-224, especially p. 222.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
Making the Ineffable Intelligible: The Image and the Imagination in 
Mystical Metaphor 
 
Marguerite Porete’s appeal to move beyond the boundaries of fixed 
reference or perception is at odds with the aim of many modern discussions of 
mystical literature, which are often characterised by a drive to arrange the 
material into thematic or subject-specific groupings or genres.1 One dominant 
perspective within this discourse is predicated on a particularly sensitive issue; 
the extent to which mystical expression points towards a ‘real’ or fictitious 
experience. The earlier discussions of Marguerite d’Oingt’s and Marguerite 
Porete’s writings, articulated through the lens of modern metaphor theory, 
observe that, in very different ways, these two women’s works do not fit easily 
with modern notions of truth and fiction.  
 
In drawing together these observations, this final chapter has a number 
of aims. The first is to reinsert d’Oingt’s and Porete’s writings into current 
scholarly debates concerning medieval mystical literature. In doing so, it 
suggests that the academy’s desire to overly-categorise mystical writing is both 
distorting and unfounded. A survey of the ways in which d’Oingt’s and 
Porete’s works engage with, or break away from, a number of diverse critical 
paradigms demonstrates that certain modern literary models provide an 
insufficiently nuanced methodology with which to categorise mystical thought.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See Newman, ‘What Did It Mean To Say “I Saw”?,’ especially pp. 1-2, for an overview of the 
ways in which Newman regards modern criticism of mystical writings as having ‘tended to 
break down along disciplinary lines.’ Newman states that literary critics ‘have turned to 
medieval dream theory,’ whilst ‘scholars of spirituality and gender have examined visionary 
writers as a group’ and anthropologists and ‘theorists of religion have produced transhistorical 
[…] studies that include medieval sources within a broader analysis of the vision as a form of 
religious experience,’ p. 2. See also Hollywood, ‘Introduction.’ 
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Instead, it is possible to replace this concern to identify fixed categories with 
another line of enquiry, namely a heightened emphasis on the cognitive 
faculties as recognised within the medieval worldview, and reviewing them 
through a modern lens whose contours are formed by the exigencies of 
cognitive metaphor theory. The resulting discussion proposes that when 
cognitive models of reason, the imagination, image and impression are 
explored with reference to spiritual expression, the conclusions drawn demand 
a re-evaluation of what is meant by truth, fiction, and authenticity in the field of 
mystical writing. The hermeneutic model offered by cognitive and conceptual 
metaphor theory, this chapter suggests, provides an alternative perspective 
from which to approach these issues, engaging with the medieval text and its 
invitation to new modes of thought, understanding, and ‘imaginative 
rationality.’ 
 
In modern literary terms, the dominant method of categorisation is one 
of genre. Until quite recently, scholars of mysticism have been content to 
distinguish its written testimony as belonging, broadly speaking, to one of two 
genres, classified by Peter Dinzelbacher as ‘erlebte Visionen’ (experienced 
visions), and ‘literarische Visionen’  (literary visions). 2  According to 
Dinzelbacher’s thesis, the first of these is characterised as relating to a singular 
transportation to heaven or hell during which the visionary experiences a vivid 
and realistic journey which, in turn, produces a conversion of life. The second 
genre, Dinzelbacher contends, was more prevalent in the later Middle Ages, 
portraying consciously prepared experiences that are highly emotive, less 
geographically specific, concern multiple encounters with heavenly figures, and 
are more receptive to allegorical interpretation. His study makes use of these 
two typologies of revelation to hint at a third ‘type,’ in which elements of the 
experienced vision merge with and borrow from the literary narrative, and vice 
versa, but he does not explore this in any depth. Arguably, this third ‘type’ of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Peter Dinzelbacher, Vision und Visionsliteratur im Mittelalter, Monographien zur Geschichte des 
Mittelalters, 23 (Stuttgart: Anton Hiersemann, 1981).  
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mystical articulation would have been the most fruitful for Dinzelbacher to 
interrogate further. The implication that visionary literature both draws on, and 
is reflective of, differing spectrums of experience and modes of thought is a 
suggestive one and deserves more attention. 
 
Given mysticism’s propensity towards apparent paradox; the authorial 
voices that deny their authorship, the articulations of experience that question 
their state of experiential consciousness, and the despair at the unsuitability of 
language as a vehicle for communication (even as mystics employ language to 
do so), it is not surprising that binarisms have emerged in the analytical drive to 
understand mystical literature. However, this study’s assessment of the 
metaphorical language in the writing of both Marguerite d’Oingt and 
Marguerite Porete points not towards a need for divisions and classification in 
mystical writing, but rather towards continuity in the mystical mode of 
expression. Where previous critics have emphasised polarity, these writers’ 
works can be placed on a scale of mystical cognition, the conceptual framework 
of which is structured by ‘imaginative rationality’ and ‘imaginative theology.’3 
 
 Despite the troubled relationship between visionary and mystical 
experience discussed in the Introduction, literary scholars frequently couple 
medieval mysticism with the genre of the dream vision under an all-
encompassing label of ‘visionary writing.’4 As categories, both the dream and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 ‘Imaginative rationality’ is a label given to the cognitive structuring of metaphor by George 
Lakoff and Mark Johnson in Metaphors We Live By, p. 192. It is discussed in further detail in 
Chapters One and Three. ‘Imaginative theology’ is a phrase coined by Newman in God and the 
Goddesses; see, in particular, pp. 292-301. Her terminology is discussed in further detail at the 
end of this chapter.  
4 A. C. Spearing, for example, describes mystical works as ‘scriptural and Christian visions,’ 
which, on occasion are used as ‘other-world vision[s] for theological and political polemic.’ He 
does not distinguish between the dream and the vision, preferring to see the two as sub-genres 
of the same broader category of literature. See Medieval Dream-Poetry (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1976), pp. 11-14. Steven Kruger, meanwhile, posits a binary opposition of 
divine and mundane dreams, into which, like Dinzelbacher, he also inserts a ‘middle vision,’ 
which blends features of both genres. However like Spearing, Kruger does not specify how and 
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the vision often share certain characteristics: both appeal to the unconscious or 
transcendent mind, feature a narrator guided by a spiritual or intellectual 
authority, and appear to resolve irreconcilable dilemmas of the terrestrial or 
waking world. Such comparisons of mystical writings to dream visions often 
centre on the state of human consciousness at the time of the experience and, by 
extension, implicitly or explicitly, the authenticity of the experience being 
related. One approach, for example, has been to stress the role of dreams in 
drawing the marvellous and the fantastical into the real world, connecting them 
with a person, a time, and a place, while providing their readership or audience 
with an accountable explanation of the illusions of sleep.5 Yet herein lies a 
problem. When contrasted to this dream ‘reality,’ mysticism is seen to represent 
the articulation of a symbolised or allegorical experience, divorced from the 
‘real’ world and unconnected to explicable states of consciousness such as sleep. 
According to this paradigm, these two modes of revelation, the dream vision 
and the mystical vision, are seen as representing two antithetical literary forms 
the essence of which is reducible to a simple binary of fact and fiction, or, 
‘experienced’ and ‘literary.’  
 
 A comparison of Marguerite d’Oingt’s Christocentric, tangible and 
visceral use of metaphor with the more lyrical and allegorical qualities of 
Marguerite Porete’s Mirouer appears, at first glance, to reinforce this distinction. 
The Carthusian’s visionary writing is grounded in what Richard Kieckhefer 
calls a ‘liturgical realism,’ an extreme correlation between the events of the 
liturgy and the physical states perceived and experienced by the visionary 
protagonist.6 Her references to the dates on which the visionary experiences 
occurred and to specific physical locations at the time of the visions she 
recounts; of being in the church during mass and at prayer before the altar and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
when the genre of the dream ends and mystical truth begins. See Dreaming in the Middle Ages 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), in particular p. 129.  
5 See E. V. Gordon’s introduction to Pearl, ed. E. V. Gordon (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), pp. 
xiv-xv, for an example of this perspective. Dreams, Gordon suggests, ‘represent some sense of 
reality – some real event described in the language of allegory.’ 
6 Kieckhefer, Unquiet Souls, p. 92.  
	  	   222	  
at matins, and to Béatrix eating with her community in the refectory, or lying 
alone in her cell, situate her protagonists’ spiritual journeys within a 
chronologically defined, material space, whilst her figurative imagery is deeply 
rooted in the dominant devotional trends of her age. The images that catalyse 
and provide her visions with symbolic significance: the crucified Christ on the 
cross, the codex decorated in the colours of the Passion, the ascetic suffering 
depicted in her hagiography of Béatrix, and the graphic imagery of the 
Eucharist that transforms into the flesh of Christ, are carefully constructed so as 
to provide a meditative account based variously on an appeal to the 
imagination, the rational intellect, and the emotions.  
 
 Literary form and content echo each other across Marguerite d’Oingt’s 
corpus. Her writing contains, and is framed and contextualised by, the holy 
book of Scripture in the same way that her experience and her account of 
Béatrix’s experience find shape and meaning in the experience of Christ. The 
apotheosis of the book and the body, in the form of both Christ’s and Béatrix’s 
suffering flesh, becomes a means through which to express the visionary 
mysteries of the divine, the corporeal nature of the flesh and the codex 
providing a tangible structure and sequence to the otherwise inexpressible. 
Throughout the Pagina, the Speculum and the Via Seiti Biatrix, Marguerite 
creatively manipulates concepts of colour, spatial relations, and aspectual or 
‘event-structuring concepts,’ as Lakoff and Johnson call them, to give an 
impression of tactile reality to her expression.7 
 
Such a decidedly material experience of Christocentric ecstasy, in which 
the mind is guided by means of emotionally charged allegorical comparisons 
(such as the wounded body, and the codex inscribed in red and black ink) not 
only suggests a realism and authenticity to Marguerite d’Oingt’s experience, 
but also something of who might share in this experience, and how. An 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Lakoff and Johnson, Philosophy In the Flesh, especially pp. 16-36.  
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audience participating in a similar liturgical environment may also 
conceptually configure a corresponding schema out of the same physical 
symbols, and engage their own cognitive faculties in pursuit of similar spiritual 
encounters. In creating her liturgical systematicity, Marguerite shapes a 
coherent model in terms of the expression of her own visions, and with respect 
to their subsequent reception. The metaphors of her text echo and resonate with 
each other, creating a conceptual map that both protagonist and audience can 
navigate by means of a joint participation and a shared lived experience in the 
events and narratives of the liturgy.  
 
This sense of realism is heightened by Marguerite d’Oingt’s framing of 
her protagonists’ spiritual experiences with physically manifested states of 
human consciousness and emotion. Her visionaries feel and respond to fear 
(‘pavorum’) and pain (‘dolorem’), sleep ‘en bona pays,’ faint, and, even when 
experiencing the heights of spiritual ecstasy, do so in relation to the conceptual 
and material awareness of their human selves: 
illi remaneyt en si grant consolacion y en si grant joy de cuor de 
la vision et del granz secrez de son bon creatour que a bein po 
que illi se sentievet corporalment, mais li eret ades vyayres que 
illi deffallit del cors et se sentivet come en espirit.8 
 
 Marguerite d’Oingt’s emphasis on materiality, her use of chronological 
and liturgical structures, the location of her experiences within a navigable 
spatial setting, and her use of metaphorical imagery drawn from biblical and 
exegetical motifs, centring on the themes of embodiment and the embodied 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Li via seiti Biatrix, p. 128, §104; ‘because of the vision and great secrets of her good Creator, she 
experienced such great consolation and joy that it hardly seemed to her that she was fainting 
and she had the impression that she was only spirit.’ The Life of the Virgin Saint Beatrice, p. 58. 
Earlier in the Via, Marguerite narrates a instance during which Béatrix saw the saints ‘non […] 
pas des heuz corporaz mays en spirit; et veit son cors el leit a bein po semblablo al cors mort.’ Le 
via seiti Biatrix, p. 118, §81. ‘[But she saw them] not physically, but spiritually; and she saw her 
own body in the bed, and it looked like a dead body.’ The Life of the Virgin Saint Beatrice, p. 54.  
	  	   224	  
mind, invite a strong sense of empathy, a ‘vital cognitive faculty’ and a crucial 
facet in metaphoric processing.9 Metaphor, in this sense, functions not only as a 
linguistic mode of expression, but also precisely as described by cognitive 
metaphor theorists: as a means of structuring more abstract target domains of 
experience, and in turn providing a means by which an audience might imagine 
the reality of Marguerite d’Oingt’s spiritual theology.   
 
These observations suggest that Marguerite d’Oingt’s literary oeuvre fits 
comfortably into the category of ‘authentic’ visionary literature outlined 
above.10  The dominant features in all three of her visionary accounts can be 
correlated with Barbara Newman’s description of ‘authentic’ visionary 
literature as frequently including episodes of revelation and journeys into the 
otherworld, as well as accounts taken from ‘spiritual diaries.’ 11  To read 
d’Oingt’s writing, with its blend of recounted human states of consciousness 
with the authority of scripture, as an example of ‘authentic’ experience is, 
however, to expose it to a second, and in this context, recurrent, series of 
questions concerning the extent to which language, recounted truths, and 
spiritual experience reflect an objective account of reality. Although the case has 
been made here for a recontextualist approach to mystical writing, in so far as a 
text’s historiographical context sheds light on its internal composition and its 
external dissemination and reception, schematising an otherwise arbitrary 
‘montage of events into spiritual autobiography’ is deeply problematic, 
particularly with regard to how the text’s metaphorical language functions as 
vehicle for the cognitive practices at stake. 12 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Lakoff and Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh, p. 565. 
10 Newman discusses the genres of ‘authentic’ and ‘fictional’ visionary literature in God and the 
Goddesses, pp. 26-33.  
11 Newman, God and the Goddesses, p. 26.  
12 Denise Despres, Ghostly Signs: Visual Meditation in Late-Medieval Literature (Norman, OK: 
Pilgrim Books, 1989), p. 20. Kieckhefer also notes the proliferation of potentially unreliable 
autobiographical detail in fourteenth-century saints’ vitae. See Unquiet Souls, pp. 4-7.  
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Despite the sprinkling of autobiographical features in d’Oingt’s texts, 
which root the narrative in a medieval monastic historicity, the dominant 
metaphor across her corpus of writings is that of Christ’s life, suffering and 
Passion. It is only through this biblical biography of Christ that the reader is 
able to imagine, in accordance with the semantic limitations that metaphor 
involves, the figures of d’Oingt and her protagonists, and to shape a cognitive 
map that re-orders the protagonist’s life into a corresponding pattern of 
Christological self-knowledge and revelation. Within Christian exemplary 
literature, the use of Christ’s life as an exegetical trope is a common one. What 
is more problematic here, however, is that a reader’s perception of Marguerite 
d’Oingt’s visionary protagonists may be too closely aligned with the beatific or 
mystical vision being related to be accurately described as ‘authentic,’ if, indeed, 
‘authentic’ equates to biographical account.   
 
Terms such as ‘autobiography’ in a discussion of the ‘authenticity’ of 
Marguerite d’Oingt’s discourse need to be used with caution. Denise Despres, 
for example, in her study of visual meditation in the later medieval period, 
tempers her use of the expression ‘spiritual autobiography’ by suggesting that a 
suitable synonym might be ‘exemplary fiction,’ designed to be imaginatively 
and conceptually, but not factually, true. In her discussion of the mystical genre 
and its reception, Despres’ focus on the cognitive function of the imagination is 
extremely helpful in its suggestion of an alternative framework to the 
descriptive categories of ‘authentic’ and ‘fictional’ visions. However, Despres 
does not quite adhere to her observations. Later in her study, she establishes a 
correlation between ‘authentic’ experiences and ‘details from personal 
experience’ which embellish accounts derived from Scripture in mystical 
thought, and thereby misinterprets the purpose and function of the mystical 
text.  
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This is not to suggest that the personal details added to these texts in 
order to validate the visions, or to place them in context are to be discarded 
entirely. However, to regard Marguerite d’Oingt’s writing as indicative of some 
form of ‘reality’ is problematic on a further two counts. First, notions of 
‘authenticity’ and ‘autobiography’ are antithetical to the mystical genre, with its 
emphasis on the dissolution of the self in favour of experience of the divine; an 
image used to particular effect in Marguerite Porete’s mystical prose. Whilst 
d’Oingt frames her accounts of visionary experience with personal details, these 
contextual descriptors serve primarily as catalysts for the visionary’s entry into 
the celestial, or divine, realm. Mystical ‘authenticity’ does not equate to fact, 
reality, or objectivity. Rather, it is a lens through which to structure cognition 
and perception; a mode of seeing as opposed to seeing itself.  
 
There is a certain irony in viewing Marguerite d’Oingt’s mystical writing 
as a portrayal of authentic or autobiographical experience. As the analysis of 
her texts has demonstrated, the details of each of her visionary experiences are 
almost wholly derived from scriptural or exegetical precedents. These extra-
textual allusions contribute, Newman suggests, to the visionary’s ‘truth-claims’; 
the validity of her vision depends on the ‘learned weight of allegorical, 
scriptural, theological, and scientific exegesis.’13 However, they do so in a way 
not explored by Newman in God and the Goddesses. By drawing on scriptural 
precedent, Marguerite d’Oingt is not making ‘truth-claims’ but rather is 
extending an invitation to her audience to participate in what might be called 
‘belief-claims.’ This idea stems from the earlier discussion of Chapter One 
regarding the interrelated systematicity of language and cognition and the 
limitations of its inherent ‘open-endedness.’ Arguably Marguerite d’Oingt 
utilises figurative imagery, or metaphor, from scriptural precedent in order to 
articulate lacunae in a narrative that she cannot otherwise explain, but for 
which the cognitive processes of the imagination can substitute.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Newman, God and the Goddesses, p. 302.  
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 Chapter One proposed that metaphor possesses the capability to conjure 
meaning for the person hearing the metaphor without that individual ever 
having come into contact with the source domain, and knowing only something 
of the target domain. In Marguerite d’Oingt’s case, this might, in theory, apply 
to any of the scriptural metaphors she employs in order to describe her 
experience of the ineffable. For example, not all of the nuns in her order would 
have been trained as scribes, but, as Chapter Two has demonstrated, they 
would have had sufficient exposure to writing practices to imagine and process 
the metaphor of the inscribed heart and its relationship to the codex of Christ in 
the Speculum.  Thus, not only does metaphor processing involve the mapping of 
the source domain onto that of the target, to use Lakoff and Johnson’s 
terminology, in order to find ways to imagine, contextualise, and relate to the 
indescribable experience, but so too, within the cognizance of the target, certain 
gaps in experiential knowledge can be filled by the imagination and by the 
belief that those imagined details are true (or false). If the person processing the 
metaphor does not believe certain properties of both the target and source 
domains to be true, then any discussion of intended or implied meaning 
becomes redundant; the ‘truth-claim’ of the mystical discourse loses its claim to 
authority. As Monroe C. Beardsley notes: 
 [although] in part the connotations of the word [the target 
domain] derive from what is generally true of the objects [from 
which the target is literally derived], they do not coincide 
completely. For the connotations are controlled not only by the 
properties the object actually has, but by those it is widely 
believed to have – even if the belief is false (original emphasis).14 
 
What might be deduced from Beardsley’s observations is that whilst one 
of the supporting pillars of metaphor is truth, its foundations are constituted by 
belief. If these observations are applied to the discussion of ‘authenticity’ and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Beardsley, ‘The Metaphorical Twist,’ p. 107.   
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‘truth-claims’ in Marguerite d’Oingt’s writing, it becomes clear that at both a 
linguistic and a conceptual level, her visionary literature is not a product of, 
and nor does it purport to engage with, modern notions of objective reality. 
‘Authentic’ experience as related by d’Oingt is metaphorical and used to 
structure ineffable experience, not the other way around. An analysis of 
Marguerite d’Oingt’s three mystical testimonies problematizes Dinzelbacher’s 
‘erlebte Visionen’ in more ways than it clarifies his categories, and, in this 
instance, Marguerite Porete’s Mirouer des simples ames does little to recalibrate 
those distinctions between ‘authentic’ and ‘fictional’ mystical prose.  
 
 If Marguerite d’Oingt’s text is an exponent of metaphorical ‘liturgical 
realism,’ then Marguerite Porete’s mystical writing might appear to constitute 
its counter opposite. Porete’s dialogic prose is set within an unspecified, 
imaginary location in a continuous present tense without chronological or 
grammatical indications as to its timeframe. As Suzanne Kocher notes, the 
Mirouer possesses a frameless quality, without physical description of its 
characters or landscape, which functions to situate the text in the cognitive 
landscape of the mind, where the characters’ voices act as personifications of 
the soul’s mental faculties in her spiritual progression towards the divine.15 It is 
this emphasis on cognition that draws Marguerite Porete’s writing and 
conceptualisation of mystical experience into a reciprocal dialogue with the 
very different visionary literature of Marguerite d’Oingt.  
 
 Marguerite Porete’s experimentation with literary conventions causes 
her text to appear as an exemplary model of Dinzelbacher’s ‘literarische 
Visionen.’ Borrowing heavily from a diverse range of both ancient and 
contemporary styles and motifs, from biblical, patristic, and twelfth-century 
exegesis to contemporary romance, Porete’s text is perhaps more accessible to 
modern scholars as a self-conscious manifestation of literary art, or, more 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Kocher, Allegories of Love, p. 10.  
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precisely, of abstract pastiche. The impulse to shape narratives from earlier 
sources, both oral and written, and to choose elements from a wide range of 
literary styles and genres, from hagiography to dream vision, and from 
romance to chronicle, to name just a few, is commonplace in medieval literary 
composition.16 Yet whilst deciphering Porete’s inter- and extra-textual allusions, 
her targets of satire, and her sources of inspiration is no less challenging a 
prospect than determining the implications of her religious experience, it is 
perhaps more comfortable for modern scholars to focus on the fictional nature 
and literary composition of texts such as Porete’s than it is to explore the 
ramifications of her intellectual and spiritual claims.17  
 
Recent efforts undertaken to reveal Porete’s literary sources are 
fundamental to the advance of more philosophical approaches. However, the 
function of Porete’s self-consciously literary style has more to do with the 
intended cognitive processing of her mystical articulation than has been 
recognised. The purpose of her abstract style, dialogic form, literary borrowings, 
and use of metaphor, is not purely for artistic effect. Rather, the aesthetic 
qualities of the Mirouer’s use of metaphor mirror its spiritual rationale, 
permitting an audience to imagine, if not directly experience, something of the 
transcendent.  
 
This sense of otherworldliness derives, in large part, from Marguerite 
Porete’s neo-Platonic metaphors of eminence and return. Over the course of her 
spiritual progression towards the mystical seventh stage of unity with the 
divine, the Ame is described as ‘fluans et decourans de la Divinité,’ or ‘fondue’; 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Newman notes the ‘impulse towards artistic refinement’ in medieval vision texts. She writes: 
‘the popularity of visions as a literary genre encouraged a nearly irresistible tendency to 
improve on experience, or at times to invent it from whole cloth. This impulse can be discerned 
in both highly stylized, formulaic texts and strikingly original, idiosyncratic ones. We see one 
tendency in the saints’ lives, where the subject’s visions often conform so closely to 
conventional types […] that their authenticity is impossible to gauge.’ ‘What Did It Mean To 
Say “I Saw”?,’ p. 4.  
17 See Newman, God and the Goddesses, p. 300; From Virile Woman To WomanChrist, pp. 246-247.  
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terms that suggest a distinct absence of materiality. The annihilated soul is 
‘franche,’ ‘descombree de toutes choses’ by the ‘muance d’amour.’18 These 
descriptions of states of transience combine with the soul being cast as a series 
of entities associated with movement, such as an eagle or a river, in order to 
create a protagonist whose identity appears constantly in flux, both internally, 
to her fellow interlocutor, Raison, and externally, to the audience or readership. 
Porete’s use of grammar and syntax is also formulated to showcase l’Ame’s 
mutability in her relationship both to and with the Divine. The following 
passage, taken from chapter 118, illustrates the verbal, nominal and syntactical 
fluctuation of l’Ame during her interaction with God at the fifth stage: 
Or, a ce qui n’est fors en mauvaistié, qui est donc toute 
mauvaistié, est dedans luy enclos franche voulenté de l’estre 
de Dieu […] Et pource espant la divine Bonté par devant ung 
espandement ravissable du mouvement de divine Lumiere. 
Lequel mouvement de divine Lumiere, qui est dedans l’Ame 
espandu par lumiere […] <…> du lieu la ou il est, ou il ne doit 
pas estre, pour le remectre la ou il n’est, dont il vint […].19 
 
In semantic terms, both the Soul and the Divine are depicted in this 
passage in a reciprocal relationship based on fluidity and symbiosis. What was 
‘en mauvaistié’ is now in a state of flux, ‘espandu par lumiere.’ The syntax also 
mirrors this shift from enclosure to overflow, the final clauses paralleling and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Mirouer, ch. 28, p. 96; ‘flowing and running out of the Divinity,’ Mirror, p. 109. Mirouer, ch. 80, 
p. 228; ‘melted,’ Mirror, p. 155. Mirouer, ch. 85, p. 240; ‘free,’ Mirror, p. 160. Mirouer, ch. 60, p. 
176; ‘unencumbered from all things,’ Mirror, p. 138. Mirouer, ch. 118, p. 332; ‘transformation of 
love,’ Mirror, p. 194.  
19 Mirouer, ch. 118, p. 324. The lacuna signaled by the brackets, <…>, marks an omission in Ms. 
Chantilly, Musee Condé, XIV F 26. In Verdeyen’s Corpus Christianorum Continuatio 
Mediaevalis Latin edition, this is rendered as ‘ad mouendum uelle animae’, Speculum, p. 325. 
Babinsky translates the extract as follows: ‘Thus enclosed within the one who is not except in 
wretchedness, who is therefore total wretchedness, is free will from the being of God who is 
Being […] And thus the Divine Goodness pours out from (His) bosom one rapturous overflow 
of the movement of Divine Light. Such movement of Divine Light, which is poured into the 
soul by light […] in order to move the will of the soul from the place where it now is, where it 
ought not to be, in order to dissolve it where it is not, whence it comes […].’ Mirror, p. 191.  
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contradicting each other by turn. It is this emphasis on mutation and 
transformation that gives the text its abstract quality, and contributes to 
Kocher’s conclusion that the Mirouer’s action is placed ‘in a spiritual rather than 
a material domain, the inner rather than the outer, the contemplative rather 
than the active, the soul or mind rather than the body.’20 However, Kocher’s 
suggestions that material references are used ‘mainly as a starting block from 
which to push away,’ and that the sense of abstraction is derived from a theme 
of ‘bodilessness,’ which in turn ‘facilitates descriptions of the Soul’s 
disappearance into God,’ are disputable.  
 
As the previous chapter established, Marguerite Porete’s text does not 
present physicality in the same way as other thirteenth-century women mystics. 
The distinctive aspects of late medieval piety so prevalent in female-authored 
texts, including those by Marguerite d’Oingt, and brought under scrutiny by, in 
particular, Caroline Bynum’s and Sarah Beckwith’s studies, are largely absent 
from the Mirouer or, conversely, objects of derision by a Soul who mocks Saincte 
Eglise la Petite’s fixation with the materiality and performativity of the 
Scriptures and the Eucharist.21 Porete’s focus is the staged erosion and eventual 
annihilation of the speaking subject. In the lower stages of the soul’s trajectory 
towards God, the body is described as needing to be ‘pulverised’ (‘moulue’), ‘en 
deffroissant et debrisant,’ and that the ‘gros du corps est osté et diminué par 
oeuvres divines.’22 As a result, ‘[b]odily sensations, illness, visions, and physical 
martyrdom do not’, Kocher concludes, ‘figure in Porete’s stock of images and in 
her theology.’23 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Kocher, Allegories of Love, p. 181.  
21 Bynum, Holy Feast and Holy Fast, passim; Beckwith, Christ’s Body, passim. 
22 Mirouer, ch. 118, p. 322; ‘pulverized in breaking and bruising,’ Mirror, p. 190. Mirouer, ch. 65, 
p. 188; ‘grossness of the body is taken away and diminished by divine works.’ Mirror, p. 142.  
23 Kocher, Allegories of Love, p. 181 
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 There is, however, a distinctly physical essence to many of Porete’s 
metaphorical evocations of l’Ame, particularly those depicting the Soul’s 
relationship to the divine.  The comparators explored in the previous chapter, of 
the rivers flowing to the sea, and of iron melting in the fire, are not corporeal in 
the sense of possessing a human body.24 They do, however, exhibit qualities of 
form, substance and boundary, all of which are subject to patterns of spatiality, 
orientation, force, and composition; the very attributes Lakoff and Johnson 
assign to the embodied object. These, in turn, are the components that provide 
the metaphorical vocabulary with a coherence for aspects of thought processing, 
which, in this case, involves the post-experiential articulation of relations with 
the divine.25  
 
The description of l’Ame as ‘emprainte en Dieu, ainsi comme est la cire 
d’un seel,’ is a metaphor whose origins and development Mary Carruthers 
explores at length in The Book of Memory, and whose medieval entailments play 
an important role in this context.26 Carruthers demonstrates the importance of 
the seal-in-wax as a metaphorical representation of cognition and memory 
function in both classical and medieval thought, and ranging in meaning from a 
marker of ethical behaviour to the formation of character. 27  Consistent 
throughout the various philosophical, rhetorical, patristic and monastic uses of 
the metaphor that Carruthers analyses, however, is the notion that sealing wax, 
and by extension the wax tablet, is conceived of as a metaphor for embodied 
cognition. In the writings of Plato, Socrates, Cicero, Quintilian, Augustine, and 
others, wax functions as a visual representation of the mental faculties and as a 
vehicle for simultaneously pictorial and verbal memorial and cognitive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 See Mirouer, chapters 52 (iron and fire), and 82 (river and sea).  
25 Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, pp. 25-30; Philosophy in the Flesh, pp. 34-38.  
26 Carruthers, The Book of Memory. See p. 378, n. 48 for additional bibliography.  
27 See, for example, Hugh of St Victor’s metaphor of wax likened to novices undertaking their 
moral education in the De institutione novitiorum, Patrologia Latina, 176: 933B. See Carruthers, 
The Book of Memory, p. 89, for an English translation. 
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processing.28 Carruthers observes that as a metaphor for cognition, the seal is 
inherently visual, but, as a ‘model of inscription,’ it is also ‘verbal’ in nature, as 
in the case of writing on a wax tablet or stone surface.29  
 
The metaphorical entailments emanating from the figuring of wax as the 
source domain for the Ame are complex. The ‘seel,’ the Divine, creates the Ame, 
or the ‘cire,’ which becomes an embodiment of the Divine. By extension, 
imagining the Soul as wax causes her to become a ‘model for inscription’; she is 
the cognitive model through which the reader or audience becomes cognizant 
of mystical experience and of God. Variously embodied as water, iron, or wax, 
the Soul is the primary vehicle for the conceptualisation of her journey towards 
union with the Divine, and, despite Amy Hollywood’s proposal that Porete 
‘eschewed visionary experience,’ her figurative ‘bodies’ possess both an 
aesthetic and a descriptive quality, which in turn structure how the report of 
her experience is received and understood.30 This visual aspect to Porete’s Soul 
is a vital element of its role as a metaphorical vehicle for mystical experience.  
 
Porete both embodies and locates her articulation of mystical experience 
to a greater, if subtler, degree in the figure of l’Ame than the critic such as 
Kocher and Hollywood suggest, and in this respect, her writing can be more 
readily compared to that of Marguerite d’Oingt than might first be apparent. 
Conceptualising the Soul as an embodied entity, as a ‘vaissel,’ for example, 
facilitates descriptions of the Soul as being able to ‘retraire dedans’; she 
possesses an interior and an exterior, and thereby lessens the impossibility of 
the paradox that: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 See Carruthers, The Book of Memory, pp. 24-25 and p. 34.  
29 Carruthers, The Book of Memory, pp. 24-25.  
30 Amy Hollywood, Sensible Ecstasy: Mysticism, Sexual Difference, and the Demands of History 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2002), p. 8.  
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Aussi ne font elles, dit Amour, nulle chose qui soit contre la 
paix de leur estre de dedans, et si pourtent en paix 
l’ordonnence d’Amour. Les personnes qui telles sont, sont si 
remplies, que elles ont dedans elles, sans mendier dehors elles, 
le divin soleil, par quoy elles pevent garder purté de cueur 
[…].31  
 
Porete’s references to light and the interiority of the heart resonate with 
the imagery used by Marguerite d’Oingt. In both cases, the embodied 
protagonist constitutes both the internal recipient, and the external reflection, of 
divine grace. That Porete’s Soul can also be regarded as an embodied concept, 
as theorised by Lakoff and Johnson, is evident from l’Ame’s frequent 
description as a subject with both locational and spatial properties. The Soul is 
depicted in a number of symbolic geographic locations throughout the course 
of the Mirouer, Porete combining and contrasting the biblical image of the holy 
mountain with the beguinal representation of the abyss in order to reinforce the 
extremity and the singularity of the mystical journey.32 However, Porete’s use 
of the geographically abysmal imagery is also transformed into the interior 
landscape of the Ame. The Soul falls into the abyss ‘sans fons’ in the fifth stage 
of her progression towards the divine, she also describes herself as ‘abysmé en 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Mirouer, ch. 73, p. 206; ‘vessel,’ Mirror, p. 148. Mirouer, ch. 113, p. 304; ‘retreat with[in],’ Mirror, 
p. 184. Mirouer, ch. 24, pp. 88-90; ‘Also these Souls, says Love, do nothing which would be 
contrary to the peace of the being of their interior, and so they carry in peace the ordinance of 
Love. Such persons are so filled that they possess the divine sun within themselves, without 
begging for anything beyond themselves, by which they can guard a purity of heart.’ Mirror, p. 
106.   
32 References to the Soul atop the mountain can be found in chapters 65, 74, and 118. The 
‘abysme abysmee sans fons’ is a common image in the Mirouer, and is found variously as the 
‘abysme de toute pouvreté’ in chapter 38 and as the ‘fons de la vallee, dont elle voit le mont de 
la Montaigne.’ Mirouer, ch. 74, p. 206; ‘bottom of the valley, from which she sees the height of 
the mountain.’ Mirror, p. 148. The Bible makes frequent use of the imagery of the holy mountain, 
and it is likely that Porete derives her mountainous allusions directly from Scripture or from the 
numerous medieval exegetes who commented on the same sources. Examples can be found in 
the Books of Exodus, Ezekiel, the Psalms, Isaiah, Micah, and Jeremiah. As noted in an earlier 
footnote, Hadewijch makes use of the image of the abyss and also of the mountain in her 
visions and poems. A wide-ranging survey of the development of the ‘mountain’ as symbol can 
be found in Walther Kirchner, ‘Mind, Mountain, and History,’ Journal of the History of Ideas, 11, 4 
(Oct. 1950): 412-447.  
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humilité’ and as possessing the spiritual capacity to reach the depths of the 
‘abysme du fons de [sa] propre mauvaistié.’33 The interior landscape of the Soul 
mirrors the abstract, exterior landscape which she inhabits, and, at the fifth 
stage, uncovers new depths of spiritual awareness. This transformation is only 
possible, however, because Porete represents the Soul as an embodied entity; 
were she not, the fall into her interior depths would be impossible to 
conceptualise.  
 
Linked to the locational aspect of Porete’s imagery is her portrayal of the 
Soul’s motion. The Soul is depicted as one who flies high and swims, ‘arrives’ 
metaphorically at her own ‘understanding of her nothingness,’ ‘falls from love,’ 
and is ‘carried up to the sixth’ stage.34 As such, the Ame is also a mirror for her 
own spiritual journey, and in this sense, there is little abstraction to be found in 
Marguerite Porete’s prose. Her mysticism takes a distinctly rational approach to 
mystical ecstasy, grounded in a common understanding of orientation and the 
physical landscape, which is matched by her cognitive expression and, 
arguably, a reader or audience’s conceptualisation of the Soul and her 
environment. In her portrayal of the Ame and her world, Porete’s mystical 
expression might be seen to encapsulate the modern theoretical model of 
embodied cognition. Just as the embodied selves of Marguerite d’Oingt’s 
protagonists become reflective of the trajectory of her text, and structural 
representations of her theology, so too Porete’s Soul can be seen in her 
embodied nature to help structure and conceptualise mystical experience. It is 
because she possesses both an exterior, which climbs the mountain or sinks into 
the abyss, and an interior, within which she rises in ecstasy or sinks into 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Mirouer, ch. 40, p. 126; ‘fallen into the abyss of humility’ (my translation). Babinsky translates 
this as ‘in the abyss of humility,’ rendering the action more neutral and diminishing Porete’s 
striking emphasis on the Soul’s fall, see Mirror, p. 120. Mirouer, ch. 117, p. 312; ‘abyss of the 
depth of my own wretchedness,’ Mirror, p. 187.  
34 Mirror, ch. 22, p. 104; ‘vole hault,’ Mirouer, p. 82. Mirror, ch. 28, p. 109; ‘nage,’ Mirouer, p. 96. 
Mirror, ch. 47, p. 126; ‘est venue en cognoissance de son nient,’ Mirouer, p. 142. Mirror, ch. 118, p. 
193; ‘cheue d’amour,’ Mirouer, p. 328. Mirror, ch. 58, p. 135; ‘ou sizieme ravie,’ Mirouer, p. 168.  
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wretchedness, that a reader can conceive of, and imagine, the nature of her 
divine encounter.  
 
Marguerite Porete also imagines the Soul as a structural metaphor for 
her textual environment in a striking similar way to the bibliophilic manner in 
which Marguerite d’Oingt conjures a relationship between her writing, her 
protagonists, their bodies and that of Christ, and ultimately, with Holy 
Scripture. Addressing Raison, Dame Amour explains that the Soul has taken 
leave of the Virtues and the ‘escole’ of Reason, and is now taken up with 
learning the ‘divine leçon’: 
[M]ais ceste leçon n’est mie mise en escript de main d’omme, 
mais c’est du Saint Esperit, qui escript ceste leçon 
merveilleusement, et l’Ame est parchemin precieusement; la 
est tenue la divine escole, a bouche close, que sens humain ne 
peut mectre en parole.35 
 
As the ‘parchemin précieux’ that carries ‘cest leçon,’ the Soul is metaphorically 
reconfigured as the surface onto which the Mirouer is divinely written, an image 
that carries a double meaning. First it re-emphasizes that, as in Marguerite 
d’Oingt’s writings, Porete’s work is divinely, not humanly, inspired, crafted, 
and written. Echoing the words of the Mirouer’s Prologue, authorial 
responsibility is deftly shifted from human to godly agent, not as a plea of 
humility, but rather as a means of underlining the divinity of the message the 
book contains. Porete’s statement that it was the Holy Spirit who wrote ‘ceste 
leçon’ is highly likely to be derived from Scripture, and the implications of her 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Mirouer, ch. 66, pp. 188-190. ‘But this lesson is not placed in writing by human hand, but by 
the Holy Spirit, who writes this lesson in a marvelous way, and the Soul is the precious 
parchment. The divine school is held with the mouth closed, which the human mind cannot 
express in words.’ Mirror, p. 142.  
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imagery are profound.36 In Biblical imagery, the Holy Spirit is frequently 
represented as God’s agent in the writing of Scripture. By borrowing the image 
of the Holy Spirit as author, and conceiving of the Saint Esperit as the scribe of 
the Mirouer, Porete therefore imagines her own text as a subsidiary of the Bible. 
This is not to suggest that Porete configures her text as equal in status to Holy 
Scripture. However, as a manifestation of her mystical theology, the Mirouer is 
explicitly imagined as a micronarrative to the Bible’s macronarrative. This is 
perhaps the clearest indictor within the text as to how Porete may have viewed 
and conceptually situated her own work, and it is concurrent with this thesis’ 
suggestion that the Mirouer, and similarly the writings of Marguerite d’Oingt, 
make extensive use of the metaphors of the book and the embodied self, and of 
a mirroring technique between these two key metaphors, in order to make 
sense of their respective mystical experiences and articulations of theology.  
 
 Second, Porete’s metaphor of the Ame as parchment, echoing Marguerite 
d’Oingt’s graphic imagery of writing on the body, and no doubt drawing on the 
same complex network of textual sources, re-configures the Soul conceptually 
as the structural support, or embodiment of the Mirouer.37 The Soul is her text, 
in the same way that her interiorised, spiritual landscape mirrors the Mirouer’s 
interior, textual landscape. The same idea was proposed in the previous 
chapter: that to participate in a reading of the Mirouer is to look at, or into, the 
Soul. Metaphorically speaking, however, this raises a further series of 
theoretical questions as to how Marguerite Porete may have conceived of her 
mystical experience.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 That the books and letters that make up the Bible were written by prophets and messengers 
of God, all of whom worked under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, is frequently attested to in 
Scripture. See, for example, 2 Peter 1:20-21: ‘Non enim voluntate humana allata est aliquando 
prophetia: sed Spiritu Sancto inspirati, locuti sunt sancti Dei homines.’ ‘For prophecy came not 
by the will of man at any time: but the holy men of God spoke, inspired by the Holy Ghost.’ See 
also 2 Timothy 3:16-17. 
37  See Chapter Three for an extended discussion of this metaphor’s potential sources. 
Carruthers also discusses the image of writing on the body as a metaphorical structuring of 
thought and memory in The Craft of Thought, particularly at pp. 102-103.  
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 Lakoff and Johnson, and, more recently, Zoltán Kövecses, propose that 
metaphorical mappings from the source onto the target domain are transferred 
in a single direction.38 In other words, only the attributes of the source domain 
are mapped onto the target domain within cognitive processing; simultaneous 
bidirectional metaphorical projections do not exist within a single metaphor. 
Applying this theory to Porete’s metaphor of the Soul as parchment would 
suggest that only the concrete attributes of parchment might be applied to the 
more abstract domain represented by the Soul. However, Porete’s articulation 
of the Soul and the book suggests a more complex interaction between the two 
conceptual domains. In a later passage, she writes:  
Et ainsi escripsit ceste mendiant creature ce que vous oez; et 
voult que ses proesmes trouvassent Dieu en elle, par escrips et 
par paroles.39 
 
To find God within the Soul ‘par escrips et par paroles’ twists the 
metaphor of the Soul as book, so that it is the spiritual qualities of the Soul that 
give rise to the corresponding mystical attributes of the Mirouer. Here, the book 
is not referenced directly, but rather is alluded to metonymically in the form of 
writing and words, words which Porete may be suggesting are read aloud as 
opposed to forming an integral part of the Mirouer’s codicological, material 
existence. If the former is intended, reinforced by the use of the verb ‘oez,’ and 
the Soul is regarded as speaking orally, then arguably it is the Soul that 
represents the source domain here, and her voice that metaphorically 
constitutes ‘this book’ as the abstract target domain. If, on the other hand, the 
‘escrips’ and ‘paroles’ are intended as written signs, the directionality of the 
metaphorical mapping can be seen to change. As written signs, it is the words 
that become the signifiers of the Soul’s hidden and mystical meaning, the words 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38  Zoltán Kövecses, Metaphor and Emotion: Language, Culture and Body in Human Feeling 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), especially at pp. 127-129. 
39 Mirouer, ch. 96, p. 268. ‘And so this mendicant creature wrote what you hear. And she 
desired that her neighbours might find God in her, through writings and words.’ Mirror, pp. 
170-171.  
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constituting the source domain in relation to the intangible target. Porete’s 
intended meaning here is obscure, and perhaps intentionally so. In either case, 
Porete suggests that at the heart of the elusive target domain, be it the codex or 
the Ame, lies humanity’s knowledge of, and relationship with, the divine. The 
Soul and the book, or codex, are simultaneously and reciprocally constructed as 
both signifier and signified, each standing for the external representation and 
the inner, hidden meaning of divine truth.  
 
In answer to Raison’s question concerning the catalyst and duration of 
the Ame’s spiritual transformation, she answers that she has enjoyed a state of 
annihilation: 
Des le temps, dit l’Ame, que Amour me ouvrit son livre. Car 
ce livre est de telle condicion, que si toust que Amour l’ouvre, 
l’Ame scet tout, et si a tout, et si est toute oeuvre de parfection 
en elle emplie par l’ouverture de ce livre.40  
 
In the same way that mystical understanding is attained by the protagonist of 
Marguerite d’Oingt’s Speculum through gazing into Christ’s book, the spiritual 
transformation of Porete’s Soul is metaphorically figured as the opening of 
book, at the heart of which lies knowledge: l’Ame ‘scet tout.’ The multi-
directionality of the metaphor of ‘Soul as book’ is captured in a single phrase, 
‘toute oeuvre de parfection en elle emplie par l’ouverture de ce livre.’ The 
reference to the ‘oeuvre de parfection’ is ambiguous, held in tension by the dual 
roles of the Soul and the book, and used interchangeably throughout the 
Mirouer. The ‘oeuvre’ may be an allusion to the literary, or to the spiritual work 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Mirouer, ch. 101, p. 278. ‘Since the time, says the Soul, that Love opened her book to me. For 
this book is of such a kind, that as soon as Love opened it, the Soul knew all things, and so 
possesses all things, and so every work of perfection is fulfilled in her through the opening of 
this book.’ Mirror, p. 174. 
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of the Soul; both of which are resolved in, by and through her by means of the 
nature of her relationship with Dame Amour, the divine.  
  
 This discussion of the Ame’s metaphorical physicality, and the means by 
which her corporeity contributes to the ways in which the Mirouer’s theological 
message can be understood, suggests that the concept of the ‘embodied’ 
mystical protagonist requires further scholarly attention. Kocher’s argument 
that Marguerite Porete’s prose shows ‘only infrequent interest’ in the body as a 
locus for redemption collapses, because, as the metaphorically constitutional, 
orientational, and dimensional properties of the Ame reveal, it is the very nature 
of the Soul’s embodied status that permits her, and by extension, her audience, 
to conceive of an imagined union, and therefore reconciliation, with God.41 In 
this case, Kocher’s definition of the ‘body’ is too literal to allow for the subtleties 
of Porete’s use of embodied metaphor. The Mirouer’s Soul makes use of the 
attributes of embodiment without needing a ‘body’ in order to do so, although 
towards the close of the text, as the Soul reaches her desired state of 
annihilation the the divine, Porete reduces her descriptions to a series of verbs 
and adjectives. In the closing stanza of the Soul’s song before the text’s first 
explicit, she denies even her pronominal self: 
J’ay dit que je l’aymeray. 
Je mens, ce ne suis je mie. 
C’est il seul qui ayme moi: 
Il est, et je ne suis mie.42 
 
In the following sixteen chapters, Porete resurrects the Soul’s voice, but 
never again is she referred to as a structural entity or depicted in terms of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Kocher, Allegories of Love, p. 180.  
42 Mirouer, ch. 122, p. 346. ‘I have said that I will love Him. / I lie, for I am not. / It is He alone 
who loves me; / He is, and I am not.’ Mirror, p. 201.  
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geography or motion. The cognitive essence of the Soul remains; she continues 
to remember, to contemplate, to have affection, and to love, but her embodied 
status begins to fade.43 The audience remains aware of l’Ame until the text’s 
close, but, unlike the protagonists of Marguerite d’Oingt’s visionary writing, 
vividly depicted until the close of her narratives, the Soul’s image is described 
as: ‘hoc est quod uidelicet resoluatur per adnichilationem.’44 The audience is left 
with an image of visionary activity, not undertaken by the Soul, but rather by 
God, whose sight is mediated through, and therefore is, the sight of the Soul: 
car ses deux yeulx vous regardent tousdis; et se bien ce 
considerez et regardez, ce regard fait estre l’Ame simple.45  
 
Not only does this closing image encapsulate the very essence of the 
annihilated Soul, in that God sees through her, but it also leaves the Soul as the 
embodiment of ‘all’ and ‘nothing.’ ‘All,’ in that she is entirely subsumed and 
incorporated by God and therefore spiritually complete; but also ‘nothing,’ in 
that she is fully transparent and consumed by the divine. The audience is left 
with a resolution only possible through the acceptance of paradox; the 
articulation of the Soul’s realisation of mystical ecstasy is an articulation that 
lies beyond the linguistic capacities of the text. It may be argued that Porete’s 
closing image of God seeing ‘through’ the Soul and the simultaneous lack of 
representative imagery reflects a more accurate depiction of the upper limits of 
spiritual experience than the vivid, but ultimately static, series of vignettes 
portrayed by Marguerite d’Oingt. Read as such, the Mirouer, with its fleeting 
and paradoxical imagery of an embodied but ever-evolving Soul, is perhaps a 
more candid representation of Dinzelbacher’s ‘erlebte Visionen.’  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Mirouer, ch. 133, pp. 390-394. Mirror, pp. 216-217.  
44 Speculum, ch. 138, p. 401. ‘It is that she is dissolved by annihilation,‘ Mirror, p. 220.  
45 Mirouer, ch. 139, p. 404; ‘for His two eyes always see you. And so ponder and consider that 
this seeing makes the Soul Simple.’ Mirror, p. 221.  
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 This reading of Marguerite d’Oingt’s and Marguerite Porete’s works 
demonstrates that the distinctions made between ‘authentic’ and ‘literary’ 
mystical prose, or between ‘biographical’ and ‘fictional’ writing, are inherently 
porous. Both women’s writings can be seen to correlate with, and yet 
undermine, the imposition of a generic analytical framework based upon such 
diametrically opposed poles as reality and fantasy, states of waking and 
dreaming, or objective truth and subjective belief. This is because mystical 
writing, rather like the notion of cognition itself, is the product of both 
impulses: the desire to capture and make sense of the experience as precisely as 
possible, and yet at the same time the acknowledgement that all cognitive 
processing of one’s own, or another person’s, experience is bound up with 
culturally constructed conceptual pathways and the imprecise act of 
information retrieval and recall.  
 
Defined categories serve only to classify elements of an individual’s 
writings in relation and contrast to those of other mystics, and do little to shed 
light on the articulation of visionary phenomena themselves. Instead, mystical 
modes of thought, experience, and verbalisation, ought to be regarded in terms 
of a spectrum, and the following remarks will propose the possibilities of two 
spectra within which Marguerite d’Oingt’s and Marguerite Porete’s visionary 
writing can be located and fruitfully compared. These are the continua of 
meditative and contemplative thought, and theory and praxis. To regard 
d’Oingt and Porete’s literary works as participating within these spectra is to 
situate them both within their contemporary cultural milieux, whilst permitting 
parallels to be drawn with modern theoretical approaches to their writings.  
 
 Although the categories of ‘authenticity’ and ‘literariness’ are deeply 
problematic for the study of mystical writing, they point towards a further two 
elements within the act of discourse, both of which are crucial to spiritual 
literature, but which pose additional theoretical questions. These two elements 
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might be broadly labelled as ‘experience’ and ‘construction.’ Whilst mystical 
‘experience’ is both the catalyst for visionary writing, as well as its stated 
objective to re-capture, it is, by definition, beyond human capacity to re-create. 
Reviewing mystical and visionary writing, the conclusions drawn by modern 
commentators have ranged from establishing them as ‘dream narratives’ to 
dismissing them as episodes of ‘hysteria,’ to more recent investigations of 
spiritual writing as evidence of psychological phenomena and psychiatric 
diagnoses. 46  However, all of these attempts to explain and categorise 
‘experience’ as evidenced by mystical writing face the same set of 
methodological hurdles.  
 
The complications of authorship discussed in Chapter Two call into 
question the reliability of visionary literature as evidence of an experienced 
reality.  The frequency of literary tropes and inter-textual borrowing, 
meanwhile, serve, somewhat paradoxically, to both clarify and confuse the 
matter. On one hand, stock imagery and common motifs help the reader to 
locate or place the recounted event or experience within a recognizable cultural 
framework, rendering it more identifiable and, arguably, meaningful. On the 
other hand, the very notion of categorisation brings this discussion full-circle. 
Categorization, and with it the recognition of the ‘constructed-ness’ of a literary 
account, re-introduces this chapter’s earlier distinction between ‘authenticity’ 
and ‘literariness,’ and with it the dangers of a perceptual hierarchy, privileging 
the ‘reality’ of a mystical experience over its apparently fictitious opposite.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Until quite recently, ‘hysteria’ was the most common psychiatric diagnosis ascribed to 
Margery Kempe. For a discussion of the term, its use by scholars, and the diagnosis of other 
disorders apparent in her writing, see Richard Lawes, ‘The Madness of Margery Kempe,’ The 
Medieval Mystical Tradition: England, Ireland, and Wales, Exeter Symposium IV: Papers Read at 
Charnley Manor, July 1999, ed. by Marion Glasscoe (Cambridge: Boydell and Brewer, 1999), pp. 
147-167. Further psychoanalytic studies of medieval visionary writers can be found, for 
example, in: Jerome Kroll and Roger De Ganck, ‘The Adolescence of a Thirteenth-Century Nun,’ 
Psychological Medicine, 16 (1986): 745-756; ‘Beatrice of Nazareth: Psychiatric Perspectives on a 
Medieval Mystic,’ Cistercian Studies, 24 (1989): 301-323; Eugene G. d’Aquili and Andrew B. 
Newberg, The Mystical Mind: Probing the Biology of Religious Experience (Minneapolis: Augsburg 
Fortress, 1999); Kroll and Bachrach, The Mystic Mind, passim.  
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A further methodological obstacle concerns the lack, in medieval 
visionary narratives, of detail sufficiently detailed to discern the complex 
psychological portrait needed to construct a modern diagnosis of mental 
disorder. Some recent studies have sought to portray mystical writing as a 
report of psychodrama, the spontaneous re-enactment of specific happenings or 
inner mental processes in an individual’s past. Yet even if the descriptive 
limitations of the mystical account are acknowledged, or accepted as 
contributing in some way to the diagnosis of the condition portrayed, this 
approach risks being overly reductionist. Jerome Kroll and Bernard Bachrach’s 
conclusions concerning Marguerite d’Oingt’s portrayal of Béatrix d’Ornacieux, 
for example, have a tendency to over-emphasise the psychopathology of the 
saint’s experience without allowing sufficient discussion of the theological and 
historical dimensions of her vita and their associated symbolism. 47  To 
emphasise the psychology and neurophysiology associated with self-harming 
behaviours such as those enacted by Béatrix is to risk distorting the text into a 
medical report in which human behaviour and its motivation are taken as 
factual realism, drawing the modern scholar once again into the irresolvable 
struggle between the subjective and the objective, the literal and the 
metaphorical.  
 
 This reading of Marguerite d’Oingt’s and Marguerite Porete’s mystical 
writing suggests a different approach to medieval spiritual expression, an 
approach that highlights the very constructed-ness of the text through its focus 
on figurative language without underestimating the role played by the notion 
of ‘experience.’ Metaphor, after all, is constituted by a blend of reality and 
fiction. Grounded in the perceived realities and experiences of the speaker and 
their audience, both utterer and recipient process metaphor in terms of a 
‘mappable’ correlation between what they believe to be the most accurate and 
appropriate qualities of the source and target domains. As the conceptual space 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Bachrach and Kroll, The Mystic Mind, especially Chapter 11, ‘Beatrice of Ornacieux.’  
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created by the source and target domains, the metaphor constitutes a negotiated 
‘truth,’ a believable reality constituted by the interaction between the structural 
components of two domains of meaning. Max Black’s theory of metaphor 
expresses this idea in slightly different terms, but reaches a similar conclusion. 
Black suggests that metaphor functions by means of a filter, the ‘reality’ of the 
target domain being illuminated by the ‘screen’ or lens of the source domain.48 
However Black develops his theory to suggest that the relationship between the 
two domains: 
enable[s] us to see aspects of reality that the metaphor’s 
production helps to constitute. But that is no longer surprising 
if one believes that the world is necessarily a world under a 
certain description – or a world seen from a certain perspective 
[original emphasis].49 
 
Black’s notion that metaphor allows for a reality that it itself contributes 
to, through the interaction between the two domains and the activity of 
‘filtering’ or ‘screening,’ correlates with this study of metaphor in mystical 
writing, in which it has been argued that metaphor permits a reader, medieval 
or modern, to revisit elements of that reality without losing sight of the 
constructed-ness of the prose and its processing. Whilst Black suggests that 
metaphor possesses a generative ability to create novel views of a domain, he 
also proposes that metaphor can yield insights into ‘how things are.’50 This is 
not the same, Black argues, as asking whether or not metaphorical statements 
are able to represent the ‘truth,’ since a focus on ‘truth’ brings about a distorted 
connection between statement and reality. Metaphor is not bound by the binary 
of fiction and fact, but rather, in Black’s words, it always ‘says something.’51 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Black, ‘Metaphor,’ p. 75.  
49 Max Black, ‘More About Metaphor,’ in Metaphor and Thought, ed. by Andrew Ortony 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 19-43. Here at pp. 39-40.  
50 Black, ‘More About Metaphor,’ pp. 40-41.  
51 Black, ‘More About Metaphor,’ p. 41.  
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This ‘something’ is the ‘representational aspect’ of metaphor, and it is the 
delving into the structures, analogies, and appropriateness of the metaphor at 
the level of cognitive processing that reveals the apparently paradoxical ability 
of metaphor to conjure a new awareness about the reality of ‘how things are.’52  
 
 Black’s observations correspond with the use of cognitive metaphor 
theory as a heuristic lens through which to view Marguerite d’Oingt’s and 
Marguerite Porete’s articulations of their mystical experiences and to provide a 
helpful conceptual framework with which to renegotiate the traditional 
distinctions between the truth or falsehood of mystical expression. Over the 
course of the two women’s works, both texts construct what might be thought 
of as a mystical ‘world’ in which their metaphorical utterances correspond to a 
schema of embodiment, conceptualised by means of a wide range of source 
domains: light, the codex, the body, the Eucharist, iron, water, wax, and fire.  
 
For the duration of the mystical narrative, these metaphors represent 
logical, rational possibilities for transformation, ‘real’ within the parameters of 
the mystical world they exist in. Their figurative language functions literally 
within the world of their texts; iron does not disappear when subjected to the 
heat of a flame, but transforms from a solid to a liquid. The schema highlighted 
in Marguerite d’Oingt’s work is derived from a literal view of medieval textual 
production; the body and the skin of Christ depicted in the Pagina correspond 
logically, within the world constructed by her writing, to the binding and folios 
of the book in the Speculum. In this context, metaphor functions as literal 
language within an imaginary world: possibilities that could not be represented 
in what Samuel Levin calls the ‘actual world’ or ‘the world in which we live,’ 
such as the body being a book, become logical constructions within a reader’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Black, ‘More About Metaphor,’ p. 41.  
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understanding of the mystical realm.53 It is by means of these metaphors’ 
entailments and their internal logic that the mystical world makes sense to the 
non-mystic: in metaphorical representation, what ‘shifts’ is not the literal 
meaning of the metaphorical language per se, but rather, as the earlier quotation 
by Black demonstrates, it is the conceptualisation of the world in which it is 
perceived that modulates the metaphor’s meaning.  In an observation equally 
applicable to medieval and modern texts, Levin writes: ‘what is metaphoric is 
not the language, but the world.’54 
 
 Both Marguerite d’Oingt’s and Marguerite Porete’s writings may be read 
as representations of mystical, metaphorical worlds, in which metaphor is the 
organising principle of their modes of expression. Both women’s works 
participate in a ‘reality’ within the paradigm of those worlds; a ‘reality’ made 
possible by metaphor’s ability to unite two modes of thought, reason and the 
imagination.55 The cognitive activity underpinning the processing of metaphor 
involves the categorizing of metaphorical entailments and inferences in order to 
make meaning, an activity characterised by a series of cognitive decisions held 
to be rational and logical. Yet the ‘truth-value,’ and associated ‘reality,’ that this 
rationality gives rise to are only realisable in the realm of the imagination, in 
which it is possible to reconstruct a partial, if not complete, mental image of the 
metaphorical world being alluded to. The imagination can be seen to work in 
much the same way as cognitive metaphor processing, being both spontaneous, 
yet simultaneously controlled and constrained. 56  In the case of metaphor 
processing, it is the latter mode that is stimulated, at least initially, constrained 
and controlled by the conceptual limits and internal rationality of the 
relationship between the source and target domains.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Samuel Levin, Metaphorical Worlds (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1988), p. 
2.  
54 Levin, Metaphorical Worlds, p. 2.  
55 See Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, p. 192.  
56 E. S. Casey, Imagining: A Phenomenological Study (Bloomington, IN, and London: Indiana 
University Press, 1976). See also Levin, Metaphorical Worlds, pp. 73-77.  
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It is impossible, within the remit of this study, to undertake anything 
other than a very broad view of what is may be meant by the term ‘the 
imagination,’ either in a medieval or modern sense.57 Of interest here, however, 
is a very specific sense of the imagination, in which metaphor functions within 
mystical writing as a device for thinking about the ineffable; a rhetorical tool 
that doubles as an exploratory, cognitive device for imagining the divine. This 
chapter has, in large part, demonstrated the extent to which modern readings of 
metaphor theory can be successfully traced in medieval mystical writing. 
However, the medieval mind was equally concerned with models of human 
psychology, and the underpinning processes through which the mind engages 
in the production of knowledge and understanding.  
 
It is unlikely that Marguerite d’Oingt and Marguerite Porete came into 
direct contact with the primary sources expounding these ideas. Yet 
psychological schemas undoubtedly constituted an integral element within the 
wider medieval intellectual and cultural environment. Sketching out some of 
the parallel dynamics between medieval and modern articulations of the 
mechanisms of thought and language reveals a striking correlation between the 
two, which can be brought into focus in relation to mystical expression. 
Mystical writing and metaphor theory can be seen to constitute two closely 
linked phenomena, and indeed, both constructs occupy a far more significant 
place in theological, devotional, and speculative thought than some studies 
have allowed for.  
 
  A particularly influential example of early medieval human cognition 
can be found in Augustine’s characterization of his memory in the Confessiones, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 A useful introduction to the medieval imagination can be found in Jacques Le Goff, The 
Medieval Imagination, trans. by Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1988). Originally published as L’imaginaire médiéval (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1985). A more 
recent study can be found in Karnes, Imagination, Meditation, and Cognition in the Middle Ages, 
passim.  
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in which he highlights the role played in medieval cognitive pattern-making by 
‘rationes,’ the ordering apparatus inherent within the mind.58 Augustine writes 
that ‘rationes’: 
aliae sunt, non sunt imagines earum, quas mihi nuntiauit 
carnis oculus: nouit eas quisquis sine ulla cogitatione 
qualiscumque corporis intus agnouit eas.59 
 
  ‘Rationes’ are not ‘images,’ for which Augustine uses the word ‘res,’ but 
rather are cognitive devices for putting thoughts in order. They are 
characterised as the cognitive processes by which images or conceptual 
artefacts are structured in relation to one another, and distinguish and 
assimilate patterns out the stock of images and experiences stored in the mind.60 
In Augustine’s writings, these cognitive schemas consist of locational 
measurements, of mathematical numbers and dimensions, but they are not to 
be confused with ‘reason’ in the modern sense of the word.61 They derive from 
the Latin ‘ratio,’ meaning ‘computation’ or ‘calculation,’ an important 
distinction in this context if the role played by ‘rationes’ is identifiable in the 
cognitive function performed by metaphor and can be located in the writings of 
Marguerite Porete. Porete’s scorn for scholastic logic and reason, manifested in 
her character Raison (given the name Ratio in the Latin translation), renders the 
suggestion that a cognitive system grounded in ‘reason’ underpins Porete’s 
work a particularly delicate task. Porete’s criticism of Raison’s conceptual 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Carruthers provides an overview of Augustine’s rationes in The Craft of Thought, pp. 32-34. See 
also Brian Stock, Augustine the Reader: Meditation, Self-Knowledge, and the Ethics of Interpretation 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996).  
59 Augustine, Confessions, Book X, Chapter 12, p. 126; ‘these are quite different. They are not the 
images of those lines which my fleshly eye has reported to me. They are known by whoever 
recognizes them interiorly, without cogitation about any body whatsoever.’ Saint Augustine, 
Confessions, p. 280. Carruthers provides a slightly different translation of this passage: ‘they are 
of another sort, not images of those things which my bodily eye has reported to me: whoever 
learns to use them knows intuitively without any reference to a physical body.’ The Craft of 
Thought, p. 33.  
60 Carruthers, The Craft of Thought, p. 34.  
61 Carruthers, The Craft of Thought, p. 33.  
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blindness and inability to comprehend the deeper workings of Scripture is 
voiced early in the Mirouer and is a recurrent theme throughout the text: 
Hee, Entendement de Raison, dit l’Ame Adnientie, que vous 
avez d’arbitres! Vous prenez la paille et laissez le grain, car 
vostre entendement est trop bas, par quoy vous ne povez si 
haultement entendre, comme il esconvient entendre a celluy 
qui bien veult entendre l’estre dont nous parlons.62 
 
Dame Amour and the Ame’s critique of Raison may appear antithetical to 
the proposal that a rational framework can be found within in the Mirouer. Yet 
in chapter 21, Dame Amour explains that whilst in the early stages of the Soul’s 
ascent, ‘ceste Ame fist, quequ’il luy coustast de cueur et de corps, tout ceu que 
Ra<i>son lui enseignoit,’ in the Soul’s transformation by Divine Love, the role 
of ‘maistress’ Raison is reversed so that she becomes the Soul’s ‘pure serve.’63 
Porete’s articulation of mystical ascent involves the Soul taking leave of the 
Virtues and of Reason, but they remain in service to her until she reaches the 
seventh stage and perfect union with God. In this sense, the thought processes 
attributed to reason and logic are not rejected by the Soul, but rather are recast 
in the cognitive mould of the mystical Soul. It is the conceptualisation of Reason 
that is transformed, rather than the definition of reason itself; Reason continues 
to be aligned with ‘ordenance,’ but, as the earlier discussion of metaphorical 
worlds illustrated, it is the parameters of this ‘ordering’ that have shifted.64 It is 
therefore possible to discuss an internal rationale to Porete’s expression of 
cognitive ordering without conflicting with the narrative’s ideological purpose. 
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62 Mirouer, ch. 12, p. 50. ‘Ah, Intellect of Reason, says the Annihilated Soul, how you are so 
discerning! You take the shell and leave the kernel, for your intellect is too low, hence you 
cannot perceive so loftily as is necessary for the one who wishes to perceive the being of which 
we speak.’ Mirror, p. 93. Akbari notes that this image can also be found in Dominicus 
Gundissalinus’ De divisione philosophiae. See Seeing Through the Veil, p. 17, also n. 62, p. 249.  
63 Mirouer, ch. 21, p. 80; ‘this Soul did whatever Reason taught her, whatever the cost to heart 
and body,’ Mirror, p. 103. Mirouer, ch. 39, p. 122; ‘simple handmaid,’ Mirror, p. 119.  
64 See Mirouer, ch. 39, pp. 122-126; Mirror, pp. 119-120.  
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a cyclical pattern of repetition and reformulation, personifications and events 
being repeatedly revisited and clarified with the use of the same terms and 
images and with added layering of further metaphors, it is actually the 
metaphors and the ways in which the figurative images resonate with each 
other across the text that give the Mirouer its coherent structure, driving the 
narrative towards its conclusion.65  
 
Whilst Augustine employs numbers, measurements, and calculations as 
the essential mnemonic practices by which to fashion his thought patterns, 
Marguerite Porete and Marguerite d’Oingt employ a pattern of embodiment, 
structured by conceptual metaphor, in order to construct and articulate the 
mental means with which to imagine mystical experience. Embodied images 
employed metaphorically, which this study has defined as objects possessing a 
conceptually similar structure to the human body, function in much the same 
way as Augustine’s ‘rationes,’ as ‘tools of the mind.’66  
 
For Marguerite d’Oingt and Marguerite Porete, conceptual metaphor 
functions in a similar way to Augustine’s ‘rationes.’ Their use of source and 
target domains work in essentially the same way as Augustine’s articulation of 
the ‘rationes,’ as devices that, in the act of imaginative recall, construct a 
relational dynamic based on what the reader or listener distinguishes as being 
the appropriate entailments arising from the interaction between the two. This 
activity is recollective, grounded in memorial, mnemonic techniques, as well as 
compositional, shaping inventive and sometimes original ways in which to 
conceptualise events and experiences. This echoes Paul Ricoeur’s theory of 
metaphor: it is simultaneously constrained by the parameters and associations 
of the source and target domains whilst also being, as Black, and Fauconnier 
and Turner argue, highly generative and open to novel interpretations. Thus a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Kocher, Allegories of Love, pp. 54-56.  
66 Carruthers, The Craft of Thought, p. 34.  
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metaphor such as Marguerite Porete’s rivers flowing into the sea, representative 
of the Soul’s dissolution into the divine, is both constrained by a commonly 
held, rational logic concerning geography and the flow of water, and yet 
simultaneously catalytic, inspiring recollection of associations with other 
watery metaphors of union, such as Bernard of Clairvaux’s metaphor of water 
mixing with wine. A similar process can be seen in Marguerite d’Oingt’s 
Speculum, in which she writes of the saints: 
Et citi doucors ne se pot decreytre assi po et menz que li ayguy de 
la mar. Quar tot assi com li fluyvo sallont de la mar tuit et tuit y 
retournont, tot assi li beuta Nostron Segnour et li doucors, cum bein 
que illi se expandet a tot, illi retornet toz jors a luy.67  
 
Metaphor’s paradoxical capacity to be both generative and restrictive, 
where appropriate producing cognitive patterns afresh whilst limiting them in 
accordance with memorial practice, is reminiscent of the enigmatic nature of 
mystical writing itself, caught between ‘authenticity’ and ‘fiction.’ Yet, in both 
cases, the resolution to this contradiction can be found in the cognitive model of 
processing itself. In order to ascertain the ‘truth-value’ of a metaphor, or of a 
mystical utterance, it is necessary mentally to process the invented nature of the 
statement in order to arrive at a position in which it is possible to be inventive.68 
Simply put, it is in recognising the metaphorical construction that the mind is 
able to be creative with the metaphor’s entailments. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Speculum, p. 96. ‘This sweetness cannot decrease any more or any less than can the water of 
the sea. For just as the rivers all come out of the sea and go back to it, so it is for the beauty and 
sweetness of Our Lord: although they flow everywhere, they always return to Him.’ Mirror, p. 
44.  
68 Carruthers notes that the medieval mind was also thought to function in this way. ‘Thus 
comes about a curious but fundamental quality of the medieval analysis of res memorabiles, one 
very difficult for many moderns to understand. What is “truthful” about them is not their 
content, that is what they remember, but rather their form and especially their ability to find out 
things and/ or characters in a story, the general shapes and “faces” of a building […]. The 
“things” in such a [cognitive] map [are] […] important not so much for what they are as for 
what we do to and with them.’ The Craft of Thought, p. 35.  
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This recognition of the ‘constructedness’ of metaphor as a catalyst to 
creativity and new thought finds a similar framework in the medieval discourse 
of cognition. As Carruthers demonstrates in The Craft of Thought, the medieval 
notion of invention, or ‘inventio,’ carried with it both the implications of 
creativity and, conversely, of inventory, or storage. 69  It is through the 
deployment of the articles kept in memorial storage, the ‘res,’ organised by 
means of the ‘rationes,’ that the generation of new material can take place. In 
large part, this has been the objective of this thesis: to identify the structural 
composition of Marguerite d’Oingt and Marguerite Porete’s respective spiritual 
imaginations by means of their use of metaphor, and to match the functioning 
of the inventories of their figurative imagery with the ways in which they may 
have conceived of the creativity of mystical experience.  
 
 However, in both of their works, metaphor does not only function as a 
means by which to plot a conceptual map across the course of the text. In 
comparing and contrasting one metaphorical representation with another, the 
reader or listener ‘moves’ through the narrative, highlighting metaphor’s 
rhetorical quality of ‘ductus,’ ‘the way in which a composition guides a person 
to its goals.’70 In her discussion of the tropes of Scripture, Carruthers suggests 
that such figurative language functions rather like ‘the stations of the way,’ or 
‘route indicators’ on a conceptual map which takes its reader, or pilgrim, from a 
particular starting point towards its target (‘skopos’).71 She describes these 
‘route indicators’ as ‘stylistic ornaments’ and notes that these figurative 
schemes were particularly important for monastic composition: meditating on 
the more complex tropes of the Bible was, as Augustine commented, ‘obscuritas 
utilis et salubris,’ ‘a productive and health-giving difficulty’ in the pathway to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Carruthers, The Craft of Thought, pp. 8-12.  
70 Carruthers, The Craft of Thought, p. 78.  
71  See Carruthers, The Craft of Thought, particularly Chapter Three, ‘Cognitive Images, 
Meditation, and Ornament.’ Here at p. 116.  
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meditative enlightenment.72 The stylistic ornaments of a text give its subject-
matter a ‘mood’ (‘modus,’ ‘color’), an ‘attitude’ (‘intentio’), and a reading 
‘tempo’. As such, ‘choice is involved for the author in placing ornaments in a 
work, and choice for an audience in how to “walk” among them. And as in all 
performances, variation from one occasion to another is a given.’73 
 
 Observations concerning medieval cognitive ‘wayfinding’ through 
Scriptural tropes are applicable to this exploration of metaphorical imagery in 
mystical writing. Chapter Two’s analysis of the Middle English Carthusian 
transmission of Porete’s Mirouer suggested that encapsulated in M. N.’s preface 
and glosses to his translation of the work was a directive to read it through a 
hermeneutical lens. In this sense, Marguerite d’Oingt’s and Marguerite Porete’s 
mystical prose demands of its reader a recognition that inherent in its 
conceptualisation, composition, reception, and interpretation lies a possibility to 
capture or experience something of the ineffable qualities associated with the 
soul’s ascent into mystical ecstasy. As a stylistic tool for conceptualisation, the 
cognitive processing underlying a metaphor possesses the mnemonic capacity 
to spark memory and recollection, and to construct and organise thought 
pattern and direction, in terms both of creating an internal coherence to the 
shape and scope of the text and of directing a reader’s or listener’s 
comprehension of the text’s broader ideology. Metaphoric processing also 
involves a sequential cognitive progression of ‘belief making’; an assessment of 
the relationship between the source and target domains predicated on logic and 
rationality, in order to ascertain the ‘truth value’ of the metaphorical statement. 
It is only when the mind has performed this sequence that the metaphor is 
understood to reveal its meaning.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Augustine, De doctrina christiana, De vera religione, in Sancti Augustini Opera, ed. by Joseph 
Martin, 4.8.22.7-8. Corpus Christianorum Series Latina, 32 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1962), p. 131. 
Quoted in Carruthers, The Craft of Thought, p. 116.  
73 Carruthers, The Craft of Thought, p. 117.  
	  	   255	  
This process is markedly similar to the one described above by 
Carruthers, and can be seen at work in the mystical writings analysed in the 
thesis. Across the corpus of Marguerite d’Oingt’s writing, for example, one 
embodied image directs the reader or listener to another. The bound (‘ligari’), 
stretched (‘districte’), whipped (‘verberaverunt’), and pierced (‘perforabant’) 
body of the crucified Christ in the Pagina meditationum, identifiable with the 
colours of the Passion, red, black, and white, directs an audience towards the 
next of Marguerite’s striking images, the decorated codex of the Speculum, but, 
when readers or listeners arrives at it, they are invited to think back to the 
initial image of Christ as they contemplate the significance of the Speculum’s 
book, inscribed in ‘letres blanches,’ ‘neyres,’ and ‘vermelles.’ D’Oingt’s writing 
repeats the effect in the depiction of the ascetic Béatrix d’Ornacieux’s body, in 
which the saint’s own body becomes the basis for her hagiography. Each time a 
new stylistic image is introduced, the reader is asked to reflect on the images 
that have preceded it in order to think about the new image effectively.   
 
The consequences of this style of cognitive activity are profound, and 
may shed light more broadly on how these examples of mystical writing were 
intended to be delivered and reflected upon. Here it is worth recalling 
metaphor’s capacity to conjure images in the mind, a notion proposed by 
Aristotle and developed by numerous patristic and medieval scholars including 
Augustine, who, in relation to the writings of St Paul, wrote: 
Quis enim legentium vel audientium quae scripsit apostulus 
Paulus uel quae de illo scripta sunt non fingat animo et ipsius 
apostolic faciem et omnium quorum ibi nomina 
commemorantur? […] Neque in fide nostra quam de domino 
Iesu Christo habemus illud salubre est quod secundum 
speciem de homine cogitamus.74 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Augustinus Hipponensis, De trinitate, ed. by W.J. Mountain, Corpus Christianorum Series 
Latina, 50 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1968), Book VIII, Chapter IV. ‘Who, upon reading or listening to 
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Augustine’s observations resonate with the points made above. That 
images are formed in the mind as a result of textual reception is important; that 
medieval thought was taught, and conditioned by and through, the use of 
images is well documented.75 What is important, Augustine states, is not the 
particularity of the image formed by the mind during the process of listening or 
reading, but rather the sorts (‘speciem’) of thoughts one has, and the way in 
which they are used.  As such, his argument appears to challenge any notion 
that recall and mental imagery must be grounded in objective truth. Rather, in 
order to be effective, the cognitive activities involved in conjuring mental 
imagery should be focused on the process itself, as opposed to the use of mental 
images in order to re-capture an event or experience verbatim, in perfect detail. 
Within the framework and focus of this thesis, Augustine’s account of cognition 
can be aligned with the observations above concerning the possible mental 
processes at work when metaphorical statements are employed in the context of 
mystical prose.  
 
 Using Augustine’s theory of cognition as a guide, it may be argued that 
the primary function of metaphor in mystical writing is twofold. First, it must 
conjure an image in the mind, attracting the attention of the reader or listener. 
But, more importantly, metaphor acts as a locus for cognitive, meditational 
activity. Which images the metaphor conjures are not unimportant per se, but it 
is the conscious cognitive activity associated with the development of those 
images that drives the mystical impulse inherent in these texts. Encapsulated 
within metaphor are the notions of stasis and flux: the metaphor ‘fixes’ its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
what Paul the Apostle wrote or was written about him, does not fashion in his mind both the 
appearance of the Apostle and also of all those whose names are there remembered? […] But for 
our faith in Jesus Christ, it is not the image which the mind forms for itself that leads us to 
salvation, but according to our mental representation, what about [?] his humankind.’ Trans. by 
Carruthers, The Craft of Thought, p. 121 and p. 313, n. 10. See also Stock, Augustine the Reader, pp. 
251-254. For more on Aristotle’s arguments concerning cognitive representation, see Richard 
Sorabji’s introductory notes to his translation of De memoria et reminiscentia, translated as 
Aristotle on Memory, with commentary and notes (Providence, RI: Brown University Press, 1972), 
pp. 2-17.  
75 Carruthers, The Craft of Thought, pp. 118-124.  
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referent between two poles, or domains, even whilst it requires its interpreter to 
move or negotiate between them, and even between metaphors, in order to 
establish meaning. Metaphor invites the reader or listener to progress from 
invention to inventiveness, from passivity to activity, in order to arrive at a 
point of fresh, or more focused, thought.  
 
This process is similar to the process of meditation and contemplation 
prescribed by monastic literature. Both Marguerite d’Oingt, worshipping 
within the strict regime of the Carthusian order, and Marguerite Porete, who, 
although no insights into her religious practices survive, alludes to a range of 
devotional practices in the Mirouer, lived and wrote within a complex web of 
spiritual praxis and ‘theoria.’ This range of practices include the use of images 
as aids in visualisation routines; ‘lectio divina,’ with its accompaniments of 
‘oratio’ and ‘meditatio’; the contemplation of sacred scenes in books and on 
church walls and ceilings; hagiographic narratives, visionary accounts and an 
increasing emphasis on guided descriptions of the Passion and the Nativity; 
and a growing interest in ascetic practices such as disrupted sleep, fasting, and 
corporeal punishment indicate that meditation and visualisation. The resulting 
cognitive practices associated with such reflective thought are hardly a 
surprising development, and are perhaps even to be sought in mystical writing 
and the study of its reception. In this sense, no matter how ‘authentic’ a vision 
may be, in the environment of the late thirteenth and early fourteenth century, 
most visionary accounts may be thought of as ‘constructed,’ an inner world 
constructed by the outer world, the body, and the mind.  
 
In her conclusion to God and the Goddesses, Newman suggests a ‘new 
category of medieval writing,’ which she terms ‘imaginative theology,’ and into 
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which she gathers numerous texts traditionally held as exemplary of other 
literary genres.76  She defines this category as: 
the pursuit of serious religious and theological thought 
through the techniques of imaginative literature, especially 
vision, dialogue, and personification […]. Imaginative 
theology […] focuses on how theology might be performed; it 
draws attention to theological method and epistemology […] 
For the imaginative theologian, like the poet, works with 
images and believes […] that ‘the road of the imagination […] 
reveals the face of God to whoever follows it to the end.’ 
[original emphasis]77 
 
Newman recognises the anachronism of her terminology; the texts she 
groups under this rubric would probably not have been recognised as 
‘theological’ by either their authors or their contemporaries, and the role of the 
imagination, Newman writes, ‘had a more limited, technical meaning in 
medieval psychology than it has today.’78 Yet her observations are perceptive, 
and can be expanded and developed further than the scope of God and the 
Goddesses allows for. Newman does not give a definition of what she means by 
‘the imagination,’ and nor does she include Porete or d’Oingt in her 
observations. But further probing of her terminology and its application to the 
insights made over the course of this thesis help to draw some thought-
provoking conclusions about language, literature, modes of cognition, and 
metaphor.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Newman, God and the Goddesses, p. 292. Newman groups such diverse texts as Piers Plowman, 
Dante’s Commedia, Chaucer’s Parlement of Fowls, the Roman de la Rose, Henry Suso’s Horologium 
Sapientiae, and visionary works including those by Hildegard, Hadewijch, and Birgitta of 
Sweden into this new category. Imaginative theology is compared and contrasted with other 
‘literary’ models of theological thought, namely, monastic, scholastic, pastoral, mystical, and 
vernacular. See God and the Goddesses, pp. 293-304.  
77 Newman, God and the Goddesses, pp. 293-297.  
78 Newman, God and the Goddesses, p. 297.  
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‘Imaginative theology’ should not be confined to the purely semantic 
discourse in which Newman leaves it. Despite the fact that she never offers a 
definition for the ‘imagination’, the notion itself, and the concomitant 
juxtaposition of image and reflection on the divine, is powerful and worth 
developing.  ‘Imaginative theology’ goes to the centre of a thought system 
heavily based upon images, images which are overlaid, and which conjure a 
multi-faceted heuristic frame and response. Porete and d’Oingt illustrate 
common and individual approaches to expressing the mystical within the 
period, and within a continuity of past Christian discourse on the subject. To 
explore the thought-worlds of these two women, it is necessary to explore the 
way in which they use their languages, and the ways in which they populate 
their linguistic landscape. Cognitive metaphor theory, applied sensitively to the 
particular example, is a productive way to draw the meaning from the 
kaleidoscope of images with which both women furnish their readers. In the 
movement from experience to text, and the recollection and re-imagining of the 
mystical experience, the modern reader follows the journey from words to 
wordlessness, through a process of cognitive image-making, to the final 
contemplation of the divine. How the metaphors are chosen, what they entail, 
how they blend tradition and experience, allow for modern insight into 
medieval cognition. This is shadowed, and not so darkly, in the medieval 
iteration of this process. Medieval models of reason and reckoning, of image 
and impression bear fruitful comparison with their modern analogues. That the 
two should be recognised as such is the major contention of this discussion.  
 
 Metaphor permits, and allows for, an exploration of the ‘imaginative 
rationality’ of mystical writing’s metaphorical world; it both structures thought 
and opens up a heuristic framework for an exploration of that thought. To this 
end, it is both a manifestation of thought and praxis. When metaphor ceases in 
mystical writing, the account of mystical experience ceases too: when, in one of 
her letters, Marguerite d’Oingt struggles to express the meaning of the word 
‘vehemens,’ or her experiential understanding of it, she has no other choice but 
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to be silent.79 Similarly, Marguerite Porete’s Ame adnientie, though annihilated, 
remains vocal and extant until the close of the text. Metaphor grounds mystical 
expression in a meditative, imaged-based consciousness; the higher states of 
visionary thought, and the move into contemplative, imageless, thought 
contains no interior faculties of imagination, memory, or sensuality. Yet, whilst 
it remains, metaphor allows the mind to ‘see,’ and an exploration of that seeing 
perhaps allows for a ‘thinking’ and a ‘seeing’ in something of the manner that 
the medieval mystics articulated their sight, and thoughts, of God. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Item alia epistola, §143-4, pp. 144-6. Another Letter, p. 66.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
This review of mystical writing through the combined lenses of cognitive 
and conceptual theories of metaphor does indeed reveal fresh perspectives on 
both modes of expression. A careful reading of the interpretative possibilities 
offered by metaphor exposes a means by which to explore and articulate some 
of mysticism’s many complexities, namely its relationship to metaphor’s hidden 
cognitive capacity, to reveal, or perhaps inspire afresh, pathways of thought 
directed towards the divine. Applied to mystical literature, metaphor theory 
allows for an examination of mysticism’s debts, both textual and contextual, to 
the traditions of biblical exegesis, liturgy, prayer, and contemplation, and 
indeed encourages a discussion of mysticism’s perpetual paradox, caught as it 
is between the fullness of experience and the limitations of expression. 
However, by taking the writings of Marguerite Porete and Marguerite d’Oingt 
as two case studies, this study has demonstrated that, in paying close attention 
to the methodological exigencies of late medieval texts, further light can be 
shone onto the academy’s understanding and application of metaphor theory. 
Christian mysticism requires that an analysis of its constituent conceptual 
structures and ‘mental spaces’ be realised in unison with the fundamental 
tenets of the faith: receptive to doctrine, and perceptive of the deeper resonance 
of belief. In being brought into dialogue, mysticism and metaphor demand 
much of each other, but the ensuing interchange is both striking and rewarding.  
 
Lakoff and Johnson’s model of metaphor provides an initial framework 
for this interpretative process. Their two-domain theory provides a stable 
structural framework with which to probe a corpus characterised by its often 
highly abstract nature. However, as Chapter One has established, this 
theoretical frame requires further support in order to cope with the 
complexities of mystical material. Fauconnier and Turner’s more flexible 
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hypothesis of the ‘blended space’ of the metaphorical utterance broadens the 
scope of Lakoff and Johnson’s vision, and in turn offers a theoretical 
underpinning that privileges the sensitivities of context and ideology. When the 
two theories are combined, a hermeneutic web emerges that is sufficiently 
supple to engage with a mode of expression predicated on apparent linguistic 
and conceptual paradox, revealing previously unnoticed facets of its enigmatic 
discourse.  
 
  The boundaries of geography, language, and the particular 
manifestations of spiritual practice do not impede a comparative reading of 
both women’s works; rather, in acknowledging their existence, as contextualists 
would suggest, such a reading is made all the richer. It is through the adoption 
of elements of Fauconnier and Turner’s ‘blending theory’ that these elements of 
contextualism can be brought into focus. Fauconnier and Turner’s hypothesis 
that metaphor constitutes a ‘blended mental space,’ comprised of various ‘input 
spaces,’ affords historical, religious, political, cultural, and social contextual 
factors a vital but not preponderant role. This hermenutic approach illuminates, 
for example, the question of whether of not Marguerite Porete belonged to a 
beguine community, textual or actual. Establishing textual connections between 
her writing and those of figures such as Mechthild of Magdeburg and 
Hadewijch of Brabant, as Barbara Newman does so effectively, helps locate an 
otherwise hard-to-place author more firmly within her literary milieu.1 Yet this 
does little to shed light on the conceptual, cognitive framework underpinning 
Porete’s prose. Over-privileging contextual factors, to the virtual exclusion of 
the more imaginative (or enigmatic) aspects of mystical writing, risks falsely 
distorting a mystical text in the service of modern conceptions of a medieval 
contextual ‘reality’ which exists only in twenty-first century scholarly discourse.  
   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Newman, From Virile Woman to WomanChrist, especially Chapter Five, ‘La mystique courtoise.’ 
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This particular application of metaphor theory as a hermeneutic device 
not only permits the mystical writer to be placed within her historical or literary 
milieu, but also allows for insights into the particular ways in which she may 
have imagined her relationship with the divine; the cornerstone of her mystical 
expression. This is not quite the same as simply trying to reconstruct 
Marguerite d’Oingt’s or Marguerite Porete’s cognitive processes and mystical 
‘product’ from the language materials they produced.2 Mystical prose is only 
ever a partial revelation of divine experience, and to suggest that metaphor 
theory provides anything other than a partial reconstruction of cognitive 
processing would be to deny the foundations upon which it is based. What has 
been demonstrated by this exploration of Marguerite d’Oingt’s and Marguerite 
Porete’s spiritual testimonies is that metaphor theory permits a glimpse of them 
from two perspectives. First it allows them to be imagined within their 
respective, and occasionally colliding, worlds, as Carthusian prioress and 
educated laywoman. Second, it reveals an insight into the imaginative worlds 
they create beyond their contexts and histories; into the metaphorical worlds 
contained within their texts.  
 
Mystical text and mystical author are neither synonymous, nor are they 
to be divorced from each other. Rather, one is seen through the other and vice 
versa, in much the same way that metaphorical meaning is comprehended 
‘through’ and ‘in spite of’ its literal word or phrasing.3 Crucially, however, this 
combinatory approach to metaphor theory also allows the texts and their 
content to stand alone, as it were, and to possess a creativity and an imaginative 
rationality all of their own. Seen in this way, the mystical text, and the 
experience it points towards is a deeper representation of Fauconnier and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 As Gerard Steen argues, such an approach is ‘quite problematic and at the end of the day too 
speculative to be taken seriously. It has long been known in literary criticism, for instance, that 
author’s [sic] intentions and general plans for writing cannot be reliably recovered from the 
text.’ Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage: A Methodological Analysis of Theory and Research, 
Converging Evidence in Language and Communication Research, 10 (Amsterdam and 
Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 2007), p. 363.  
3 Ricoeur, ‘The Metaphorical Process,’ p. 234.  
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Turner’s ‘blended space.’ What is established is that the mystical text itself 
represents the hermeneutic gap between Lakoff and Johnson’s source and the 
target domains; the space in which imperfect language and indescribable 
experience meet and are negotiated. As such, the mystical text is a metaphor.  
 
Advancing this hypothesis one step further correlates with both 
d’Oingt’s and Porete’s very different articulations of a similar assertion: that the 
experiences they recount are simultaneously ‘in-the-world’ or ‘of-the-world,’ 
whilst also separate from it. Two examples drawn from their respective works 
illustrate this schema in different ways. The first concerns Porete’s contentious 
suggestion that the ame adnientie is able to join the community of Saincte Eglise la 
Grande whilst still on earth, ‘through’ and ‘in spite of’ the material trappings of 
Saincte Eglise la Petite. According to Porete’s tripartite typology of souls, the lost 
souls who remain obedient to Raison are only able to conceptualise God by 
means of these material, institutional, and earthly symbols. Lost souls: 
sont qui du tout mortiffient le corps, en faisant o<e>uvres de 
charité; et ont si grant plaisance en leurs oeuvres qu’ilz n’ont 
point cognoissance qu’il soit nul meilleur estre que l’estre de 
oeuvres de vertuz et mort de martire […] par l’aide d’oraison 
remplie de prieres, en multipliance de <bo>n vouloir, tousjours 
pour la t<en>ue que telles gens ont ad ce, et que ce soit le 
meilleur de tous les estres qui pevent estre.4 
 
 Sad souls, on the other hand, recognise the inherent deception in 
regarding ‘oeuvres’ and ‘prieres’ as a means to an end, somewhat akin to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Mirouer, ch. 55, pp. 158-160; ‘completely mortify the body in doing works of charity; and they 
have such great pleasure in their works that they have no awareness that there might be any 
better being than the being of the works of the Virtues and death by martyrdom […] with the 
aid of an orison filled with prayers, in the multiplication of good will, always for the purpose of 
retaining what these folk possess, as if this might be the best of all the beings that could be.’ 
Mirror, p. 132.  
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regarding them as literal statements. These souls are able to pass from Saincte 
Eglise la Petite to the higher Church: ‘ceste, qui telle est, ne quiert plus Dieu par 
penitence ne par sacrement nul de Saincte Eglise.’5 The sad souls are capable of 
participating in the ascent to annihilation, during which they continue to live in 
the world, but without any direct requirement of it.6 Porete’s annihilated soul 
can thus be conceptualised in metaphorical terms: she exists beyond the 
confines of the literal, material world, but nevertheless maintains a relational 
position to it. Her ‘otherness’ is qualified by the fact that she is seen to have 
moved ‘through’ the limitations of Raison’s world-view, and instead inhabits a 
world whose structures and shapes she shares with ‘les marriz,’ but whose 
imaginative rationality is indicative of a more profound knowledge of divinely 
inspired reality.7  
 
Though her portrayal is different, Marguerite d’Oingt nevertheless 
presents a similar conceptualisation of the mystical experience in Li via seiti 
Biatrix. Describing an occasion when Béatrix had fallen asleep and experienced 
a vision of the saintly community in heaven, d’Oingt writes: 
Totes veis illi non o veit pas des heuz corporaz mays en espirit; et 
veit son cors el leit a bein po semblablo al cors mort.8   
 
Béatrix’s awareness of her body during the experience suggests that it is 
simultaneously conceptualised and made sense of because it is embodied and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Mirouer, ch. 85, p. 242. ‘This Soul who is such no longer seeks God through penitence, nor 
through any sacrament of the Holy Church.’ Mirror, p. 160.  
6 This is expressed most clearly in Porete’s description of ‘taking leave of the Virtues’ (see 
chapter 6 of the Mirouer). A highly controversial statement, this made its way into the record of 
her condemnation, published in Corpus documentorum inquisitionis haereticae pravitatis 
neerlandicae, 2 vols (Ghent: The Hague, 1889-1906), here in volume 2, p. 63: ‘primus talis est: 
‘Quod anima adnichilata dat licentiam virtutibus nec est amplius in earum servitute, quia non 
habet eas quoad usum, sed virtutues obediunt ad nutum.’ 
7 Porete describes these ‘sad souls’ in chapter 57 of the Mirouer.  
8 Li via seiti Biatrix, p. 118, §81. ‘But she saw them not physically, but spiritually; and she saw 
her own body in the bed, and it looked like a dead body.’ The Life of the Virgin Saint Beatrice, p. 
54.  
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of-this-world, and yet is also distinctly ‘other.’ In both cases, these writers 
conceive of mystical consciousness in the same way that this thesis understands 
metaphor. Mystical awareness involves an elimination of the spheres of 
quotidian reference and reality; a realisation that the trappings of the material 
world, the ‘oeuvres’ and the ‘prieres,’ are not an end unto themselves. This 
realisation constitutes a ‘splitting of reference’ in which the abolition of one 
world-view gives rise to another.9 Out of the ‘ruins’ of the terrestrially-bound 
reference markers emerges an ‘innovation in meaning’ comprising the mystical 
schema, a new referential mode of thought and expression obtained through 
the destruction of the old, primary reference framework.10 As such, metaphor 
theory provides the hermeneutic key not only to the mystical text, but also to 
the markers of mystical reference. It enables mystical awareness to be re-
imagined, and thus offers the fleeting conceptual possibility, if not lived 
actuality, of mystical experience.  
 
The blend of theoretical approaches advocated in the introduction has 
been borne out in this exploration of the literature of late medieval mysticism. 
The principles of Lakoff and Johnson’s cognitive metaphor theory have been 
carried over into Marguerite d’Oingt’s and Marguerite Porete’s writings, and 
the two brought into a dialogue of exchange. The nature of this exchange is 
both complex and revelatory. The enigmatic qualities of mystical expression 
find an analogue in the structures proposed by theorists of modern metaphor, 
and a nuanced and sensitive vocabulary opens up with which to explore the 
many facets of mystical writing, as a speculative, experiential, vivid yet highly 
abstract mode of expression. A second, and perhaps more surprising 
consequence stemming from this dialogue concerns the potential of metaphor 
theory to bring together two seemingly very different modes of mystical 
thought. A common complaint in recent discussions of mystical literature has 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Paul Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor, trans. by Robert Czerny (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1977), p. 230.  
10 Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor, p. 230.  
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been the academy’s need to qualify a given text’s mystical ‘status,’ and 
categorise it in accordance with a set of rules, which often veil a more 
problematic assertion concerning the perceived ‘quality’ of the mystical voice.11 
This approach has, however, demonstrated that with a sufficiently flexible 
interpretative framework, writings such as Marguerite d’Oingt’s conservative 
mystical works can be positively engaged with more radical articulations of the 
divine, such as that of Marguerite Porete. Seeking out the conceptual 
underpinnings of their prose invites an analysis grounded in continuity as 
opposed to fracture, in which the narratives can be seen to participate, in 
varying degrees, in a spectrum characterised by ‘imaginative rationality.’ 
Teasing out the imaginative worlds mystical writers create, and the 
manifestations of their internal logic or rationale, presents a more inclusive 
dialogue of exchange than those approaches which focus on a need to segregate 
the canon of Christian mystical writing in accordance with parameters of 
literary genre, orthodoxy, or psychology.  
 
Mapping the conceptual underpinnings of Marguerite d’Oingt’s literary 
corpus demonstrates that her mystical expression is deserving of more critical 
attention than the academy has, to date, afforded it. While her works appear to 
be an unprepossessing and highly conformist series of vision narratives, a 
concentration on her manipulation of figurative language discloses a 
remarkable amount of detail about the imaginative world of a thirteenth-
century Carthusian and her relationship to and with the divine. A sensitive 
application of metaphor theory to her works reveals her to have been a 
competent theologian and imaginative synthesiser of liturgical material, as well 
as possessed of a creative and poetic imagination. By illuminating her 
employment of various source domains, such as the codex, the body, and light, 
and their often-interconnected entailments, metaphor theory presents a means 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 See Newman, ‘What Did it Mean To Say “I Saw”?’; Hollywood, ‘Introduction.’ 
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of reading her works in which their ‘textual residue’ functions as a catalyst for 
understanding their more abstract projections.12  
 
This has important implications for the study of medieval mysticism, 
especially that of women’s mysticism, as well as for medieval intellectual 
writing more widely. By preserving the text as the fulcrum around which 
explorations of Marguerite d’Oingt’s imaginative, theological, and literary 
practices take place, the modern scholar is required to establish his or her 
conceptual underpinnings within the confines of Marguerite’s own words. 
These underpinnings must therefore match the content and meaning of the text, 
not vice versa. Cognitive metaphor theory, as applied here, mines the mystic’s 
textual residue without disposing of it, and therefore reduces the risks involved 
when the premise of the investigation is founded on the reconstruction of a 
textual or historical community into which the text in question is expected to fit. 
As the methodological hurdles represented by the lives and texts of Marguerite 
d’Oingt and Marguerite Porete demonstrate, modern scholars of medieval 
literature are all too often left with gaps in their contextual knowledge. 
However by starting with a medieval text’s metaphorical language, this study 
suggests that far more can be interpreted from ‘residue’ than is first apparent.  
 
Conversely, Marguerite Porete’s Mirouer des simples ames has been the 
source of considerable scholarly attempts at textual and historical 
reconstruction. The text’s dramatic involvement in the inquisition’s actions of 
1310, its complex manuscript tradition, and twentieth-century re-discovery, 
coupled with its seemingly radicalised message of ‘unio indistinctionis,’ has led 
numerous commentators to look for a causal narrative linking the text to its 
historical record and the perplexing figure of its author. A reading of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 This term is borrowed from Walter J. Ong’s study, Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of 
the Word, New Accents (New York: Routledge, 2002, orig. publ. 1982). ‘[W]e think of words as 
the visible marks signalling words to decoders: we can see and touch such inscribed “words” in 
texts and books. Written words are residue.’ See p. 11.  
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Mirouer through the lens of metaphor theory, however, shifts the interrogative 
focus from the external to the internal forces at play within the confines of the 
text. In contrast to studies which have sought to discern the text’s applicability 
to (or deviance from) its context, this approach, with its attention to the network 
and interaction of source and target domains, highlights Porete’s capabilities to 
construct a highly systematic, logical, and transformative textual space in which 
the potentiality of the metaphorical imagination can be realised. The Mirouer’s 
abstraction serves as the counterpart to Marguerite d’Oingt’s more stylised 
series of tangible mystical experiences. If d’Oingt’s works recount mystical 
states of being, Porete’s Mirouer provides an account of such mystical states’ 
processes of becoming. The Mirouer thus ceases to be seen as a reflection of 
anything other than the workings of the mind, and the union of a transformed 
imagination with a divine rationale. Once again, this approach liberates the text 
from the restrictions of hermetic binaries. Questions as to its orthodox or 
heterodox nature, or its apparent claims to autotheism or antinomianism, 
recede, secondary to the primary investigation of the text’s sophisticated 
portrayal of metaphorical, mystical, vision.  
 
The interpretative opportunities arising from this reading of Marguerite 
d’Oingt’s and Marguerite Porete’s narratives indicate that similar results may 
be sought by extending the corpus of mystical material to include examples of 
mystical expression from the ancient to the modern day. The capacity of 
cognitive and conceptual metaphor theory to act as a framework in which to 
discuss both the theory and praxis of Christian mystical expression, and the 
experiences to which it alludes, suggests multiple possibilities for its 
application to other examples within the canon. It allows for a more inclusive 
dialogue across the spectrum of mystical writing, and takes seriously the notion 
of mysticism as the union between post-experiential narration and the 
metaphorical process.  
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This exploration of Marguerite d’Oingt’s and Marguerite Porete’s works 
demonstrates that metaphor theory can be effectively harnessed to unlock the 
record of past experience in a way that is contextually sensitive and without 
recourse to hermetic and anachronistic categories. As such, it facilitates a 
dialogue of exchange between theological concerns of mystical truth, the 
potency of human cognition, and contemporary scientific, metaphysical, and 
philosophical theories of meaning and reality. As a hermeneutic device, 
metaphor, and its theoretical underpinning, do indeed constitute the cognitive 
analogue to mystical expression. When these two modes of thought and 
expression are engaged in an interdisciplinary and reciprocal exchange, the 
interpretative possibilities are profound and wide reaching. Addressed together, 
metaphor and mysticism offer insights into how perceptual capabilities may be 
adjusted, and in so doing, shed light on the imaginative rationality of new 
worlds, new meanings, and new truths, ‘per speculum in aenigmate.’ 
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